Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

To this point must be recalled the various intentions or relations of works to the end, which we reviewed in the preceding article, namely the actual, the virtual, the interpretative, and the habitual; but especial attention must be paid to the twofold virtual, one of which we called explicit by reason of a prior actual intention virtually persisting, the other implicit by reason of the object tending of itself to the end, by whose goodness the agent is moved to act. Compare the preliminary note of the said article.

The Louvain theologians teach that man, as often as he acts deliberately, is bound under venial sin to refer the act to God from love — not indeed of charity, but of benevolence — by an explicit virtual relation, left over, that is, from a preceding actual relation, which still perseveres and flows into the work; yet in such a way that the defect of this relation indeed infects the agent himself, but not the work itself.

For the explanation and assertion of the contrary opinion, which is common to the other Catholic schools,

I say 1°: Man is bound at times to refer all his works, by an explicit virtual relation, to God as his ultimate end, whether natural or supernatural, namely in that way in which he knows him or can know him.

Proof. For every man, whether faithful or unfaithful, is bound at times to elicit an act of love of God, as the ultimate end, or above all things. This all admit, even concerning unbelievers; because, although they do not know God as the author of nature, they can nevertheless know him, since there is no invincible ignorance regarding him, as we said in the First Part. But in an act of this kind of love of God above all things, and as the ultimate end, there is virtually involved the relation of all works to God as the ultimate end; for the ultimate end is that which is sought for its own sake and all other things for its sake. Whence the Author, in II Sentent., dist. 40, q. unica, a. 5, ad 6: « When someone, he says, thinks of directing his whole self to the love of God, then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God. » And below: « Whenever the habit of charity issues into act, there comes about the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods for himself. »

I say 2°: In order that both the agent and the work be exempted from sin, it is not necessary that man, acting deliberately, refer his work to God loved for his own sake, by an explicit virtual relation, as often as he acts; rather an implicit virtual relation suffices. Or, to speak more precisely, it is not necessary that an actual relation to God loved for his own sake should have preceded, by whose force and influence the work is elicited; but it suffices, where the precept of loving God above all things is not urgent, that the work be good from its object, and vitiated by no evil end, nor by any other evil circumstance, so that the agent, by free choice, in conformity with the dictate of reason and of the natural law, spontaneously subjects himself to the author of this law, and, loving the particular goodness of this work, is judged to love virtually and implicitly the primal and fontal goodness, which is God himself, of which this particular goodness is a participation: and consequently intends God himself implicitly.

This conclusion was first attacked by D. Hagens, professor at Louvain, in a posthumous work — if indeed it is his — to which I opposed my Vindiciae. The same conclusion, and the Vindiciae, were afterward attacked by R. P. Maugis, regent doctor at Louvain, to whom I now briefly reply, though somewhat more fully than the plan of the Compendium allows. But let the kindly reader forgive me; for his sake I will condense as much as will be permitted. And because the new adversary aims chiefly at this, that, having gathered from everywhere texts of Sts. Augustine and Thomas, he might show that the holy Doctors are opposed to us, I in turn shall aim above all, having discussed all the texts article by article, and having understood them in their true sense, to prove that the holy Doctors in no way oppose our opinion. If to this I add the solution of the things which he objects against our chief proofs, I shall, I think, have finished the matter — certain other points for and against being omitted, not because they are convincing against me, as he might pretend and has sometimes said, but because they are less necessary, less suited to a Compendium, and what I shall say will abundantly suffice to establish the conclusion against his efforts. He himself omitted many of the things which I said in both editions of this question. Does he for that reason think himself defeated? Therefore.

Proof of the 1st conclusion. No law, no precept can be assigned by which man, acting deliberately, is bound to refer his work to God otherwise than is said in the conclusion, except the precept of the love of God, which, since it is affirmative, does not oblige always, but at certain times and circumstances. Therefore, where this precept is not urgent, man is not bound to refer his work to God otherwise than is said in the conclusion. — The antecedent, besides being clear from the solution of the objections, is expressly St. Thomas's teaching, in the cited II Sentent., ad 6, where he says: « If it be asked when it is fitting to refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when it is fitting for the habit of charity to issue into act. » And 1ae 2ae q. 100, a. 10, objecting to himself that saying of the Apostle, Ⅰ Cor., X, 31: Do all to the glory of God, he answers to the 2nd thus: « Under the precept of charity is contained that God be loved with the whole heart, to which it pertains that all things be referred to God, and therefore man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also be referred to God. Thus, then, he who honors his parents is bound by charity to honor them, not by force of this precept which is: « Honor thy parents, » but by force of this precept: « Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. » And since these are two affirmative precepts, not obliging always, they can oblige at different times, and so it can happen that someone, fulfilling the precept of honoring his parents, does not at that moment transgress the precept regarding the omission of the mode of charity. » If you say, with our adversaries, that St. Thomas here treats of charity strictly so called: granted; but what he says of charity must also be understood of the benevolent love of God, since in both cases the rationale of the affirmative precept is the same.

Against this proof the adversary objects, firstly, that the precept of the love of God, since it is affirmative, does not oblige always to continuous acts, but does oblige always virtually.

I answer, as in the Vindiciae, that this objection is directly against St. Thomas. For the holy Doctor speaks in the same way of the precept of charity as of the precept of honoring one's parents. But the latter does not oblige virtually always. Therefore neither does the former. Moreover, I think it unheard-of in the schools that affirmative precepts oblige virtually forever; for this would be for the precepts themselves simply to oblige forever.

You will insist, 1°: St. Thomas, q. 1 de Charitate, a. 11, and elsewhere, teaches in express terms that the precept of charity obliges virtually always. How then would the preceding solution be directly against St. Thomas and unheard-of in the schools, especially in the Thomistic school?

I answer that St. Thomas teaches this neither in q. 1 de Charitate nor elsewhere, as will be clear from the solution of the fourth objection; and so it remains that this solution is directly against St. Thomas and unheard-of in the schools.

You will insist, 2°: St. Thomas speaks in that way of the precept of charity and of the precept of honoring one's parents when the question concerns the time at which the act of theological charity ought to be elicited, or at which one's parents ought to be honored, but not when the question concerns the precept of referring one's works to God; for nowhere does St. Thomas say that we are not bound to refer our works to God virtually and explicitly, except when the precept of eliciting an act of charity is urgent.

But on the contrary: St. Thomas says in express terms, in II Sentent., dist. 40, q. unica, a. 5, ad 6: « If it be asked when it is fitting to refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when it is fitting for the habit of charity to issue into act. »

He replies: St. Thomas speaks of the habit of charity. But the adversaries do not say that the habit of charity is required for the explicit virtual relation of works to God; otherwise, one lacking the habit of charity, who loved God above all things with a benevolent love — by which the precept of charity is fulfilled — would not refer all his works virtually and explicitly to God, which they do not admit.

