Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

Because, as I have said, the opinions of Lessius and the Congruists, which we have opposed up to now, are akin, and they agree chiefly in this: that predestination to glory is from the foreseen good use of grace — not the use which grace itself efficaciously gives by its own power, but the use which it begs from free will — and all the arguments that are usually proposed against gratuitous predestination aim at proving this; we, however, deny this in both conclusions: consequently the arguments that fight against one conclusion fight equally against the other, and therefore we propose them all here without distinction. But for their easier solution,

I note 1° that predestination can be considered in two ways: in the order of intention and in the order of execution. In the order of execution, again in two ways: in the order of execution preconceived and willed, and in the order of execution exercised. For God first, gratuitously, intends from eternity to give glory to some, as a reward to be obtained through merits, and consequently to give merits; and this is the order of intention, which our authors call the intentive decree, which can be expressed thus: I will to lead this one to glory by way of a reward, and for that reason to prepare for him the congruous means. Then, God from eternity preconceives and decrees to give in time, first, the means by which this glory may be obtained as a reward; and this is the order of execution preconceived and willed, which our authors call the executive decree, and which is expressed thus: I will to give merits to this one first, and glory on account of the merits. Finally, in time he confers merits, and on account of the merits, glory; and here the order of execution exercised is terminated. Therefore merits enter the order of intention, not as motives or as an end, but as an effect; but they enter the order of execution as motives, not by way of an end, but as means or dispositions that dignify the person and render him fit for the reward.

§ I. — The objections from Scripture are resolved.

You will object 1°, with Honoré Tournely, that passage of Matthew 25:34 and 35: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat. But to the reprobate it is said, in the same place, 41: Depart from me, cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. Here good works are referred to as the reason, not only for the bestowal of the kingdom, but also for the preparation and destination for it, as if he were saying: The kingdom has been prepared and destined for you, because you gave alms to the poor: for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat. Therefore.

I answer. If Tournely had not mutilated the text, and had not suppressed the words immediately following the second proposition, he would have found in them an evident solution to his own argument — or rather, there would have been no argument at all in need of a solution. For the second sentence of the Lord runs thus: Depart from me, cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat. Both sentences, both of the predestined and of the reprobate, are, as you see, expressed in the same tenor. But the causal particle for in the second proposition does not refer to prepared, but to depart; otherwise the sense would be that hell was prepared for the devil because the reprobate did not give alms, which is absurd. Therefore, similarly, in the first proposition the same particle for does not refer to prepared, but to possess, as if he were saying to the predestined: Possess the kingdom, because you performed works of mercy; all of which pertains to execution.

But even if we granted, for argument's sake, that for refers to prepared, it would be understood of the preparation in the order of execution preconceived and willed, not in the order of intention. Hence, when Tournely insists that the kingdom is given in time in the same way as it was prepared from eternity, this is true of the eternal preparation in the order of execution, not in the order of intention. For in the order of intention the end is intended first, then the means; but in the order of execution the means are intended first, from which the attainment of the end follows; because, as has been said, what is first in intention is last in execution, and conversely.

You will object 2°, with the same author, from Matthew 22:14. The parable is proposed of those invited to the wedding feast, to which, because many were unwilling to come, the Lord concludes: Many are called, but few are chosen. Therefore few are chosen, because few were willing to come. Therefore that election presupposes the good will of those who, called by grace, were willing to come.

I answer: I deny the consequence, which does not follow at all from the words of the Savior. It is not, then, that few are chosen because few were willing to come; but on the contrary, few were willing to come because few are chosen — so that the coming to the wedding feast is not the cause, but the effect, of election. Hence, a posteriori, that is, as from an effect, from the fact that few came it is rightly inferred that few are chosen.

You will object 3°, with the same author, that passage of Romans 8:29: Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son. Foreknowledge here is prior to predestination. Whom he foreknew... he predestined, that is, those whom he foreknew would be, by the benefit of grace, conformed to his Son — these he also predestined.

I answer 1° that, according to some, the Apostle understands foreknowledge as founded on the decree, following the rule of St. Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chap. 19, n. 48 — namely, that when the calling of the elect is in question, foreknowledge, among the expositors of the word of God, is to be understood as predestination; and thus the sense of the Apostle will be: Whom he predestined to glory, these he predestined to be, by the benefit of grace, conformed to the image of his Son, through the exercise of good works.

