Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I say: The objective beatitude of man consists in the uncreated good alone, namely God¹, according to that verse of Psal. LXXII, 25 and 26: What have I in heaven? and besides thee what do I desire upon earth?... God is my portion for ever. Likewise that verse of Psal. XVI, 15: I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear.

Proof 1°. Only the uncreated good can satisfy the appetite of man². Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. The rational appetite, or will, cannot be satisfied except by its adequate object. But the adequate object of the will is not this or that good, but every good; just as the object of the intellect, which the will follows, is not this or that truth, but every truth. But God alone is every good, of whom all created goods are participations. Whence that verse of Exod., XXXIII, 19: I will shew thee all good. Therefore.

Proof 2°, by going through all created goods³. The beatitude of man does not consist in any created good. Therefore in the uncreated good alone. — Proof of the antecedent. Created goods are of a threefold kind, namely external goods or goods of fortune, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But none of these can constitute the objective beatitude of man. Therefore.

Not the goods of fortune, which are riches, honor, fame, and power⁴: 1° Because they do not last, but easily slip away. 2° They do not exclude all evils, but are common to the good and the wicked. 3° They do not fully satisfy; for the more they abound, the more they inflame desire, according to that well-known saying: « The more waters are drunk, the more they are thirsted for. » 4° They do not suffice; for to those who have them, many other necessary things can be lacking, such as wisdom, health, etc. 5° From them evil can befall someone, as experience shows. But all these things are repugnant to true beatitude. 6° Finally, they come from external causes; but the beatitude of man is acquired through interior principles, namely the intellect and the will.

Not the goods of the body⁵; because both the being of the body and the other things which depend on the body, such as health, beauty, strength, pleasure, and other things of this kind, are unstable; they are common to the good and the wicked, indeed even to brute animals; nay, brute animals even surpass man in several of these, as deer in speed, lions in strength, etc. The other reasons too, which we brought forward against the goods of fortune, also apply here.

Not the goods of the soul⁶: 1° Not the soul itself considered in itself; for thus it is in potency, namely to knowledge and to virtue. But since potency exists for the sake of act, as for its complement, it is impossible that what is of itself existing in potency should have the character of the ultimate end. Not the other things which pertain to the soul, such as the powers, the acts, or the habits even of the virtues; because these are accidents and finite goods ordainable to God as the ultimate end. And as for the virtues, they do indeed pertain to happiness, but as the way to the goal; but the way is distinguished from the goal. Likewise, happiness is the reward of virtue. Therefore virtue is not happiness itself. Finally, virtue does not satisfy the appetite, but only rectifies it.