Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

What predestination is, and whether it exists?

Among theologians predestination is taken in two ways: 1° Broadly and in an ample sense, for any eternal decree of God to do something in time. In this sense Augustine, Tract. LXVIII on John, n. 1, said: «God made future things by predestining them¹.» But more frequently Scripture, the Fathers, and theologians take predestination specifically for the divine ordination of some to glory and to the means by which it is infallibly obtained. It is in this sense that we treat of it here. Hence

I say 1°: Predestination is rightly defined by Augustine, bk. On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14, n. 35: «The foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which whoever are freed are most certainly freed.» By St. Thomas, hic q. 23, a. 2, o: «The plan of the ordering of some to eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind.» That is, the very order preconceived in the divine mind of some unto salvation.

By foreknowledge, in the first definition, is not understood merely speculative knowledge, or middle knowledge, but practical and effective knowledge, by which God foresees what he himself is going to do, resting consequently upon the decree of doing it, as Augustine explains, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10, n. 19: «By predestination, he says, God foreknew those things which he himself was going to do.»

By «the preparation of the benefits by which they are most certainly freed,» in the same definition, is understood the certitude not of foreknowledge only, but also of causality; or, what is the same thing, is understood the preparation of benefits that are not merely sufficient and determinable by the human will, but, of themselves and as they descend from God, infallibly efficacious.

I say 2°: Predestination is formally an act of the intellect², namely a command; presupposing, however, an act of the will, namely volition and the efficacious intention of the end. This is clear from what has been said about providence, of which predestination is a part.

I say 3°: Not only does there exist a predestination by which God most certainly directs some, in preference to others, to eternal life, but it is so necessary that without it no one can be saved.

Proof of the first part, from Scripture. Rom., VIII, 30: Whom he predestined, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. Eph., I, 11: In Christ we were called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will. Augustine, bk. On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 19, n. 48: «No one could have disputed against this predestination, which we defend according to the holy Scriptures, except by erring.» Likewise everywhere among the holy Fathers.

Proof from reason. God does nothing in time that he has not preordained from eternity; otherwise either he would begin to will in time, or it would be, for him, a matter of chance and beyond his intention: both of which are absurd³. But God is he who in time brings some, in preference to others, to eternal beatitude, as exceeding the powers of nature. Therefore he preordained from eternity that he would do this; and this eternal preordination is predestination, as is clear from what has been said.

And hence the second part remains proved. The argument already made is thus renewed. It is impossible for one to be saved in preference to another, except through God; both because salvation, or eternal beatitude, exceeds the powers of nature, and because every good, especially salvation, is from God, according to that verse, Ps. XXXVI, 39: The salvation of the just is from the Lord; and Rom., VI, 23: The grace of God, life everlasting; and John, VI, 44: No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him. But, as I have said, it is also impossible that God should do anything in time that he has not preordained from eternity; and this preordination is predestination. Therefore.

You will object the common and hackneyed argument that the impious constantly hurl back, so that they may sin more freely; that heretics hurl, so as to exclude the necessity of good works and freedom; that the scrupulous hurl, so as to torment themselves superstitiously: If a certain and infallible predestination is granted, either I am predestined, or I am not. If I am predestined, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be saved; if I am not predestined, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be damned. What then remains, except that I do as I please?

I answer 1° that those who bring forward this sophism, for the most part, acknowledge in God a certain and infallible foreknowledge; for only some among the pagans denied it. Hence I turn the argument back thus: God knows certainly and infallibly whether I am going to be saved, or not. If the former, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be saved; if the latter, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be damned. What then remains, except that I do as I please? Thus Augustine often argued against the Semi-Pelagians, and from this he concluded, On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 15, n. 38, that, just as the Semi-Pelagians were not deterred by this sophism from confessing divine foreknowledge, so neither ought they to be deterred from upholding divine predestination.

Likewise, if this dilemma had any force, no one would understand it better than the demons, beings far more perceptive and cunning, and so all their snares and temptations would cease, were they to reason thus: Either men are predestined, or they are not. If they are predestined, we tempt them in vain, for, notwithstanding our temptations, they will certainly be saved; if they are not predestined, even though we do not tempt them, they will most certainly be damned. And yet these very demons do everything, stir up everything, to draw men to their side — tempting, laying snares, disturbing the imagination, offering objects and occasions, etc. — as if there were no predestination at all. The demons acknowledge, therefore, that predestination brings no hindrance to prevent men from being good or evil, happy or unhappy, whichever they should choose; unless perhaps you should say that the demons act thus because they do not acknowledge predestination. But how can they fail to acknowledge what both faith, and reason, and their own unhappy experience so clearly demonstrate?

I answer 2° that what those arguing infer from the asserted predestination is altogether false, namely: If I am predestined, whatever I do, I shall be saved. For God does not predestine to the end without at the same time predestining to the means by which the end can and must be obtained; and the means to salvation are good works, flight from sin, care and solicitude for salvation, perseverance in good, etc. «Providence, says the holy Doctor⁴, of which predestination is a part, does not take away secondary causes, but so provides effects that even the order of secondary causes is itself subject to providence. Just as, therefore, natural effects are so provided by God that [the means, or] the natural causes are also ordained to those effects, without which they would not come about,» — for example, thus God provides and orders the future harvest in such a way that he also provides and orders the tilling of the field and the sowing — «so the salvation of someone is predestined by God in such a way that whatever promotes a man toward salvation also falls under the order of predestination: whether one's own prayers or those of others, or other good works, or whatever else of this kind, without which no one attains salvation. Hence the predestined must strive solicitously to do good and to pray, because it is through effects of this kind that predestination is certainly fulfilled. Wherefore it is said, II Peter, I, 10: Labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.»

Therefore, by daily practice and by the consensus of the whole human race, this argumentation is convicted of falsity. For, as a certain more recent writer elegantly puts it, nothing happens in this world that is not subject to the unchangeable foreknowledge and will of God. No one lives longer than God wills, no one reaps, no one becomes rich, no one conquers an enemy in war, no one reaches port, except as much and whenever God has disposed from eternity. Yet who has ever been so foolish as to refuse to steer a ship in order to cross the sea, to scatter seed in order to make a harvest, to apply effort to acquiring riches, to make every attempt to obtain victory, to take every care to preserve or recover health, on the grounds that he believed all things come about by the divine will and unchangeable nod? These are plainly ravings, not arguments. If, then, no one fails to labor for earthly life, although he knows that all things happen by the divine nod, why should he not equally labor for the heavenly life, although he knows that no one attains it except one predestined by the divine will?