Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

You will ask 1° what providence is¹.

I answer. To provide, if we attend to the etymology of the word, is as it were to see from afar, and thus it is the same as to foreknow; but if we look to the thing signified by the word, to provide is to order in the mind, toward their ends, the things that are to be done. Whence divine providence is rightly defined: The plan of the order of things toward their end, existing in the divine mind. Now the execution of this order is called governance. Hence

You will gather that providence is formally an act of the intellect, presupposing however an act of the will; because, as has been said, providence is the plan of the order of things toward their end; but plan and order belong to the intellect, whose function it is to direct and dispose, and this the τὸ providere indicates, for to see is proper to the intellect. It presupposes, however, an act of the will, because, since it is the plan of the order of things toward their end, it presupposes the intention of the end, by force of which it commands the execution of the means. Thus several acts concur virtually in divine providence, just as several acts concur really in human providence. 1° The divine will intends, as an end, to manifest its glory outwardly. 2° The intellect, for this end, judges and proposes the most fitting means, namely the fourfold order of nature, grace, glory, and the hypostatic union. 3° The will accepts and chooses these means proposed to it. 4° Finally, by force of this efficacious intention and choice, the intellect commands the execution of these means to be carried out in time; and in this efficacious command we place providence.

You will ask 2° whether there is providence in God².

I answer in the affirmative. In Wisdom, XIV, 3, it is said: But thy providence, O Father, governeth it. And chapter VIII, 1: She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.

Proof from reason. Providence is the plan of the order of things toward their end. But this plan of the order of things toward their end exists in God. Therefore. — The major is the definition of providence. — Proof of the minor. Everything that is caused by God pre-exists in the divine mind; for since God is the most perfect intellectual agent, it is necessary that the plan of any of his effects pre-exist in him, unless you wish the most perfect intellectual agent to act blindly and without a plan. But the order of things toward their end is something caused by God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Every good is caused by God. But in things there is a good, not only that they exist, but also that they are ordered, both among themselves and toward their ends. Therefore. Whence to deny that God is provident is to deny that he is intelligent, and thus to deny that he is God; whence all the things that prove that God exists, prove that there is providence in him.

You will ask 3° whether divine providence extends to all things.

I answer. Divine providence extends to all things, even the smallest and most worthless, so that nothing is fortuitous with respect to God.

Proof, 1°, from the Scripture cited: She reacheth from end to end, etc., as above. In Matthew VI, 25-32 and X, 29-31; Luke, XII, 6 and 7, 22-30, Christ teaches that the birds of the sky, and the lilies of the gardens, and the grass of the field, and the hairs of the head are altogether subject to his providence, so that not one of them falls without the will of the Father. And concerning our free acts, Ecclesiasticus, XXXIII, 13 and 14: As the clay is in the potter's hand, to fashion and order it. All his ways are according to his ordering: so man is in the hand of him that made him.

Proof from reason. Since every agent, especially an intellectual and prudent one, such as God is, acts for an end, its providence, which is the plan of the order of things toward their end, extends as far as its causality extends. But the causality of God, as the first being and the most universal cause, extends to absolutely all beings and all differences of beings whatsoever. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether providence is infallible, not only as regards the ordering of the means to the end, but also as regards the attainment of the end.

I answer that here the Thomists themselves disagree, both sides grounded in St. Thomas. For their reconciliation, I judge it must be said that, since the efficacy of providence (which, as has been said, consists in the act of command regarding the means) depends, in attaining the end, on the efficacy of the volition or intention of the end, that providence which presupposes a consequent and absolute will of the end is infallible, not only as regards the order and execution of the means, but also as regards the attainment of the end; whereas that providence which presupposes only an antecedent and conditioned will of the end, although it is infallible as regards the positing of the means, is nevertheless not infallible as regards the attainment of the end.

Although, therefore, there is in God only one providence, it can nevertheless be considered in various ways: 1° as a whole, insofar as it is the ordination of the whole of being toward the universal end, which is the glory of God; 2° insofar as it exerts itself in this or that species of things with a view to particular ends; in which sense one is called natural, another supernatural, one ordinary, another extraordinary. If, therefore, providence is considered as a whole, it is infallible as regards the attainment of the end, because its end, namely the glory of God, is efficaciously willed. But as it exerts itself toward particular ends, it is not always infallible as regards the attainment of the end, because such ends are not always efficaciously willed; and thus, although all men are ordered by God's providence to eternal salvation, nevertheless not all are saved; because that particular end, namely the salvation of all, is not efficaciously willed by God, but only antecedently and sufficiently. And thus the opposing opinions, and the testimonies of St. Thomas which seem to conflict, are reconciled.

What predestination is, and whether it exists?

Among theologians predestination is taken in two ways: 1° Broadly and in an ample sense, for any eternal decree of God to do something in time. In this sense Augustine, Tract. LXVIII on John, n. 1, said: «God made future things by predestining them¹.» But more frequently Scripture, the Fathers, and theologians take predestination specifically for the divine ordination of some to glory and to the means by which it is infallibly obtained. It is in this sense that we treat of it here. Hence

I say 1°: Predestination is rightly defined by Augustine, bk. On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14, n. 35: «The foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which whoever are freed are most certainly freed.» By St. Thomas, hic q. 23, a. 2, o: «The plan of the ordering of some to eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind.» That is, the very order preconceived in the divine mind of some unto salvation.

By foreknowledge, in the first definition, is not understood merely speculative knowledge, or middle knowledge, but practical and effective knowledge, by which God foresees what he himself is going to do, resting consequently upon the decree of doing it, as Augustine explains, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10, n. 19: «By predestination, he says, God foreknew those things which he himself was going to do.»

By «the preparation of the benefits by which they are most certainly freed,» in the same definition, is understood the certitude not of foreknowledge only, but also of causality; or, what is the same thing, is understood the preparation of benefits that are not merely sufficient and determinable by the human will, but, of themselves and as they descend from God, infallibly efficacious.

I say 2°: Predestination is formally an act of the intellect², namely a command; presupposing, however, an act of the will, namely volition and the efficacious intention of the end. This is clear from what has been said about providence, of which predestination is a part.

I say 3°: Not only does there exist a predestination by which God most certainly directs some, in preference to others, to eternal life, but it is so necessary that without it no one can be saved.

Proof of the first part, from Scripture. Rom., VIII, 30: Whom he predestined, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. Eph., I, 11: In Christ we were called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will. Augustine, bk. On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 19, n. 48: «No one could have disputed against this predestination, which we defend according to the holy Scriptures, except by erring.» Likewise everywhere among the holy Fathers.

Proof from reason. God does nothing in time that he has not preordained from eternity; otherwise either he would begin to will in time, or it would be, for him, a matter of chance and beyond his intention: both of which are absurd³. But God is he who in time brings some, in preference to others, to eternal beatitude, as exceeding the powers of nature. Therefore he preordained from eternity that he would do this; and this eternal preordination is predestination, as is clear from what has been said.

And hence the second part remains proved. The argument already made is thus renewed. It is impossible for one to be saved in preference to another, except through God; both because salvation, or eternal beatitude, exceeds the powers of nature, and because every good, especially salvation, is from God, according to that verse, Ps. XXXVI, 39: The salvation of the just is from the Lord; and Rom., VI, 23: The grace of God, life everlasting; and John, VI, 44: No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him. But, as I have said, it is also impossible that God should do anything in time that he has not preordained from eternity; and this preordination is predestination. Therefore.

You will object the common and hackneyed argument that the impious constantly hurl back, so that they may sin more freely; that heretics hurl, so as to exclude the necessity of good works and freedom; that the scrupulous hurl, so as to torment themselves superstitiously: If a certain and infallible predestination is granted, either I am predestined, or I am not. If I am predestined, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be saved; if I am not predestined, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be damned. What then remains, except that I do as I please?

I answer 1° that those who bring forward this sophism, for the most part, acknowledge in God a certain and infallible foreknowledge; for only some among the pagans denied it. Hence I turn the argument back thus: God knows certainly and infallibly whether I am going to be saved, or not. If the former, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be saved; if the latter, whatever I do, I shall infallibly be damned. What then remains, except that I do as I please? Thus Augustine often argued against the Semi-Pelagians, and from this he concluded, On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 15, n. 38, that, just as the Semi-Pelagians were not deterred by this sophism from confessing divine foreknowledge, so neither ought they to be deterred from upholding divine predestination.

Likewise, if this dilemma had any force, no one would understand it better than the demons, beings far more perceptive and cunning, and so all their snares and temptations would cease, were they to reason thus: Either men are predestined, or they are not. If they are predestined, we tempt them in vain, for, notwithstanding our temptations, they will certainly be saved; if they are not predestined, even though we do not tempt them, they will most certainly be damned. And yet these very demons do everything, stir up everything, to draw men to their side — tempting, laying snares, disturbing the imagination, offering objects and occasions, etc. — as if there were no predestination at all. The demons acknowledge, therefore, that predestination brings no hindrance to prevent men from being good or evil, happy or unhappy, whichever they should choose; unless perhaps you should say that the demons act thus because they do not acknowledge predestination. But how can they fail to acknowledge what both faith, and reason, and their own unhappy experience so clearly demonstrate?

I answer 2° that what those arguing infer from the asserted predestination is altogether false, namely: If I am predestined, whatever I do, I shall be saved. For God does not predestine to the end without at the same time predestining to the means by which the end can and must be obtained; and the means to salvation are good works, flight from sin, care and solicitude for salvation, perseverance in good, etc. «Providence, says the holy Doctor⁴, of which predestination is a part, does not take away secondary causes, but so provides effects that even the order of secondary causes is itself subject to providence. Just as, therefore, natural effects are so provided by God that [the means, or] the natural causes are also ordained to those effects, without which they would not come about,» — for example, thus God provides and orders the future harvest in such a way that he also provides and orders the tilling of the field and the sowing — «so the salvation of someone is predestined by God in such a way that whatever promotes a man toward salvation also falls under the order of predestination: whether one's own prayers or those of others, or other good works, or whatever else of this kind, without which no one attains salvation. Hence the predestined must strive solicitously to do good and to pray, because it is through effects of this kind that predestination is certainly fulfilled. Wherefore it is said, II Peter, I, 10: Labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.»

Therefore, by daily practice and by the consensus of the whole human race, this argumentation is convicted of falsity. For, as a certain more recent writer elegantly puts it, nothing happens in this world that is not subject to the unchangeable foreknowledge and will of God. No one lives longer than God wills, no one reaps, no one becomes rich, no one conquers an enemy in war, no one reaches port, except as much and whenever God has disposed from eternity. Yet who has ever been so foolish as to refuse to steer a ship in order to cross the sea, to scatter seed in order to make a harvest, to apply effort to acquiring riches, to make every attempt to obtain victory, to take every care to preserve or recover health, on the grounds that he believed all things come about by the divine will and unchangeable nod? These are plainly ravings, not arguments. If, then, no one fails to labor for earthly life, although he knows that all things happen by the divine nod, why should he not equally labor for the heavenly life, although he knows that no one attains it except one predestined by the divine will?

§ I. — Prenotes and various opinions.

Since predestination includes an act of the will, as has been said, the ground of predestination must be inquired into just as the ground of the divine will is inquired into. Indeed, properly speaking, the question here does not concern predestination itself formally taken for the act of command, but the very intention and election by which God wills to bring one, loved in preference to another, efficaciously to glory. Election, therefore, is not taken strictly as of means, but broadly as of persons unto an end¹.

The Pelagians, since they held that free will was sufficient of itself for acting well, said that merits acquired by one's own powers were the cause of predestination. They were condemned in the Councils of Palestine, Milevis, and Orange.

The Semi-Pelagians, who, against the Pelagians, acknowledged that we cannot do good works by our own powers without the grace of God, contended nevertheless that the beginning and preparation for them — such as the pious affection of belief, desire, and the asking for help, which they did not reckon among good works — was from us: just as, they said, although a sick man cannot procure for himself medicine and health, he can nevertheless desire and ask for a physician. They said, therefore, that God had decreed to give grace to those whom he had foreseen would prepare themselves for it by these initial works, and glory to those whom he had foreseen would persevere to the end, by their own freedom, without a special gift, in the grace received. As for infants dying prematurely, in whom these beginnings are not found, they said that God had predestined or reprobated them from the foreknowledge of the good or evil works which they would have done, had they lived. This error was proscribed in the Second Council of Orange.

