Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

You will ask 1° whether will exists in God properly and formally.

I answer affirmatively¹. So it is throughout the Scriptures. Rom., XII, 2: That you may prove what is the will of God. Ibid., IX, 19: Who resisteth his will? Psal. CXIII, 3: All things whatsoever he would, he hath done. These and similar testimonies the holy Fathers unanimously understand in the proper sense.

The reason is that it belongs to any being whatsoever to will and love its own perfection and the preservation of its own being, in such a way that it tends to acquire the good which it does not have, and takes complacency and rests in the good which it has². Now in an intellectual being this inclination is called will; for will is an inclination toward the good as apprehended by the intellect. Therefore to God, the first being and supremely intellectual, there belongs a will by which his own being and his own goodness are pleasing to himself. Add that will is an unqualifiedly simple perfection, and therefore is not to be denied to God.

You will ask 2° whether the divine will is virtually distinguished from its own volition.

I answer negatively³, because, as we have already said concerning the divine intellect and intellection, only those things are virtually distinguished in God which are equivalent to several created things distinct by formal object and belonging to diverse lines; but will and volition in God have the same formal object, nor do they belong to diverse lines. Likewise, if the will were virtually distinguished from the volition, and retained toward it the character of a potency, it would be conceived as perfectible and actuable by it: and consequently it would not be conceived as pure act.

And so the divine will, with respect to the volition, does not have the character of a potency, except according to our manner of conceiving divine things by analogy to created things. It has, however, the character of a potency and principle with respect to the effect proceeding from it or produced by it; because it is not related to that effect as something actuable and perfectible by it, but on the contrary, as actuating and perfecting it.

You will ask 3° whether God wills, not only himself, but also things other than himself.

I answer affirmatively⁴, because a natural thing has not only a natural inclination with respect to its own good, so as to acquire it when it does not have it, or so as to rest in it when it has it, but also so as to diffuse its own good into other things insofar as this is possible: whence we see that every agent, insofar as it is in act and perfect, makes something like itself. It belongs, therefore, to the nature of will, that one should communicate to others the good which one has, and this belongs especially to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived. Therefore God wills himself and things other than himself, but himself as end, and other things as ordered to the end, insofar as it befits the divine goodness that other things also should participate in it. Hence Scripture, Thess., IV, 3: This is the will of God, your sanctification. And Psal. CXIII, 3: Whatsoever he would, he hath done; now he made things other than himself.

You will ask 4° what the formal object, both motive and terminative, of the divine will may be.

I answer that it is the divine goodness alone⁵; creatures, however, are its material object. For that is the formal object, both motive and terminative, of any potency, by which it is moved of itself and by reason of itself, and which it attains of itself and by reason of itself. But the divine goodness alone is that by which the divine will is moved of itself and by reason of itself, and that which it attains of itself and by reason of itself. The major, therefore, is the very notion of the formal object, both motive and terminative. — Proof of the minor. God, in every act of willing, is his own end to himself; for the Lord hath made all things for himself, says Scripture, Prov., XVI, 4. But in those things which we will only for the sake of an end, the whole reason for moving is the end: thus he who wills to take a bitter potion for the sake of health, health is that which alone moves his will. But if it is the whole reason for moving, it is also the reason for terminating, since there must be a proportion between the motive object and the terminative object.

I suppose 1° that God necessarily wills His own goodness¹; because, since He is necessarily willing in act, and in His goodness shines forth every note of goodness without any defect, He cannot not love it.

Hence, when the holy Fathers and St. Thomas sometimes say that God loves Himself freely, they understand this of freedom from coercion, because He is compelled to it by nothing extrinsic, but not of freedom from necessity.

I suppose 2° that God enjoys the greatest freedom toward creatures. Thus Scripture everywhere. Psal. XCIII, 1: The God of revenges hath acted freely. Rom., IX, 18: He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Ephes., I, 11: Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. I Cor., XII, 11: The Spirit dividing as he will.

The reason is, first, because freedom of choice is the greatest perfection, involving of itself no imperfection; for the power of sinning does not belong to the nature of freedom, but is its blemish, as we shall say elsewhere. Therefore it is impious to deny it to God.

2° God wills things other than Himself insofar as they are ordered to His goodness, as to an end². But those things which are for an end, we who will the end do not will of necessity, unless they be such that without them the end cannot exist. Therefore, since God's goodness is perfect, and can exist without other things — for no perfection accrues to Him from other things — it follows that His willing things other than Himself is not necessary absolutely, but that He extends Himself to them by a free and gratuitous freedom, communicating to them His goodness, not that it may profit Him, but that it may be well with them.

But there is a difficulty, and a most intricate one, as to what constitutes the free act of God. For it is difficult to conceive how the freedom of God stands together with His immutability, the rights of each being preserved. For either the free act could have been absent from God, or it could not: if the first, how is God immutable? if the second, how is He free? for it belongs to the nature of a free act that it be able to be absent. Behold the sum of the difficulty which torments the minds of theologians.

Before all else, this must always be kept before one's eyes: that divine freedom is not, as human freedom is, an indifference of a power to diverse acts of willing and not-willing, but is the indifference of one most simple and most pure act to diverse objects (compare article I of this dissertation), such that by this one and the same most simple act it brings about the being or non-being of creatures, this or that, and insofar as it brings about being, it is called volition, insofar as it brings about non-being, it is called nolition. This, I say, keep in mind; for from this flows the solution of the knot, if indeed it can be called a solution. Therefore

Dico: The free act of God is nothing other than His necessary act insofar as it expresses a relation or termination not necessary to creatures.

Proof 1° from the principles of St. Thomas. The Holy Doctor, in Contra Gentiles I, ch. 82, says thus: «The will of God by one and the same act wills Himself and other things. But His relation to Himself is necessary and natural; His relation to other things is according to a certain fittingness — not indeed necessary and natural, nor violent or unnatural, but voluntary.» Likewise elsewhere. By these words is disclosed the distinction already assigned between divine and human freedom, on which the truth of our assertion is founded. For thus I argue: According to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, divine freedom does not consist in the indifference of a power to several acts, as human freedom does, but in the indifference of one most simple act to diverse objects — which act, simple in itself, is virtually manifold, necessary and free under different aspects. Insofar as it is terminated at the divine being, it is necessary; insofar as it is terminated at creatures, and is virtually distinct from itself as terminated at the divine being, it is free: under which aspect, remaining unmoved in itself, it can be terminated at this or that, at the being or non-being of creatures, and as it is terminated at being, it is called volition, as it is terminated at non-being, it is called nolition; and all this on account of the supreme actuality, simplicity, unlimitedness, and eminence of the divine act. Therefore the note of the necessary and the free in God must be placed in the same act according to its diverse terminations.

