Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

In this article and in those that follow, the question is no longer about the knowledge of God strictly so called, but about his cognition as such, whether it be scientific or not.

You will ask 1° how far the knowledge of God extends?

I answer 1°. God knows himself through himself, indeed he even comprehends himself¹.

The reason for the first part is that God, just as he is supremely understanding, so he is supremely intelligible, and most present to and united with himself; indeed, as understanding and as intelligible, he is in every way one and the same. Therefore he knows himself through himself, and not through a species distinct from himself.

The reason for the second part is that God knows himself as much as he is knowable; for as he is infinitely knowable, so he is infinitely cognitive, since on both sides he is pure and infinite act. Therefore.

I answer 2°. God knows all things other than himself, whether possible, or present, or past, or future, even the smallest, not only according to the common note of being, but also as to their proper and singular being, down to the last differences².

It is a matter of faith, handed down everywhere in the Scriptures. Hebr., IV, 13: There is no creature invisible in his sight, but all things are naked and open to his eyes. Psal. CXXXVIII, 3-5: Thou hast understood my thoughts afar off,... thou hast foreseen all my ways,... thou hast known all things, the last and those of old. And throughout the whole psalm. Psal. XXXII, 15: He who hath made the hearts of every one of them, who understandeth all their works. Sap., VIII, 8: She knoweth signs and wonders before they be done, and the events of times and ages. Psal. LXVIII, 6: My offences are not hidden from thee. And elsewhere, in many places.

It is proved by reason. God perfectly knows himself and his own power. But power cannot be perfectly known unless all the things to which it extends are known. Now the divine power extends to all things other than God, not only as to the common note of being, but as to their formal and singular being, down to the last differences; for he is the fullness of being and the effective and exemplary cause of all beings and of every difference and perfection of theirs. Therefore.

You will ask 2° what the formal and primary object of the divine knowledge is.

I answer. The formal and primary object of the divine cognition is not created being, nor being as such abstracting from created and uncreated; but only uncreated being, namely God himself³.

It is proved 1°. That is the formal and primary object of the divine cognition which it attains through itself, first, and by reason of itself⁴. But that which the divine cognition attains through itself, first, and by reason of itself, is not created being, nor being as such abstracting from created and uncreated, but God alone. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. 1° because nothing is or can be conceived prior to God; 2° because God knows himself as cause, and in himself, as cause, knows creatures as effects. Therefore. — First, through himself and by reason of himself he knows himself; secondarily, and dependently on himself, creatures; thirdly, the divine essence is first represented through itself to the divine intellect, and creatures secondarily and by reason of it. Therefore the divine essence is attained by the divine cognition through itself, first. — The consequence is clear, because the intellect is borne toward its objects in the order in which they are represented to it. — Proof of the antecedent. The species which the divine intellect uses is the divine essence itself. But the divine essence represents itself first, and then, in itself, creatures; because, if it represented itself and creatures equally, God would not be more, in intelligible being, than a creature, as we have already noted elsewhere. Therefore.

You will ask 3° how many kinds of knowledge there are in God.

Although the divine knowledge, on the part of God, is one, simple, and unlimited, comprehending all things most perfectly in a single act, yet on the part of the object, and according to our mode of conceiving, it is variously divided. Hence

I answer. Setting aside the various divisions of the divine knowledge into speculative and practical⁵, and into necessary and free, the most celebrated of all is the division into the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision⁶.

Knowledge of simple intelligence is that which is concerned with those things which neither are, nor were, nor will be, that is, with the quiddities of things in a state of mere possibility: it coincides with the speculative and the necessary⁷. It is called of simple intelligence, however, not to exclude the relation of knowledge to the thing known, which inseparably accompanies all knowledge, but to exclude the admixture of that which is outside the genus of knowledge, such as the existence of things, which the knowledge of vision adds, or the order of the will to the things known, which the knowledge of approbation adds. The knowledge of vision, then, is that which is borne toward things which are, or were, or will be; hence it adds, as I was just saying, over and above the knowledge of simple intelligence, an order to the physical existence of the object, as present in eternity, in a manner to be explained below. It is called of vision, a metaphor taken from the bodily eye, which is said to see things when it reaches them as present to itself. But whether this division is adequate, or whether, on the contrary, there is given another, mediating knowledge between those two, which is called middle knowledge, is a question most celebrated in the whole of theology, which we shall endeavor below to weigh in all its particulars, against Molina and the Fathers of the Society [of Jesus], the assertors of this middle knowledge.

There is another division, stated above, of knowledge into necessary and free. The necessary is that which precedes the free determination of God, and is concerned only with necessary objects, such as the quiddities or essences of things, which cannot be otherwise. The free is that which presupposes a decree, and is concerned with objects depending on the free will of God, such as things existing or future.

The knowledge of vision is subdivided into the knowledge of approbation and of disapprobation. The knowledge of approbation is that which is concerned with good things, and presupposes an approving decree of the divine will concerning them. The knowledge of disapprobation is that which is concerned with sins, and presupposes a decree of the divine will concerning them, not an approving one, but only a permissive one. And according to this division, God is sometimes said in Scripture to know and not to know evils or sins: not to know by the knowledge of approbation, to know by the knowledge of disapprobation.