I answer that what St. Thomas says here of the habit of charity is to be understood also of benevolent love. For although the rationale of the habit of charity and of benevolent love is not in all respects the same, it is nevertheless the same, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, as regards the explicit virtual relation of works to God. For this reason, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, he who elicits an act of habitual charity refers all his works virtually and explicitly to God; « because when someone thinks of directing his whole self to the love of God, then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God. » These are the words of the holy Doctor in the place cited. But he who elicits an act of benevolent love of God above all things, by which he fulfills the precept of charity, directs his whole self to the love of God. Therefore the rationale of the habit of charity and of benevolent love is the same as regards the explicit virtual relation of works to God.

Nor is it true, as is claimed, that St. Thomas there treats only of what is required for condign merit, as though the sense of his words were: « If it be asked when it is fitting to refer an act to the ultimate end, » so that the agent might merit condignly by his relation, « this is nothing other than to ask when it is fitting for the habit of charity to issue into act »: this, I say, is by no means true, since the just man often merits condignly without the habit of charity issuing into formal act, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, ad 2.

He objects, 2nd, against the same proof, a retortion of the argument thus: An affirmative precept does not oblige always. Therefore man is not bound always to refer his work to God by an implicit virtual relation.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is that the affirmative precept of referring all works virtually and implicitly to God not only involves, but coincides with, the negative precept of never doing evil, or is founded on it as on its own rationale: not so the precept of charity. For to one asking why I am bound to refer my act virtually and implicitly to God, I rightly answer: Because I am forbidden to do any evil act; for by this very fact that I do something absolutely good, it is virtually and implicitly referred to God. Nor can anything further be answered. But to one asking why I am bound to refer all works virtually and explicitly to God, it cannot be answered: « Because I am forbidden not to refer them, or to do some evil act; » but rather: « Because God is the ultimate end. » If you say: « Because it is not lawful to cling to a creature, » I would further ask why it is not lawful to cling to a creature, and nothing else can be answered than: « Because God, and not a creature, is the ultimate end. » Moreover it is false that he who performs an absolutely good act virtually and implicitly related to God clings to a creature.

He objects, 3rd, against the same proof, with St. Thomas's own words, 1ª 2ae, q. 100, a. 10, ad 2: « And since these two affirmative precepts (namely, of loving God and of honoring one's parents), not obliging always, can oblige at different times, it can accordingly happen that someone, fulfilling the precept of honoring his parents, does not at that moment transgress the precept regarding the omission of the mode of charity. » In these words, he says, by our own admission, St. Thomas treats of charity strictly taken and obliging under grave sin, but not always, because the precept of charity obliges only at fixed times. But that someone can fulfill the precept of honoring his parents and not sin mortally, although he does not elicit an act of charity, it does not follow that he can fulfill it and not even sin venially, although he omits the relation to God.

I answer. 1°. I deny that I conceded that St. Thomas there treats of charity strictly taken; I only granted this: Granted, I said — a word which, as all know, is not that of a person conceding, but of a person allowing it to pass. 2° Although the precept of charity in itself obliges under grave sin, I did not concede that it could not, per accidens and from the circumstances, oblige under venial sin, as in the other precepts of believing, hoping, honoring one's parents, paying one's debts, etc. 3° We do not concede that the precept of charity, even broadly taken, of referring all and each of our acts virtually and explicitly to God — if it be granted to exist — in itself obliges only under venial sin. Of this, below. 4° Finally, whether St. Thomas speaks of charity strictly or broadly taken for benevolent love, it makes no difference as regards the present question, since the precept of each is affirmative. The question between us and our adversaries is whether, according to the holy Doctor, we are bound, by the precept of charity whether strictly or broadly taken for benevolent love, to refer all and each of our acts virtually and explicitly to God. If we are so bound, as the adversaries hold: then that precept obliges in every act, which, however, St. Thomas expressly denies, because it is affirmative. Let him now see what the force of the argument is.

To what D. Hagens had said, that in the phrase of St. Thomas the precept does not oblige except while and insofar as it binds under mortal sin, I answered in the Vindiciae that the sense of St. Thomas is that venial sin is not against the law, in this sense, that it does not overturn the end of the law; yet it is against the law, in this sense, that it is forbidden by the law. And this the new adversary concedes; but because on this matter I had cited certain texts of St. Thomas, he contends that I cited them wrongly, and seems to accuse me, as it were, of carelessness or bad faith. Although it would not be difficult to prove our sense in these texts, yet since he concedes what I principally intend, and he himself says that he does not need those texts, it suffices to remove the suspicion of carelessness or bad faith if I say that I cited these texts in the same manner and in the same sense in which the most celebrated Sylvius cited them, 1ª 2ae, q. 71, a. 6 — whom no one, I think, will accuse of carelessness or bad faith. Let the first proof, then, remain unshaken.

Proof of the 2nd conclusion. An unbeliever or sinner who, with no preceding actual relation to God loved for his own sake, gives alms from a motive of mercy, honors his parents from a motive of piety, pays his debts from a motive of justice, sins on no count: not on the part of the object, which is good and upright; not on the part of the circumstances, since I suppose none evil to be present; not from a defect of end, since he has for his proximate and explicit end the particular goodness of this work: and since this particular goodness of itself tends toward and is referred to the source, author, and perfecter of all goodness, who is God, he has God virtually and implicitly for his ultimate end.

It is confirmed, 1°. He who wills some good work, e.g., almsgiving, formally and explicitly on account of its particular goodness, wills it virtually and explicitly on account of goodness as such; for he is not moved formally and explicitly by the particular goodness without being moved virtually and explicitly by goodness as such: and since this goodness as such is in reality God, he wills it virtually and implicitly on account of God.

It is confirmed, 2°, and this fundamental reason is more fully explained. A sinner or unbeliever, in whom the love of natural goodness and equity is not entirely abolished, who from that love does certain just and upright things without any admixture of an evil circumstance, but in conformity with the dictate of right reason and the natural law — for example, renders to his neighbor what is his, keeps faith given to a friend, has mercy on an afflicted innocent, etc. — precisely because he sees these things to be just, and by the natural light feels himself bound to them: 1° here and now obeys God, although he does not know him explicitly enough, because he does what God, the author of all equity, commands to be done; 2° acts implicitly on account of God, because he acts on account of equity and natural goodness, of which God is the author and perfecter; 3° implicitly and in a certain respect loves God as the first rule of good actions, because he loves the goodness which God commands to be loved. Whence Augustine, on Psalm 100, n. 6, introducing God as speaking: « Whatever is done well is done to me, because it is done at my command. »

And this is the most express opinion of St. Thomas, who, in ch. XIV of Romans, lect. 3, says in decisive words: « In an unbelieving man, along with his unbelief, there is the good of nature. And therefore, when some unbeliever does some good thing from the dictate of reason, not referring it to an evil end, he does not sin. » Nothing indeed could be more express, and it is our very conclusion, nor do I see what the adversaries can answer. For they cannot say that he does not sin by the sin of the work but of the worker, since the holy Doctor says absolutely, indefinitely, and without any restriction: « He does not sin. » Therefore he sins neither by the sin of the work nor by the sin of the worker; otherwise he would sin.