Proof 2° by another reason. For the constitutive of a free act in God two things are required: first, that it be something intrinsic to God and divine, since God's free act is vital and immanent; second, that it be able in some sense to fail, for it belongs to the nature of a free act that it be able in some sense not to be. But, by constituting the free act of God in His necessary act — not insofar as it connotes the divine goodness, under which aspect it is necessary, but insofar as it connotes and is terminated not necessarily at creatures — these two things are had: 1° it is had that it be something intrinsic and divine; for the necessary act of God, identified with God Himself, is God Himself; 2° it is also had that it be something in some sense defectible; because, although this act is entitatively necessary, yet reduplicatively and formally, insofar as it is terminated at creatures, it is not necessary, since these could have not been, and were they to fail, this connotation or termination would fail. Therefore.

But immediately the entanglement of the knot recurs, which our manner of speaking does not seem to resolve. For either that non-necessary termination to creatures, in which we place the freedom of God, is something intrinsic to God and intrinsically defectible, or it is not. If the first, then God is intrinsically defectible, and not supremely simple; if the second, then He is not intrinsically free. And thus the knot remains unresolved.

To this difficulty, which I confess to be the gravest and almost the only one, the response of the Thomists is not single.

The older and more common [response] in the school of St. Thomas, and more conformable to his principles, is that this termination — understanding it as active — is intrinsic, since it is the divine act itself compared and terminated to creatures, and is defectible, not indeed intrinsically and by reason of itself or of some other intrinsic thing, but extrinsically, by reason of the defectible thing willed, so that the same act, unmoved in itself, as I have already said, with no intrinsic reality in itself changed or defectible, could have produced or not produced creatures, and could have ordered and disposed them variously. And therefore the constitutive of divine freedom, according to what it imports in recto, is something intrinsic, in itself indefectible, namely the divine act itself, entitatively necessary and immutable; but according to what it imports in obliquo, is something extrinsic and defectible, namely the connoted creatures, which are defectible.

Nor, in order that God be called intrinsically free, is it required that something intrinsic to Him be able to fail insofar as it is intrinsic, but it suffices that one and the same act, unmoved and indefectible in itself, could have differently changed creatures. Which is proved: 1° because, as I repeat again, divine freedom is not the indifference of a volitional power to diverse acts, but the indifference of one most pure and most simple act to diverse objects. Therefore by this very fact He is judged free, in that, unchanged in Himself, by reason of His eminence and supreme dominion over creatures, He can change them.

2° When for an intrinsic denomination there is required not the intrinsic form alone, but also an extrinsic connotation, that form denominates through the mere positing of the extrinsic connotation, without any change on its own part: thus God in time is denominated creator and lord through an eternal intrinsic form, namely His omnipotence, the whole change occurring in time remaining on the side of creatures. And this is common to every comparative term, that, in order to be said to fail and to stand differently to another, it suffices that this other be changed. Therefore, in order that God's act be free, and could have stood differently toward creatures, it need not have been changed in itself, by losing or receiving something, but it suffices that, unchanged in itself, it could have changed creatures differently.

[And this seems to be the constant and open doctrine of St. Thomas, not only in the place cited, but even more clearly and repeatedly elsewhere. For thus he says, here q. 19, a. 3, o: «Since the goodness of God is perfect, and can be without other things, since no perfection accrues to Him from other things, it follows that His willing things other than Himself is not necessary absolutely, and yet it is necessary from supposition; for supposing that He wills, He cannot not will, because His will cannot be changed.» And in the same place, ad 5: «The divine will, which of itself has necessity, determines itself to the thing willed, to which it has a non-necessary relation.» Likewise q. 23 de Veritate, a. 4, o: «That the divine willing has necessity on the part of the one willing and of the act itself is undoubtedly true; for the action of God is His essence, which is agreed to be eternal. Hence this is not what is in question, but whether the willing itself has necessity by comparison to the thing willed.» And here again, q. 19, a. 3, ad 4: «That God does not will of necessity something of those things which He wills, does not arise from a defect of the divine will, but from a defect which pertains to the thing willed according to its own nature; because, namely, it is such that without it the perfect goodness of God can exist: which defect indeed follows upon every created good.»]

Although the will on God's part is one, since it is His very essence, nevertheless, by reason of the material objects into which it is borne, it is customarily assigned as manifold by theologians.

I say 1°: The divine will is divided, 1°, into the will of good pleasure and the will of sign¹. The will of good pleasure is the very act of the divine will, whence it is properly and formally in God. The will of sign is something external which among us is wont to be a sign that we will something, although God does not will in that way; hence it is not called will of sign as though it were a sign that God wills, but because, as I have said, it is wont to signify that we will, and thus it is formally and properly in God, but only metaphorically, the sign being taken for the will itself.

Five signs of the divine will² are assigned, namely: precept, counsel, prohibition, permission, and operation, comprised in this verse.

He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, fulfills, [because by these five modes we are wont to signify that we will something interiorly. For when we perform some work, it is an evident sign that we will it; likewise when we command or counsel another, it is a sign that we will that to be done by another; but when we prohibit, it is a sign that we will that not to be done by him; finally, when we permit someone subject to us to do something, it is a sign that we will that to be done.]

The will of sign in God stands in three ways to the will of good pleasure³. For there is a certain will of sign which never coincides with the will of good pleasure, as the permission by which He permits evils to be done; for He never wills evils to be done. There is a certain one which always coincides, as operation. But there is a certain one which sometimes coincides, sometimes not, as precept, prohibition, and counsel: thus the precept which He gave to Abraham to kill Isaac did not coincide with the will of good pleasure, since He afterward commanded the contrary. Of the will of sign is understood that saying of the Lord's Prayer: Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth.

The second and more celebrated division of the divine will is into antecedent and consequent⁴. So teach all theologians after Damascene and St. Thomas. Not all, however, explain it in the same way. The Thomists, with their Doctor, explain it thus: that the will is called antecedent insofar as it is borne toward the object considered in itself and precisive from circumstances; consequent, insofar as it is borne toward the object clothed with all its circumstances.

You will gather from this, 1°, that the consequent will is will simply, and the antecedent will is will in a certain respect⁵. For the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves on the side of the thing. But in themselves, on the side of the thing, they exist in particular with all their circumstances. Therefore we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said: The just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but in a certain respect wills him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Likewise the merchant, with danger imminent, simply wills to throw overboard his wares, but in a certain respect wills to keep them, namely with the danger removed. And therefore this will in a certain respect, as compared to the will simply, can, according to St. Thomas, rather be called velleity than absolute will.

