Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

[Molina teaches that sufficient grace is that which so bestows on man a complete and unencumbered power of acting well, that it rests with his will alone, by consenting or dissenting, to render it efficacious or inefficacious, with nothing else required on God's part for its efficacy, beyond the general simultaneous concurrence.

According to Suárez and the other Congruists, who do not seem to withdraw sufficiently from Molina's opinion, sufficient grace is incongruous grace; for it confers on man a complete and unencumbered power of operating well, yet never the actual operation. It does not differ from congruous or efficacious grace in respect of the aid and its power, but only in respect of the gift and benefit. For insofar as God gives grace in those circumstances in which he foresaw, through the middle knowledge, that man would consent, it is called congruous and efficacious; but insofar as he gives the same or an equal grace in circumstances in which he foresees that man will not consent, it is called incongruous and merely sufficient.

According to Jansenius and the Jansenists, in the state of fallen nature no grace is given that is merely sufficient, but every grace is efficacious, from their capital principle, by force of which the human will, in this state of fallen nature, is necessarily carried away by one or the other undeliberated delight — either the heavenly delight, in which they locate grace, or the earthly — according as the one surpasses the other in degree.]

By the name of sufficient aid we understand that which confers a proximate or remote power, according as it is proximately or remotely sufficient for acting well, but never the actual operation, unless there supervenes another aid or concurrence — not merely concomitant, as the Molinists hold, but preceding in nature — which by its own force inclines and determines the will to consent, as we shall say more fully when treating of Grace.

I suppose that God, by force of the antecedent will he has of saving all through Christ and on account of Christ, prepares in common for all sufficient aids to salvation. This follows from the will of saving all and from the death of Christ for all¹. For

1° Although men merited by Adam's sin to be deprived of grace and glory, yet by this very fact that God, through Christ and on account of Christ, resumed the will and care of saving all, as we have proved, he consequently wills and prepares in common for all of them means sufficient for salvation; for no one sincerely wills an end unless he wills means sufficient for attaining it, since the end is not attainable without means. And St. Thomas constantly insists on this principle in the places cited in the margin. Thus a merchant — an example he also uses — would not be judged to will sincerely to save his goods, if he did not employ sufficient diligence to save them.

2° By this very fact that Christ died for the salvation of all, as we have likewise proved, he merited for all means sufficient for attaining that salvation. Therefore they are owed to all from the merits of Christ. Therefore God wills, prepares, and provides them, as far as in him lies, for all; for he intends to defraud no one of his right.

But the difficulty is, whether God not only prepares and provides for all in common sufficient aids to salvation, but also whether he offers and confers them on each and every one in particular: Some think that God in fact denies them to certain persons — not indeed to the just, since that is condemned in the first proposition of Jansenius — but to unbelievers, to the hardened, and to little children dying without baptism, as a punishment for a preceding sin, original or actual. So Father Gonet, one of our own, holds this opinion, disp. V, de reprob., art. 5. He indeed reports several Thomists as agreeing with him, whom, however, the most learned Salmanticenses clear of this opinion.

Before the resolution, it must be observed that sufficient aid does not consist in an indivisible point, but admits of latitude, and that one aid is proximately, another remotely, sufficient: thus, for example, an aid proximately sufficient for asking for the grace to overcome temptation, is remotely sufficient for overcoming the temptation itself.

I say: God not only prepares in common, but also confers in particular on each and every man living morally, according to place and time, aids proximately or remotely sufficient for salvation, according to each one's condition and need: so that, if some do not observe the commandments and by not observing them sin, or are not converted to the faith or to penance, and finally do not attain salvation, this is not to be attributed to God, as though he denied those aids to anyone as a punishment for a preceding sin, but to the side of men, who either reject them when offered, or, having received them, do not use them or abuse them.