But perhaps St. Thomas means this of mortal sin, namely, that he does not sin mortally, but indeed venially. This indeed is how the adversary interprets it, but he is utterly wide of the mark. For the holy Doctor immediately adds, after the words quoted: « Yet his work is not meritorious, because it is not informed by grace. » Why, I ask, would St. Thomas have added this observation, if he had judged that this unbeliever sinned venially in his good work? Has anyone ever dreamed that a man merits by sinning venially, or that venial sin is meritorious?

But, says the adversary, St. Thomas explains clearly enough that he means this of mortal sin, immediately subjoining: « But when an unbelieving man does something precisely because he is an unbeliever, it is manifest that he sins; » namely, mortally.

But on the contrary: In the first place, the adversary is mistaken; for the holy Doctor does not subjoin these words to the former immediately, but after several lines. But that matters little. Not even a hundred-eyed Argus could see that St. Thomas explains the former words by these later ones in the sense of the adversary. St. Thomas in the later words treats of mortal sin: Granted; does he therefore do so in the earlier words? An unbeliever acting from unbelief sins mortally. Therefore an unbeliever acting from the dictate of reason and doing some good, not referring it to an evil end, sins venially, though not mortally. What a consequence! Let there be a familiar example. The adversary, to a penitent consulting him about the defamation of his neighbor, answers: « If you reveal grave sins of your neighbor for a good and necessary end, you do not sin; if you reveal them from hatred and with the intention of defaming, without a necessary end, you sin. » In the second member the matter concerns mortal sin: does it therefore also in the first? Does one who reveals his neighbor's sin for a good and necessary end therefore sin venially, even though not mortally? See by what glosses and interpretations the clearest words of the holy Doctor are obscured, so that, even against his will, he may be held to be the patron of a singular opinion against the common opinion of the Catholic schools. Let the argument made before, then, return. St. Thomas says absolutely, indefinitely, and without any restriction, that this unbeliever does not sin. Therefore he does not sin, neither mortally nor venially; otherwise he would sin, which St. Thomas denies. The holy Doctor speaks in the same manner and sense in 2ª 2ae, q. 10, a. 4, o, where he says: « It is not necessary that [unbelievers] sin in every one of their works, but whenever they perform some work out of unbelief, then they sin. »

Moreover, against this proof the adversary objects, firstly, a retortion of the argument concerning the conjugal act, from St. Thomas in IV Sentent., dist. 31, q. 2, a. 2; but of this in the solution of the objections, obj. 3.

He objects, 2nd: This unbeliever or sinner does not indeed sin by a sin of action, but he does sin by a sin of omission, insofar as his work is not further referred to God, either actually or virtually, and so he rests in a creature; which cannot be without sin.

I answer that this unbeliever or sinner does not sin even by a sin of omission, because his work is sufficiently referred to God, nor is there given a precept of referring it further — or let him produce one; and thus he does not rest in a creature.

Moreover St. Thomas says most formally, indefinitely, absolutely, and without any restriction, that this man does not sin. Why then does he keep dinning into our ears the distinction between the sin of action and of omission? Perhaps this distinction escaped the sagacity of the Angelic Doctor.

He objects, 3rd, against the same proof: Our virtual relation does not excuse from every sin, as is clear from St. Thomas on the conjugal act. But, as before, of this argument in the solution of the objections, obj. 3. Meanwhile let him hear St. Thomas as cited: « He does not sin. » Therefore he is excused from every sin.

He objects, 4th, against the same proof: Our relation is not a relation in the true sense of the name; otherwise one who reads or studies, because he loves some particular virtue, would be judged to love God implicitly, who is the first truth.

I answer that truth is the object of the intellect, not of the will, except as good. If, therefore, someone loves truth as good for himself, as suited to his state according to the dictate of reason and prudence, he will be judged to love God virtually and implicitly, as in other good works.

And thus the adversary's efforts against this proof remain disarmed, which accordingly stands in its full force.

Proof of the 3rd conclusion. If man, acting deliberately, is bound to refer all his actions to God loved for his own sake by an explicit virtual relation, in the sense of the adversaries, the defect of this relation would vitiate not only the agent, but also the work. But the consequent is false, as the adversaries themselves admit. Therefore. — Proof of the inference of the major. An act not ordered to its due end is a disordered and evil act. Whence St. Thomas, 1ª 2ae, q. 18, a. 9, o, says: « An act proceeding from deliberate reason, if it is not ordered to its due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. » From which principle he infers that no act is indifferent in the individual. But, according to the adversaries, an act not related to God loved for his own sake by an explicit virtual relation is an act not ordered to its due end. Therefore.

The adversaries reply that the defect of the relation affects the agent, but in no way the work; consequently, even if the agent sins through the defect of the explicit relation, the work nevertheless remains untouched. And this they attempt to prove by various examples. Thus, they say, one who is bound by vow to recite the seven penitential Psalms on bended knees, if he recites them attentively and devoutly while standing, sins, but his action is not evil; thus one who by the precept of his confessor is bound to refer virtually and explicitly to God the alms enjoined on him, and in giving the alms omits this relation, sins, but the almsgiving is not evil; thus one who by the precept of the Church is bound to fast in order to avert war and famine, and fasts only for one end, sins, but his fast is not evil, etc.

I answer that the disparity is that in these and similar examples the obligation affects the agent, and not the act; but in our case, according to the principles of the adversaries, it affects both: because, according to them, this obligation arises from the dominion which God, as first principle and ultimate end, has not only over the agent, but also over his action; consequently this obligation affects the agent and the act, and this end is owed to the act in the individual no less than that which is said to be otherwise intrinsic, and it is of a different character from the other circumstances. Whence, just as, according to us, an act would be evil if, by reason of some circumstance, it were not referred virtually and implicitly to God; so, according to the adversaries, it must be judged evil, if it is not referred explicitly to God, especially since, according to them, it rests in a creature.

The adversary contends that the mere lack of the due end never formally vitiates an action. What, then, does St. Thomas mean, when he says that « an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil? » He answers: « St. Thomas does not say that an act ordered to no due end is formally vitiated by the mere lack of an end. » Let him say, I would like to know, whether for an act to be repugnant to reason and to become evil from the lack of the due end, is not for the act to be vitiated formally from the lack of the due end. These are synonymous.