Certain more recent [theologians] teach that predestination is from the foreseen merits of grace; but they do not explain it in one and the same way. Some say that God, by an equal general will, wills all to be saved, and offers to all without distinction sufficient graces left to free will; but that he foreknows, through middle knowledge, who, once that grace is offered, will use it well and persevere in it by their innate freedom, and takes these in preference to others up to glory: so that, in that sign of the preparation of means for salvation, he does not love the predestined more than the reprobate, nor does he distinguish the former from the latter; but he awaits this distinguishing to be made through free will, and, once it is foreseen, he decrees glory for those who distinguish themselves, leaving the rest aside. And thus, according to this opinion, predestination to the grace common to the predestined and the reprobate is gratuitous; but predestination to glory is from foreseen merits, namely from the foreseen good use of grace. So Lessius, Molina, Becanus, and many others of the same Society.

Other defenders of middle knowledge as well, positing a general will in God to save all, and a preparation of sufficient helps for attaining that salvation, say that God, through middle knowledge, foreknows how each one would use them, if he were placed in these or those circumstances: this conditional foreknowledge being posited, out of all whom he orders to salvation by a general will, he selects some by a special love and mercy, whom he determines to place in those circumstances in which he foresaw they would use grace well and persevere in it, and to these he decrees salvation; but others he determines to place in those circumstances in which he foresaw they would not use grace well, and thus he negatively reprobates them. Hence this election and distinguishing of those to be saved from the reprobate is from the gratuitous will of God. But, since in salvation two things are connected, namely grace or merits, and glory, they say that God first decreed grace or merits, and, in view of these, glory: and thus that predestination to the grace proper to the elect and actually saving — in that manner, namely, in which it can be saving on the principles of middle knowledge — is gratuitous; but that predestination to glory is from the foreseen merits of grace. So the Congruists in general.

This twofold way of explaining predestination from foreseen merits, in our judgment, must be carefully distinguished, since, because many omit to do so, they produce much that is useless and confused. For the second way concedes something that the defenders of gratuitous predestination intend, namely that the election of those to be saved — which is the very distinguishing of the predestined from the reprobate — is from the gratuitous will of God, and not from a foreseen merit of the creature; which the first way denies. Nevertheless, this second way errs not only in this — as our most learned Goudin said with less than full care — that it says God, in a preposterous order, wills the means before the end, but also, and chiefly, in this: that the merits, in view of which it says predestination to glory takes place, are not given by God by the most powerful force of his grace, but arise from the depth of free will, which, under an indifferent help, determines itself by its own inclination to the good; and thus it always remains the case that predestination to glory supposes something on our part, by reason of which it comes about, and that the whole mercy of God toward the elect is placed in this alone: that he determines to place them in congruous circumstances. This way, moreover, of defending gratuitous predestination, on which certain theologians of the Society wrongly congratulate themselves, differs utterly from the way in which Sts. Augustine and Thomas, and the more common body of theologians, defend it.

The last opinion, therefore, which we say is that of Sts. Augustine and Thomas, more conformable to Sacred Scripture, and more common in the schools, maintains predestination as gratuitous in every respect, and says that God, out of all those whom by his antecedent will he wills to be saved, and for whom he prepares sufficient helps, takes up or chooses some, more specially loved out of pure mercy, unto glory, and thereafter prepares for them helps efficacious of themselves, by which they attain it. We shall establish this opinion, moreover, by refuting both ways of speaking of the Fathers of the Society, in the two §§ following.

§ II. — Gratuitous predestination is asserted against the opinion of Lessius and Molina.

The effect of predestination can be considered in two ways²: 1° in particular, or inadequately, and thus nothing prevents one effect from being the cause or reason of another, which we shall treat in the following §; 2° in general, or adequately, for the whole assemblage of benefits by which God efficaciously directs and orders some in preference to others to eternal life, eternal life itself being included; and it is concerning predestination taken thus adequately that we inquire here: whether it has any reason or cause on our part, as Lessius and Molina hold; or, on the contrary, whether it is purely gratuitous, as others hold. For the resolution of this,

I say: Predestination, taken for the intention or purpose which God has of efficaciously bringing some in preference to others to salvation, has no reason on our part, but is from the mere mercy of God and his gratuitous will³.

We are not here distinguishing, as you see, between predestination to grace that actually saves, or discriminating grace, and predestination to glory, as to which is prior: this we shall discuss in the following §; but we say that God, out of all those whom by his general will he wills to be saved, and for whom he prepares sufficient helps, has chosen some in preference to others to be efficaciously brought to salvation, not because he foresaw that they, out of the sufficient and indifferent helps equally prepared for both reprobate and elect alike, would by their innate freedom make good use of them and persevere in good, but from the gratuitous will and mercy by which he pursues them in preference to others.

Proof, 1°, from Scripture. The Apostle, to the Ephesians, I, 3-6 and 11, says: Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ; as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in his sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the purpose of his will, unto the praise of the glory of his grace... In whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. From these you have: 1° that God did not choose us because we would be holy, or because he foresaw that we would be holy, but that we should be holy; 2° that he chose us according to the purpose of his will, that is, by a gratuitous will, that he might commend his grace; and therefore by lot, with respect to us, because there was in us no reason for this election. What the adversaries reply to this I shall shortly resolve. See further chapter II of the same Epistle. Likewise to Titus, III, and in many other places.

But above all others illustrious is the testimony of the same Apostle to the Romans, chapters VIII, IX and XI, where, treating expressly of gratuitous predestination, he explains it, proves it, and defends it against those who impugn it. First, in chapter VIII, 28, he defines it as the purpose of God; in chapter IX, 11, as the purpose according to election; in chapter XI, 5, as according to the election of grace, that is, gratuitous, as he also immediately adds, 6: And if by grace, it is now no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. Then he explains its various properties, namely, in chapter VIII, 28, that to those who are called according to the purpose, all things work together unto good. Likewise, in the same chapter, 30, that from that purpose there flow calling, justification, and glorification: Whom he predestinated, he says, them he also called, etc. Finally, in the same chapter, 31, he repeats the efficacy of this purpose from the omnipotence of God: If God be for us, who is against us?

Then in chapter IX, asking why so few of the Jews believed in Christ, although the promises of salvation had been made to the Jews, namely the children of Abraham, he answers that not all the carnal children of Abraham were, in the eternal counsels of God, children of the promise, or predestined, but only some, chosen gratuitously in preference to others. And he proves this gratuitous predestination by many arguments, but especially, 1°, by the example of Jacob and Esau, who, though born of the same parents and the same act of conception, the younger was chosen and the elder abandoned, not from works, but from the grace of him who calls: For when they were not yet born, he says, nor had done any good or evil (that the purpose of God according to election might stand), not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated; 2°, by the testimony of God himself, who said to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy. From which he infers: So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. 3°, he proves the same by an irrefragable principle; namely, that no one can give anything to God beforehand, by reason of which God would be moved to choose him, but everything that one has, one has received from God: Who, he says, chapter XI, 35 and 36, hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things. For indeed it is for no other reason that the Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and the Catholic writers against whom we here contend, deny gratuitous predestination, than because they want there to be something on our part which moves God to predestine some in preference to others: the Pelagians, a good work; the Semi-Pelagians, the beginning of a good work; the Catholic writers, the good use of grace. For if all these things are from God, God does not wait for them, nor does his choosing some in preference to others depend on them; but, on the contrary, he gives them to some in preference to others because he has already chosen them beforehand. But all these things, according to the Apostle, are from God: For who hath first given to him? etc. And 1 Corinthians, IV, 7: What hast thou that thou hast not received?

But that is not all. The chief arguments which can be, and usually are, brought against gratuitous predestination, the Apostle himself proposes and resolves in chapter IX: first, that there would be injustice on God's part if, before foreseen merits, he took up one and left another; second, that a ground of excuse is left to those who perish, namely that it is not by their own fault, but by God's will, which no one resists, that they are compelled to sin and perdition. To the one arguing thus he first rebukes him for his insolence: O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Then to the first he answers with the example of the potter, who is not for that reason unjust, although out of the same lump of clay he makes one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor; so likewise neither is God, in whose hand we are, as clay in the hand of the potter, according to Ecclesiasticus, chapter XXXIII, 13, unjust, although he freely takes up some, leaving others to their own vile condition. To the second he answers that no ground of excuse is left to those who sin and perish; because God does not impel them to sin, but only permits it, and patiently endures sinners, as vessels of wrath, for the commendation of his justice and the benefit of the elect. Rightly, therefore, he concludes it all, chapter XI, 33 and 34, crying out: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor?

To these most manifest testimonies of the Apostle the adversaries make various replies; but altogether without foundation.

They answer chiefly that Genesis, XXV, 22 and following, and Malachi, I, 2 and following, from which the Apostle took the example of Jacob and Esau, is not to be understood of the persons of Jacob and Esau, but of the two peoples, namely the Israelites and the Idumeans who were to arise from them, nor of election to eternal life, but to the benefits of this life.

On the contrary. We are not disputing here about the sense which these words have in the Old Testament, but the sense which they have in the Epistle of the Apostle. Now it is certain that the Apostle expounds them spiritually of eternal things and the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, and that by Jacob he understood the predestined, or that he set him forth as a type of the predestined, and Esau as a type of the reprobate: so that, just as Jacob was gratuitously chosen, before foreseen merits, to the temporal kingdom, so also are the predestined chosen to the heavenly kingdom; and just as Esau, before foreseen demerits, was negatively reprobated from the temporal kingdom, so are the reprobate from the heavenly kingdom. And although a solid argument is not usually drawn from the mystical sense of Scripture, it is otherwise, however, if this mystical sense is expounded and admitted in Scripture itself; for then the mystical sense of the book being expounded becomes the literal sense of the book that expounds it.

Proof, from Augustine. According to St. Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 14, n. 35, Enchiridion, c. 100, n. 26, and elsewhere, «predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of benefits,» not of just any kind, not merely sufficient ones, but efficacious ones, namely «by which, most certainly, whoever are freed, are freed.» Consequently, by the name of predestination he does not understand predestination to some versatile grace common to the elect and the reprobate, which each one by his own choice renders efficacious or inefficacious, but predestination to efficacious grace, discriminating the elect from the reprobate and actually saving. But he constantly teaches that this predestination is gratuitous, and not from merit or any other thing foreseen on the part of the predestined, but, on the contrary, that all the merits by which the elect merit glory, especially final perseverance, are conferred upon them from that eternal predestination. Therefore. — The major is the definition of predestination handed down by Augustine himself. — The minor, indeed, he teaches so constantly and evidently everywhere, especially in the books On Rebuke and Grace, On the Gift of Perseverance, and On the Predestination of the Saints, that no one but the willingly blind could fail to see it. From the countless passages I gather these few. The book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, n. 13, has it thus: «Whoever are set apart from that original damnation by this bounty of divine grace, there is no doubt that hearing of the Gospel is procured for them; and when they hear, they believe, and persevere to the end in the faith which works through love; and if at any time they go astray, being rebuked they are corrected, and some of them, even if not rebuked by men, return to the way which they had left, and some, having received grace at whatever age, are snatched away from the dangers of this life by the swiftness of death. For he who made them vessels of mercy works all these things in them, he who also chose them in his Son before the foundation of the world through the election of grace.» From these you clearly see that, according to Augustine, the predestination by which God wills to save someone in preference to another, not only does not presuppose anything on the part of the predestined, but, on the contrary, is itself the cause of all the things that lead him to salvation. The book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 9, n. 21: «Of two infants,» he says, «equally bound by original sin, why this one is taken up and that one left; and of two grown persons equally impious, why this one is called in such a way and that one is not so called, the judgments of God are inscrutable.» And chapter 28 of the Soliloquies⁴: «You cleanse, of us the children of men, those in whom it has pleased you to dwell: whom, from the inaccessible depths of the secret judgments of your incomprehensible wisdom, always just, though hidden, you predestined before the world without their merits, called out of the world, and magnify after the world. But you do not do this to all: which all the wise men of the earth marvel at as they waste away.» More may be seen in Epistles⁵ 105, 106, 157; sermon 11 On the Words of the Apostle⁶; and in almost the entire books On Rebuke and Grace, On the Predestination of the Saints, and On the Gift of Perseverance. And the holy Doctor defends this gratuitous predestination, not as his own opinion, but as a dogma of the faith; whence in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 19, n. 48, he says: «This I know, that no one could have disputed against this predestination, which we defend according to the holy Scriptures, except by erring.»