I answer 2°, according to others, and, as it seems, more in conformity with the text of the Apostle, that he foreknew and he predestined are taken by him for the same thing, and both are referred to conformity with Christ, not in grace, but in glory; so that the sense is: Whom he foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son in glory, these he calls in time, justifies, and, at last, glorifies.

§ II. — The objections from the Fathers are answered.

You will object 1°, with Tournely. St. Prosper, in his Letter to Augustine, writes that the mind and opinion of nearly all the ancient Fathers was one: that the predestination of men to glory comes about from the foreseen merits of grace. Therefore.

I answer that St. Prosper is relating, not his own opinion, but that of the Semi-Pelagians — or rather their complaint and calumny: « Many servants of Christ, says St. Prosper, dwell in the city of Marseilles who think that whatever you have argued, in the writings of your holiness which you composed against the Pelagian heretics, concerning the calling of the elect according to God's purpose, is contrary to the opinion of the Fathers and to the sense of the Church. »

You will insist 1°, with the same author. St. Prosper says: « We ask that you show, patiently bearing with our foolishness, how this may be refuted. » Therefore he is speaking from his own opinion.

I answer, I deny the consequence. Rather, the opposite follows from Prosper's words. For St. Prosper, thinking himself unequal to solving the objection of the Semi-Pelagians, has recourse to Augustine, sets it before him, and, humbly confessing his own ignorance, asks him to show how it is to be refuted and resolved. From which it plainly follows that St. Prosper does not believe the objection, does not relate it as his own opinion, nor speaks in his own name, but on the contrary reckons it false, since he seeks its solution.

You will insist 2°, with the same author, from St. Ambrose, lect. 5 On the Faith, ch. 6; St. Jerome, Epist. 105, to Hedibia; Chrysostom, hom. 8 on ch. XXV of Matthew, who teach that predestination rests upon foreknowledge. Therefore.

I answer 1°, from Augustine, who, in On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 14, n. 27, says that the earlier Fathers, before the rise of the Pelagian heresy, touched upon this question only in passing, and so it is no wonder if some of their expressions are less accurate, although they nevertheless asserted the principle from which gratuitous predestination is derived: likewise, in On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 19, n. 48, that the Fathers themselves speak of a foreknowledge founded on the divine decree, and not on a created will, which foreknowledge is included in predestination itself; and therefore that by "foreknowledge," among them, predestination itself is to be understood.

I answer 2° that the holy Fathers speak of predestination in the order of the execution of what was preconceived, because, viewed thus, it is better known to us and more apt for commending good works, but not of predestination in the order of intention. For this deeper question, which the Pelagian heresy forced Augustine to discuss, they scarcely, or hardly at all, touched upon; which is clear from the Semi-Pelagians themselves, who, having most diligently examined the monuments of the ancient Fathers, complain, in Hilary's Letter to Augustine, that he had needlessly raised this new question, which none of the Fathers had raised before him, and without which they preached grace to the people usefully. The holy Fathers, therefore, dwelt upon predestination viewed according to the order of willed execution; because, as I have said, viewed thus, it is better known to us and more apt for commending merits. For this same reason, many who, after the Pelagian heresy, wrote ascetical treatises — indeed we ourselves, and those who agree with us, although for altar and hearth we defend gratuitous predestination in the order of intention — nevertheless, when from the sacred pulpit we exhort the people to good works, we regard predestination according to the order of execution, and we use the same expressions which the ancient Fathers used: because predestination, viewed thus, depends on good works, and confers, and decrees to confer, the reward only after them and on account of them; and in that sense it is truly said that no one is predestined to glory except on account of foreseen merits.

This answer, although most true and most well-founded, Honoré Tournely, out of his modesty toward us, calls absurd and repugnant to the Fathers cited; because, since they speak of predestination from eternity in the mind of God, he pretends that we answer that they speak of the execution of predestination in time. But we freely forgive him this, since, a stranger to the Thomistic school, he does not know how to distinguish between the eternal decree of predestination to be executed and its own temporal execution; and while we speak of predestination according to the order of execution, he immediately supposes that we are speaking of its own temporal execution. Had he been able to make this distinction, as the very novices of our schools distinguish, he would have found in the answer not absurdity, but truth.