Proof 1°, from Scripture. The Apostle, Rom. I, 21, says that unbelievers are inexcusable because, although they had known God as the author of nature, they did not nevertheless glorify him as God, that is, they did not turn themselves to him, nor did they give thanks for that aid conferred on them. And in chapter II, 4, to anyone, whether unbeliever or hardened believer, he says: The kindness of God leads you to penance; or, as the Greek text properly signifies (as Cornelius a Lapide notes), drives and impels [you] to penance. Now it is certain that no one is drawn, driven, or impelled to penance except through aids of grace received within, or at least so offered that it is within man's power to reject them. Apoc. III, 20: I stand at the door and knock... If anyone shall open the door to me, I will come in to him. From this passage St. Thomas, on Hebr. ch. 12, lect. 3, infers that grace is wanting to no one at all, but is communicated to all as far as lies in it. Matth. V, 45: He makes his sun to rise upon the good and the bad, and rains upon the just and the unjust. This Ambrose, serm. 8 on Ps. CXVIII, explains of the sun of justice and the rain of grace. Eccli. XV, 11: Say not: It is through God I am wanting; that is, do not say: he himself withdraws strength from me. Wisd. XI, 24: You have mercy on all. Prov. I, 24: I called, and you refused; I stretched out my hand, and there was none that regarded. These words are understood of all, especially of the hardened.

Proof 2°, from Augustine, to whom the adversaries appeal. The holy Doctor, Tract. I in Ioann., n. 19, explaining these words of this Evangelist, John I, 11: The light shines in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it, says: « Therefore, just as to a blind man placed in the sun, the sun is present to him, but he himself is absent to the sun; so every fool, every unjust man, every impious man, is blind of heart. Wisdom is present to him, but when it is present to a blind man, it is absent from his eyes: not because it is itself absent from him, but because he himself is absent from it. » Likewise the holy Doctor, de Natura et Gratia, cap. 67, n. 81, says: « Perhaps (sinners) would rightly complain if no man were ever victor over error and lust; but since (God) is everywhere present, who in many ways, through a creature serving him as Lord, calls the one turned away, teaches the one believing, consoles the one hoping, exhorts the one loving, helps the one striving, hears the one imploring; it is not imputed to you as a fault that you are ignorant against your will, but that you neglect to seek what you are ignorant of; nor is it imputed that you do not bind up your wounded limbs, but that you spurn the one willing to heal you. These² are your own proper sins; for to no man has it been taken away to know how to seek profitably what he is ignorant of unprofitably. » St. Thomas, a faithful interpreter of Augustine, 1st part, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3: « God does not fail to do what is necessary for salvation. » Q. 14 de Verit., a. 11, ad 1: « This belongs to divine providence, that it provide for each one the things necessary for salvation, provided that it is not impeded on his part. » And III Contra gent., ch. 159, from these words of the Apostle, I Tim. II, 4: He wills all to be saved, he infers that God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give grace to all. « Although, he says, someone cannot merit or acquire divine grace by a movement of free will, he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it; for it is said of certain persons, Job XXI, 14: They said to God: Depart from us, and we do not want the knowledge of your ways, and ibid. XXIV, 13: They were rebels against the light... Those alone, therefore, are deprived of grace who place in themselves an impediment to grace: just as, when the sun illumines the world, it is imputed as a fault to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follows from this. »

Proof 4°, by an argument founded on the Scriptures. Salvation is possible for each one living morally, even supposing not only original sin, but supposing any other actual sins that are not final. But the preparation of means for salvation in common would not render it sufficiently possible for those to whom God in particular would in fact deny them, on account of a preceding original or actual sin. Therefore. — The major seems certain.

Proof of the minor. On whatever ground a means sufficient and necessary for attaining some end is denied to someone, whether on account of or apart from fault, in reality such an end is not possible for him; for the end is not attainable except through means: for example, if someone through his own fault has lost the money necessary for buying a vineyard, is the acquisition of the vineyard equally impossible for him as for one who, without fault, were deprived of the money necessary for the purchase? If you say: the first can receive money from friends; I will say: so can the second. Moreover, what favors the acquisition of the vineyard, namely that he can receive money from friends, if the friends who before the fault had intended to give it, after the fault are unwilling to give it? But it would be otherwise if they were to offer the money, and he were to refuse to accept it; for then he is truly judged able to buy. Or, to use another example already employed: if a king who destined medicines for the whole province, in fact denies them to certain citizens whom he has caught guilty of the crime of lese-majesty, could the king be said, after that crime has been detected, still to will to heal them, and could these in reality be healed, so long as the remedies necessary for health are denied them? Similarly in our case.

