Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I say: Future things are present to God in eternity, not only objectively and intentionally, but physically and really — not, indeed, through an anticipated production of them in eternity, but through the virtual coextension of eternity itself with that portion of time in which they will at some time exist.

Proof 1° From the Fathers. St. Augustine, book II ad Simplic., q. 2, Pope St. Gregory, book XX Moral., ch. 33, and many others, deny: 1° that there is foreknowledge in God in the strict sense. 2° They deny that anything is future to God. 3° Finally, they deny, as something most absurd, that God knows something anew in time which he did not know before. But if future things were present to God only objectively and intentionally, and not physically and really, 1° he would have, with respect to them, foreknowledge in the strict sense, as is clear in the case of the Prophets, who, notwithstanding the objective presence they have of future things, nevertheless have, with respect to them, foreknowledge in the strict sense; 2° future things would be absolutely future to God, since it is not objective presence but only real presence that removes the character of true futurition; 3° finally, he would know something anew in time which he did not know before, namely, things physically existing. Therefore.

As for St. Thomas, he is entirely of this opinion here, art. 13; in I Sent., dist. 38, art. 5. o, and elsewhere many times.

Proof 2° By reason. 1° Eternity is a duration infinite, indivisible, and wholly simultaneous in its character as duration, as is clear from its definition commonly received from Boethius¹. But by reason of its infinity it contains all durations — past, present, and future; by reason of its indivisibility and simultaneity it contains them, although they flow successively, in an indivisible manner in the same now, without any succession. Therefore all times, and the things measured by time, are really present to God by reason of eternity. Hence eternity is compared to a tree planted in the middle of a river of such extent that it contains the whole river, coexisting all at once and together with all the flowing parts of the water, and not awaiting their passage in order to possess and measure them. Or, with St. Thomas², God in eternity is compared to a man standing on a high watchtower from which he sees the whole road and all who pass along it; for although one walks after another, and the one before does not see the one behind, yet he who is on the watchtower sees them all at once and has them present to himself. Likewise God has present to himself, in the watchtower of eternity, all things, even past and future, although they succeed one another and cannot exist simultaneously in their own proper duration.

2° Since the knowledge of God is most perfect, it must be invariable³. But it would not be invariable if he did not see future things really present in his eternity. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. If things were not really present to God in eternity, he would begin anew to see them really present in time, namely in the very manner in which they would be produced. Therefore, as Augustine argued, he would know them twice — now as future, afterward as really present — and something new would occur in time within that knowledge, and thus it would be changed, just as God's will would be changed if he began now to will something which he had not willed before. Therefore.

You will object: It is unintelligible that something should exist in eternity which does not exist in itself; for to exist in itself is prior to existing in another. But future things do not now exist in themselves. Therefore they do not exist in eternity.

It is answered commonly, by distinguishing the minor. Future things do not now exist in themselves in their own proper duration, I concede; they do not now exist in themselves in the higher duration of eternity, I deny. For eternity, according to its virtual extension, contains that portion of time in which the Antichrist, for example, will exist in his own proper duration.

Some, in order to render this difficulty more intelligible, observe that eternity does not measure created things immediately, presupposing them as already passively changed and produced in themselves, but precisely as they are contained in the divine action and are regarded as its term. Hence the effect of God's action can be considered in two ways: in one way, as passively changed and produced, and thus it founds its own proper duration, and is not from eternity; in another way, as it is precisely the term connoted and regarded by the eternal action, and under this aspect it is drawn to a higher measure and is from eternity, because it is measured by the same measure by which the action of which it is the term is measured — not as changed by that action, but as connoted by it.

Therefore, according to this observation, the minor of the argument is to be distinguished thus. Future things do not now and from eternity exist in themselves as effects passively changed and produced, I concede the minor; as terms connoted by an actual action, I deny the minor

If instes: The effect, precisely as the term connoted by the eternal action, is nothing real outside its causes. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish Nothing is real outside its causes in this sense, that it is not passively changed, I concede; in this sense, that it is only possible or future with respect to God, I deny. For, taken in this way, it is no longer considered within the divine essence merely as able to produce or as willing to produce, but as actually producing; from which it is understood to have created being outside its causes — not indeed as passively changed, nor yet as only possible or future in first act, but in second act, as it is connoted by the action actually existing as its term, and thus we say it is really present in eternity. According to this understanding, which is that of John of St. Thomas, and which Contenson also follows, the difficulty seems to vanish and to be reduced to a question of name, and at the same time many difficult objections are forestalled, which we therefore omit.