Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I say 1°: The future is rightly defined: That which is determined in its causes to have existence in the time that follows. The defenders of middle knowledge do not admit this definition — indeed they attack it with all their might — because they see that it overturns their system. Nevertheless

Proof 1° from authority. St. Augustine, bk. VI de Genes. ad litt., ch. 17, says: « For God to make future things is nothing other than to prepare their causes. » And Tract. LXVIII in Ioann.: « God makes future things by predestining them. » St. Thomas, q. 2 de veritate, a. 12, ad 7: « When it is said: This is future, the order that exists in the causes of that thing toward its production is designated. » In this Part, q. 16, a. 7, ad 3: « That which now is, was future from this, before it was, because it was in its cause that it should come to be, » not in the cause as merely potent precisely, for this denominates only the possible; not in the cause as actually influencing, for this denominates the actually existing. Therefore in the cause as determined to produce it in the time that follows. And from this the fundamental reason is drawn. Therefore.

Proof 2° from reason. To be future is a real denomination, not an intrinsic one — for this does not belong to a thing not existing — but an extrinsic one, and so one drawn from some extrinsic real form. But this can be nothing other than its cause, as determined to give it existence in the time that follows; for it cannot be the cause as merely able to produce, since this denominates only the possible, nor as actually producing, since this denominates the existent. Therefore.

It is confirmed. The future must be constituted by that through which it is drawn out from the mass of possibility, and is distinguished from the possible and the existent. But nothing else can be assigned by which it obtains this, than the determination of that cause. Therefore. — The minor is proved. The possible is indeed contained in a cause that is able, but undetermined to produce it; the existent is outside its causes. Therefore the future, which is midway between the two, is constituted in a middle way — not by a cause merely able and indifferent, not by a cause actually producing, but by a cause determined to give it existence for the time that follows.

The adversaries reply that the future is constituted by a relation to existence for the time that follows, that is, from the fact that it will be.

But on the contrary, I ask: whence does the future contingent — the very thing chiefly in question — have a relation to existence, that is, have it that it will be rather than that it will not be: from itself, or from a cause? Not from itself, otherwise it would not be a future contingent, but a necessary one, and it would be future in every sign of reason before the possible, or an existing God, were conceived. If from a cause, not from a cause merely able precisely to produce it — for since this is indifferent to producing or not producing, it does not give a relation to being rather than to non-being, but constitutes only the possible, as has been said; nor from a cause as actually producing, because, as I have also said, this makes it actually existent. Therefore from a cause determined to give it existence.

From what has been said it follows of itself that no future is contingent independently of the determination of the first cause; because, so long as the first cause remains undetermined, no second cause is determined — otherwise it would not be a second cause, but the first. And from this the system of middle knowledge is utterly overturned, as will be clear from what follows.

I say 2°: The future is one thing when necessary, another when contingent. The necessary is that which by its own nature demands to exist at some time, and is not naturally impedible, as tomorrow's sunrise. The contingent, if taken broadly, is indeed that which by its own nature demands to exist at some time, but by the concurrence of other causes is naturally impedible, as a long life from a robust temperament. The contingent taken properly and strictly is that which by its own nature is indifferent to being and not-being, as are those things which depend on free choice.

The properly contingent future is one thing when absolute, which does not depend on any condition, another when conditioned, which depends on some condition. The conditioned, again, is one thing when pertinent, another when impertinent, or disparate. Pertinent is that which has some connection, whether moral or physical, with the condition, as the conversion of the Tyrians, if the Gospel were preached to them; the salvation of Judas, if he were to do penance. Disparate is that which has no connection with the condition, as: if the goat should leap, the tree will flower; or that saying of Elisha to King Joas, IV Reg., XIII, 19: If thou hadst struck the ground five times, or six, or seven, thou wouldst have struck Syria even to consumption.