You will object 2°, with the same author: Augustine does not refuse to agree with the Pelagians contending that predestination to glory comes about from merits, provided they acknowledge that those merits are acquired through grace: « If they understood our merits, he says, in bk. On Grace and Free Will, ch. 6, n. 15, in such a way as to recognize that they themselves are also gifts of God, that opinion would not have to be reprobated. »

I answer that we too say and hold this with Augustine. If Tournely acknowledged that our merits are, in every respect, gifts of God, his opinion would not have to be reprobated as contrary to Scripture and the Fathers, but only as less consonant with reason. But in fact, according to the system of middle knowledge, of which Tournely is a perpetual advocate and flatterer, we contend that what is chief in our merits, namely the consent of the will unto the good, is not a gift of God, as we have proved at length elsewhere.

Tournely objects 3°. St. Augustine, bk. I To Simplician¹, q. 2, n. 6, weighing that word of the Apostle to the Romans, IX, 11 and 12: That the purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger, says, among other things: « It is not because God finds good works in men, which He chooses, that the purpose of justification stands; but because it stands, that He may justify believers, that He therefore finds works which He may now choose unto the kingdom of heaven... Election, however, does not precede justification, but justification precedes election; for no one is chosen, unless he is already distinct from him who is rejected. Whence, as to what is said, Ephesians, I, 4, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it can be said, except by foreknowledge. » From which it evidently appears, according to Augustine, that predestination to grace is gratuitous, but that predestination to glory is from the election of merits. This argument, as though it were unanswerable, the adversaries extol most highly.

But in the first place, as I have already observed elsewhere, it seems preposterous that the adversaries should continually have recourse to the books of Augustine addressed to Simplician, which he composed while still a young man and before the rise of the Pelagian heresy, especially since eminent authors, among them Bellarmine, hold that what is objected was retracted in his later works. But granting, as others hold, that nothing was retracted absolutely, at least it cannot be denied that, since Augustine had not yet at that time discussed the depth of these questions, nor had he discovered many things which he later investigated and found with greater diligence, several less accurate expressions concerning the present matter crept into these earlier books; which detracts not a little from their authority.

I answer that St. Augustine does not speak there of predestination to glory in the order of intention, but in the order of execution. That this may be made manifest, note, as I have already observed elsewhere, that election is distinguished into two kinds: one properly so called, namely the election of means, the other less properly so called, namely the election of persons unto an end. The first regards execution, as is clear; the second regards intention, because the person is the end to whom an end which, or that for whose sake, is intended. But that Augustine speaks, not of the election of persons unto the end for whose sake, but of the election or volition of means unto the end, is clear from his context. For he says first, that God does not have the purpose of justifying, or of granting justifying grace, because He finds good works which He chooses; but on the contrary, that He finds good works which He chooses because He has the purpose of granting justifying grace; for works are not merits and eligible means unto the kingdom, except as informed by justifying grace. Whence he rightly adds, that election — namely of works or merits — does not precede justification, but on the contrary that justification precedes the election of works. He adds: no one is chosen — namely by reason of works — unless he is already distinct from him who is rejected, because the election of a person unto the kingdom by reason of works is the same as the election of works unto the kingdom; for works are not chosen apart from the person. But it is most true that in the election of works, or of a person by reason of works — which, as has been said, belongs to the order of execution — no one is chosen unless he is distinct and distinguished from him who is rejected. And hence he rightly concludes that what is said, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, is not said except by foreknowledge, from which this executive election of means was disposed and ordered from eternity.

§ III. — Objections from reason are answered.

You will object 1°, with Tournely: God intends glory for the predestined as a crown and reward. But a crown and reward cannot be intended except on account of merits. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. A crown and reward necessarily implies a relation to merits, no less than a father to a son. Therefore.

I answer. Granted the major, I deny the minor. For God, by His antecedent will, intends glory for all as a crown, since He orders all to glory to be obtained through merits; and yet, as even the adversaries admit, He does not intend it on account of foreseen merits. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent. A crown and reward necessarily implies a relation to merits as to an effect or a motive, I concede; always as to a motive, I deny. In the order of intention it implies a relation to merit as to an effect, because God intends glory to be obtained through merits, and because, in willing the end thus, He wills the merits; but in the order of execution, it implies a relation to merits as movers. Hence in the order of intention the merits are caused, in the order of execution they are causing; for what is first in intention is last in execution, and what is last in intention is first in execution.

