Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
First published 1754
Charles René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae (Liège, 1754) is his six-volume abridgment of the larger Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata (1746–1751). It condenses Aquinas's order and teaching into a reference manual while retaining the Dominican's characteristic distinctions, scholastic proofs, and historical material. The compendium belongs to the eighteenth-century consolidation of post-Tridentine Thomist education and helped carry Billuart's influential reading of Aquinas into later schools. Schola presents the Latin text with an English translation from its public-domain source.
Proemium I: De natura et dotibus theologiae
Tractatus I: De Deo et Ejus Attributis
Dissertatio I: De Dei existentia
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Articulus II: Utrum sit Deus, et quibus rationibus demonstretur?
Articulus III: De Atheismo
Articulus IV: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis de existentia Dei?
Articulus V: An existant athei theoretici?
Dissertatio II: De natura seu quidditate Dei et Ejus attributis in communi
Articulus I: Quodnam sit constitutivum divinae naturae?
Articulus II: De attributis divinis in communi
Dissertatio III: De attributis in particulari quae pertinent ad divinum esse
Articulus I: De simplicitate Dei
Articulus II: De perfectione Dei
Articulus III: De bonitate Dei
Tractatus I: De infinitate Dei
Tractatus II: De immensitate Dei
Articulus IV: De immutabilitate Dei
Articulus V: De aeternitate Dei
Articulus VI: An Deus sit unus?
Dissertatio IV: De visione Dei a nobis
Articulus I: Utrum Deus, ut est in se, possit videri oculo corporeo?
Articulus II: Utrum intellectus creatus supernaturaliter adiutus possit videre Deum ut in se est?
Articulus III: Utrum aliquis in hac vita viderit, possitve videre Deum ut est in se?
Articulus IV: Utrum essentia divina videatur aut videri possit per aliquam similitudinem seu speciem?
Dissertatio V: De scientia Dei
Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit scientia proprie dicta, eaque sit attributum?
Articulus II: De obiecto et divisione scientiae Dei
Articulus III: An et quae scientia in Deo sit causa rerum?
Articulus IV: In quo medio Deus cognoscat alia a se?
Dissertatio VI: De praescientia futurorum
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit futurum?
Articulus II: Utrum Deus certo et infallibiliter cognoscat omnia futura absoluta, contingentia et libera?
Articulus III: Quomodo futura sint praesentia in aeternitate?
Articulus IV: In quo medio Deus cognoscat futura absoluta, contingentia et libera?
Articulus V: De scientia futurorum conditionatorum
Articulus VI: De scientia media
Dissertatio VII: De voluntate Dei
Articulus I: De voluntate Dei secundum se, et eius obiecto
Articulus II: De libertate Dei
Articulus III: Quotuplex sit voluntas in Deo, et an semper impleatur?
Although the will on God's part is one, since it is His very essence, nevertheless, by reason of the material objects into which it is borne, it is customarily assigned as manifold by theologians.
I say 1°: The divine will is divided, 1°, into the will of good pleasure and the will of sign1. The will of good pleasure is the very act of the divine will, whence it is properly and formally in God. The will of sign is something external which among us is wont to be a sign that we will something, although God does not will in that way; hence it is not called will of sign as though it were a sign that God wills, but because, as I have said, it is wont to signify that we will, and thus it is formally and properly in God, but only metaphorically, the sign being taken for the will itself.
Five signs of the divine will2 are assigned, namely: precept, counsel, prohibition, permission, and operation, comprised in this verse.
He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, fulfills, [because by these five modes we are wont to signify that we will something interiorly. For when we perform some work, it is an evident sign that we will it; likewise when we command or counsel another, it is a sign that we will that to be done by another; but when we prohibit, it is a sign that we will that not to be done by him; finally, when we permit someone subject to us to do something, it is a sign that we will that to be done.]
The will of sign in God stands in three ways to the will of good pleasure3. For there is a certain will of sign which never coincides with the will of good pleasure, as the permission by which He permits evils to be done; for He never wills evils to be done. There is a certain one which always coincides, as operation. But there is a certain one which sometimes coincides, sometimes not, as precept, prohibition, and counsel: thus the precept which He gave to Abraham to kill Isaac did not coincide with the will of good pleasure, since He afterward commanded the contrary. Of the will of sign is understood that saying of the Lord's Prayer: Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth.