St. Augustine was followed by other Fathers: Fulgentius, Prosper, St. Gregory, St. Bernard, Isidore, Bede, Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, and the Master of the Sentences. As for St. Thomas, there is no room for doubt, since both our conclusion and the arguments which we shall bring forward in the following § are from him, and moreover in the same article 5, ad 3, he says in the most formal terms: «Why he chose these unto glory and reprobated others, has no reason except the divine will.» See also q. 6 On Truth, a. 2; III Summa Contra Gentiles, last chapter; in I Sentences, dist. 41; on chapter IX of Romans, lect. 2 and 3; on chapter I to the Ephesians, lect. 4, and elsewhere.

This conclusion, moreover, will be proved again, and more effectively, from what we are about to say in support of the following conclusion. For if it is established, as we shall prove, that God, in the matter of predestination, begins first from the intention of giving glory, then, by force of this intention, wills to give grace and the merits proceeding from it, as the necessary means for obtaining glory; it will be established most certainly of all that no merits whatsoever, nor any good use of grace, are the cause or motive reason of predestination to glory, but rather its effect. Let it be, then,

§ III. — Gratuitous predestination is asserted against the opinion of the Congruists.

The Congruists commonly, as we noted in § I, say that, since predestination taken adequately involves two things, namely grace and glory, God in predestining begins from the intention of giving grace — special grace, that is, proper to the elect — and then, on account of the merits proceeding from that special grace, decrees glory; so that predestination to the grace proper to the elect and actually saving is gratuitous, while predestination to glory is from foreseen merits.

If the question here concerned only the order that holds between predestination to grace or merits and predestination to glory, and if it were granted, by those who hold predestination to merits to be prior, that these merits are from God through grace efficacious by its own power, and not from free will under versatile grace and indifferent concourse, this question would be of slight moment, and the Congruists would err in this alone: that, by a preposterous order, they would place the choice of the means before the intention of the end. But since they defend predestination, in the said sense, as gratuitous according to the system of middle knowledge, they hold it to be gratuitous only insofar as God gratuitously decrees to place the predestined in those circumstances in which He foresaw, through middle knowledge, that he would consent to versatile grace of his own freedom — which foreseen consent persevering, He decrees glory for him: so that, according to this manner of explaining gratuitous predestination, with middle knowledge retained, predestination to glory in itself is also from the foreseen free consent, or good use of grace, not proceeding from grace but from free will under concomitant grace. And when they say that God predestines to glory from the foreseen merits of grace, they do not mean the merits which grace by its own power efficaciously confers, itself working the very consent to grace — for this they reckon a destruction of freedom — but merits arising from the foundation of created freedom, which, the help being offered to it indifferently to either alternative, determines itself to the good at its own pleasure. Hence they stick in almost the same mire as the pure Molinists, and because they evade nearly all the arguments we have brought forward against Molina and Lessius, by interpreting them as concerning predestination to glory in its seed — that is, predestination to the special grace which is the seed of glory, or that gratuitous will of giving congruous grace to some — we undertake here to prove that predestination to glory in itself is prior to this predestination to grace; and thus that predestination to glory in itself is not from any foreseen merits whatsoever, but that these are its effect. Hence

I say: In the decree of gratuitous predestination, predestination to glory in itself is prior to predestination to grace or merits⁷. Consequently predestination to glory in itself is purely gratuitous.

Proof from a fundamental reason. Whoever acts prudently and in an orderly manner intends the end before the means. But God acts prudently and in an orderly manner, and merits are the means, glory is the end. Therefore He intends glory before merits.

Although it does not escape me that our adversaries have devised almost innumerable responses to this brief and inescapable argument, I nevertheless do not see which of its propositions can be denied with any foundation. — The major is known by the light of nature alone. For means are not sought for their own sake — otherwise they would not be means, but an end — but they are sought on account of the end, and from love of the end. Therefore the end must be loved first. Moreover, whoever wills the means either wills them for the sake of some end, or not: if the former, then he wills the end first; if the latter, then he acts by chance and at random, not knowing for what he acts, which is repugnant to one who acts prudently. Finally, it is a common axiom of theologians and philosophers that « the end is first in intention and last in execution. » — The minor is no less certain. As to the first part — namely, that God acts prudently and in an orderly manner — it is certain with that certainty by which it is certain that God exists. As to the second part — namely, that merits are the means and glory the end — it is equally certain: 1° by reason; because merits are not sought for their own sake, but for the sake of the reward, which is the wage of merits, and the last thing, upon the attainment of which merits cease; 2° from the definition of the Church in the Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, where it is said that « the final cause of our justification is the glory of God and of Christ, and eternal life. » Therefore eternal life exercises, with respect to grace and merits, the causality of a final cause; but merits belong to this way by which we tend toward that eternal life, as toward our last end. Therefore merits are the means by which we tend toward glory, as toward the end. These things are so clear that they are evident to those who have either attained the dawn of reason, or have been instructed in the first rudiments of religion. Let us see, however, to what and to how many evasions our adversaries have recourse, in order to extricate themselves from this brief snare.

Tournely answers, 1°, here, § Solv. obj. ex rationibus, by absolutely denying the major proposition of the argument, namely: « Whoever acts prudently and in an orderly manner intends the end before the means. » But on what foundation? Hear with your own ears: « The falsity of this principle, he says, is evident from the example of the predestination of the angels, which many of those who disagree with us here, » namely the Jansenists, « judge to have been made from foreseen merits. »

But on the contrary: 1° In the first place, this response does not touch us, since we maintain that the predestination of the angels is no less gratuitous than that of men in fallen nature. Hence the Parisian doctor should have denied the major only on the principles of Jansenius, and not absolutely. 2° By Tournely's own admission, predestination from foreseen merits, and this principle: « He who acts prudently intends the end before the means, » are not compatible with each other. But what does right reason dictate in a like case? That what is more certain should be retained, and what is less certain should be let go. Now, no one of sound mind, I suppose, will deny that predestination from foreseen merits — which Tournely himself acknowledges to be impugned by very many and most celebrated doctors — is less certain than the aforesaid principle is certain, inasmuch as it is an axiom commonly received, proved by the experience of the whole human race, resting on the first principles of reason, as we have proved, asserted by St. Thomas, and absolutely denied by none of our adversaries that I know of, except Tournely, but rather either distinguished or explained. Therefore predestination from foreseen merits must be let go, and the aforesaid principle must be retained. 3° Jansenius denied this principle. Granted. Is it therefore to be denied? Is Jansenius, denying it, of greater weight to the Molinist doctor than the Angelic Doctor, expressly asserting, here q. 23, a. 4, o: « Nothing is commanded to be ordered to an end, unless the will of the end already exists »? Not sufficiently confident, then, in this response, Tournely

Answers, 2°, by allowing the aforesaid principle under a twofold restriction or condition: first, that the end have only the character of an end, and not of a reward or wage; second, that it be intended absolutely and efficaciously, and not conditionally and inefficaciously. But God, he says, does not predestine men to glory under the single character of an end, but also under the character of a reward and wage; nor does He intend it absolutely and efficaciously, but inefficaciously and conditionally — namely, if men are willing to make good use of the help of grace: hence it does not follow that He intends the end, or glory, before merits.

Against the first. Glory, even as reward and crown, stands to merits as end to means; for merits are prepared for us and conferred so that through them, as through means, we may obtain glory as a crown and reward, as the last end of our justification, according to the Tridentine passage cited. But, as Tournely himself allows, and as all grant, the end, as end, is intended before merits. Feel the subterfuge of the Sorbonne doctor in a familiar example. He who stands in the contest intends the prize as reward and crown; and yet he intends it before the contest, nor does he gird himself for the contest except from love of the prize, for this reason, namely, that the prize is the end, and the contest the means. But the end is intended before the means. Likewise, the antecedent will in God of the salvation of all is a will of salvation as reward and crown, and yet it is intended thus before merits; for this antecedent will, as our adversaries grant, is not from foreseen merits.

Against the second. Predestination, according to the definition of Augustine, which Tournely accepts, is « the foreknowledge and preparation of benefits, » not of just any benefits, but of those « by which whoever are delivered are most certainly delivered, » that is, benefits leading efficaciously and with certainty to glory. But it cannot be that God should will to employ means absolutely efficacious for attaining glory, unless He wills glory itself absolutely and efficaciously. Therefore, by His predestining will, God intends glory not inefficaciously and conditionally, but efficaciously and absolutely. — Proof of the minor. 1° From absurdity. He would be reckoned, I do not say imprudent, but nearly a fool, who should employ means which he knew to be certainly efficacious for attaining some end, and yet should not will that end efficaciously and absolutely. This is evident in the case of one who should apply fire to tow, and yet not will that the tow be efficaciously burned. Proof, 2°, by reason. The intention of the end is the cause of the choice of the means. Therefore the choice of efficacious means presupposes an efficacious intention of the end. Otherwise the proportion between cause and effect would not be preserved, but the effect would exceed the power of the cause.

To these things, the Parisian doctor replies with two points: 1° He denies this principle, namely that the choice of means certainly and efficaciously conducive to the end presupposes an efficacious intention of the end. Note the reason for his denial: because, he says, « to many of the reprobate, more efficacious helps of grace are sometimes conferred than to the elect, if you except final perseverance alone; and yet God does not have, toward those reprobate, an efficacious and absolute intention of conferring glory. » Who would not marvel at this decisive refutation of the argument? The argument concerns helps certainly and efficaciously conducive to glory, and therefore including final perseverance. The response concerns helps efficacious for certain acts, but not including final perseverance, nor certainly and efficaciously leading to glory: we speak of onions, he of garlic. I am indeed weary (be it said without offense) of lingering over the refutation of these things, though some are not weary of marveling at them.

2° He admits the principle just stated, if the question concerns the choice of a help efficacious of itself, independently of the consent of the will; otherwise he denies it.

Against this, 1°, I subsume: But that the helps which God prepares for the predestined are efficacious of themselves, independently of the consent of the will, we have already proved at length against Tournely, and shall prove again elsewhere. But what he objects — that it is of faith that, whatever the power and efficacy of grace be supposed to be, the will can always dissent, which he repeats everywhere to the point of nausea, as though any Catholic had ever absolutely denied this — is utterly futile. For we grant that the will can dissent from any grace whatsoever, by antecedent power and in the divided sense, not by consequent power and in the composite sense: we grant, I say, that it can truly dissent; but we also know that God, who has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have, can bring it about that it does not in fact dissent, and thus that this power of dissenting does not impede the efficacy of grace.

2° Let us abstract for a moment whether these helps prepared for the predestined are efficacious of themselves, or from the consent of the will. I argue thus: Either God foreknows them to be efficacious, in whatever way they are efficacious, or He does not. This latter cannot be said. If the former be said, the full force of the argument remains: namely, that it is a kind of folly to employ means which you know to be efficacious for attaining some end which you do not will to attain efficaciously; and that it is absurd for an effect — such as the choice of means with respect to the end — to exceed the power of its cause. By all these points I think abundant satisfaction has been given to the quibbles of the Molinist doctor.

Others answer, 3°, to the principle first stated, that indeed no one can intend efficacious means except from efficacious love of the end, when he intends the end for himself through means dependent on his own will alone; but if he intends the end for another through means dependent on that other's will, then he cannot intend the end efficaciously and absolutely, but inefficaciously and conditionally — namely, if that other should put the means in place. Thus, they say, one cannot will for another the prize of a contest efficaciously, except upon the foreseen victory of that other, but only inefficaciously and conditionally, if he should win; thus one cannot will the wage for a laborer efficaciously and absolutely, except upon his foreseen labor, but only inefficaciously and conditionally, if he should labor. But God intends glory for us as a crown and reward, through our merits, which He wills to proceed from our free will; for He neither compels nor necessitates us to them. Therefore He wills glory for us only inefficaciously and conditionally.