We do not deny, however, that one acting without the due end has an evil end, not in itself, but evil in this sense, that it is not due; for by this very fact, says St. Thomas, the act is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil, and in the same sense St. Thomas said in II Sentent., dist. 40, a. 5, ad 5, that the end of a deliberate act cannot be indifferent. And thus the principal arguments of the adversary collapse. Moreover, granted that a positively and in-itself evil end is required in the agent lacking the due end, in order for his act to be evil, this is held in the opinion of the adversaries, namely, a clinging to a creature.

For the rest, I repeat what I said in the first edition of this question, and then in Vindiciis, that I do not principally insist on this argument. Indeed I granted, and even now I grant to the adversaries, what they intend. « Granted, I was saying, that the work is not infected by a defect of the relation. » Wherefore I think it superfluous to dwell here any longer.

Proof of the 4th conclusion. If man sins by the defect of an explicit virtual relation to God loved for his own sake, when he does a work good from its object, it follows that it is necessary for an unbeliever, so long as he remains an unbeliever, to sin in every work; which is condemned by Alexander VIII in this proposition: « It is necessary for an unbeliever to sin in every work. » It is the eighth. This is understood in its obvious sense, so long as he is an unbeliever.

The adversary objects 1° against this proof, that he acknowledges in unbelievers sufficient graces, with which they can avoid sin.

I answer. Either those sufficient graces bring with them a knowledge of the true God, or they do not. If the former, they cease, on this score, to be unbelievers; but the condemned proposition is understood of unbelievers, so long as they remain unbelievers: if the latter, they will not be able to refer their acts virtually and explicitly to God, whom they do not know, and thus, by the defect of this relation, they will necessarily sin in every one of their works.

He objects 2° that unbelievers, in his opinion, do not sin in the work, but in the omission. But the obvious sense of this proposition: « To sin in the work, » is that the work is vitiated.

I answer that the obvious sense of this proposition: « The unbeliever sins in every work, » is: « The unbeliever sins as often as he acts, » whether he sins with the sin of the work, or of the one working; just as when we say in French: « Il pèche dans toutes ses actions, » the sense is: « Il pèche toutes les fois qu'il agit. » The adversaries, however, admit that the unbeliever sins as often as he acts, namely by the defect of the explicit relation. Moreover, that this is the sense of the condemned proposition, we draw out from the circumstances: 1° because, if the Supreme Pontiff had condemned this proposition only insofar as it says that the work is vitiated, he would have condemned nothing other than what had already been condemned by three Supreme Pontiffs in Baius, namely, that all the works of unbelievers are sins. Nor say that this second proposition adds a new falsity to the first, when it says: « It is necessary that all the works of unbelievers be sins; » for that is also implied in the first. For if all the works of unbelievers are sins, without doubt it is necessary that it be so, otherwise it would sometimes happen otherwise; 2° because, according to Baius, the author of this proposition, all the works of unbelievers are sins for this reason, that they are not explicitly referred to God. But it is impossible for works to be explicitly referred to God by those who do not know him, as unbelievers are. Therefore it is necessary, in the sense of the condemned proposition, that all the works of unbelievers be sins.

Likewise Baius used to say that the works of unbelievers not referred to God are sins, because he ascribed the defect of the relation to the work itself; and when certain theologians, after his condemnation, in order to avoid it, said that the work was not a sin, but that the one working nevertheless sinned by the defect of the relation, ascribing, to be sure, the defect of the relation to the one working and not to the work, they were again condemned in the proposition above. Therefore they were not condemned because they said that the works of unbelievers are sins, but because they said that the unbeliever sins in the work, that is, in working without the relation.

The adversary insists: Whoever says of some author: « He sins in his style, » the sense is that the style is faulty. Therefore, when it is said: « The unbeliever sins in every work, » the sense is that all his works are faulty.

I answer. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequent. The disparity is, first, that in the adversary's proposition the object and the matter in which the sin lies are explicitly determined; it is not so when it is said generally: « He sins in every work, » which, according to the common understanding, signifies, as often as he acts, as has been said. Second, the disparity is that the sense which we attribute to the condemned proposition we draw out from the circumstances, such as the adversary's singular proposition does not have. But the natural and obvious sense of any proposition must be gathered from the circumstances.

For the rest, as I have already noted elsewhere, let these things be said by way of arguing and disputing, not of asserting; for we intend to condemn no one.

Proof of the 5th conclusion. If there were an obligation to refer all works virtually and explicitly to God loved for his own sake, this obligation would be, from its kind, under mortal sin. But the consequent is false, the adversaries themselves admitting it. Therefore the antecedent too. — Proof of the inference of the major. 1° because they ground this obligation in the precept of loving God with the whole heart. But this precept obliges, from its kind, under mortal sin, such that its transgressor in a grave matter sins mortally, as all admit; and here there can be grave matter, as if, for example, a long series of actions in the state of choosing were withdrawn from God and not referred to him loved for his own sake. Therefore. 2° because they again ground this obligation in the natural precept of acknowledging and constituting God as the first principle, and likewise as the ultimate end of all our actions. But the object of this natural precept is in itself grave. Therefore the obligation too is grave, because the obligation of a natural precept follows the nature of its object. 3° I ask the adversaries, on what basis, since God commands that all things be referred to himself loved for his own sake, they say that this precept obliges only under venial sin, while other precepts, whether natural or divine positive, where the object in itself is grave, oblige of themselves and from their kind under mortal sin.

The adversary objects against this proof thus. He who pays great debts, pours out his life for his country, does not withdraw from God a notable thing, since this is granted, but withdraws from God only the relation of a notable thing, which is a slight matter.

I answer. He who does these things without an explicit relation to God, on the adversaries' own principles, withdraws from God a notable thing: 1° because what is done, and is not done for God's sake, is withdrawn from him; 2° because in these grave matters he does not have God as his ultimate end, and clings to a creature; which is a grave matter; 3° because in a grave matter he transgresses the precept of loving God above all things.

He insists: One who had vowed to refer explicitly to God all his deliberate works would not sin mortally by omitting the relation of a notable thing. Therefore similarly.

I answer. 1°. I deny the consequent; because a vow obliges only according to the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing is not held to have intended to bind himself under mortal sin to the relation of this or that thing, even a notable one. But it is not so with the natural and divine precept of referring all things explicitly to God, if such be granted. 2° Setting aside a contrary intention of the one vowing, I judge it true that one bound by such a vow, who repeatedly and for a long time in grave matters omitted this relation, would sin mortally.

He insists again: According to us, we are bound to refer all our works to God by an implicit virtual relation, by a natural and divine precept, which in grave matter obliges gravely. Therefore he sins mortally who bestows an alms of a thousand florins on the poor out of vainglory; which is false.

I answer. I deny the consequent; because the precept of referring all our works virtually and implicitly to God is not distinct from the precept of not doing evil, as I have already said elsewhere. Hence it obliges according to the quantity of the evil, such that, if the evil is grave, it obliges under mortal sin; if slight, as vainglory is, it obliges under a slight sin. But this cannot be said of the precept of referring all things to God by an explicit virtual relation, if such be granted, as we have already proved above.