Proof 5°. God denies no one aids proximately or remotely sufficient for observing the commandments, when here and now they are pressing, and hence for avoiding all sins. But by avoiding all sins and observing all the commandments, salvation is had, according to that saying, Matth. XIX, 17: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments. Therefore. — Proof of the major, 1°, from this principle: God does not command impossible things. But he would command impossible things to him from whom he withdrew the sufficient aid necessary for observing the commandments, as is self-evident. Therefore. — The major is a commonly received principle. Whence the Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11, says: « God does not command impossible things, but by commanding he admonishes you both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot; and he helps you that you may be able. » And St. Thomas, in II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3: « God, he says, is not more cruel than man. But it is imputed to a man as cruelty, if he binds someone by a precept to what he cannot fulfill. Therefore this must in no way be supposed of God. »

They answer — the Jansenists — that although certain precepts would be impossible for men, this powerlessness nevertheless does not excuse transgressors from sin, because it arises from at least original sin, and hence the transgression is always voluntary in the head.

But on the contrary: 1° For the fault of the person, the voluntary in nature does not suffice, but the voluntary in the person is required³. 2° It would follow that first-first movements in us — of blasphemy, of filthiness, and other things which madmen do against the law of God — would be imputed to them as fault, because these flow from original sin, and are voluntary in the head; likewise, that negative unbelief would be a sin, which is proposition 65 condemned in Baius.

Gonet answers, disp. V de reprob., a. 6, § 2, that anyone can keep the commandments and be saved, not by an intrinsic power, but by an extrinsic one, inasmuch as he can receive from God a grace sufficient for observing the commandments and for salvation.

But on the contrary. This answer indeed would be true on the hypothesis that God were ready, and willing to give this grace, because then the common adage of St. Thomas holds: that what we can do through friends willing to help us, we can do through ourselves. But, on Gonet's hypothesis, that God has decreed to deny this grace as a punishment for a preceding sin, it is utterly foreign to reason and common sense to say that this man can observe the commandments and be saved. Otherwise, by equal right you would say that an imprisoned man can be set free, because a rich man can give him the price of his liberation, which however he refuses; that a poor man can buy a villa, because he can receive the money which no one is willing to give him; that a sick man can be healed, because the king destined medicines for the whole province, yet forbade them to be given to this sick man in particular; that Peter, with broken legs, can run, because he can be healed by a surgeon who is unwilling to heal him.

Gonet answers again, in the place cited, de reprob., that sinners are inexcusably obligated to keep the commandments, although they lack the intrinsic power for their observance, because such a defect and lack arises from their own fault: thus, he says, a servant who, sent by his master into the city, voluntarily throws himself into a pit and breaks his legs, is not on that account exempted from the obligation of the precept, and is justly punished; thus a drunk man is not excused from a homicide committed, although he is powerless to avoid it; thus demons and the damned are not excused from sin in transgressing the commandments, although the aid of grace is denied them, because they fell into this state by their own fault. Therefore.

I answer. A sin following upon a voluntary act is not imputed to the agent, except insofar as it was foreseen, or could in a human manner have been foreseen, in its cause: otherwise it would be voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, as we have taught elsewhere and as is commonly taught in the treatise on Human Acts. Now both the servant, by voluntarily throwing himself into the pit, and the drunk, by making himself drunk, and the damned, by finally persevering in sin, foresaw, or could in a human manner have foreseen, the resulting powerlessness to fulfill the precepts, and therefore their transgression is imputed to them. But the sinner, in sinning, could not foresee the privation of all aid, by which he would be rendered powerless to observe the commandments, because as long as he is on the way, such a privation is not given, as I have already said and shall presently say. Hence Gonet's argument runs on a false supposition.

From these two last proofs, then, we have that God denies sufficient aids neither to unbelievers nor to hardened and blinded sinners — to the former for believing, to the latter for doing penance: because, according to the first argument, salvation is possible for both, and necessary for salvation is, in the unbeliever, faith, in the sinner, penance; according to the second argument, because an adult unbeliever is bound to lay aside unbelief, to believe in God, to worship God, and to love him with his whole heart, at least in the manner in which he knows him; and the sinner is bound to do penance. And these cannot be accomplished without grace, as is taught in Trent, sess. VI, can. 3⁴, and it was defined against the Pelagians.

You will object 1°: Those interior aids, proximately or remotely sufficient, are pious illuminations of the intellect and pious motions of the will toward fulfilling the precepts, or at least toward asking for the grace of fulfilling them. But it is utterly incredible that the most wicked of mortals — the blinded, the hardened, pagans, heretics, atheists — as often as a precept is incumbent on them, as often as they sin, are stirred by those pious illuminations and motions, at least to pray to God.