You will insist: What is intended as a crown and reward is intended as a debt of justice. Therefore it presupposes merits as motives and causes.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. What is intended as a crown and reward is intended as a debt of justice to be exercised in the order of execution, I concede the antecedent; as a debt of justice exercised in that order of intention, I deny the antecedent. For God wills to give glory gratuitously, but He does not will to give gratuitously; that is, He wills to give independently of merits, but He does not will to give without merits. Thus a king, gratuitously, out of mere liberality, proposes to give a reward to the victor in a contest; yet he does not will to give it gratuitously, but on account of the victory: and there justice is exercised, not indeed in the first intention, which is purely gratuitous.

You will urge: The reward stands to merit just as punishment stands to fault. But God does not will punishment except with fault presupposed. Therefore neither reward, except with merits presupposed.

I answer. I distinguish the major. The reward stands to merit just as punishment stands to fault, in the order of execution, I concede, because, just as the reward is in fact rendered on account of merit, so punishment is inflicted on account of fault; in the order of intention, I deny. The disparity is that punishment, as punishment simply, is not good, but only on the supposition of fault, which, since it likewise is not good, cannot be willed by God. Hence it is repugnant that God should first will the punishment, and on account of the punishment will the fault. But both reward and merit are simply good, and both are from God. Since, however, the reward is the end and the greater good, God intends it first, and then the merits, as means to it.

Tournely objects, 2°: God preordains things from eternity in the same way that He does them in time. But He confers glory in time on the predestined on account of merits. Therefore He preordained from eternity to confer it on account of merits.

I answer, I concede the whole. For in truth God from eternity preordained to confer glory in time on account of merits, yet He did not preordain it on account of merits, but by a gratuitous will.

Tournely insists. Does there not seem to be a kind of conflict and contradiction in God, if He should will at once to destine glory gratuitously, and to render that same glory as wages and reward? Does it not conflict that the same thing should be destined at once, and in the same instant of reason, both out of pure mercy and out of justice?

I answer that there is no conflict or contradiction here, except in the mind of Tournely, who does not distinguish between giving glory gratuitously and willing to give glory gratuitously. God wills to give glory gratuitously, and not on account of merits; yet He does not will to give it except through merits and on account of merits: and these in no way conflict with each other, as is clear from what has been said.

Tournely urges: The decree by which God would intend from eternity to confer glory gratuitously would, without doubt, be absolute and efficacious. Therefore, by force of this decree, glory would have to be granted gratuitously; otherwise God would decree what He would not execute, or would execute what He had not decreed from eternity, and would perform one thing in execution while decreeing another in intention: which things certainly seem to conflict with one another.

I answer. Tournely always strays on the same string. We do not say that God intends from eternity to confer glory gratuitously, but we say that God from eternity gratuitously intends to confer glory through merits and on account of merits, and this He executes in time.

§ IV. — The objections from untoward consequences are resolved.

It is objected: Predestination before foreseen merits, 1° does not sufficiently provide for the edification and consolation of the faithful, 2° does not sufficiently agree with the sweetness of divine providence and the goodness of God, 3° renders God's promises and threats vain and illusory. Therefore.

Proof of the first untoward consequence. If God, before foreseen merits, chooses a few and abandons an almost innumerable multitude, who would not be troubled, crushed, lose heart, and be led into torpor at this terrible view, rightly presuming himself to be rather in the great number of the reprobate than in the small number of the predestined? On the other hand, if he hears that predestination does not occur except after foreseen merits, and that it awaits the free will, that it is in his own power and will to be among the number of those to be saved, and that his lot thus ultimately depends on himself, so that by his consent to a versatile grace he can secure it for himself: his mind is calmed, looking upon his salvation not as uncertain, as in the former opinion, but as placed in his own hand; he rejoices and becomes eager for good works, by which he may attain so great a benefit. For this reason Lessius says that he was chiefly moved to embrace this opinion.

Proof of the second untoward consequence. The goodness of divine providence requires that it provide for all the things necessary for salvation, sincerely take care of all, and abandon no one unless it is first abandoned by him, as Scripture indicates, Ezechiel, XXXIII, 11: I will not the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted; Psalm CXLIV, 9: The Lord is sweet to all; Wisdom, VI, 8: He has equal care for all; I Timothy, II, 4: He wills all men to be saved, etc. But this would not be so, if independently of foreseen merits or demerits he took up some and abandoned others. Moreover, since God's goodness toward all is so great, if their salvation depended solely on his good pleasure, the number of those to be saved would not be so small. It depends, therefore, on something on our part, by whose defect it happens that so few are saved, namely, on the fact that few consent to grace and persevere in it.