What the adversary further objects against this proof will come up again in the solution of the objections.

And these things more than suffice to establish and confirm the opinion, which is the common one of the Catholic schools, as its fourteen approvers in the first edition testify. Wherefore, and lest I detain the reader too long in the Compendio over matters of lesser importance, I here omit certain other proofs from inconvenience.

This one thing only I would like noted, that, according to the adversaries, we are bound to refer all acts by an explicit relation to God out of the love of benevolence, and this by reason of the precept of loving God above all things, and because he is our ultimate end; otherwise it would be to cling to a creature. But when we infer from this that whoever observes the commandments of God from obedience alone, who elicits an act of faith or hope, or acts with a view to the eternal reward, without a further relation to God loved for his own sake, sins — because that act does not refer to God as good in himself, and hence not from the love of benevolence, nor as he is the ultimate end.

They answer to the first, that not every act of benevolence is borne toward God as good in himself; because, according to St. Thomas, to love God with the love of benevolence is to will him good, which is found in the aforesaid acts; to the second, that these acts are referred to God as the ultimate end, in this sense, that they are for his sake, and not for the sake of another.

Against the first: To love God with the love of benevolence is indeed to will him good, but without prejudice to the formal object of this love, which is God good in himself. For the object of love is good. Therefore either man loves God as good for himself, and this is the love of concupiscence, or as good in himself, and this is the love of benevolence. Hence St. Thomas, 2ª 2ae, q. 27, a. 2, ad 1, says that, when the Philosopher defines to love, which is to will someone good, « he defines to love, not setting down the whole formal note of it, but something pertaining to its formal note, in which the act of loving is most manifested. »

Against the second: The ultimate end is the supreme good which is sought for its own sake, and all things for its sake, by reason of which, therefore, according to the adversaries, we ought to refer all our acts to it. Therefore, to induce this obligation, an ultimate end only in a qualified sense, as they explain it, does not suffice.

And these are the chief points contained in what we do not here examine at greater length, and which prove not so much that the adversaries think ill on this score, as that they do not speak consistently with their own principles.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ADVERSARY ARE OVERTHROWN

The adversary derives the foundations of his opinion from various texts of Saints Augustine and Thomas, which he judges to favor him. Let us, then, examine these.

1° The objections from St. Thomas are answered.

Objection 1°: St. Thomas, in I Sentent., dist. 1, q. 3, a. unico, asking whether use is to be made of all other things besides God, says, 1°: « Punishment is to be used and ordered to an end according as it promotes a man's merit, leading him to a consideration of his weakness, and according as it purges sins. » But the endurance of punishment for a natural and honorable end does not promote a man's merit, nor does it purge sins. Therefore.

2° In the same place, in the second instance, he objects to himself thus: « We use that by which we, tending toward beatitude, are helped. But we are frequently impeded by creatures, etc. Therefore we cannot use all things. » To this argument he replies thus: « To the second it must be said that creatures, as far as they are in themselves, do not impede us from attaining beatitude, but on our part, insofar as we abuse them, resting in them as in an end. » Therefore St. Thomas is treating of such a use of a creature as helps those tending toward beatitude; for he admits as true the major of the argument proposed. But a use of a creature that helps toward beatitude implies an explicit relation; for an implicit one, since it is natural, does not help toward it. Therefore.

3° In the same place, ad 3, he says: « According to the theologian, no act proceeding from a deliberating will is indifferent: for, if it is referred to God, grace being supposed, it is meritorious; but if it is not referable, it is a sin; and if it is referable and is not referred, it is vain. » But an act referable to God is not an evil act, nor an act indifferent as to species; for, since a relation is a circumstance, it presupposes an act already constituted in the species of evil. Therefore it is a morally honest act. Therefore, besides its implicit relation, it needs an explicit one; otherwise, according to St. Thomas, it is vain and idle.

I answer, 1° generally, that St. Thomas in this article intends nothing other than that man can and ought to use creatures and not enjoy them, as he had said of God in the preceding question. Now among the various ways of using creatures, we say that whoever does a good work — for example, one who pays his debts out of love of justice, honors his parents out of piety, without any further relation — uses and does not enjoy the creature, which St. Thomas nowhere denies.

I answer, 2°, likewise generally, that St. Thomas in this article, in order that man not sin in the use of a creature, or in his works, requires only a habitual relation: « Likewise, he says at the end of the body, our works, which are not evil, are from Him and are to be done for His sake: not that every operation must always be actually referred to God, but it suffices that he habitually place the end of his will in God. »

The adversary replies that St. Thomas takes the term habitually for virtually. But on the contrary: although I do not deny that it is sometimes so taken by the holy Doctor, he does not, however, take it so in this article. This is clear from the answer ad 4, where he says that one who sins venially has God habitually as his end — where the term habitually cannot be taken for virtually, since it is certain that a man does not sin by acting for God virtually. Now it is not likely that St. Thomas took the same term in a different sense within the same article.

The adversary insists: St. Thomas, ad 3, says: « If the act is referred to God, grace being supposed, it is meritorious. » But if St. Thomas does not take the term habitually for the term virtually, his answer will have this sense: « If the act is referred to God either actually or habitually, grace being supposed, it is meritorious; » which is false, since a habitual relation does not suffice for merit.

I answer: I deny the minor; for St. Thomas understands this of an inflowing of grace; for an inflow of grace is necessary for merit. But where there is an inflow of grace, there is more than a habitual relation.

And these two general answers would suffice for everything he objects from St. Thomas in the place cited. Yet, over and above, I answer each point individually.

To 1. 1° I distinguish the minor. The endurance of punishment for a natural end does not promote a man's merit, nor does it purge sins actually and formally, I concede; presuppositively, I deny. Now St. Thomas does not say that punishment must be used by actually meriting and purging sins, for an explicit relation would not suffice for that; but that punishment is to be used insofar as it promotes merit, leading a man to a consideration of his weakness, and insofar as it purges sins. Now he who patiently endures, for example, a disease caused by intemperance, or a death to which he has been condemned for homicide, acknowledging that the punishment is due to his crime, uses the punishment insofar as it promotes merit, leading him to a consideration of his weakness and insofar as it purges sins, in the sense that such endurance is presupposed and is prerequisite to actual merit, so that, the other requirements for merit concurring, he would in fact merit.

2° Granted that St. Thomas understands this of a use that is actually meritorious, in this he taught the best way of using punishment, but not the necessary one: unless you wish to hold that every use of punishment that is not meritorious is evil; which is false.

To 2. There is nothing in St. Thomas's answer that militates against our position, unless it be supposed that he admits the major of the argument proposed, not only as true, but also as exclusive of every other way of using creatures; which the adversary does not prove, nor will he prove, except by understanding it, as above, of a use of a creature that helps, presuppositively, those tending toward beatitude.