You will gather, 2°, that the consequent will is the absolute will, and the antecedent is the conditioned will⁶, namely if a greater good does not stand in the way; conditioned, I say, not on the part of the subject, as we said concerning conditioned decrees. Hence there is no imperfection on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken with all its circumstances.

You will gather, 3°, that the antecedent will is a will, not only of sign, but also of good pleasure. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas, whatever certain Thomists may object. For the Holy Doctor, q. 23 de Veritate, a. 3, o, says: «The nature of will is found properly in God, and thus will is properly said of God. And this is the will of good pleasure, which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent.» Likewise in I Sent., dist. 47, a. 2: «We can, therefore, speak of the will either of good pleasure or of sign, and of the will of good pleasure either as consequent or as antecedent.» This is also proved by the examples which he brings forward concerning the judge and the merchant; for truly and properly the judge wills the man, in himself, to live, and the merchant wills his wares, in themselves, to be preserved.

Reason favors this. The will of good pleasure is regarded according as things are disposed interiorly in God, and not only according to exterior signification. But the object of the antecedent will is disposed interiorly in God, for God, for example, interiorly orders all men to salvation and provides for them aids sufficient thereto, although, circumstances being considered — for instance the splendor of the universe, the defectibility of the human will, the manifestation of the attributes, etc. — He has willed to permit that some should fail from this order, whom therefore He wills, by the consequent will, not to save. On this matter again in the following article.

I say 2°: The consequent will of God is always fulfilled; the antecedent will is not always fulfilled, at least as to the principal thing willed⁷.

Proof of the first part. 1° From Scripture. Isa., XIV, 27: The Lord of hosts hath decreed: and who shall be able to disannul it? And XLVI, 10: My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done. Esther, XIII, 9: There is none that can resist thy will. Psal. CXIII, 3: All things whatsoever he hath willed, he hath done. Eccles., VIII, 3: Whatsoever he shall will, he shall do. Rom., IX, 19: Who resisteth his will? But all these must be understood of that will of God which is will simply and absolutely, such as is the consequent will.

2° God is omnipotent. Therefore He can be hindered by no one from fulfilling what He has willed absolutely and simply.

The second part is also indicated in Scripture; for concerning the antecedent will, which, as I have said, is only a will in a certain respect and conditioned, the following are understood. Ezech., XXIV, 13: I wished to cleanse thee, and thou art not cleansed. Matth., XXIII, 37: Jerusalem..., how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not? Proverb., I, 24: I called, and you refused. Act., VII, 51: You always resist the Holy Ghost. I ad Tim., II, 4: He will have all men to be saved, and yet not all are saved. Likewise several other things of a similar kind.

It is also clear from what has been said. For the antecedent will is concerned with the thing in itself as precisive from circumstances; but the thing does not come to be except with all its circumstances. Moreover, the antecedent will is conditioned, and in many cases the condition is not fulfilled.

I said, at least as to the principal thing willed, because it can be efficacious and be fulfilled with respect to some adjunct or means. Thus the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved, of which we shall speak shortly, is inefficacious as to the principal thing willed, which is the salvation of all as actually possessed: from it, however, there efficaciously results a future salvation conditionally, all men are ordered to salvation, and for them at least sufficient means are prepared for attaining it; but on that side and under this aspect it is consequent, and not merely antecedent.

I say 3°: The will of good pleasure is not always fulfilled, as is clear in the antecedent will, which we have said to be a will of good pleasure. Hence, when St. Thomas sometimes says that the will of good pleasure is always fulfilled, he must be understood, not concerning the will of good pleasure taken generically, but specifically and restricted to the consequent will. The will of sign, indeed, is sometimes fulfilled, sometimes not fulfilled, according as it is joined or not joined to the consequent will of good pleasure, as I said above from St. Thomas.

On the occasion of what we said in the preceding article about the antecedent and consequent will of God, three very grave difficulties arise here, which are connected with one another: first, whether God wills all men to be saved; second, whether by force of that will Christ died for all; third, whether by force of the same will God offers or confers on all sufficient means to salvation: which we shall endeavor to resolve in three articles, the first in this present article.

[The Semi-Pelagians erred concerning the will of God regarding the salvation of all in this, that they posited in God a general and equal will to save all men, if they should will it — a willing which he expected from their own will — such that he did not will the salvation of the predestined more specially than that of the reprobate: consequently, that Christ too died with an equally general will for all; likewise, that equal helps are conferred on all, namely helps that are indifferent and subject to their free will. Thus report Prosper, both in his Epist. ad S. Augustinum, and in the poem de Ingratis, and Fulgentius, lib. de Incarnat. et Gratia, c. 26.

Calvin, lib. III Instit., c. 24, n. 16 and elsewhere, on the contrary denies that there is in God a will to save the reprobate. A few had gone before him who were called Predestinarians. Jansenius seems to have followed him, who, lib. III de Gratia Christi, c. 20, acknowledges in God only an antecedent will to save all before original sin, not with that sin supposed.]

I say, 1°: God, even after the fall of Adam, wills, by an antecedent will — not an idle one, but an active one — that absolutely all men be saved. This is against Calvin and Jansenius.

Proof 1°, from that celebrated testimony of the Apostle, I Tim., II, 1-6: I entreat therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, petitions, and thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings and all who are in a high position... For this is good and acceptable before God our Savior, who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a redemption for all. But the Apostle is speaking of men after the fall of Adam, and of all of them taken distributively. Therefore.

Proof of the minor 1°: According to the Apostle, God wills all those to be saved for whom he wills supplications and prayers to be made, as is clear from the text. But he wills supplications and prayers to be made for each and every man, and these were in the state of fallen nature — indeed they were princes and emperors, entangled not only in original sin but in the gravest crimes, as Nero, under whose reign Paul suffered martyrdom; whence the Church, on the day of the Parasceve, prays for all, no one excepted. Therefore. 2° The Apostle says that Christ is the Mediator, and that he gave redemption for those whom God wills to be saved. But the mediation and redemption of Christ presupposes the sin of Adam, and it is a dogma of faith that Christ is the Redeemer of each and every man, as we shall prove in the following article. Therefore. Finally, the Apostle did not say he willed, but he wills all, which denotes a present will concerning all men actually existing.