But on the contrary. This response, which almost coincides with the preceding one, rests on a false supposition, namely that our merits, however free, are not in the hand and power of God; which is entirely false. For God, according to Scripture, works all things; works both the willing and the accomplishing; in Him we live, and move, and are; from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things. And according to Augustine, « He has a most omnipotent power of inclining human hearts to what He pleases... He has the wills of men more in His own power than they themselves have, » de Correp. et Grat., cap. 13. And, « while He crowns our merits, He crowns His own gifts, » serm. 333⁸, n. 5; lib. de Gratia et Libero arbit., cap. 6, n. 15. Nor does He therefore compel or necessitate us, but, according to the same Augustine, lib. I, cont. duas epist. Pelagian., cap. 19, n. 37, by His omnipotence « He makes the unwilling willing, and the resisting consenting; » and lib. de Grat. et Lib. arbit., cap. 16, n. 32: « He makes us to act, by supplying most efficacious powers to the will. » This being laid down, I retort the argument thus: No one can choose efficacious means for attaining an end, when these means are in his own hand and power, without first intending the end efficaciously. But our merits, which are the means to glory, are in the hand and power of God. Therefore God cannot intend for us efficacious merits toward glory, unless He first intends glory efficaciously. But the examples adduced fail in this: that it is not in the power of the one proposing the prize or the wage to give the contestant industry and victory, and the laborer the will to labor, strength, and labor.

He answers, 4°, that God wills merits, not for the sake of giving glory to the elect, but for the sake of His own glory; for the Lord has made all things for Himself, Prov., XVI, 4.

But on the contrary. The Apostle says, II Tim., IV, 8: There is laid up for me a crown of justice. Therefore glory is the end of merits. And the Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, places our glory among the ends of our justification, as has been said. Although, then, the glory of God is the general end of all His works, there are nevertheless other particular ends; for He wills, says St. Thomas⁹, that the things which are for the end be ordered to the end. He wills, therefore, this to be for the sake of that, namely merits for the sake of glory, as means for the sake of a particular end.

They answer, 5°, that the asserted principle — namely, that the end is intended before the means — is true in the case of those who will the end and the means in a certain order through several acts; but that God wills them simultaneously by one simple act.

But on the contrary. This response does not solve the difficulty, but flees from it. For the difficulty proceeds on the hypothesis that God wills the end and the means according to an order of prior and posterior, not on the part of His act, but on the part of the things willed, which have this order of prior and posterior among themselves. From which we have a foundation for conceiving that God wills one thing before another, and that His act, therefore, though really simple and one, is virtually manifold. But if this were denied in this matter of predestination, it would have to be denied in all other matters, contrary to the common sense of theologians and Fathers, indeed of Scripture itself, which in many passages could not be explained without this virtual distinction on the part of the divine act, as that passage of Judith, IX, 4: For Thou hast done the former things, and hast devised those that came after: and this was done because Thou didst will it.

They answer, 6°, that the often-cited principle is true where the question concerns physical means, which attain the end by their own power; but not so with moral means, such as merits are, which do not attain the end by their own power, but through the mediation of another whom they move to confer the end.

But on the contrary. Whether the means be physical or moral, by this very fact that they are certainly efficacious — whether by their own power or another's — it cannot be that they are intended efficaciously, except from efficacious love of the end. But merits are means certainly efficacious for obtaining glory, according to the definition of predestination given by Augustine, and that saying of the Apostle, II Tim., IV, 8: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day.

Because, as I have said, the opinions of Lessius and the Congruists, which we have opposed up to now, are akin, and they agree chiefly in this: that predestination to glory is from the foreseen good use of grace — not the use which grace itself efficaciously gives by its own power, but the use which it begs from free will — and all the arguments that are usually proposed against gratuitous predestination aim at proving this; we, however, deny this in both conclusions: consequently the arguments that fight against one conclusion fight equally against the other, and therefore we propose them all here without distinction. But for their easier solution,

I note 1° that predestination can be considered in two ways: in the order of intention and in the order of execution. In the order of execution, again in two ways: in the order of execution preconceived and willed, and in the order of execution exercised. For God first, gratuitously, intends from eternity to give glory to some, as a reward to be obtained through merits, and consequently to give merits; and this is the order of intention, which our authors call the intentive decree, which can be expressed thus: I will to lead this one to glory by way of a reward, and for that reason to prepare for him the congruous means. Then, God from eternity preconceives and decrees to give in time, first, the means by which this glory may be obtained as a reward; and this is the order of execution preconceived and willed, which our authors call the executive decree, and which is expressed thus: I will to give merits to this one first, and glory on account of the merits. Finally, in time he confers merits, and on account of the merits, glory; and here the order of execution exercised is terminated. Therefore merits enter the order of intention, not as motives or as an end, but as an effect; but they enter the order of execution as motives, not by way of an end, but as means or dispositions that dignify the person and render him fit for the reward.

§ I. — The objections from Scripture are resolved.

You will object 1°, with Honoré Tournely, that passage of Matthew 25:34 and 35: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat. But to the reprobate it is said, in the same place, 41: Depart from me, cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. Here good works are referred to as the reason, not only for the bestowal of the kingdom, but also for the preparation and destination for it, as if he were saying: The kingdom has been prepared and destined for you, because you gave alms to the poor: for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat. Therefore.

I answer. If Tournely had not mutilated the text, and had not suppressed the words immediately following the second proposition, he would have found in them an evident solution to his own argument — or rather, there would have been no argument at all in need of a solution. For the second sentence of the Lord runs thus: Depart from me, cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat. Both sentences, both of the predestined and of the reprobate, are, as you see, expressed in the same tenor. But the causal particle for in the second proposition does not refer to prepared, but to depart; otherwise the sense would be that hell was prepared for the devil because the reprobate did not give alms, which is absurd. Therefore, similarly, in the first proposition the same particle for does not refer to prepared, but to possess, as if he were saying to the predestined: Possess the kingdom, because you performed works of mercy; all of which pertains to execution.

But even if we granted, for argument's sake, that for refers to prepared, it would be understood of the preparation in the order of execution preconceived and willed, not in the order of intention. Hence, when Tournely insists that the kingdom is given in time in the same way as it was prepared from eternity, this is true of the eternal preparation in the order of execution, not in the order of intention. For in the order of intention the end is intended first, then the means; but in the order of execution the means are intended first, from which the attainment of the end follows; because, as has been said, what is first in intention is last in execution, and conversely.

You will object 2°, with the same author, from Matthew 22:14. The parable is proposed of those invited to the wedding feast, to which, because many were unwilling to come, the Lord concludes: Many are called, but few are chosen. Therefore few are chosen, because few were willing to come. Therefore that election presupposes the good will of those who, called by grace, were willing to come.

I answer: I deny the consequence, which does not follow at all from the words of the Savior. It is not, then, that few are chosen because few were willing to come; but on the contrary, few were willing to come because few are chosen — so that the coming to the wedding feast is not the cause, but the effect, of election. Hence, a posteriori, that is, as from an effect, from the fact that few came it is rightly inferred that few are chosen.

You will object 3°, with the same author, that passage of Romans 8:29: Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son. Foreknowledge here is prior to predestination. Whom he foreknew... he predestined, that is, those whom he foreknew would be, by the benefit of grace, conformed to his Son — these he also predestined.

I answer 1° that, according to some, the Apostle understands foreknowledge as founded on the decree, following the rule of St. Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chap. 19, n. 48 — namely, that when the calling of the elect is in question, foreknowledge, among the expositors of the word of God, is to be understood as predestination; and thus the sense of the Apostle will be: Whom he predestined to glory, these he predestined to be, by the benefit of grace, conformed to the image of his Son, through the exercise of good works.

I answer 2°, according to others, and, as it seems, more in conformity with the text of the Apostle, that he foreknew and he predestined are taken by him for the same thing, and both are referred to conformity with Christ, not in grace, but in glory; so that the sense is: Whom he foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son in glory, these he calls in time, justifies, and, at last, glorifies.

§ II. — The objections from the Fathers are answered.

You will object 1°, with Tournely. St. Prosper, in his Letter to Augustine, writes that the mind and opinion of nearly all the ancient Fathers was one: that the predestination of men to glory comes about from the foreseen merits of grace. Therefore.

I answer that St. Prosper is relating, not his own opinion, but that of the Semi-Pelagians — or rather their complaint and calumny: « Many servants of Christ, says St. Prosper, dwell in the city of Marseilles who think that whatever you have argued, in the writings of your holiness which you composed against the Pelagian heretics, concerning the calling of the elect according to God's purpose, is contrary to the opinion of the Fathers and to the sense of the Church. »

You will insist 1°, with the same author. St. Prosper says: « We ask that you show, patiently bearing with our foolishness, how this may be refuted. » Therefore he is speaking from his own opinion.

I answer, I deny the consequence. Rather, the opposite follows from Prosper's words. For St. Prosper, thinking himself unequal to solving the objection of the Semi-Pelagians, has recourse to Augustine, sets it before him, and, humbly confessing his own ignorance, asks him to show how it is to be refuted and resolved. From which it plainly follows that St. Prosper does not believe the objection, does not relate it as his own opinion, nor speaks in his own name, but on the contrary reckons it false, since he seeks its solution.

You will insist 2°, with the same author, from St. Ambrose, lect. 5 On the Faith, ch. 6; St. Jerome, Epist. 105, to Hedibia; Chrysostom, hom. 8 on ch. XXV of Matthew, who teach that predestination rests upon foreknowledge. Therefore.

I answer 1°, from Augustine, who, in On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 14, n. 27, says that the earlier Fathers, before the rise of the Pelagian heresy, touched upon this question only in passing, and so it is no wonder if some of their expressions are less accurate, although they nevertheless asserted the principle from which gratuitous predestination is derived: likewise, in On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 19, n. 48, that the Fathers themselves speak of a foreknowledge founded on the divine decree, and not on a created will, which foreknowledge is included in predestination itself; and therefore that by "foreknowledge," among them, predestination itself is to be understood.

I answer 2° that the holy Fathers speak of predestination in the order of the execution of what was preconceived, because, viewed thus, it is better known to us and more apt for commending good works, but not of predestination in the order of intention. For this deeper question, which the Pelagian heresy forced Augustine to discuss, they scarcely, or hardly at all, touched upon; which is clear from the Semi-Pelagians themselves, who, having most diligently examined the monuments of the ancient Fathers, complain, in Hilary's Letter to Augustine, that he had needlessly raised this new question, which none of the Fathers had raised before him, and without which they preached grace to the people usefully. The holy Fathers, therefore, dwelt upon predestination viewed according to the order of willed execution; because, as I have said, viewed thus, it is better known to us and more apt for commending merits. For this same reason, many who, after the Pelagian heresy, wrote ascetical treatises — indeed we ourselves, and those who agree with us, although for altar and hearth we defend gratuitous predestination in the order of intention — nevertheless, when from the sacred pulpit we exhort the people to good works, we regard predestination according to the order of execution, and we use the same expressions which the ancient Fathers used: because predestination, viewed thus, depends on good works, and confers, and decrees to confer, the reward only after them and on account of them; and in that sense it is truly said that no one is predestined to glory except on account of foreseen merits.

This answer, although most true and most well-founded, Honoré Tournely, out of his modesty toward us, calls absurd and repugnant to the Fathers cited; because, since they speak of predestination from eternity in the mind of God, he pretends that we answer that they speak of the execution of predestination in time. But we freely forgive him this, since, a stranger to the Thomistic school, he does not know how to distinguish between the eternal decree of predestination to be executed and its own temporal execution; and while we speak of predestination according to the order of execution, he immediately supposes that we are speaking of its own temporal execution. Had he been able to make this distinction, as the very novices of our schools distinguish, he would have found in the answer not absurdity, but truth.

You will object 2°, with the same author: Augustine does not refuse to agree with the Pelagians contending that predestination to glory comes about from merits, provided they acknowledge that those merits are acquired through grace: « If they understood our merits, he says, in bk. On Grace and Free Will, ch. 6, n. 15, in such a way as to recognize that they themselves are also gifts of God, that opinion would not have to be reprobated. »

I answer that we too say and hold this with Augustine. If Tournely acknowledged that our merits are, in every respect, gifts of God, his opinion would not have to be reprobated as contrary to Scripture and the Fathers, but only as less consonant with reason. But in fact, according to the system of middle knowledge, of which Tournely is a perpetual advocate and flatterer, we contend that what is chief in our merits, namely the consent of the will unto the good, is not a gift of God, as we have proved at length elsewhere.

