Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
First published 1754
Charles René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae (Liège, 1754) is his six-volume abridgment of the larger Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata (1746–1751). It condenses Aquinas's order and teaching into a reference manual while retaining the Dominican's characteristic distinctions, scholastic proofs, and historical material. The compendium belongs to the eighteenth-century consolidation of post-Tridentine Thomist education and helped carry Billuart's influential reading of Aquinas into later schools. Schola presents the Latin text with an English translation from its public-domain source.
Proemium I: De natura et dotibus theologiae
Tractatus I: De Deo et Ejus Attributis
Dissertatio I: De Dei existentia
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Articulus II: Utrum sit Deus, et quibus rationibus demonstretur?
Articulus III: De Atheismo
Articulus IV: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis de existentia Dei?
Articulus V: An existant athei theoretici?
Dissertatio II: De natura seu quidditate Dei et Ejus attributis in communi
Articulus I: Quodnam sit constitutivum divinae naturae?
Articulus II: De attributis divinis in communi
Dissertatio III: De attributis in particulari quae pertinent ad divinum esse
Articulus I: De simplicitate Dei
Articulus II: De perfectione Dei
Articulus III: De bonitate Dei
Tractatus I: De infinitate Dei
Tractatus II: De immensitate Dei
Articulus IV: De immutabilitate Dei
Articulus V: De aeternitate Dei
Articulus VI: An Deus sit unus?
Dissertatio IV: De visione Dei a nobis
Articulus I: Utrum Deus, ut est in se, possit videri oculo corporeo?
Articulus II: Utrum intellectus creatus supernaturaliter adiutus possit videre Deum ut in se est?
Articulus III: Utrum aliquis in hac vita viderit, possitve videre Deum ut est in se?
Articulus IV: Utrum essentia divina videatur aut videri possit per aliquam similitudinem seu speciem?
Dissertatio V: De scientia Dei
Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit scientia proprie dicta, eaque sit attributum?
I suppose 1° that God understands most perfectly1: for all understand God to be a supremely perfect being, the most orderly first mover, the wisest ruler of the world, and the first cause of all things. But without understanding he would not be a supremely perfect being, since this is the greatest perfection; he would be a blind mover and a most imprudent ruler; nor would he be the cause of all things, since he would not confer upon us an understanding which he himself lacked.
Likewise, a being is cognitive to the extent that it is immaterial, or raised above the conditions of matter2. But God is in the highest degree of immateriality, inasmuch as he is pure act3. Therefore. — Proof of the major. Cognition occurs insofar as the knower has in itself the form of the thing known, while retaining its own. But that something should have in itself the form of another while retaining its own arises from immateriality and elevation above the conditions of matter. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. That something should have in itself both its own form and the forms of others arises from its amplitude and unlimitedness; for the more things a thing embraces, the more ample and unlimited it is. But that amplitude and unlimitedness arises from immateriality; for it is matter that limits form and prevents it from being communicated to another subject under the same individual character, which is to make it its own alone. Therefore. Hence a greater or lesser capacity for knowing is apportioned according to a greater or lesser immateriality, a greater or lesser elevation above the conditions of matter: as is evident in all cognitive things.
I suppose 2° that, in God, understanding and the intellect are one and the same, without virtual distinction; because in God only those things are virtually distinguished which are equivalent to several created things distinct in formal object and belonging to different lines. But the intellect and actual understanding belong to the same line and are concerned with the same formal object. Therefore.
I say 1°: There is, in God, knowledge properly so called. It is common, against Vasquez.
[Proof 1°, by this most profound and evident reason adduced by the Angelic Doctor, hic, q. 14, a. 1, o: « In God there is knowledge in the most perfect way. To make this evident, it must be considered that knowing things are distinguished from non-knowing things in this respect, that non-knowing things have nothing but their own form only; but a knowing thing is of a nature to have the form of another thing as well, for the species of the thing known is in the knower. Whence it is manifest that the nature of a non-knowing thing is more constricted and limited, while the nature of knowing things has greater amplitude and extension, on account of which the Philosopher says, in III de anima, that « the soul is in a certain way all things. » Now the constriction of form comes through matter: whence we also said above that forms, insofar as they are more immaterial, to that extent approach nearer to a certain infinity. It is clear, therefore, that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive, and the mode of cognition follows the mode of immateriality. Whence it is said in II de anima that plants do not know, on account of their materiality. But sense is cognitive because it is receptive of species without matter; and the intellect is still more cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as is said in III de anima. Whence, since God is in the highest degree of immateriality, it follows that he himself is in the highest degree of knowledge. »]
Proof 2°. Knowledge properly so called is nothing other than certain and evident cognition of things through their causes4. But God knows things certainly and evidently through their causes; for he knows them in every way in which they are knowable, and they are knowable through their causes. Therefore.
I say 2°: Knowledge in God is his attribute.
Proof. An attribute is an absolute formality, existing formally in God, and consequent upon the divine nature already constituted, drawing it to a different line: as is clear from what has been said about the attributes. But such is knowledge in God. — And first, it is established from the first conclusion that it is an absolute formality existing formally in God. — It is proved as to the remaining particulars. The divine act of understanding, as constitutive of God, regards the divine essence absolutely and precisely as intelligible; the act of understanding, as scientific, regards the divine essence in a determinate manner, namely under the aspect of cause. Therefore it follows upon the nature already constituted, and by reason of a different object it draws it to a different line.
You will say: The divine act of understanding, as constitutive of the divine nature, is scientific. Therefore knowledge is not an attribute of God, but the divine essence itself. — The antecedent is proved. The divine act of understanding, as constitutive of the divine nature, attains it as the formality of the attributes and the cause of creatures; for since it is infinite and comprehensive, it knows the divine nature in every way in which it is knowable. Therefore.
I answer, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent. The divine act of understanding, as constitutive of the divine nature, regards it as the root of the attributes, as the formality which is attained, I concede the antecedent; as the formality under which the attributes themselves are attained, I deny the antecedent. For thus it is attained by knowledge, and this suffices for the constitutive act of understanding and the scientific act of understanding to be virtually distinguished. Thus knowledge in God attains the formality of things to be done and things to be made, as the formality which; but, because prudence attains the formality of things to be done, and art the formality of things to be made, as the formality under which, prudence and art are therefore virtually distinguished from knowledge.