To 3. I deny the minor as to the second part, and its proof, because in acts indifferent as to species, the circumstance of the end confers on them a first moral species in the individual, as is taught in tract. de Actibus humanis. Moreover, St. Thomas does not say that he who does not refer a referable act simply sins, but that his act is vain, idle, and sinful: which cuts the throat of the adversaries' position, if it be understood of an explicit relation; for they deny that an act is evil and sinful by the defect of an explicit relation.

Objection 2°: the text of St. Thomas in II Sentent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. ult., ad 7, to which I fully replied in the first and second editions of this question. And since the adversary replies nothing other than what D. Hagens said, for the answer let our Vindiciae be consulted, p. 36, 43 and the following.

Objection 3°: St. Thomas, in IV Sentent., dist. 31, q. 2, a. 2, which is found in q. 49 Suppl., a. 5, in the answer ad 1, says that « offspring, insofar as it is a good of the sacrament, adds something beyond offspring insofar as it is a good intended by nature. For nature intends offspring insofar as the good of the species is preserved in it; but in offspring, according as it is a good of the sacrament of matrimony, it is understood, beyond this, that the offspring received be further ordered to God. And therefore it is necessary that the intention of nature, which intends offspring, be referred, in act or in habit, to the intention of offspring insofar as it is a good of the sacrament; otherwise one would rest in the creature, which cannot be without sin. And therefore, when nature alone moves toward the marital act, one is not wholly excused from sin, except insofar as the movement of nature is further ordered, in act or in habit, toward offspring insofar as it is a good of the sacrament. » Now the implicit relation, which is already presupposed in the conjugal act itself duly performed for the sake of offspring and of fidelity, cannot be understood by the habitual relation, since St. Thomas requires another beyond that one. Therefore he requires an explicit one.

For the solution of this argument, the doctrine of the article cited must be set forth. In the first place, St. Thomas in the body of the article says that, « just as the goods of matrimony, insofar as they are habitual, make matrimony honorable and holy; so also, insofar as they are in the actual intention, they make the act of matrimony honorable, as regards those two goods which concern its act. » Now the two goods that concern the act of matrimony are offspring and fidelity. And therefore St. Thomas adds: « Hence, when spouses come together for the sake of procreating offspring, or in order to render the debt to one another, which pertains to fidelity, they are wholly excused from sin. »

Nothing else, therefore, is required for the act of matrimony to be wholly excused from sin, than the intention of offspring, or of fidelity, without any evil circumstance. And the holy Doctor subjoins the reason, namely that the third good, which is the good of the sacrament, does not pertain to the act, but to the essence of matrimony: « But the third good, he says, does not pertain to the use of matrimony, but to its essence, as has been said. Hence it makes matrimony itself honorable, but not its act. »

This doctrine must be reconciled with the answer ad 1, which is objected against us. If St. Thomas necessarily requires an explicit relation to the good of the sacrament, in order that spouses be wholly excused from all sin: then not only the good of offspring and of fidelity, but also the good of the sacrament pertains to the conjugal act; and it renders honorable not only matrimony itself, but also its act; which St. Thomas expressly denies. Likewise, spouses coming together only for the sake of offspring or of fidelity would not be wholly excused from sin; which St. Thomas expressly affirms.

It must therefore be said that, in the answer ad 1, by the habitual relation to the good of the sacrament, he does not understand that explicit relation of the adversaries, but the relation implicit in the conjugal act itself duly performed for the sake of offspring or of fidelity, without any vitiating circumstance.

But, says the adversary, a habitual relation is already supposed in the conjugal act for the sake of offspring or of fidelity. Therefore St. Thomas requires something else. — I answer: I distinguish the antecedent. A habitual relation is already supposed in the conjugal act for the sake of offspring or of fidelity, if no circumstance vitiates it, I concede; if some circumstance vitiates it, as it can easily be vitiated, especially in this matter, I deny. For since in that case it is not referred to God, neither is it referred to the good of the sacrament.

Add that, if St. Thomas understood the habitual relation as explicit, it would follow that, without it, not only would the spouses simply sin, but that their act would be evil; for the holy Doctor says, ad 1, that « the act is not wholly excused from sin, except insofar as the movement of nature is further ordered, in act or in habit, toward offspring, according as it is a good of the sacrament. » Which indeed overturns the adversaries' system.

Nor should you say that St. Thomas foresaw this objection, because at the end of the answer he says: « Nor does it follow, however, that the movement of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect, unless it is further ordered to some good of matrimony. » For the movement toward the act is one thing, the act itself another. The movement of nature toward the act can be not evil, but only imperfect, and yet the act itself be vitiated by some circumstance which impedes the habitual relation that it requires, and therefore be evil. And indeed, who can reconcile these two: that the act is not wholly excused from sin, and that the act is not evil?

Objection 4°: St. Thomas, q. de Charitate, a. 11, asking whether all are bound to perfect charity, ad 2, says: « That all things be virtually referred to God pertains to the perfection of charity, to which all are bound. » Now that virtual relation cannot be understood of an implicit relation, because it does not pertain to the perfection of charity, and because St. Thomas says in the same place that by it a man can merit in all things, if he has charity; but by an implicit relation he will not be able to merit. Therefore he understands it of an explicit relation.

I answer that St. Thomas here, by the virtual relation, understands indeed an explicit relation, but one implied in an act of strict charity, or in its equivalent, namely in the benevolent love of God above all things, by which, as he teaches in II Sentent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, the precept of charity is fulfilled: « For whenever, he says in II Sentent., dist. 40, q. unica, a. 5, ad 6, someone thinks to direct his whole self to the love of God, then whatever pertains to himself will be ordered to God. » Now it is certain that by the love of God above all things, a man, if he has charity, can merit, and that this love can be elicited by a sinner not yet justified, that is, not having charity, as we prove concerning attrition in tract. de Poenit.

Objection 5°: St. Thomas, q. 22 de Charitate, a. 2, says: « Just as in the demonstrative sciences a conclusion is not rightly drawn except by resolution to the first principles, so the appetite of a rational creature is not right, except through an explicit appetite for God Himself, in act or in habit. »

I answer, 1°, that St. Thomas in this article resolves that all beings desire God — inanimate and non-cognitive things implicitly, the rational creature explicitly. Hence here he takes the explicit appetite, not as it implies a distinct knowledge of God, but as it is opposed to the innate appetite of inanimate things, and therefore he adds, « through an explicit appetite for God Himself, in act or in habit. »

I answer, 2°. Granted that by the explicit appetite St. Thomas understands a distinct knowledge of God, he says that a non-explicit appetite is not right, not because it is evil, but because it is not perfect. This is evident from the text itself. For if someone draws a legitimate conclusion from immediate principles, although he does not resolve it to the first principles, that conclusion will be good, but not perfect. Therefore, likewise, whoever desires some particular good on account of its honorableness, although not explicitly on account of God, the appetite will not be evil, but nevertheless imperfect: otherwise it would have to be said, not only that the agent sins, but also that his act is evil; which the adversaries do not admit.