The second and more celebrated division of the divine will is into antecedent and consequent4. So teach all theologians after Damascene and St. Thomas. Not all, however, explain it in the same way. The Thomists, with their Doctor, explain it thus: that the will is called antecedent insofar as it is borne toward the object considered in itself and precisive from circumstances; consequent, insofar as it is borne toward the object clothed with all its circumstances.
You will gather from this, 1°, that the consequent will is will simply, and the antecedent will is will in a certain respect5. For the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves on the side of the thing. But in themselves, on the side of the thing, they exist in particular with all their circumstances. Therefore we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said: The just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but in a certain respect wills him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Likewise the merchant, with danger imminent, simply wills to throw overboard his wares, but in a certain respect wills to keep them, namely with the danger removed. And therefore this will in a certain respect, as compared to the will simply, can, according to St. Thomas, rather be called velleity than absolute will.
You will gather, 2°, that the consequent will is the absolute will, and the antecedent is the conditioned will6, namely if a greater good does not stand in the way; conditioned, I say, not on the part of the subject, as we said concerning conditioned decrees. Hence there is no imperfection on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken with all its circumstances.
You will gather, 3°, that the antecedent will is a will, not only of sign, but also of good pleasure. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas, whatever certain Thomists may object. For the Holy Doctor, q. 23 de Veritate, a. 3, o, says: «The nature of will is found properly in God, and thus will is properly said of God. And this is the will of good pleasure, which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent.» Likewise in I Sent., dist. 47, a. 2: «We can, therefore, speak of the will either of good pleasure or of sign, and of the will of good pleasure either as consequent or as antecedent.» This is also proved by the examples which he brings forward concerning the judge and the merchant; for truly and properly the judge wills the man, in himself, to live, and the merchant wills his wares, in themselves, to be preserved.
Reason favors this. The will of good pleasure is regarded according as things are disposed interiorly in God, and not only according to exterior signification. But the object of the antecedent will is disposed interiorly in God, for God, for example, interiorly orders all men to salvation and provides for them aids sufficient thereto, although, circumstances being considered — for instance the splendor of the universe, the defectibility of the human will, the manifestation of the attributes, etc. — He has willed to permit that some should fail from this order, whom therefore He wills, by the consequent will, not to save. On this matter again in the following article.
I say 2°: The consequent will of God is always fulfilled; the antecedent will is not always fulfilled, at least as to the principal thing willed7.
Proof of the first part. 1° From Scripture. Isa., XIV, 27: The Lord of hosts hath decreed: and who shall be able to disannul it? And XLVI, 10: My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done. Esther, XIII, 9: There is none that can resist thy will. Psal. CXIII, 3: All things whatsoever he hath willed, he hath done. Eccles., VIII, 3: Whatsoever he shall will, he shall do. Rom., IX, 19: Who resisteth his will? But all these must be understood of that will of God which is will simply and absolutely, such as is the consequent will.
2° God is omnipotent. Therefore He can be hindered by no one from fulfilling what He has willed absolutely and simply.
The second part is also indicated in Scripture; for concerning the antecedent will, which, as I have said, is only a will in a certain respect and conditioned, the following are understood. Ezech., XXIV, 13: I wished to cleanse thee, and thou art not cleansed. Matth., XXIII, 37: Jerusalem..., how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not? Proverb., I, 24: I called, and you refused. Act., VII, 51: You always resist the Holy Ghost. I ad Tim., II, 4: He will have all men to be saved, and yet not all are saved. Likewise several other things of a similar kind.
It is also clear from what has been said. For the antecedent will is concerned with the thing in itself as precisive from circumstances; but the thing does not come to be except with all its circumstances. Moreover, the antecedent will is conditioned, and in many cases the condition is not fulfilled.
I said, at least as to the principal thing willed, because it can be efficacious and be fulfilled with respect to some adjunct or means. Thus the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved, of which we shall speak shortly, is inefficacious as to the principal thing willed, which is the salvation of all as actually possessed: from it, however, there efficaciously results a future salvation conditionally, all men are ordered to salvation, and for them at least sufficient means are prepared for attaining it; but on that side and under this aspect it is consequent, and not merely antecedent.
I say 3°: The will of good pleasure is not always fulfilled, as is clear in the antecedent will, which we have said to be a will of good pleasure. Hence, when St. Thomas sometimes says that the will of good pleasure is always fulfilled, he must be understood, not concerning the will of good pleasure taken generically, but specifically and restricted to the consequent will. The will of sign, indeed, is sometimes fulfilled, sometimes not fulfilled, according as it is joined or not joined to the consequent will of good pleasure, as I said above from St. Thomas.