Proof 2°, from Augustine, in whom Jansenius places the greatest confidence. The Holy Doctor, lib. de Spiritu et littera, cap. 33, says: «God indeed wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, yet not in such a way that he takes from them free will, by the good or evil use of which they are most justly judged.» This will be established still further from what is to be said in the two following articles. Likewise, St. Prosper, the most faithful disciple of Augustine, in answering the second Vincentian objection, proves the same thing, as we do, from the aforementioned testimony of the Apostle.

Proof 3°. The opinion of Jansenius empties out Christian hope, whose foundation is the will of God for the salvation of all. For what sort of hope of his own salvation can someone have, who does not firmly believe that God wills him to be saved? Likewise, it is against the common sense of the schools and of the faithful.

But that this antecedent will to save all men is not a metaphorical will, a mere will of sign, but a sincere will of good pleasure, existing properly and formally, is clear from the preceding article.

I say, 2°: The antecedent will of God is conditioned — not in this sense, that God wills to make all saved, if they themselves will it by a volition which he awaits from their free will, as Tournely holds along with the Molinists: that is, the antecedent will to save all is not so efficacious on God's part that it depends on man alone, by consenting to grace, to render it efficacious in every respect for actually attaining salvation; — but it is said to be conditioned in this sense, that he wills all to be saved, if higher ends do not stand in the way, e.g., the general good of the universe, the order of providence, the mutability of free choice, the splendor of mercy, the beauty of justice: «For if every man were to be freed, it would certainly lie hidden what is owed to sin through justice,» says St. Augustine, Epist. 194¹, ad Sixtum, n. 5.

St. Thomas expresses this conclusion in these words: «The antecedent will can be called conditioned, and yet this is not an imperfection on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken with all the circumstances that are required for the right order to salvation².» As if he were saying: The antecedent will of God for the salvation of all is conditioned, because he wills it, if various circumstances do not stand in the way, to which the universal provider must attend for the right and fitting order to salvation.

Proof 1°, from Augustine, lib. IV Contra Iulianum, c. 8, and Enchirid., c. 97, where he teaches that many are not saved, not because they themselves are unwilling, but because God is unwilling: which is shown without any controversy in the case of infants. He explains this more fully in de Dono perseverantiae, c. 12.

Proof 2°, from reason. It is God himself who works the willing, or the consent, of man, according to that saying of the Apostle to the Philip., II, 13: He works in us both to will and to accomplish, according to good will; and that saying of Augustine, de Dono persev., c. 13: «We indeed will, but God works in us both the willing..., according to good will.» Therefore it is contradictory for him to will our salvation under the condition of a volition which he awaits from us, that is, for it to depend on us to render his will efficacious.

(Proof 3°. This opinion does not seem to withdraw sufficiently from the error of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, who likewise said that God wills all men to be saved, «provided, however, that they themselves be willing to consent to God calling them,» and thus that the divine will can be frustrated and impeded by created will, as Augustine testifies in Enchirid., cap. 103. But this the Molinists openly assert, namely that God so wills all men to be saved, if they are willing, that this will of God — as far as it is of itself efficacious — can be frustrated and impeded by created will; and thus it happens daily in the case of the reprobate, who are for that reason not saved, because they are unwilling, notwithstanding the will of God, as far as it is of itself efficacious, to save them.)

You will object against the first conclusion, with Jansenius: The principal foundation of our conclusion is the words of the Apostle, I Tim., II, 4: God wills all men to be saved. But these words, according to Augustine, ought not to be understood of each and every man. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. As often as the Holy Doctor turns over these words of the Apostle, he interprets them in an accommodated sense — either of all who are saved; or of the classes of individuals, not of the individuals of the classes; or in a causal sense, insofar as he makes the just will the salvation of all. Therefore.

I answer. Granting the major, I deny the minor. For Augustine's interpretations do not conflict with ours, which is that of Damascene and St. Thomas, nor do they exclude it; because they proceed in a different sense. Augustine's interpretations proceed concerning the consequent will, and ours proceeds concerning the antecedent will.

Whoever, however, interprets the words of the Apostle concerning the consequent will must, with Augustine, understand them in an accommodated sense; but those who interpret them, with Damascene and St. Thomas, concerning the antecedent will, must understand them in a distributive sense. Now Augustine interprets the words of the Apostle concerning the consequent will, not according to his own opinion — for elsewhere he understands them concerning the antecedent will, as is clear from the proofs of the conclusion — but on the hypothesis of the Semi-Pelagians, who understood them concerning the consequent will.

Against the second conclusion, Honoratus Tournely here, § Quarta probatio, weaves a long series of the Fathers who say that God wills to save all men, if they themselves are willing. But what follows from that? This too we profess with open mouth, this all Catholics acknowledge, nor has anyone ever dreamed that God wills to save the unwilling and reluctant. Undoubtedly, then, God wills all to be saved if they are willing, but not by a volition which he awaits and begs from them, as the Molinists say — as though the divine will depended on the human will in order to be efficacious, and it rested on men alone that it be fulfilled — but he wills all to be saved if they are willing, by a volition which he himself works in them, by the most powerful force of his grace: «Not because we ought not to will, says Augustine, Epist. 217³, n. 12, but because he works the willing in us.» And lib. I ad Bonifac., c. 19: «God knows how to work within, in the very hearts of men, not so that men (which cannot happen) believe while unwilling, but so that they become willing from having been unwilling.»

This question follows upon the preceding one, and is raised likewise against Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius. For these, by denying that God wills all to be saved, consequently deny that Christ, who came into the world to do the will of the Father, died for all. We, on the contrary, who say that God wills all to be saved, consequently maintain that Christ died for all. It must be noted, therefore, 1°, that the question is not whether the death of Christ is a sufficient price for redeeming and saving all men. The heretics do not deny this. Indeed, in this sense Christ could be said to have died, not only for all men, but even for the angels, for the demons, and for possible men; because his death was of sufficient worth to redeem and save all these. But the question is whether Christ offered his death to God for absolutely all men, and willed, with a sincere will — antecedent, however — to benefit all for their eternal salvation, at least as regards the sufficiency of the means.

I said, for the eternal salvation of all; for Jansenius does not deny that Christ died for some of the reprobate, in this sense, that he offered his death to the Father only for the temporal spiritual salvation of certain of the reprobate, namely, of those who are justified for a time in view of the merits and death of Christ. In this he differs from the Calvinists and Lutherans.