Tournely objects 3°. St. Augustine, bk. I To Simplician¹, q. 2, n. 6, weighing that word of the Apostle to the Romans, IX, 11 and 12: That the purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger, says, among other things: « It is not because God finds good works in men, which He chooses, that the purpose of justification stands; but because it stands, that He may justify believers, that He therefore finds works which He may now choose unto the kingdom of heaven... Election, however, does not precede justification, but justification precedes election; for no one is chosen, unless he is already distinct from him who is rejected. Whence, as to what is said, Ephesians, I, 4, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it can be said, except by foreknowledge. » From which it evidently appears, according to Augustine, that predestination to grace is gratuitous, but that predestination to glory is from the election of merits. This argument, as though it were unanswerable, the adversaries extol most highly.

But in the first place, as I have already observed elsewhere, it seems preposterous that the adversaries should continually have recourse to the books of Augustine addressed to Simplician, which he composed while still a young man and before the rise of the Pelagian heresy, especially since eminent authors, among them Bellarmine, hold that what is objected was retracted in his later works. But granting, as others hold, that nothing was retracted absolutely, at least it cannot be denied that, since Augustine had not yet at that time discussed the depth of these questions, nor had he discovered many things which he later investigated and found with greater diligence, several less accurate expressions concerning the present matter crept into these earlier books; which detracts not a little from their authority.

I answer that St. Augustine does not speak there of predestination to glory in the order of intention, but in the order of execution. That this may be made manifest, note, as I have already observed elsewhere, that election is distinguished into two kinds: one properly so called, namely the election of means, the other less properly so called, namely the election of persons unto an end. The first regards execution, as is clear; the second regards intention, because the person is the end to whom an end which, or that for whose sake, is intended. But that Augustine speaks, not of the election of persons unto the end for whose sake, but of the election or volition of means unto the end, is clear from his context. For he says first, that God does not have the purpose of justifying, or of granting justifying grace, because He finds good works which He chooses; but on the contrary, that He finds good works which He chooses because He has the purpose of granting justifying grace; for works are not merits and eligible means unto the kingdom, except as informed by justifying grace. Whence he rightly adds, that election — namely of works or merits — does not precede justification, but on the contrary that justification precedes the election of works. He adds: no one is chosen — namely by reason of works — unless he is already distinct from him who is rejected, because the election of a person unto the kingdom by reason of works is the same as the election of works unto the kingdom; for works are not chosen apart from the person. But it is most true that in the election of works, or of a person by reason of works — which, as has been said, belongs to the order of execution — no one is chosen unless he is distinct and distinguished from him who is rejected. And hence he rightly concludes that what is said, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, is not said except by foreknowledge, from which this executive election of means was disposed and ordered from eternity.

§ III. — Objections from reason are answered.

You will object 1°, with Tournely: God intends glory for the predestined as a crown and reward. But a crown and reward cannot be intended except on account of merits. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. A crown and reward necessarily implies a relation to merits, no less than a father to a son. Therefore.

I answer. Granted the major, I deny the minor. For God, by His antecedent will, intends glory for all as a crown, since He orders all to glory to be obtained through merits; and yet, as even the adversaries admit, He does not intend it on account of foreseen merits. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent. A crown and reward necessarily implies a relation to merits as to an effect or a motive, I concede; always as to a motive, I deny. In the order of intention it implies a relation to merit as to an effect, because God intends glory to be obtained through merits, and because, in willing the end thus, He wills the merits; but in the order of execution, it implies a relation to merits as movers. Hence in the order of intention the merits are caused, in the order of execution they are causing; for what is first in intention is last in execution, and what is last in intention is first in execution.

You will insist: What is intended as a crown and reward is intended as a debt of justice. Therefore it presupposes merits as motives and causes.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. What is intended as a crown and reward is intended as a debt of justice to be exercised in the order of execution, I concede the antecedent; as a debt of justice exercised in that order of intention, I deny the antecedent. For God wills to give glory gratuitously, but He does not will to give gratuitously; that is, He wills to give independently of merits, but He does not will to give without merits. Thus a king, gratuitously, out of mere liberality, proposes to give a reward to the victor in a contest; yet he does not will to give it gratuitously, but on account of the victory: and there justice is exercised, not indeed in the first intention, which is purely gratuitous.

You will urge: The reward stands to merit just as punishment stands to fault. But God does not will punishment except with fault presupposed. Therefore neither reward, except with merits presupposed.

I answer. I distinguish the major. The reward stands to merit just as punishment stands to fault, in the order of execution, I concede, because, just as the reward is in fact rendered on account of merit, so punishment is inflicted on account of fault; in the order of intention, I deny. The disparity is that punishment, as punishment simply, is not good, but only on the supposition of fault, which, since it likewise is not good, cannot be willed by God. Hence it is repugnant that God should first will the punishment, and on account of the punishment will the fault. But both reward and merit are simply good, and both are from God. Since, however, the reward is the end and the greater good, God intends it first, and then the merits, as means to it.

Tournely objects, 2°: God preordains things from eternity in the same way that He does them in time. But He confers glory in time on the predestined on account of merits. Therefore He preordained from eternity to confer it on account of merits.

I answer, I concede the whole. For in truth God from eternity preordained to confer glory in time on account of merits, yet He did not preordain it on account of merits, but by a gratuitous will.

Tournely insists. Does there not seem to be a kind of conflict and contradiction in God, if He should will at once to destine glory gratuitously, and to render that same glory as wages and reward? Does it not conflict that the same thing should be destined at once, and in the same instant of reason, both out of pure mercy and out of justice?

I answer that there is no conflict or contradiction here, except in the mind of Tournely, who does not distinguish between giving glory gratuitously and willing to give glory gratuitously. God wills to give glory gratuitously, and not on account of merits; yet He does not will to give it except through merits and on account of merits: and these in no way conflict with each other, as is clear from what has been said.

Tournely urges: The decree by which God would intend from eternity to confer glory gratuitously would, without doubt, be absolute and efficacious. Therefore, by force of this decree, glory would have to be granted gratuitously; otherwise God would decree what He would not execute, or would execute what He had not decreed from eternity, and would perform one thing in execution while decreeing another in intention: which things certainly seem to conflict with one another.

I answer. Tournely always strays on the same string. We do not say that God intends from eternity to confer glory gratuitously, but we say that God from eternity gratuitously intends to confer glory through merits and on account of merits, and this He executes in time.

§ IV. — The objections from untoward consequences are resolved.

It is objected: Predestination before foreseen merits, 1° does not sufficiently provide for the edification and consolation of the faithful, 2° does not sufficiently agree with the sweetness of divine providence and the goodness of God, 3° renders God's promises and threats vain and illusory. Therefore.

Proof of the first untoward consequence. If God, before foreseen merits, chooses a few and abandons an almost innumerable multitude, who would not be troubled, crushed, lose heart, and be led into torpor at this terrible view, rightly presuming himself to be rather in the great number of the reprobate than in the small number of the predestined? On the other hand, if he hears that predestination does not occur except after foreseen merits, and that it awaits the free will, that it is in his own power and will to be among the number of those to be saved, and that his lot thus ultimately depends on himself, so that by his consent to a versatile grace he can secure it for himself: his mind is calmed, looking upon his salvation not as uncertain, as in the former opinion, but as placed in his own hand; he rejoices and becomes eager for good works, by which he may attain so great a benefit. For this reason Lessius says that he was chiefly moved to embrace this opinion.

Proof of the second untoward consequence. The goodness of divine providence requires that it provide for all the things necessary for salvation, sincerely take care of all, and abandon no one unless it is first abandoned by him, as Scripture indicates, Ezechiel, XXXIII, 11: I will not the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted; Psalm CXLIV, 9: The Lord is sweet to all; Wisdom, VI, 8: He has equal care for all; I Timothy, II, 4: He wills all men to be saved, etc. But this would not be so, if independently of foreseen merits or demerits he took up some and abandoned others. Moreover, since God's goodness toward all is so great, if their salvation depended solely on his good pleasure, the number of those to be saved would not be so small. It depends, therefore, on something on our part, by whose defect it happens that so few are saved, namely, on the fact that few consent to grace and persevere in it.

Proof of the third untoward consequence. If predestination to glory is posited before foreseen merits, God mocks the reprobate, and beguiles them with vain hope, while he promises them glory on condition of perseverance in good, which depends on himself, and which he does not will to give them. Likewise he mocks the elect and terrifies them with a vain fear, while he threatens to exclude them from the kingdom if they do not persevere in good, though he has determined by an immutable and infallible decree to give both the kingdom and perseverance. For what would he have them fear? That they be damned? That cannot stand together with predestination. That predestination be revoked? It is irrevocable.

To the first, I answer 1° that this untoward consequence tells equally against the system of the Congruists. For who would not be troubled and crushed, if he heard that God, according to his good pleasure, gives to a few congruous grace with which they will certainly persevere in good, and without which they would not persevere, while denying it to an almost innumerable multitude of others?

I answer 2° that our opinion is far more suited to the edification and consolation of the faithful than the opinion of Lessius and Molina; because, according to us, our salvation is committed to the omnipotent hand of God, whereas according to Lessius and Molina, it is committed to our own frailty. But who would not trust God more than himself, unless he were proud, rather than humble and conscious of his own weakness? For no one is unaware, on the testimony of Scripture and his own experience, that he, however just he may be, has within himself the tinder of cupidity and concupiscence, to which, if he is allowed free rein for even a little while, he will withdraw himself from the inclination of grace and fall: The sense and thought of the human heart, says Scripture, Genesis, VIII, 21, are prone to evil from his youth; and the Apostle, to the Romans, VII, 18, says of himself: I know that good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh; and, ibid., 23: I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind and holding me captive in the law of sin. Whence Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 12, n. 28, says that « if their own will were left to men, so that they might remain, if they willed, in the help of God — without which (that is, without sufficient help) they could not persevere — and God did not himself work in them that they should will it amid so many and so great temptations, the will itself would succumb through its own weakness. » If, then, I say, a Christian man, truly humble and well aware of his own frailty, amid so many and so great dangers and temptations of life, so many deceits of Satan and assaults of the passions, should hear that God, in accomplishing the work of salvation, has prepared for him certain indifferent helps, thus left to human free choice, such that he gives their use to no one, but awaits it from us; would he not at once lose heart and despair of his salvation? On the other hand, if he hears that God has chosen some to glory, and has prepared for them, for its infallible attainment, the strongest and most invincible helps, hope will already dawn that he will obtain through God's help what he would not have obtained by his own weakness, if God had prepared only indifferent helps; and his hope will be all the firmer, the more humbly he thinks of himself and the more he distrusts himself, and the more he trusts in the Lord, knowing that God will save the humble people, Psalm, XVII, 28, and will surround with mercy him who hopes in the Lord, Psalm, XXXI, 10. And although, notwithstanding these things, he is not yet altogether certain of God's will, he is nevertheless far more uncertain of his own will; nor does the small number of the elect terrify him, because he well knows that, if men were left to themselves, far fewer still would be elect — indeed, none at all. This whole solution is Augustine's, answering a similar objection made to him by the Semi-Pelagians. It is fitting to hear him, On the Gift of Perseverance, chap. 17, n. 45: « I do not wish, he says, to exaggerate in my words, but I would rather leave it to them to consider, that they may see what sort of thing it is that they have persuaded themselves of, namely, that the preaching of predestination brings more despair than exhortation to those who hear it. For this is to say that a man then despairs of his salvation, when he has learned to place his hope not in himself, but in God, though the Prophet cries out, Jeremiah, XVII, 5: Cursed is every one who has hope in man. » And On the Predestination of the Saints, chap. 11, n. 21: « Since the Apostle says, Romans, IV, 16: Therefore of faith, that according to grace the promise might be sure, I marvel that men prefer to commit themselves to their own weakness, rather than to the firmness of God's promise. But, you say, God's will concerning myself is uncertain to me. What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you, and do you not fear, I Corinthians, X, 12: Let him who thinks he stands, take heed lest he fall? Since, therefore, both are uncertain, why does not man entrust his faith, hope, and charity rather to the firmer than to the weaker? » And chap. 6, n. 12, On the Gift of Perseverance: « We live more securely, if we give the whole to God. But we do not commit ourselves partly to him, and partly to ourselves. »

To the second, I deny the minor. For God provides sufficient helps for all, sincerely takes care of all, and abandons no one unless first abandoned by him; but it belongs to the sweetness of his providence that he provide for each one according to each one's condition, and accordingly that, among defectible things, he permit some to fail, and preserve others from failure: so that in the latter the power of grace may appear, and in the former the condition of nature. And thus our adversaries themselves answer, when they are asked why God permits sin, since he could prevent it. Because, they say, the sweetness of providence so requires, that the condition of free will be preserved.