You will insist: St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 19, a. 10, o, says: « In order that someone will some particular good with a right will, it is necessary that that particular good be willed materially, and the common divine good be willed formally. »

I answer that even in our opinion the common divine good is willed formally; for he who wills some particular good, wills it formally on account of goodness and honorableness as such, which is God.

Objection 6°: St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3, says: « The whole of what man is, and what he can do and has, must be ordered to God. And therefore every act of man, good or evil, has the character of merit or demerit before God, as far as concerns the very character of the act. » But this cannot be understood of an implicit relation, otherwise the character of merit before God would be founded on the powers of nature alone. Therefore, of an explicit one.

I answer: I deny the minor. To the proof, I distinguish. The character of merit improperly so called, and unto a temporal reward, would be founded on the powers of nature alone, I concede; of merit properly so called, and unto an eternal reward, I deny. Now in these articles, says Sylvius, the discourse is not precisely about the merit of eternal life, or about merit with respect to everlasting life, but merit is understood generally, insofar as merit is said to be everything that makes some reward due in some manner, whether temporal or eternal, whether due from justice properly so called or from some other. Thus the most celebrated Doctor of Louvain.

You will insist: St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 102, a. 6, ad 7, says: « A heavenly intention ought to be joined to all our works. » But an implicit relation is not heavenly. Therefore.

I answer, 1°. I distinguish the minor. An implicit relation is not explicitly heavenly, I concede the minor; implicitly, I deny the minor. 2°. Granted that it must be understood as heavenly explicitly, St. Thomas intends nothing else by these words than what he says elsewhere, namely that all things must be referred to God explicitly, not immediately in themselves, but mediately in their cause, namely in an act of charity, when its precept obliges; but it does not oblige always. — See the first conclusion, likewise the first and second proof of the second conclusion. 3° If you contend that the heavenly intention must be understood as applying to individual acts immediately in themselves, I distinguish the major. It must be joined to all our works in order to eternal life, I concede; in order to mortal goodness, I deny. « For, says the holy Doctor, in cap. XIV Rom., lect. 3, cited in the second proof of the second conclusion, when an unbeliever, by the dictate of reason, does some good, not referring it to an evil end, he does not sin. »

I add that St. Thomas there is treating only of the faithful who worship the true God; and so the adversaries' opinion cannot be founded on this saying of his, since they bind even unbelievers by the precept of referring all their works explicitly to God loved for His own sake.

Objection 7°: St. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 83, a. 14, o, says: « We can speak of prayer in two ways: in one way, according to itself; in another way, according to its cause. Now the cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to proceed. This indeed ought to be continual in us, either in act or in virtue; for the virtue of this desire remains in all that we do from charity. Now we ought to do all things for the glory of God, as is said in I ad Cor., X, 31. And accordingly, » that is, because and insofar as we ought to do all things for the glory of God, « prayer ought to be continual. » Hence Augustine says, ad Probam, Epist. 130¹, c. 9, n. 18: « In faith itself and hope and charity, with continued desire, we always pray. » From which it is argued thus: St. Thomas founds the obligation of continual prayer on the precept of the Apostle: Do all things for the glory of God. Therefore on an explicit relation; because only through this can prayer be continual. — Proof of the antecedent. St. Thomas says: « And accordingly, » namely because and insofar as we ought to do all things for the glory of God, prayer ought to be continual. Therefore.

I answer: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the exposition of the text, and I say that the phrase accordingly refers to the desire of salvation, and not to the precept of the Apostle. If one attends to the cause of salvation, says Sylvius in his exposition of this article, which is the desire of salvation and of salutary things, from which prayer ought to proceed, it is fitting that prayer be lasting, indeed continual; because such a desire ought to be perpetual in the Christian man, for himself and for others, at least virtually. Thus the excellent interpreter of St. Thomas. And this is clear from the very text of Augustine which St. Thomas cites. For Augustine does not say: « In acts of faith and hope and charity, » but: « In faith itself and hope and charity, with continued desire, we always pray. » And otherwise it would follow that a man, even one endowed with charity, when he was doing nothing, or acting with a distracted mind, doing nothing actually for the glory of God, would fail in prayer, and so would not pray continually, which is foreign to the sense of St. Thomas. Moreover, St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 100, a. 10, o, and elsewhere, understands the text of the Apostle of strict charity. But the adversaries do not wish their relation to be from strict charity. Therefore St. Thomas does not favor them.

2° The objections from Augustine are answered.

Objection 1°: St. Augustine, lib. I de Trinit., c. 13, n. 31, says: « That vision of God whereby we shall contemplate the incommunicable and, to human eyes, invisible substance of God... is alone our supreme good, for the sake of attaining which it is commanded that we do whatever we rightly do. » Therefore an implicit relation does not suffice for St. Augustine. — Proof of the consequent. A deed rightly done, and vitiated by no evil circumstance, is implicitly referred to God. But nevertheless, according to St. Augustine, we are commanded to do this very right deed for the sake of attaining the supreme good. Therefore it must be further referred.

I answer that Augustine takes the precept in a broad sense, as a counsel of that which is good and best; otherwise it would follow that whoever acted rightly from some motive other than that of attaining beatitude, even a supernatural one, would sin.

Nor should you say, with the adversary, that the sense of Augustine is not that in every action we must formally intend eternal beatitude and refer all our works to it, but that it is enjoined on us that in every act we tend toward it, referring it to God. For it is to the contrary that Augustine most formally says that we are commanded to do whatever we rightly do for the sake of obtaining beatitude. But what is it to do everything we do for the sake of obtaining beatitude, except to intend beatitude formally and to refer all our works to it?

Or it must be said that St. Augustine, by this phrase, wishes nothing other than that we ought in every work to have God as our ultimate end. Now he has God as his ultimate end who, while doing a work good from its object, does not taint it with any evil circumstance or any evil end.

And unless you understand Augustine in one or the other of these senses, you will not be able to reconcile him with himself. For the Holy Doctor teaches, lib. de Spiritu et litt., c. 27, n. 48², and elsewhere, that certain works of unbelievers, even the end being taken into account, are to be praised, although they were not done for the sake of obtaining eternal beatitude, nor explicitly referred to God.

You will object 2°: St. Augustine, lib. XIX de Civit., c. 25, concerning the virtues of an unbelieving man, says: « The virtues which he seems to himself to have..., unless he has referred them to God, are themselves vices rather than virtues... When they are referred to themselves, and are not sought for the sake of anything else, even then they are puffed up and proud, and therefore are to be judged not virtues, but vices. » But now, while virtues are sought for their own sake, there is, according to us, a virtual implicit relation to God. Therefore.