[Note 2°. The error of Jansenius is reported in these terms, which make up his fifth condemned proposition: «It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died, or shed his blood, for absolutely all men.» The censure of this proposition, made by Innocent X on the 31st of May, 1653, is expressed thus: «We declare it false, rash, scandalous; and, understood in the sense that Christ died only for the salvation of the predestined: impious, blasphemous, contumelious, derogatory to the divine piety, and heretical, and we condemn it as such.»]

I say: Christ died for absolutely all men in such a way that he encountered death by a true and sincere will, and offered it to the Father for the redemption and eternal salvation of all — antecedently indeed and sufficiently for the reprobate, consequently and efficaciously for the predestined.

Proof 1°, from the authority of Scripture. The Apostle everywhere asserts that Christ died for the redemption of absolutely all. Thus I Tim., II, 6: He gave himself a redemption for all. Likewise II Cor., V, 14 and 15, he proves that all died in the sin of Adam, because Christ died for all: If one, he says, died for all, then all died; and Christ died for all. But the Apostle's proof would be inept if Christ had not truly died for each and every one. Whence Augustine, book IV, Against Julian, ch. 4, says thus: «One, says the Apostle, died for all; therefore all died: showing that it could not have come to pass that he should die, except for the dead. For from this he proved that all were dead, because one died for all. I press it, I urge it, I thrust it upon the one who refuses... One died for all. Therefore all died. See that he wished it to be a consequence, that all should be understood to be dead, if he died for all.»

They answer 1°, the Jansenists, that by these authorities it is signified that Christ died for all in an accommodated sense, that is, for the classes of individuals, not distributively for the individuals within the classes, or that he died for all in this sense, that he took on a nature and cause common to all.

But on the contrary: 1° The words of Scripture are to be understood in their proper and obvious sense, where nothing compels recourse to an improper one. But here nothing compels these universal terms, all, all men, to be restricted to only certain ones. 2° This solution openly contradicts the texts that follow: I Tim., IV, 10: We hope in the living God, who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful; I Cor., VIII, 11: The weak brother, for whom Christ died, shall perish by thy knowledge; II Cor., V, 15: Christ died for all, just as it also contradicts the texts of Augustine cited and others to be cited below, by which it is openly signified that Christ died for all in such a way that he died also for the reprobate. Moreover, this response is effectively destroyed by what we shall presently adduce from the Council of Trent, from the doctrine of the Church, and from the holy Fathers.

They answer 2°, that by these authorities it is signified only that Christ died for all sufficiently, in this sense, that his death is sufficient for the saving of all men, but not in this sense, that he ordained it and offered it to the Father for the salvation of all.

But on the contrary: 1° To die for someone manifestly implies that the intention of the one dying is that his death should benefit him: because for implies the final cause on account of which something is done; for when it is said that a physician came for a sick man, it is signified that he came for the advantage and benefit of the sick man, and for the sake of his health. Hence, if a father had two captive sons, and wished to free only one, the other being left neglected as a punishment for his crimes, and for the freeing of this one offered a sum which would suffice for the freeing of both, but which he wished to benefit and be applied to one only, he would indeed be said to offer a price sufficient for both, but not to offer it for both.

2° It is most evident, according to the Scriptures cited, that Christ died for men otherwise than for demons. But this would be false, if the response of the Jansenists were true: since indeed, as we have already said, the death of Christ is also sufficient for the saving of demons. Therefore.

Proof 2° of the conclusion. The Council of Trent, session VI, ch. 2, says: «Him (Christ) God set forth as a propitiator through faith in his blood for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.» And immediately it adds, in ch. 3: «But although he died for all, yet not all receive the benefit of his death, but those only to whom the merit of his passion is communicated.» By these words the Catholic dogma is openly handed down, namely, that Christ died for the salvation of all, both the elect and the non-elect; yet not all are saved, because the merit of his death is not applied to all through the sacraments of faith.

By this testimony also all the evasions of the Jansenists are precluded; for thus I press the point: the Tridentine council defined that Christ died for all, in the sense in which Calvin, against whom it is directed, denied it: otherwise its decree would be altogether vain and idle. But Calvin did not deny that Christ died for all in an accommodated sense, nor in the sense that he had taken on a nature and cause common to all, nor in the sense that his death was of itself a price sufficient for the saving of all; for he admitted all these senses, just as the heretics still admit them today: but he denied only that he had died with the intention and will of redeeming and saving all. Therefore the council defined this. Whence also Jansenius preferred to pass over this decree of the council in deep silence, rather than employ these inept solutions, as his followers do today.

Proof 3°, from the authority of the Fathers. Setting aside the almost innumerable Fathers, I propose one, Augustine, whom Jansenius contends to claim wholly for himself. Besides what has already been said, the holy Doctor writes thus on Psalm XCV, n. 15: «He shall judge the world in equity: not a part, because he did not buy a part. He must judge the whole, because he gave the price for the whole.» In Sermon 67, he introduces Christ on the day of judgment addressing the reprobate thus: «I took up your sorrows, that I might give you glory; I took up your death, that you might live forever.... Why have you lost what I endured for you? Why have you ungratefully refused the gifts of your redemption?» Tract. IV on John, n. 1: «They crucified their Savior, and made him their condemner.» In Book II On the Creed of the Faith¹, ch. 8, he introduces Christ reproaching the reprobate thus: «You recognize the side which you pierced: since it was opened both through you and because of you, and yet you were unwilling to enter.»

Proof 4°, from the common and perpetual faith of the Church contained in the Nicene Creed and that of Athanasius. This article of the Nicene Creed: «Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven... Was crucified also for us, etc.,» or, as it is found in the Creed of Athanasius: «Who suffered for our salvation:» this article, I say, is proposed to be believed with certain and undoubted faith by each and every one, not only the faithful, but also unbelievers, according to that precept of Christ, Matth., XXVIII, 19: Teach all nations; and indeed it is to be accepted under grave obligation, as is clear from the Creed of Athanasius: «This is the catholic faith (namely, contained in the preceding articles, one of which is the one we here press), which unless each one believes faithfully and firmly, he cannot be saved.» But no one is commanded to believe what is false. Therefore it is not false that Christ died for the salvation of unbelievers and the reprobate, inasmuch as this article of faith is proposed to them to be believed, as I have said. Hence the Church speaks thus in her prayers: Jesus, Redeemer of all, and Bernard, sermon II on Psalm Qui habitat: «All things can say to God: You are my Creator... All men can say: You are my Redeemer.»