As for what is added, that, since God is infinitely good, if our salvation depended solely on his good pleasure, the number of those to be saved would not be so small.

I answer: I deny the inference; because, although God is infinitely good, the outpouring of his goodness must nevertheless be so tempered that the condition of defectible nature be preserved, room be given to justice, other attributes be manifested, and the remaining ends of general providence be safeguarded, as has been said. Whence, that he does not save all, or not more, does not derogate from divine goodness, but indicates that his goodness is orderly. And thus our adversaries too are bound to answer in the same way; for it is certain, on every opinion, that God could save all: and if he does not do so, he himself is not the cause, but some defect on our part, which indeed he could remove, but which his most wise and most orderly goodness does not require him to remove. I add that, on the opinion of our adversaries, according to which God prepares for us only sufficient helps, so left to free will that they do not give but await its consent, not merely fewer, but none at all would be saved, as is clear from the answer to the first untoward consequence. In this, however, according to us, the divine goodness shines forth most of all, in that he confers on those whom he has chosen the strongest and most invincible helps, by which they are most certainly brought to salvation.

To the third, I answer 1° that this untoward consequence must equally be resolved both by the Congruists and by the pure Molinists. By the Congruists, because, on the supposition that God has decreed to give to one the congruous grace of final perseverance, and not to another, the attainment of glory is assured to the first, and exclusion from glory is assured to the other. He mocks, then, the first, while threatening to exclude him from the kingdom if he does not keep the commandments; he mocks the other, while promising him the kingdom if he keeps the commandments to the end, since he knows for certain both that the one will certainly keep them and that the other will certainly not keep them in the end. By the pure Molinists, because predestination is now certainly made, in whatever way it was made, and those who are predestined will certainly be saved, and those who are not will certainly not be saved. God, then, mocks the predestined, while threatening to exclude them from the kingdom if they do not persevere in good; he also mocks the reprobate, while promising them the kingdom if they persevere in good: since it is certain and infallible that the predestined will persevere, and the reprobate will not persevere.

I answer 2° that this untoward consequence in no way follows from gratuitous predestination, if it be supposed, as is indeed the case: 1° that no one is certain that he is among the number of the predestined; 2° that predestination, in its execution, depends on free and good works and on perseverance in them to the end; 3° that man, under gratuitous predestination, enjoys freedom for good or evil just as much as if there were no predestination, as I shall now say and as we have proved several times elsewhere; 4° that the kingdom is granted to the humble, who distrust themselves but trust in the Lord, and denied to the proud, who trust in themselves. On these suppositions, I say, God mocks neither the reprobate by his promises, nor the elect by his threats. He does not mock the reprobate, in promising them the kingdom on condition of good works, because they can do those good works. He knows indeed that they will not do them, but this is their own fault, and because they voluntarily resist these promises and various other graces; nor is God on that account bound to fail in the office of universal provider, whose part it is to urge all to good, both by threats, and by promises, and by other means. He could indeed break their resistance by his efficacious grace, but he owes it to no one, nor does the order of providence require it. Do our adversaries, and especially Tournely in many places, hold that God has in his treasuries graces by which he can break the hardness of all sinners? Why then does he not break it? Because it neither pleases him, nor is he bound to. Nor does he mock the elect, by threatening to exclude them from the kingdom if they do not perform good works; because the execution of predestination takes place only through good works, and these the elect so freely do, that they could fail to do them. They do not, then, fear that they will perish, if they are predestined, nor that predestination will be revoked; but they fear that they may not be among the number of the predestined, because this is uncertain to them, and from this same uncertainty they fear lest they fall and perish. I add that this fear is usefully instilled in them by God, that they may be more humble, and that thereby their predestination may be certainly fulfilled.

Whether reprobation exists, and what it is?

I say 1°: There is in God a reprobation of certain persons¹. For it pertains to the providence of the universal provider that, among the defectible things subject to it, it should permit some to fail, for the good of the whole universe. But by divine providence intellectual creatures, defectible by their own nature, are ordained to glory. Therefore it pertains to this providence to permit some to fail from that end, and this is called to reprobate. Likewise, God executes nothing in time that He has not decreed from eternity. But in time He reprobates some, as is clear from that text, Matth., XXV, 41: Depart from me, you cursed. Therefore.

I say 2°: Reprobation does not consist in the mere negation of predestination, but in a positive act by which God wills to permit some, by their own fault, to fail from glory, and on account of the fault to inflict the punishment of damnation.

The reason is that reprobation is an objective part of providence²; but providence implies a positive act both of the intellect and of the will. And otherwise possible angels and men could be called reprobate, because they are not predestined.

Hence you will infer 1° that reprobation, no differently than providence, of which it is an objective part, consists in an act of the intellect presupposing an act of the will.

You will infer 2° that reprobation is rightly defined by the Author³ as the providence concerning those who fail from the end, with the will of permitting the fault, and on account of the fault of inflicting the punishment of damnation; or, what is the same thing, the decree by which God wills to permit that some, by their own fault, fall from glory, and for the fault to inflict the punishment of damnation.

You will infer 3° that, although reprobation is one, it can nevertheless be divided into negative and positive, as into two inadequate functions. For when it is defined as the will of permitting that some, by their own fault, fail from glory, and on account of the fault of inflicting the punishment of damnation: insofar as it implies the will of permitting that some, by their own fault, fail from the end, it is called negative; not that it is not a positive act, as has been said, but because it effects nothing, but only permits, and to permit is, as it were, to be disposed negatively; but insofar as it implies the ordination of the fault to eternal punishment, it is called positive, because now it decrees something to be done, namely, the punishment to be inflicted. Whence negative reprobation includes only the term from which, namely, the glory from which the reprobate are permitted to fail; but positive reprobation includes, in addition, the term to which, namely, the pain of loss and of sense which God decrees for them.

The question concerns reprobation as such, insofar as it regards angels and men; but whether something special, namely original sin, enters into the motive of the reprobation of men, I shall say below.

Likewise, the question concerns reprobation both positive and negative. But it must be observed that many Thomists understand by negative reprobation not, as we do, the simple permission of falling short of glory, but a positive exclusion from it as from an unowed benefit, which they therefore hold to be gratuitous and independent of foreseen demerits: this we shall impugn in the following §. Whence, in order that we may first lay down what is certain among all Catholics, let it be:

§ I. — On the motive of positive reprobation.

I say: Positive reprobation, both of angels and of men, is from foreseen demerits: that is, God decrees the punishment of eternal damnation to no one except on account of foreseen sins. So hold all Catholics, against Calvin and the other predestinarians.

Proof 1° from all those passages of Scripture in which God's goodness is commended, especially in this, that he does not will punishments and torments except as it were compelled by our demerits. Ezech. 33:11: I desire not the death of the wicked, but that he be converted, and live; Wisd. 1:13,16: God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living... But the wicked with works and words have called it to them.

2° From the Fathers. Damascene, bk. II On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 26: «God is moved of himself to show mercy, but to punish only on the presupposition of guilt.» Augustine, bk. III Against Julian, ch. 18, n. 35: «God is good, God is just. He can free some without good merits, because he is good; he cannot damn anyone without evil merits, because he is just.» This is true not only of the execution itself of damnation, but also of the intention itself; for a just judge not only does not punish, but does not even intend to punish, except on the presupposition of guilt.

3° By reason. God wills nothing except insofar as it has the character of a good. But punishment does not of itself have the character of a good, but only on the presupposition of guilt; for it is not a good that someone be punished, unless he has sinned: indeed the contrary would be evil and unjust, and therefore punishment is called an occasioned good. Therefore God does not will punishment except on the presupposition of guilt.

And hence it is clear why, in predestination, glory can be intended as a crown and reward before foreseen merits, although in execution it depends on merits; but punishment cannot be intended before foreseen demerits: because, namely, a crown and reward is something good of itself, and therefore can be first efficaciously willed, and the means prepared from its volition; but punishment, as I have said, is only an occasioned good arising from presupposed guilt. Another difference is that predestination is the cause of the means that lead to glory; but reprobation is not the cause of that which leads to punishment, namely, of guilt. Whence God can will gratuitously to give someone glory as a reward, before he foresees merits on that one's part, because he himself is the one who confers them; but it is repugnant to his justice and goodness that he should will punishment for someone before he foresees some demerit on that one's part. And thus the principal objection is forestalled.

§ II. — On the motive of negative reprobation.

The positive exclusion from glory under the title of an undue benefit is impugned.

Our contest here is with certain Thomists, who locate negative reprobation, both of angels and of men, in a positive exclusion from glory as from an undue benefit, and thus hold it to be gratuitous and prior to foreseen demerits. From this intention of positively excluding from glory, they hold that God proceeds to prepare a means by which this exclusion may be had, namely the permission of sin, which once foreseen, He decrees for those thus excluded the eternal punishment of damnation, namely the pain of sense and the pain of loss, which is the very exclusion from glory, no longer as from an undue benefit, but as a punishment for guilt. For they hold that the first exclusion from the kingdom is not a punishment, but only the second; because, they say, the first is a mere negation of a thing not owed, the second is a privation on account of guilt: just as, if a king should deny someone a dignity which is not owed to him, it is not a punishment; but if he should deny it to him on account of his demerits, being otherwise about to grant it, it is a punishment. So hold Alvarez, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Contenson, and others.

We, however, do not acknowledge a negative reprobation of this kind, of which we find not even a trace in St. Thomas, and we judge it to be harsher. We say, rather, with the Holy Doctor, as is clear from the preceding article, that negative reprobation is nothing other than the will of permitting that some, by their own will and fault, fail of glory, and we grant that it is prior to foreseen demerits, as we shall say once we have shown the present opinion of certain Thomists to be less true. Hence

I say: God positively excludes no one from glory under the title of an undue benefit, and before foreseen demerits. And thus negative reprobation is not the will of excluding from glory before guilt, but is the will of permitting that some fall from glory by their own guilt. So hold, after Capreolus, Cajetan, here a. 5, Ferrariensis, Contra gent. III, ch. 161, Nazarius, here a. 3, controversy I, Marcus Serra, here a. 3, doubt 2, ad 2, the most learned Fathers Anton. Goudin, tract 3, q. 3, a. 1, On Reprobation, and Hyacinth de Graveson, class 3 of the Letters, letter 9, from whom we shall borrow in large part what we are about to say here.

Proof, 1°, by an argument drawn from Scripture. According to Scripture, and especially the Apostle, God, as far as it is from Himself, sincerely wills that all be saved, so that their damnation proceeds from themselves alone. But if God, before any guilt foreseen on the part of the reprobate, had decreed positively to exclude him from glory and eternal salvation, and were to seek out means for that as for an end intended by Himself, it is plain that, as far as it is from Himself, He would not merely not will him to be saved, but on the contrary would will him to be excluded from salvation and to perish forever. Therefore before sin there was no such will in God, but a bare permission that some, by their own will and guilt, should fall from eternal life.

The adversaries answer that the will for the salvation of the reprobate is antecedent, which does not preclude the consequent will of excluding them from salvation and eternal life.

