Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

Note 1°: Our cognition comes about insofar as the knowing power draws things to itself, joining them to itself; and because things, on account of their materiality, cannot entitatively enter the power, they need a species which is their representation and formal likeness, through which they are united to the power. The species, therefore, in intelligible and representative being, is entirely the same as the object is in entitative being, nor does it constitute a numerically distinct thing from it — just as the image of Caesar, in the being of an image, is entirely the same as Caesar is in natural being — so that the species of a horse, e.g., contains in itself the form and nature of the horse entirely the same as that which is in the horse, not under a natural mode, but under an intelligible mode; and the species of this individual man is this same individual man in intelligible being. Otherwise the species would not represent the object as it is, and through it the object could not be known.

Note 2°: A twofold species is distinguished, impressed and expressed: the impressed represents the object as knowable, the expressed as it is known; the impressed moves toward cognition, the expressed terminates it. The question, therefore, concerns both of these species, whether it is given, or can be given, in the vision of God.

I say 1°: An impressed species is not given, nor can it be given, in the beatific vision¹. The first part is common. The second is that of the Thomists and of very many others.

Proof of the first part. An impressed species in the beatific vision is superfluous. Therefore it is not given. — Proof of the antecedent. An impressed species is required then, when either the object does not exist, or is not present to the intellect through itself, or is not sufficiently intelligible on account of its materiality. But the object of the beatific vision, namely God, exists essentially, is intimately present through himself to any blessed intellect whatever, and is supremely intelligible, because he is supremely immaterial. Therefore.

Proof of the second part. 1° An impressed species must agree with the object in the same degree of immateriality, otherwise it will not represent it as it is in itself, because it is representative to the extent that it is intelligible, and it is intelligible to the extent that it is immaterial; hence through material species we cannot know a spirit. But no created or creatable species can attain to the degree of immateriality that belongs to God. Therefore.

Proof 2°. An impressed species is the very quiddity of the object in intelligible being, as has been said². But it is contradictory that a created species should be the quiddity of God in intelligible being. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The quiddity of God is his very being, even in intelligible being. But it is contradictory that a created species should be its own being, even in intelligible and representative being. Therefore.

I say 2°: An expressed species is not given, nor can it be given, in the beatific vision. As regards both parts, it is the more common opinion among the Thomists.

Proof of the first part. 1° An expressed species is given for this purpose: that the object, which is intelligible through the impressed species, may become understood in act through the expressed species, and may stand within the intellect as its term³. But the divine essence is united to the created intellect as understood in act, making itself understood in act through itself alone⁴. Therefore. — The minor is St. Thomas's. And it is evident, because the divine essence is the purest act in intelligible being, just as in the other genera, and hence is understanding in act, and as such is intimately present to the intellect. Therefore.

Proof 2°, overturning the foundation of the adversaries. According to them, an expressed species is given in the beatific vision for this reason: that a term of that action, produced by the action itself, must be assigned. But this reasoning is worthless. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. It does not belong to the nature of an immanent action to produce an effect, although this often happens to it. But the beatific vision is an immanent action. Therefore. — Proof of the major. 1° In this an immanent action is distinguished from a transient one: that the latter is for the sake of an effect, while the former is for the sake of the perfection of the subject in which it remains. 2° Because the divine Word sees and understands, and yet does not produce another word or expressed species. 3° When we contemplate, purely beholding a word already formed in the mind, we frame no other, and then cognition is simply understanding, and not utterance. Therefore.

Proof of the second part by the same grounds by which the second part of the first conclusion was proved. For if an impressed species of such perfection and immateriality as would represent God as he is in himself cannot be given, then a fortiori neither can an expressed species, since the latter must be more perfect, or at least equally perfect as the impressed; for it belongs to the expressed species to represent the object as understood in second act, while it belongs to the impressed species to represent it as merely intelligible in first act. Therefore.