This argument is pressed further. According to the doctrine of Jansenius, the aforesaid article of faith cannot be believed even by any one of the faithful. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. The object of divine faith must be certain and undoubted. But if, according to Jansenius, Christ died only for the salvation of the predestined, it will not be certain and undoubted to any believer that Christ died for his own salvation. Therefore. — The minor is evident; because, apart from a special revelation, it is certain and undoubted to no one that he is predestined, as the Council of Trent defines, session VI, ch. 13.

You will object these words of Matth., XXVI, 28: This is my blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins. Ch. XX, 28: The Son of man came to give his life, a redemption for many. To the Hebrews, IX, 28: Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many. Therefore not for all, nor for the sins of all.

I answer 1°, that by many in Scripture it is everywhere understood all, when all are in a great number, so that concerning the same matter it uses now all, now many. Thus, for example, the Apostle, in Rom., V, 18 and 19, says: Therefore, as by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just. Where the Apostle, whom he had called all in the first part of the proposition, calls the same many in the second.

I answer 2°, with St. Thomas, on the passage cited from Matthew, that Christ died for many and for all: for many as regards efficacy and application, for all as regards the sufficiency of the reward offered. «And this by the fault of men.» In the same way the Roman Catechism explains these words of Matthew, part II, ch. 4, sect. 23.

[In the place here cited it is read: «Those words which are added: For you and for many, were taken severally from Matthew and Luke, which nevertheless holy Church, instructed by the Spirit of God, joined together. They pertain, however, to declaring the fruit and benefit of the Passion; for if we consider its power, it must be confessed that the blood was shed by the Savior for the salvation of all; but if we consider the fruit which men have received from it, we shall easily understand that this benefit extends not to all, but to many only. When, therefore, he said for you, he signified either those who were present, or those chosen from the Jewish people, such as the disciples were, excepting Judas, with whom he was speaking. But when he added for many, he wished the rest of the elect from among the Jews or Gentiles to be understood. Rightly, therefore, was it done that for all was not said, since in this place the discourse was only about the fruits of the Passion, which brought the fruit of salvation to the elect alone. And to this pertain those words of the Apostle: Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many. And what the Lord says in John, XVII, 9: I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them whom thou hast given me, because they are thine.»]

[Molina teaches that sufficient grace is that which so bestows on man a complete and unencumbered power of acting well, that it rests with his will alone, by consenting or dissenting, to render it efficacious or inefficacious, with nothing else required on God's part for its efficacy, beyond the general simultaneous concurrence.

According to Suárez and the other Congruists, who do not seem to withdraw sufficiently from Molina's opinion, sufficient grace is incongruous grace; for it confers on man a complete and unencumbered power of operating well, yet never the actual operation. It does not differ from congruous or efficacious grace in respect of the aid and its power, but only in respect of the gift and benefit. For insofar as God gives grace in those circumstances in which he foresaw, through the middle knowledge, that man would consent, it is called congruous and efficacious; but insofar as he gives the same or an equal grace in circumstances in which he foresees that man will not consent, it is called incongruous and merely sufficient.

According to Jansenius and the Jansenists, in the state of fallen nature no grace is given that is merely sufficient, but every grace is efficacious, from their capital principle, by force of which the human will, in this state of fallen nature, is necessarily carried away by one or the other undeliberated delight — either the heavenly delight, in which they locate grace, or the earthly — according as the one surpasses the other in degree.]

By the name of sufficient aid we understand that which confers a proximate or remote power, according as it is proximately or remotely sufficient for acting well, but never the actual operation, unless there supervenes another aid or concurrence — not merely concomitant, as the Molinists hold, but preceding in nature — which by its own force inclines and determines the will to consent, as we shall say more fully when treating of Grace.

I suppose that God, by force of the antecedent will he has of saving all through Christ and on account of Christ, prepares in common for all sufficient aids to salvation. This follows from the will of saving all and from the death of Christ for all¹. For

1° Although men merited by Adam's sin to be deprived of grace and glory, yet by this very fact that God, through Christ and on account of Christ, resumed the will and care of saving all, as we have proved, he consequently wills and prepares in common for all of them means sufficient for salvation; for no one sincerely wills an end unless he wills means sufficient for attaining it, since the end is not attainable without means. And St. Thomas constantly insists on this principle in the places cited in the margin. Thus a merchant — an example he also uses — would not be judged to will sincerely to save his goods, if he did not employ sufficient diligence to save them.

2° By this very fact that Christ died for the salvation of all, as we have likewise proved, he merited for all means sufficient for attaining that salvation. Therefore they are owed to all from the merits of Christ. Therefore God wills, prepares, and provides them, as far as in him lies, for all; for he intends to defraud no one of his right.

But the difficulty is, whether God not only prepares and provides for all in common sufficient aids to salvation, but also whether he offers and confers them on each and every one in particular: Some think that God in fact denies them to certain persons — not indeed to the just, since that is condemned in the first proposition of Jansenius — but to unbelievers, to the hardened, and to little children dying without baptism, as a punishment for a preceding sin, original or actual. So Father Gonet, one of our own, holds this opinion, disp. V, de reprob., art. 5. He indeed reports several Thomists as agreeing with him, whom, however, the most learned Salmanticenses clear of this opinion.

Before the resolution, it must be observed that sufficient aid does not consist in an indivisible point, but admits of latitude, and that one aid is proximately, another remotely, sufficient: thus, for example, an aid proximately sufficient for asking for the grace to overcome temptation, is remotely sufficient for overcoming the temptation itself.

I say: God not only prepares in common, but also confers in particular on each and every man living morally, according to place and time, aids proximately or remotely sufficient for salvation, according to each one's condition and need: so that, if some do not observe the commandments and by not observing them sin, or are not converted to the faith or to penance, and finally do not attain salvation, this is not to be attributed to God, as though he denied those aids to anyone as a punishment for a preceding sin, but to the side of men, who either reject them when offered, or, having received them, do not use them or abuse them.

Proof 1°, from Scripture. The Apostle, Rom. I, 21, says that unbelievers are inexcusable because, although they had known God as the author of nature, they did not nevertheless glorify him as God, that is, they did not turn themselves to him, nor did they give thanks for that aid conferred on them. And in chapter II, 4, to anyone, whether unbeliever or hardened believer, he says: The kindness of God leads you to penance; or, as the Greek text properly signifies (as Cornelius a Lapide notes), drives and impels [you] to penance. Now it is certain that no one is drawn, driven, or impelled to penance except through aids of grace received within, or at least so offered that it is within man's power to reject them. Apoc. III, 20: I stand at the door and knock... If anyone shall open the door to me, I will come in to him. From this passage St. Thomas, on Hebr. ch. 12, lect. 3, infers that grace is wanting to no one at all, but is communicated to all as far as lies in it. Matth. V, 45: He makes his sun to rise upon the good and the bad, and rains upon the just and the unjust. This Ambrose, serm. 8 on Ps. CXVIII, explains of the sun of justice and the rain of grace. Eccli. XV, 11: Say not: It is through God I am wanting; that is, do not say: he himself withdraws strength from me. Wisd. XI, 24: You have mercy on all. Prov. I, 24: I called, and you refused; I stretched out my hand, and there was none that regarded. These words are understood of all, especially of the hardened.