I answer, I distinguish the major. Those sufficient aids are pious illuminations of the intellect and pious motions of the will, received or offered, I concede; always received, I deny. Hence I deny the supposition, the minor, and the consequent. For in order that aids be judged sufficient, it is not necessary, according to us, that unbelievers, atheists, the hardened, receive them and are actually stirred by them, but it suffices that they be so offered to them, that, if they do not receive them, it is not because God denies them, but because they themselves place an obstacle.

You will object 2°: St. Augustine, in the book de Corrept. et Grat., cap. 11, says: « (God) had given an aid to the first man, without which he could not have persevered, even if he had willed to. » And below: « If this aid... had been wanting to him, he would by no means have fallen through his own fault... But now, those to whom such aid is wanting, it is the punishment of sin. » From which St. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1: « If, he says, something is said to be in man's power with the aid of grace excluded, then man is bound to many things to which he cannot attain without reparative grace, such as to love God and neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith; yet he can do this with the aid of grace. This aid, indeed, to whomever it is given, is given mercifully; but to whom it is not given, it is not given from justice, as a punishment for a preceding sin, or at least for original sin, as Augustine says in the book de Corrept. et Gratia. » But each of the two holy Doctors is speaking of sufficient aid, as is clear from the terms. Therefore.

I answer that these words of Augustine are to be understood, not of just any sufficient aid whatsoever, but of the aid by which man could persevere with great facility, which implies not merely a transient actual aid, but sanctifying grace and the habits of the virtues, such indeed as Adam had in the state of innocence. Now, if the first parent had lacked such an aid, he would not have fallen through his own fault, because, since in the state of integral nature a grace inferior to that was not given, it is supposed that he had no other aid by which he could simply avoid the fall; so that in him to be able and to be easily able were the same. Such an aid, indeed, toward so easy an ability, we readily admit can be denied to many as a punishment for original or actual sin — we who require only remotely sufficient aids — from Augustine himself saying: « It has been taken from no man to know how to seek profitably what he is ignorant of unprofitably. » See the other texts cited above.

As to St. Thomas, I answer 1° that he likewise speaks of an aid implying sanctifying grace together with the habits of the virtues, both because he speaks in the sense of Augustine, as is clear, and because he speaks of grace, not "preparing," as some wrongly quote, but "repairing." Now it is agreed that it is not sufficient actual aid, but habitual grace, that is reparative of fallen nature.

I answer 2°. Granted that St. Thomas speaks of a sufficient actual aid, I say that he speaks of what is proximately sufficient, and not of what is remotely sufficient: for he speaks of the aid required for explicit faith, which he denies is given to all; but from this it does not follow that an aid sufficient for implicit faith — which is remotely sufficient for explicit faith — is not given. Nor indeed is it right to doubt the mind of St. Thomas, after so many of his testimonies which we have related.

You will object 3°, concerning little children: God denies sufficient aids to salvation to many infants — namely, to those who die either in their mothers' wombs, or among unbelievers before the use of reason; for the one means sufficient for salvation for these is baptism actually conferred, of which, however, they are deprived. Therefore.

I answer that God has sufficiently provided for the salvation of little children, given their condition, through the institution of baptism, inasmuch as it is instituted for all and can be conferred on all, although its actual conferral is sometimes impeded by various causes, both natural and free, which God as universal provider is not bound to impede, but on the contrary must permit, on account of higher ends. This is the common solution, according to which little children are not altogether abandoned, nor deprived of the grace of baptism as a punishment for original sin, as the opposite opinion holds, but because God, according to the laws of his general providence, does not arrest the secondary causes by which the actual conferral of baptism is impeded.

To this common solution several more recent writers add — among whom, from our own, Goudin and Bancel subscribe — that God, through the institution of baptism, has so provided for the salvation of little children, that it rests with their parents whether it is conferred on them or not; inasmuch as the parents, if they lived more soberly, abstaining from this or that food, place, or occasion, especially if they duly prayed and employed the prayers of others, and made good use of the other aids sufficient for this end that were conferred, would bring it about with God that the little child, who according to the natural course was going to die, would survive until it should receive baptism. And they think this necessary, in order that God be said to have sufficiently provided for the salvation of little children. For just as, they say, a poor man is not said to have sufficiency for the sustenance of life through the fact that God has provided for him in secondary causes as regards food, if the food can by no human diligence be procured for him; so too a little child is not said to have means sufficient for salvation, through the fact that God has instituted baptism, by force of which it could be freed from sin, if nevertheless baptism can by no human diligence be applied.