But on the contrary. Indeed the consequent will of excluding from salvation on account of the circumstance of guilt on the part of the reprobate does not stand in the way of the will of saving, as far as is on the part of God; for it is not repugnant that God, as far as it is from Himself, should will to save some whom, nevertheless, in view of their guilt, He wills actually to damn: as is explained by the example of a judge, who wills a thief to be put to death on account of his guilt, whom he would have willed to live before the guilt. But the consequent will of excluding from salvation and glory apart from any guilt in no way stands together with the antecedent will of saving, as far as is on the part of God. For by what other circumstance, besides guilt, could God be moved so that, without contradiction, He should consequently will to exclude from glory and salvation those whom antecedently, as far as it is from Himself, He wills to be saved? Not that the defectibility of free will might be shown, not that He might allow creatures to carry out their own movements, not that we might recognize the necessity of grace, not that it might be shown that efficacious grace is owed to no one, not that the virtue of others might shine forth the more, nor any other similar circumstances; for to all these things exclusion from glory before foreseen guilt contributes nothing, but all these things flow from the permission of guilt alone. If you should say: that it might be shown that glory is owed to no one; I answer that this is sufficiently shown by permitting that some should fail of it. Moreover, I shall say presently that to those ordained to glory by the antecedent will, it is in some sense owed.

Proof, 2°, from St. Thomas, who, in explaining reprobation, never makes mention of that positive will of excluding from glory before guilt, but explains it by the bare permission of failing of the last end and falling into guilt, and, this being supposed, of inflicting the punishment of damnation: « It belongs, says the Holy Doctor, here a. 3, obj., to divine providence to permit some to fail of that end [glory], and this is called reprobating. » And at the end of the body [of the article]: « Reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for the guilt. »

Proof, 3°, by a reason already proposed more than once from St. Thomas. God wills each thing according as it has the nature of a good. But that someone ordained to glory, as to his highest good, should be excluded from it, is not of itself good, but only if by guilt he shows himself unworthy of it: hence in actual execution no one is excluded from it except on account of guilt; indeed, according to the order of justice, it cannot happen otherwise. Therefore.

It is confirmed. God does not will punishment before guilt, as the adversaries grant. But to be excluded from glory forever is the gravest punishment and the height of misery, indeed the very essential damnation, namely the pain of loss. Therefore.

I know that the adversaries answer that the exclusion from glory in execution, as it is a privation of beatitude on account of guilt, is indeed a punishment of damnation, but not likewise in intention, as from an undue benefit: just as, they say, if a king should deny someone a dignity which is not owed to him, it is not a punishment; but if he should deny it on account of guilt, being otherwise about to grant it, it is a punishment.

( But on the contrary: 1° Glory, whether it be an owed benefit or not — of which presently — as things nevertheless stand, is the highest and only true good of the rational creature, outside of which nothing remains for it but the height of misery. Therefore, under whatever title this exclusion be decreed before guilt, it is nothing other than to decree the height of misery before guilt. And this is all the more true because, the elevation of man to the supernatural order being supposed, his natural happiness is so joined with the supernatural, that the natural cannot be had apart from the supernatural. Hence to be excluded from the supernatural is to be excluded from the natural. Wherefore, if God, before guilt, willed to exclude the reprobate from glory, by that very fact He willed to exclude them from their natural happiness, that is, He willed the innocent to be forever supernaturally and naturally miserable. And hence the example adduced does not help the adversaries, but rather stands against them. For granted that it is not a punishment when a king denies someone a dignity not owed to him, without which he can lead a happy life; yet if he had so ordained someone to a certain dignity that his whole happiness consisted in it, and without it he would be utterly miserable, by that very fact by which he denied it to him, he would cast him down from his whole happiness and render him utterly miserable. Since, therefore, God has ordained every intellectual creature to glory as to its happiness, so that outside of it a creature can be nothing but miserable, both naturally and supernaturally, under whatever title He excludes it from glory, He constitutes it miserable. )

2° The response of the adversaries supposes something false, namely that glory stands in relation to the reprobate as something wholly undue. For, by this very fact that man is ordained by God to glory, glory, by force of this ordination, becomes in a certain way owed to him, and he has to it a right at least inchoate, resting not indeed on his own merits, but on the fidelity and sincerity of the divine ordination; from which, therefore, God cannot exclude him, unless by his own guilt he shows himself unworthy of it.

Proof, lastly, from the self-contradiction of the opposite opinion. The adversaries say that God, in the business of reprobation, began from the intention of manifesting His punitive justice, and by force of this intention immediately excluded the reprobate from glory as from an undue benefit, and afterward decreed to permit guilt. But exclusion from an undue benefit, and before guilt, is a means wholly unsuited, indeed repugnant, to the showing of punitive justice, as is evident, because it rather shows that punitive justice has no place in it. Therefore.

We judge, therefore, that it must be said, and firmly held, that God, before guilt, not only does not will to exclude anyone from glory, but even wills, as far as it is from Himself, that all attain to it, yet according as their condition and the order of His wisdom allows: and this is the will sincerely ordaining all to glory, and preparing for them the means. But, because free will can fail, and has its unfailingness from God alone, therefore God from eternity purposed that He would permit some to fail of glory through their own guilt; for so demanded both the condition of a defectible nature, and the order of providence, and the very good of the universe and the splendor of justice, which would have no place if no guilt were permitted, or if, once permitted, it were blotted out through mercy. To others, however, He purposed to apply efficacious helps, lest they should fail, but that they should infallibly attain to glory. And thus was made the election of the former, but the reprobation of the latter begun. But the defect of guilt, now foreseen, God orders to the good of justice, by decreeing for it the punishment of damnation; and thus reprobation is completed, which, as I have said, is the will of permitting guilt, and of inflicting, for the guilt, the punishment of damnation.

The objections are resolved.

You will object, 1°, with our Gonet, that passage to the Romans, IX, 11: When they had not yet done anything good or evil, it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. There the reprobate, figured by Esau, are said to have been held in hatred, when they had not yet done anything evil. But by that hatred is understood the will of excluding from the kingdom. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the minor. For hatred there is taken broadly and improperly for a lesser love, inasmuch as God did not will salvation for the reprobate, as He willed it for the elect, by a consequent will. So St. Thomas explains this passage, in III Sent., dist. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4.

You will object, 2°, with the same author, that solemn passage of St. Thomas' commentary to Hannibaldus, d. 41, a. 3: « To the divine will regarding the salvation of man a twofold will seems to be opposed, namely a will of contradiction, according to which He wills someone not to be saved, and a will of contrariety, according to which He wills someone to be damned. The first will does not require any reason on the part of the thing willed, since the salvation of glory is not a debt of human nature, for no reason is required why I do not give to one to whom I am not obliged to give; but the will of damnation regards the reason of the thing willed in the one damned, since damnation is inflicted out of what is due. » But to will not to save is the same as to will to exclude from glory. Therefore.

I answer, 1°, that our most learned Father Echard proves by many arguments that this work to Hannibaldus is not St. Thomas', especially because before Thomas Nerius, in the year 1560, none of our own listed it among the works of the Holy Doctor, neither Ptolemy of Lucca, nor Bernard Guidonis, nor William of Tocco, nor St. Antoninus, nor others. On the contrary, this commentary is cited under the name of Brother Hannibaldus the Cardinal by several ancient authors: by our own Rainerius of Pisa, in his Pantheologia — he was writing in the year 1333; by Bandellus, in the treatise On the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, ch. 23; by Denis the Carthusian, in II, d. 1, q. 1, p. 9, and elsewhere.

I answer, 2°. But, granted that this work is a genuine offspring of St. Thomas, the adversaries thereby gain nothing. For I deny the minor of the argument: because the author, by the will of not saving, does not understand the will of excluding from glory, for this is opposed to the will of saving not merely contradictorily, but contrarily, and is the same as the will of damning: for just as God, when in execution He excludes the reprobate from glory, truly damns them; so, when He wills to exclude, He wills to damn. Therefore the author, by the will of not saving, understands only the will of not helping efficaciously toward salvation; for this is what is opposed contradictorily and not contrarily to the will of saving, and which does not require a reason on our part. For although glory is owed to one who has grace, unless by guilt he shows himself unworthy, yet it is not owed to him that he be infallibly brought to glory through efficacious helps; and in this sense the author said that the salvation of glory is not owed to human nature, namely that it be conferred on it efficaciously and infallibly. Hence, even before guilt, God can, under the title of an undue benefit, will not to save him, that is, not to help him efficaciously; which is to will to permit that he fall from glory through guilt.

But you will say: Whether this exclusion be explained by way of a positive will of rejecting from glory, or by a mere permission of failing of it, the same effect will follow; for the reprobate will equally infallibly fail of glory and perish. Therefore it is in vain that a positive exclusion is denied, in order that a permissive one be established.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The same effect will follow on the part of the reprobate, I concede; on the part of God, I deny. For, according to the former way, God would be the author of why some are not saved, because He Himself would be the one who repelled them from salvation and prepared means to that end, which must in no way be granted; but, according to the latter way, it is clearly understood that no one falls from glory by the will of God, but only by his own guilt, God comporting Himself toward this only permissively: just as, whether God decrees guilt by an effective decree, as Calvin holds, or by a merely permissive decree, as Catholics hold, guilt will equally infallibly follow; but with this difference, that on the former hypothesis God would be the author of sin, not on the second. Since, therefore, God must not be called the author of perdition (which consists in exclusion from glory) any more than of guilt: just as we say that God only permits sin, so we must say that God only permits that some, by their own guilt, fail of glory.

§ III. — The motive of negative reprobation is asserted.

We always understand negative reprobation as we have hitherto defined and defended it from St. Thomas, namely, the will to permit that some, by their own fault, fail of glory. It can, however, be considered in two ways, either absolutely or comparatively: absolutely, as it is the reprobation of some; comparatively, as it is the reprobation of these rather than of those, and the question is asked about both.

I say, 1°: The motive of negative reprobation, taken absolutely, is not sought from the foreseen demerits of the reprobate, but from the divine goodness.¹

Proof of the first part, 1°, from that saying of the Apostle to the Romans, IX, 12 and 13: When as yet they had done nothing good or evil... Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated; which hatred, as has been said, is understood as a lesser love, by which certain ones are left to their own defectibility, without the special helps that preserve from defect; which is to reprobate negatively. From which St. Augustine, Epistle 194², ch. 3, n. 14 and following; book II Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 7, n. 13 and following, and the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8, n. 15 and following, shows that no merits of an evil action are the cause of reprobation.

Proof, 2°. Negative reprobation precedes the sin of the reprobate; for it is, as we have said, the will to permit that some sin, and by sinning fail of glory. Therefore the sin of the reprobate cannot be its motive.

Proof, and the second part is explained by the reasoning of St. Thomas³: « From the divine goodness itself a reason can be taken for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. For thus it is said that God made all things on account of His own goodness, that the divine goodness might be represented in things. But it is necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, be represented in things in manifold ways, because created things cannot attain to the divine simplicity. And hence it is that for the completion of the universe diverse grades of things are required, of which some hold a high and some the lowest place in the universe. And that the manifoldness of grades may be preserved in things, God permits certain evils to happen, lest many goods be hindered. Let us, then, consider the whole human race just as the whole universe of things. God willed, therefore, in men — as to some, whom He predestines, to represent His goodness by way of mercy, in sparing them; and as to some, whom He reprobates, by way of justice, in punishing them. And this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others. And this cause the Apostle assigns, to the Romans, IX, 22 and 23, saying: Willing to show his wrath, that is, the vengeance of justice, and to make known his power, endured, that is, permitted, with much patience vessels of wrath, fit for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory. And in II to Timothy, II, 20, he says: In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some indeed unto honor, but some unto dishonor. »

Therefore, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, the motive of reprobation is sought from the divine goodness, which God willed to represent in manifold ways — in the elect by way of mercy, in sparing them; in the reprobate by way of justice, in punishing them: and so the good of justice is the reason for negative reprobation. It is not, however, the total reason, nor one excluding other reasons, such as the completion and the good of the universe, which would be deprived of many goods if all defects were prevented, and the office of universal provider, and the reason of a gentle providence, by which provision is made for each according to his own condition and need — for the defectible, defectibly.

I say, 2°: Negative reprobation, taken comparatively, has no reason but the divine will. Thus, in these very terms, the Holy Doctor, adding to the former words⁴: « But why He chose these unto glory and reprobated those has no reason but the divine will. » And this he proves, both from Augustine, Tract. 26 on John, n. 2, where he says: « Why He draws this one, and does not draw that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err; » and from examples in natural and artificial things: « Just as, he says, in natural things a reason can be assigned [since prime matter as a whole is in itself uniform] why one part of it is under the form of fire, and another under the form of earth, established by God in the beginning, so that there might thus be a diversity of species in natural things; but why this part of matter is under this form, and that under another, depends on the simple divine will: just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that one in another; although the reason of the art requires that some be in this place, and some in that. »

Reason also proves this. For among those who are equal in defectibility, no reason can be assigned why one rather than another is permitted by the provider to fail, apart from the will of the provider. But all creatures ordered to the supernatural end can equally fail from it through sin, and it is from God alone that they have it that they do not fail. Therefore it depends on the will of God alone that these rather than those are permitted to fail.