Proof of the third untoward consequence. If predestination to glory is posited before foreseen merits, God mocks the reprobate, and beguiles them with vain hope, while he promises them glory on condition of perseverance in good, which depends on himself, and which he does not will to give them. Likewise he mocks the elect and terrifies them with a vain fear, while he threatens to exclude them from the kingdom if they do not persevere in good, though he has determined by an immutable and infallible decree to give both the kingdom and perseverance. For what would he have them fear? That they be damned? That cannot stand together with predestination. That predestination be revoked? It is irrevocable.

To the first, I answer 1° that this untoward consequence tells equally against the system of the Congruists. For who would not be troubled and crushed, if he heard that God, according to his good pleasure, gives to a few congruous grace with which they will certainly persevere in good, and without which they would not persevere, while denying it to an almost innumerable multitude of others?

I answer 2° that our opinion is far more suited to the edification and consolation of the faithful than the opinion of Lessius and Molina; because, according to us, our salvation is committed to the omnipotent hand of God, whereas according to Lessius and Molina, it is committed to our own frailty. But who would not trust God more than himself, unless he were proud, rather than humble and conscious of his own weakness? For no one is unaware, on the testimony of Scripture and his own experience, that he, however just he may be, has within himself the tinder of cupidity and concupiscence, to which, if he is allowed free rein for even a little while, he will withdraw himself from the inclination of grace and fall: The sense and thought of the human heart, says Scripture, Genesis, VIII, 21, are prone to evil from his youth; and the Apostle, to the Romans, VII, 18, says of himself: I know that good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh; and, ibid., 23: I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind and holding me captive in the law of sin. Whence Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 12, n. 28, says that « if their own will were left to men, so that they might remain, if they willed, in the help of God — without which (that is, without sufficient help) they could not persevere — and God did not himself work in them that they should will it amid so many and so great temptations, the will itself would succumb through its own weakness. » If, then, I say, a Christian man, truly humble and well aware of his own frailty, amid so many and so great dangers and temptations of life, so many deceits of Satan and assaults of the passions, should hear that God, in accomplishing the work of salvation, has prepared for him certain indifferent helps, thus left to human free choice, such that he gives their use to no one, but awaits it from us; would he not at once lose heart and despair of his salvation? On the other hand, if he hears that God has chosen some to glory, and has prepared for them, for its infallible attainment, the strongest and most invincible helps, hope will already dawn that he will obtain through God's help what he would not have obtained by his own weakness, if God had prepared only indifferent helps; and his hope will be all the firmer, the more humbly he thinks of himself and the more he distrusts himself, and the more he trusts in the Lord, knowing that God will save the humble people, Psalm, XVII, 28, and will surround with mercy him who hopes in the Lord, Psalm, XXXI, 10. And although, notwithstanding these things, he is not yet altogether certain of God's will, he is nevertheless far more uncertain of his own will; nor does the small number of the elect terrify him, because he well knows that, if men were left to themselves, far fewer still would be elect — indeed, none at all. This whole solution is Augustine's, answering a similar objection made to him by the Semi-Pelagians. It is fitting to hear him, On the Gift of Perseverance, chap. 17, n. 45: « I do not wish, he says, to exaggerate in my words, but I would rather leave it to them to consider, that they may see what sort of thing it is that they have persuaded themselves of, namely, that the preaching of predestination brings more despair than exhortation to those who hear it. For this is to say that a man then despairs of his salvation, when he has learned to place his hope not in himself, but in God, though the Prophet cries out, Jeremiah, XVII, 5: Cursed is every one who has hope in man. » And On the Predestination of the Saints, chap. 11, n. 21: « Since the Apostle says, Romans, IV, 16: Therefore of faith, that according to grace the promise might be sure, I marvel that men prefer to commit themselves to their own weakness, rather than to the firmness of God's promise. But, you say, God's will concerning myself is uncertain to me. What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you, and do you not fear, I Corinthians, X, 12: Let him who thinks he stands, take heed lest he fall? Since, therefore, both are uncertain, why does not man entrust his faith, hope, and charity rather to the firmer than to the weaker? » And chap. 6, n. 12, On the Gift of Perseverance: « We live more securely, if we give the whole to God. But we do not commit ourselves partly to him, and partly to ourselves. »

To the second, I deny the minor. For God provides sufficient helps for all, sincerely takes care of all, and abandons no one unless first abandoned by him; but it belongs to the sweetness of his providence that he provide for each one according to each one's condition, and accordingly that, among defectible things, he permit some to fail, and preserve others from failure: so that in the latter the power of grace may appear, and in the former the condition of nature. And thus our adversaries themselves answer, when they are asked why God permits sin, since he could prevent it. Because, they say, the sweetness of providence so requires, that the condition of free will be preserved.