Proof 2°, from Augustine, to whom the adversaries appeal. The holy Doctor, Tract. I in Ioann., n. 19, explaining these words of this Evangelist, John I, 11: The light shines in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it, says: « Therefore, just as to a blind man placed in the sun, the sun is present to him, but he himself is absent to the sun; so every fool, every unjust man, every impious man, is blind of heart. Wisdom is present to him, but when it is present to a blind man, it is absent from his eyes: not because it is itself absent from him, but because he himself is absent from it. » Likewise the holy Doctor, de Natura et Gratia, cap. 67, n. 81, says: « Perhaps (sinners) would rightly complain if no man were ever victor over error and lust; but since (God) is everywhere present, who in many ways, through a creature serving him as Lord, calls the one turned away, teaches the one believing, consoles the one hoping, exhorts the one loving, helps the one striving, hears the one imploring; it is not imputed to you as a fault that you are ignorant against your will, but that you neglect to seek what you are ignorant of; nor is it imputed that you do not bind up your wounded limbs, but that you spurn the one willing to heal you. These² are your own proper sins; for to no man has it been taken away to know how to seek profitably what he is ignorant of unprofitably. » St. Thomas, a faithful interpreter of Augustine, 1st part, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3: « God does not fail to do what is necessary for salvation. » Q. 14 de Verit., a. 11, ad 1: « This belongs to divine providence, that it provide for each one the things necessary for salvation, provided that it is not impeded on his part. » And III Contra gent., ch. 159, from these words of the Apostle, I Tim. II, 4: He wills all to be saved, he infers that God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give grace to all. « Although, he says, someone cannot merit or acquire divine grace by a movement of free will, he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it; for it is said of certain persons, Job XXI, 14: They said to God: Depart from us, and we do not want the knowledge of your ways, and ibid. XXIV, 13: They were rebels against the light... Those alone, therefore, are deprived of grace who place in themselves an impediment to grace: just as, when the sun illumines the world, it is imputed as a fault to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follows from this. »

Proof 4°, by an argument founded on the Scriptures. Salvation is possible for each one living morally, even supposing not only original sin, but supposing any other actual sins that are not final. But the preparation of means for salvation in common would not render it sufficiently possible for those to whom God in particular would in fact deny them, on account of a preceding original or actual sin. Therefore. — The major seems certain.

Proof of the minor. On whatever ground a means sufficient and necessary for attaining some end is denied to someone, whether on account of or apart from fault, in reality such an end is not possible for him; for the end is not attainable except through means: for example, if someone through his own fault has lost the money necessary for buying a vineyard, is the acquisition of the vineyard equally impossible for him as for one who, without fault, were deprived of the money necessary for the purchase? If you say: the first can receive money from friends; I will say: so can the second. Moreover, what favors the acquisition of the vineyard, namely that he can receive money from friends, if the friends who before the fault had intended to give it, after the fault are unwilling to give it? But it would be otherwise if they were to offer the money, and he were to refuse to accept it; for then he is truly judged able to buy. Or, to use another example already employed: if a king who destined medicines for the whole province, in fact denies them to certain citizens whom he has caught guilty of the crime of lese-majesty, could the king be said, after that crime has been detected, still to will to heal them, and could these in reality be healed, so long as the remedies necessary for health are denied them? Similarly in our case.

Proof 5°. God denies no one aids proximately or remotely sufficient for observing the commandments, when here and now they are pressing, and hence for avoiding all sins. But by avoiding all sins and observing all the commandments, salvation is had, according to that saying, Matth. XIX, 17: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments. Therefore. — Proof of the major, 1°, from this principle: God does not command impossible things. But he would command impossible things to him from whom he withdrew the sufficient aid necessary for observing the commandments, as is self-evident. Therefore. — The major is a commonly received principle. Whence the Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11, says: « God does not command impossible things, but by commanding he admonishes you both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot; and he helps you that you may be able. » And St. Thomas, in II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3: « God, he says, is not more cruel than man. But it is imputed to a man as cruelty, if he binds someone by a precept to what he cannot fulfill. Therefore this must in no way be supposed of God. »

They answer — the Jansenists — that although certain precepts would be impossible for men, this powerlessness nevertheless does not excuse transgressors from sin, because it arises from at least original sin, and hence the transgression is always voluntary in the head.

But on the contrary: 1° For the fault of the person, the voluntary in nature does not suffice, but the voluntary in the person is required³. 2° It would follow that first-first movements in us — of blasphemy, of filthiness, and other things which madmen do against the law of God — would be imputed to them as fault, because these flow from original sin, and are voluntary in the head; likewise, that negative unbelief would be a sin, which is proposition 65 condemned in Baius.

Gonet answers, disp. V de reprob., a. 6, § 2, that anyone can keep the commandments and be saved, not by an intrinsic power, but by an extrinsic one, inasmuch as he can receive from God a grace sufficient for observing the commandments and for salvation.

But on the contrary. This answer indeed would be true on the hypothesis that God were ready, and willing to give this grace, because then the common adage of St. Thomas holds: that what we can do through friends willing to help us, we can do through ourselves. But, on Gonet's hypothesis, that God has decreed to deny this grace as a punishment for a preceding sin, it is utterly foreign to reason and common sense to say that this man can observe the commandments and be saved. Otherwise, by equal right you would say that an imprisoned man can be set free, because a rich man can give him the price of his liberation, which however he refuses; that a poor man can buy a villa, because he can receive the money which no one is willing to give him; that a sick man can be healed, because the king destined medicines for the whole province, yet forbade them to be given to this sick man in particular; that Peter, with broken legs, can run, because he can be healed by a surgeon who is unwilling to heal him.

Gonet answers again, in the place cited, de reprob., that sinners are inexcusably obligated to keep the commandments, although they lack the intrinsic power for their observance, because such a defect and lack arises from their own fault: thus, he says, a servant who, sent by his master into the city, voluntarily throws himself into a pit and breaks his legs, is not on that account exempted from the obligation of the precept, and is justly punished; thus a drunk man is not excused from a homicide committed, although he is powerless to avoid it; thus demons and the damned are not excused from sin in transgressing the commandments, although the aid of grace is denied them, because they fell into this state by their own fault. Therefore.