And this reasoning holds good in every opinion. For it is certain, in every opinion, that God could, by conferring more abundant helps, have preserved from sin and perdition all who sin and perish, just as He preserved others; or at least could have placed them in such a series of things in which, given the common helps, they would have used them well. Why, then, did He not do so? Because He did not will to.

You will say: God abandons no one, unless He is first abandoned by him through sin, as the Council of Trent says, sess. VI, ch. 11. But to will to permit that some fail of glory, which is to reprobate negatively, is to abandon them. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone negatively, except with a fault presupposed, by which He is abandoned.

I answer, 1°, that many understand what is said in the major to refer to abandonment through the withdrawal of sanctifying grace, which God withdraws from no one except on account of a preceding sin; but not to abandonment through the withdrawal of actual grace.

I answer, 2°. Granted that this abandonment is to be understood of the withdrawal of actual grace, I distinguish the major. God properly abandons no one, unless He is first abandoned by him, I concede the major; improperly, I deny the major. God, then, is understood to abandon someone in a twofold way: 1° by permitting him to his own defectibility, that is, by not preserving him from sin through a special and efficacious help not owed to him; yet without on that account withdrawing from him any of the ordinary helps by which, if he did not resist, he would arrive at good. And this is an improper abandonment, for which it is not necessary that man first abandon God through sin, since the permission of sin is included in that manner of abandoning, as is clear. 2° God is understood to abandon a man when He withdraws from him the common helps and the ordinary protection which He has toward the good, and this is properly to abandon; in which way God abandons no one, unless He is first abandoned by him through sin. This second dereliction is a punishment; the first is not.

You will reply: We taught above, in the preceding dissertation, a. 4, § 3, from St. Thomas, that no one is deprived of efficacious help except by his own fault; that is, that man is deprived of efficacious help, not because God does not will to give it, but because man does not will to receive it, and puts an obstacle, by sinning and resisting the sufficient helps. How then do we now say that God, before any fault, improperly abandons man, by withdrawing efficacious help from him?

I answer that these are reconciled thus. God, in conferring sufficient grace, has an antecedent will to confer efficacious grace, if man, by his own evil will, does not resist the sufficient grace. And thus it is true that man is deprived, on account of his fault, of the efficacious grace which God, in the conferring of the sufficient grace, willed by an antecedent will to give him. God could indeed impede the evil will; but, as universal provider and for higher ends, He wills, by a consequent will, through the withdrawal of that more abundant help, to permit him to his own evil will. And thus it is also true that, before any fault, he is deprived of that more abundant efficacious grace, by which he would in fact have been preserved from defect and evil will.

§ IV. — Whether original sin is the motive of the reprobation of men?

In order to separate the certain from the uncertain, I suppose, 1°, that original sin was a sufficient motive for the reprobation of all men: that is, that God could rightly, had He willed it, have reprobated all men on account of original sin, since, according to the Scriptures, we are born children of wrath and guilty of death both temporal and eternal. Hence the question is, whether the reprobation of men was actually brought about on account of it.

I suppose, 2°, that nothing prevents original sin, in those in whom it is not remitted, from actually entering into the motive of their reprobation, since it is foreseen prior to reprobation, and since some are actually damned on account of it.

I suppose, 3°, that original sin, in those in whom it has been remitted, can be said to concur in reprobation in a twofold sense: 1° insofar as it is the source and origin of actual sins on account of which, if they are final, men are reprobated. And in this sense original sin can be said to be the motive of the reprobation of those in whom it has been remitted, not formally and in itself, but radically and in its effects. And this is to say, not that original sin, but the actual sin flowing from the original, is the motive of reprobation. 2° Because, although original sin, insofar as it is a stain of the person, is removed by baptism, it is nevertheless not removed insofar as it is an infection of nature. For through original sin the weakness of nature was increased, and concupiscence made more unbridled, and these remain, once the guilt has been removed. Whence it comes about that man is more defectible and more prone to sin, and on account of this greater defectibility and proneness, requires more, from his condition, to be permitted to fail; and so original sin, in those in whom it has been remitted, by reason of this greater defectibility and more ardent concupiscence which it caused, and which, once the guilt itself has been removed, remain, can be said to concur in reprobation. But — and mark this well — this greater weakness or defectibility does not concur in reprobation as its motive, but only as a condition without which not, or as a disposition or aptitude on the part of the matter, just as the baseness of clay is not the motive why a potter fashions certain vessels unto dishonor. For however defectible nature might be, God would not permit it to fail except on account of some good, as we have already observed above; but that a defectible nature, having no guilt, be permitted to fail, precisely and in itself does not have the character of a good, except insofar as this defect is ordered to some good. Therefore this weakness of nature, increased by original sin, cannot be called the motive on account of which God permits some to fail; but, as has been said, it functions only as a condition without which not, or as a disposition of the matter for failing. The motive, however, must be sought from some good which God intends from that defect, such as the good of the universe, the manifestation of the attributes, especially of justice, etc. These things being supposed,

I say: Original sin is not the motive of the reprobation of those in whom it has been remitted.

Proof, 1°, from the authority of Scripture and the Council of Trent. Scripture testifies in many places that sins once remitted do not harm the sinner, nor does God remember them. Thus Ezekiel, XXXIII, 12: The wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him, in whatsoever day he shall be converted. And chapter XVIII, 22, concerning the wicked man who repents: I will not remember all his iniquities. And the Council of Trent, session V, canon 5, where it thus defines concerning original sin, from the Apostle, Romans, VIII, 1: «In those born again God hates nothing, because there is nothing of condemnation to those who are truly buried together with Christ through baptism.» But if, on account of original sin, God were to reprobate him in whom it has been remitted, this would harm him, God would remember it, He would have something of hatred in him, and something of condemnation would remain in him. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Through baptism God is so reconciled to man that He fully pardons the sin and the punishment of the sin, both eternal and temporal. But it is utterly repugnant to so full and sincere a reconciliation that God should retain the sin thus pardoned as a motive of reprobation; for these two are incompossible: I will efficaciously pardon original sin, and: I will efficaciously reprobate on account of it, or in punishment of it — just as it is incompossible that a judge should sincerely pardon a murderer's crime, and yet wish the murderer to be hanged on account of it; which, however, the opposite opinion must admit. Therefore.

Our Gonet answers that God, with respect to those in whom original sin has been remitted, accepted it as the motive of reprobation only as to intention, so that He did indeed reprobate them on account of original sin; but, in disposing of the means, He was unwilling to use that means, and instead took up actual sins: just as, he says, although predestination is gratuitous as to intention, it is not so as to execution.

But on the contrary: 1° This answer is given gratuitously, having no foundation in authority or in reason. 2° That decree of reprobation as to intention, according to the answer given, remains idle and useless. To what purpose, then, is it to imagine it in God? It is otherwise with the intentive decree of predestination, by virtue of which the means are put in place.

Others answer that original sin can be considered in a twofold way, as it is a stain of the person and as it is an infection of nature. Under the first aspect, they say, it is removed by baptism and is not the motive of reprobation; under the second, it remains and is the motive of reprobation.

But on the contrary, I infer: Therefore something of condemnation remains in those born again. Nowhere indeed can our adversaries escape this difficulty; for whatever you should say remains from original sin as a motive of reprobation, you will be forced to admit that something of condemnation remains. But, since the difficulty is chiefly about the mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas,

Proof, 2°, of the conclusion from each of the two holy Doctors. St. Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 8, nn. 17 and 18, sets up this very question of ours. For he asks the reason and cause why God should reprobate those to whom He has bestowed His grace and remitted original sin, by denying them the gift of perseverance: which is, I say, the very same question we are now treating. But he does not resolve it by recourse to original sin, as he would have had to do, had he recognized that original sin, in those in whom it has been remitted, was the cause and motive of their reprobation; rather he answers simply that he does not know, and takes refuge in the inscrutable judgments of God: «If it should be asked of me, he says, why God did not give perseverance to those to whom He gave the love by which they might live as Christians, I answer that I do not know. For not arrogantly, but recognizing my own small measure, I hear the Apostle saying, Romans, III, 9: O man, who art thou that repliest against God? and, ibid., XI, 33: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How inscrutable are his judgments!... It is indeed a matter for wonder, and greatly for wonder, that to certain of His own sons, whom He has regenerated in Christ, to whom He has given faith, hope, and love, God does not give perseverance; while He forgives such great crimes to the sons of others, and, having imparted His grace to them, makes them His own sons. Who would not wonder at this?» Likewise St. Thomas, when he treats professedly of reprobation, as here, a. 3, does not refer it to original sin as to its cause, but to certain general principles common to angels and men, such as the defectibility of nature, and the character of general providence, which must permit certain defects, and on account of them inflict punishment for the manifestation of its justice.

But you will say: St. Augustine, in arguing against the Pelagians, constantly has recourse to original sin as the motive of reprobation in men: «Let him who is freed, he says, chapter 8, n. 16, On the Gift of Perseverance [from the mass of perdition], love grace; let him who is not freed, acknowledge the debt.» And Epistle 194⁵, c. 3, n. 14: «We seek the merit of the hardening, and we find it. For by the merit of sin the whole mass has been condemned.» And innumerable similar passages.

I answer, 1°, that the words of Augustine, if not explained, would imply that all men, not only in intention but also in execution, are hardened, reprobated, and damned on account of original sin; which our adversaries do not admit, nor should any Catholic admit it, in those in whom it has been remitted through baptism.

I answer, 2°. I distinguish the antecedent: that St. Augustine, in arguing against the Pelagians, constantly has recourse to original sin as a sufficient motive of reprobation, I concede; as to a motive actually accepted, I deny. It is explained. The Pelagians contended that God would be an unjust respecter of persons, if He reprobated some over others without foreseen demerits. To silence this complaint, Augustine answers that no one has just cause to complain, since all are in the mass of perdition through original sin, and thence have in themselves a sufficient motive of reprobation. But whether this motive was actually accepted, in those in whom it has been remitted, Augustine does not discuss in these passages, because the Pelagians' objection did not require it; but elsewhere, when he treats this question professedly, not only does he not assert it, but on the contrary he says that he does not know the cause of this reprobation, as we have seen.

I answer, 3°, that St. Augustine often refers reprobation to original sin, not formally and in itself, but radically and by reason of its effects, namely either the actual sins which arise from the original, or by reason of the greater weakness and defectibility left behind by original sin; not that this is the motive of reprobation, but because it concurs with it as a condition and a greater disposition toward failure, as we said above.

You will insist: St. Augustine expressly asserts that original sin was even the accepted motive of the reprobation of those in whom it has been remitted; for he says, Epistle 194⁶, c. 8, n. 34: «What did God love in Jacob, before he was born or had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of His mercy? And what did He hate in Esau, before he had done anything evil, except original sin?» But original sin had been remitted in Esau, who, being the son of Isaac, was undoubtedly circumcised.

I answer as before: 1° that these words, unless explained, prove too much; 2° that they are to be understood thus, that original sin was a sufficient motive for holding Esau in hatred and reprobating him; for it is not certain that Esau was reprobated as to eternal damnation; 3° that it can be understood of original sin as to its effect, namely the greater weakness, which, as has been said, concurs in its own way in reprobation. But according to this understanding, hatred is not taken strictly, but broadly for lesser love, as St. Thomas interprets it here, a. 3, ad 1, and in III Sentences, dist. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; in which sense also the hatred of father and mother is understood, Luke, XIV, 26. Whence the sense is that God left Esau, whose nature was vitiated by original sin and made more prone to evil, to his own weakness, while He protected Jacob, infected with the same stain, by a special mercy; and thus in Jacob He loved mercy, and in Esau He held original sin in hatred, that is, He loved him less, by not coming to the aid of the weakness contracted from original sin. Some similar testimonies of St. Thomas are to be taken by the same solutions.