As for what is added, that, since God is infinitely good, if our salvation depended solely on his good pleasure, the number of those to be saved would not be so small.

I answer: I deny the inference; because, although God is infinitely good, the outpouring of his goodness must nevertheless be so tempered that the condition of defectible nature be preserved, room be given to justice, other attributes be manifested, and the remaining ends of general providence be safeguarded, as has been said. Whence, that he does not save all, or not more, does not derogate from divine goodness, but indicates that his goodness is orderly. And thus our adversaries too are bound to answer in the same way; for it is certain, on every opinion, that God could save all: and if he does not do so, he himself is not the cause, but some defect on our part, which indeed he could remove, but which his most wise and most orderly goodness does not require him to remove. I add that, on the opinion of our adversaries, according to which God prepares for us only sufficient helps, so left to free will that they do not give but await its consent, not merely fewer, but none at all would be saved, as is clear from the answer to the first untoward consequence. In this, however, according to us, the divine goodness shines forth most of all, in that he confers on those whom he has chosen the strongest and most invincible helps, by which they are most certainly brought to salvation.

To the third, I answer 1° that this untoward consequence must equally be resolved both by the Congruists and by the pure Molinists. By the Congruists, because, on the supposition that God has decreed to give to one the congruous grace of final perseverance, and not to another, the attainment of glory is assured to the first, and exclusion from glory is assured to the other. He mocks, then, the first, while threatening to exclude him from the kingdom if he does not keep the commandments; he mocks the other, while promising him the kingdom if he keeps the commandments to the end, since he knows for certain both that the one will certainly keep them and that the other will certainly not keep them in the end. By the pure Molinists, because predestination is now certainly made, in whatever way it was made, and those who are predestined will certainly be saved, and those who are not will certainly not be saved. God, then, mocks the predestined, while threatening to exclude them from the kingdom if they do not persevere in good; he also mocks the reprobate, while promising them the kingdom if they persevere in good: since it is certain and infallible that the predestined will persevere, and the reprobate will not persevere.

I answer 2° that this untoward consequence in no way follows from gratuitous predestination, if it be supposed, as is indeed the case: 1° that no one is certain that he is among the number of the predestined; 2° that predestination, in its execution, depends on free and good works and on perseverance in them to the end; 3° that man, under gratuitous predestination, enjoys freedom for good or evil just as much as if there were no predestination, as I shall now say and as we have proved several times elsewhere; 4° that the kingdom is granted to the humble, who distrust themselves but trust in the Lord, and denied to the proud, who trust in themselves. On these suppositions, I say, God mocks neither the reprobate by his promises, nor the elect by his threats. He does not mock the reprobate, in promising them the kingdom on condition of good works, because they can do those good works. He knows indeed that they will not do them, but this is their own fault, and because they voluntarily resist these promises and various other graces; nor is God on that account bound to fail in the office of universal provider, whose part it is to urge all to good, both by threats, and by promises, and by other means. He could indeed break their resistance by his efficacious grace, but he owes it to no one, nor does the order of providence require it. Do our adversaries, and especially Tournely in many places, hold that God has in his treasuries graces by which he can break the hardness of all sinners? Why then does he not break it? Because it neither pleases him, nor is he bound to. Nor does he mock the elect, by threatening to exclude them from the kingdom if they do not perform good works; because the execution of predestination takes place only through good works, and these the elect so freely do, that they could fail to do them. They do not, then, fear that they will perish, if they are predestined, nor that predestination will be revoked; but they fear that they may not be among the number of the predestined, because this is uncertain to them, and from this same uncertainty they fear lest they fall and perish. I add that this fear is usefully instilled in them by God, that they may be more humble, and that thereby their predestination may be certainly fulfilled.