I answer. A sin following upon a voluntary act is not imputed to the agent, except insofar as it was foreseen, or could in a human manner have been foreseen, in its cause: otherwise it would be voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, as we have taught elsewhere and as is commonly taught in the treatise on Human Acts. Now both the servant, by voluntarily throwing himself into the pit, and the drunk, by making himself drunk, and the damned, by finally persevering in sin, foresaw, or could in a human manner have foreseen, the resulting powerlessness to fulfill the precepts, and therefore their transgression is imputed to them. But the sinner, in sinning, could not foresee the privation of all aid, by which he would be rendered powerless to observe the commandments, because as long as he is on the way, such a privation is not given, as I have already said and shall presently say. Hence Gonet's argument runs on a false supposition.

From these two last proofs, then, we have that God denies sufficient aids neither to unbelievers nor to hardened and blinded sinners — to the former for believing, to the latter for doing penance: because, according to the first argument, salvation is possible for both, and necessary for salvation is, in the unbeliever, faith, in the sinner, penance; according to the second argument, because an adult unbeliever is bound to lay aside unbelief, to believe in God, to worship God, and to love him with his whole heart, at least in the manner in which he knows him; and the sinner is bound to do penance. And these cannot be accomplished without grace, as is taught in Trent, sess. VI, can. 3⁴, and it was defined against the Pelagians.

You will object 1°: Those interior aids, proximately or remotely sufficient, are pious illuminations of the intellect and pious motions of the will toward fulfilling the precepts, or at least toward asking for the grace of fulfilling them. But it is utterly incredible that the most wicked of mortals — the blinded, the hardened, pagans, heretics, atheists — as often as a precept is incumbent on them, as often as they sin, are stirred by those pious illuminations and motions, at least to pray to God.

I answer, I distinguish the major. Those sufficient aids are pious illuminations of the intellect and pious motions of the will, received or offered, I concede; always received, I deny. Hence I deny the supposition, the minor, and the consequent. For in order that aids be judged sufficient, it is not necessary, according to us, that unbelievers, atheists, the hardened, receive them and are actually stirred by them, but it suffices that they be so offered to them, that, if they do not receive them, it is not because God denies them, but because they themselves place an obstacle.

You will object 2°: St. Augustine, in the book de Corrept. et Grat., cap. 11, says: « (God) had given an aid to the first man, without which he could not have persevered, even if he had willed to. » And below: « If this aid... had been wanting to him, he would by no means have fallen through his own fault... But now, those to whom such aid is wanting, it is the punishment of sin. » From which St. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1: « If, he says, something is said to be in man's power with the aid of grace excluded, then man is bound to many things to which he cannot attain without reparative grace, such as to love God and neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith; yet he can do this with the aid of grace. This aid, indeed, to whomever it is given, is given mercifully; but to whom it is not given, it is not given from justice, as a punishment for a preceding sin, or at least for original sin, as Augustine says in the book de Corrept. et Gratia. » But each of the two holy Doctors is speaking of sufficient aid, as is clear from the terms. Therefore.

I answer that these words of Augustine are to be understood, not of just any sufficient aid whatsoever, but of the aid by which man could persevere with great facility, which implies not merely a transient actual aid, but sanctifying grace and the habits of the virtues, such indeed as Adam had in the state of innocence. Now, if the first parent had lacked such an aid, he would not have fallen through his own fault, because, since in the state of integral nature a grace inferior to that was not given, it is supposed that he had no other aid by which he could simply avoid the fall; so that in him to be able and to be easily able were the same. Such an aid, indeed, toward so easy an ability, we readily admit can be denied to many as a punishment for original or actual sin — we who require only remotely sufficient aids — from Augustine himself saying: « It has been taken from no man to know how to seek profitably what he is ignorant of unprofitably. » See the other texts cited above.

As to St. Thomas, I answer 1° that he likewise speaks of an aid implying sanctifying grace together with the habits of the virtues, both because he speaks in the sense of Augustine, as is clear, and because he speaks of grace, not "preparing," as some wrongly quote, but "repairing." Now it is agreed that it is not sufficient actual aid, but habitual grace, that is reparative of fallen nature.

I answer 2°. Granted that St. Thomas speaks of a sufficient actual aid, I say that he speaks of what is proximately sufficient, and not of what is remotely sufficient: for he speaks of the aid required for explicit faith, which he denies is given to all; but from this it does not follow that an aid sufficient for implicit faith — which is remotely sufficient for explicit faith — is not given. Nor indeed is it right to doubt the mind of St. Thomas, after so many of his testimonies which we have related.

You will object 3°, concerning little children: God denies sufficient aids to salvation to many infants — namely, to those who die either in their mothers' wombs, or among unbelievers before the use of reason; for the one means sufficient for salvation for these is baptism actually conferred, of which, however, they are deprived. Therefore.

I answer that God has sufficiently provided for the salvation of little children, given their condition, through the institution of baptism, inasmuch as it is instituted for all and can be conferred on all, although its actual conferral is sometimes impeded by various causes, both natural and free, which God as universal provider is not bound to impede, but on the contrary must permit, on account of higher ends. This is the common solution, according to which little children are not altogether abandoned, nor deprived of the grace of baptism as a punishment for original sin, as the opposite opinion holds, but because God, according to the laws of his general providence, does not arrest the secondary causes by which the actual conferral of baptism is impeded.

To this common solution several more recent writers add — among whom, from our own, Goudin and Bancel subscribe — that God, through the institution of baptism, has so provided for the salvation of little children, that it rests with their parents whether it is conferred on them or not; inasmuch as the parents, if they lived more soberly, abstaining from this or that food, place, or occasion, especially if they duly prayed and employed the prayers of others, and made good use of the other aids sufficient for this end that were conferred, would bring it about with God that the little child, who according to the natural course was going to die, would survive until it should receive baptism. And they think this necessary, in order that God be said to have sufficiently provided for the salvation of little children. For just as, they say, a poor man is not said to have sufficiency for the sustenance of life through the fact that God has provided for him in secondary causes as regards food, if the food can by no human diligence be procured for him; so too a little child is not said to have means sufficient for salvation, through the fact that God has instituted baptism, by force of which it could be freed from sin, if nevertheless baptism can by no human diligence be applied.