I answer 1° that this objection must be resolved by the adversaries themselves. For they do not hold that the works of unbelievers, without their explicit virtual relation, are sins and vices, as Augustine here says, but only that the unbeliever sins by not referring [his acts] to God.

The adversary replies that these virtues of unbelievers are, according to Augustine, vices, not by taking "vice" for the action considered in itself, but for the complex made up of the action and the omission, according to the common manner of speaking: thus, for example, we say of a servant who has fulfilled only half of the work enjoined on him, that he has done badly; yet no one infers that he sinned by working.

But on the contrary: Augustine did not say that unbelievers sin in these virtues, but that these virtues are vices and sins. Therefore, just as, if I were to say of a servant who has fulfilled only half of the work enjoined on him, that his labor is bad, this, according to the common manner of speaking, would be understood of the labor considered in itself, and not of the complex; so likewise in our case. And this is the more evidently clear from the fact that Augustine calls these virtues of unbelievers « puffed up and proud. » Nor should you say, with the adversary, that they are so called by Augustine for this reason, that, since they were not sought for God's sake, they deprived him of his due honor. For he who steals or fornicates defrauds God of his due honor far more than he who does not explicitly refer a good action to him, and yet this thief or fornicator is not said to be puffed up and proud.

I answer 2°. I distinguish the minor. While virtues are sought for their own sake, there is a virtual implicit relation to God, if one does not ultimately rest in them, I concede the minor; if one ultimately rests in them as in true beatitude, I deny the minor. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks, as is clear from the words immediately following: « For, he says, it is not from the flesh, but above the flesh, that makes the flesh live; so it is not from man, but above man, that makes man live blessedly. » Augustine, then, here alludes to the Stoics, who placed their beatitude in the moral virtues, and of whom he speaks thus, serm. 156³, c. 7: « There were, moreover, other proud men who, as it were removing themselves from the flesh, and placing the whole hope of their beatitude in their soul, placed the highest good in their own virtue... Such were the philosophers who were called Stoics... The Epicurean said: « For me, to enjoy the flesh is the good. » The Stoic said: « For me, to enjoy my own mind is the good. » The Apostle said, Psal. LXXII, 28: For me, to cleave to God is the good. » We confess, however, that virtues thus ultimately sought for their own sake are not true virtues, but vices; inasmuch as by this evil intention the virtual relation to God is intercepted, and one clings to the creature, enjoying it. But if the will is borne toward a work good from its object, not ultimately clinging to it, nor twisting it back toward itself or toward some other evil end, but as it is a good begun and constituted in its own degree according to right reason; we say that it is morally good, and that the agent does not sin, because he virtually and implicitly intends God as the perfection and consummation of this begun good.

The adversary insists: Augustine, in the passage cited from de Civit., treats no more of the Stoics than of the Turks, but treats generally of all those among whom there is no true religion.

I answer that the adversary here speaks contradictions. For if Augustine treats generally of all among whom there is no true religion, then he also treats of the Stoics, among whom there was no true religion, and more so than of the Turks, who did not yet exist at that time; just as, if I were now to treat generally of all among whom there is no true religion, I would without doubt be treating of the Turks, among whom there is no true religion. And just as it does not imply a contradiction that one who was treating generally of all unbelievers should at times turn his discourse to the Turks; so nothing prevents Augustine, while treating generally of unbelievers, from having spoken of the Stoics in particular, the occasion being given. And that this is so is clear from the fact that in both places he keeps the same manner of speaking. In lib. de Civit. he calls the virtues of unbelievers « puffed up and proud; » in serm. 156 he calls the Stoics « proud. » In lib. de Civit. he says: « For it is not from the flesh, but above the flesh, that makes the flesh live; so it is not from man, but above man, that makes man live blessedly. » These words openly express the dogma of the Stoics, in conformity with what he says of them in the sermon cited: « There were, moreover, he says there, other proud men who, as it were removing themselves from the flesh, and placing the whole hope of their beatitude in their soul, placed the highest good in their own virtue... Such were the philosophers who were called Stoics. »

Nor should you say, with the adversary, that the sense of these words in lib. de Civit.: « For it is not from the flesh, etc. » is not that unbelievers thought that beatitude consisted in virtues referred to themselves and not to God, but that they thought these virtues merely conduced to beatitude.

On the contrary, 1°, standing on Augustine's own parallel. Just as, concerning matter disposed for life, although it conduces to life, it is not said, according to Augustine, to make [something] live, but God alone; so neither, concerning a virtue conducing to the blessed life, is it said, according to the same Augustine, to make [one] live blessedly, but God alone. 2° Augustine expressly teaches in the sermon that the Stoics placed their beatitude in their own virtue. Why should he not have the same sense in lib. de Civit., where he keeps the same manner of speaking? 3° Finally, according to some, it can be answered that St. Augustine, in lib. de Civit., condemns those who sought virtues indeed for their own sake, yet not precisely according to themselves and as abstracted from the subject, but in the concrete and as [existing] in the subject, namely, that they might appear virtuous. If you infer: Therefore they were sought not only for their own sake, but for the sake of something else. I answer that they were sought only for their own sake in the concrete and as [existing] in the subject, and in this sense, not for the sake of anything else.

Moreover, unless you understand Augustine in one or the other sense, I do not see how it could be saved from the condemnation of this proposition: «All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices.» Nor should you say, with the adversary, that St. Augustine elsewhere admits that the works of infidels can be good. For even the very authors of the condemned proposition did not deny that the works of infidels could in some sense be called good, and nevertheless they were condemned.

You will object 3°: St. Augustine, book I de Doct. christ., c. 22, n. 21, says: «This rule of love was divinely established, Levit., XIX, 18; Deuter., VI, 5; Matth., XXII, 37, 39: «You shall love, he says, your neighbor as yourself. God, however, with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind, so that you may direct all your thoughts, and your whole life, and your whole understanding toward him, from whom you have the very things you direct.» But when he says, with the whole heart, with the whole mind, he leaves no part of our life that ought to be empty and, as it were, give room for it to wish to enjoy some other thing; but whatever else that is to be loved comes into the mind, let it be swept thither, whither the whole impulse of love runs.» Therefore, according to Augustine, all things are to be referred to God, in such a way that no part of our life is left which ought to be empty and, as it were, give room for it to wish to enjoy some other thing. But what it is to enjoy some thing, Augustine expressed, ibid., c. 4, n. 4: «To enjoy is to cling with love to some thing for its own sake; but to use is to refer what has come into use to obtaining that which you love.»

I answer that all these things are verified according to our opinion: first in an act of charity, while the precept urges; then, even outside the case in which the precept urges, in every good act vitiated in no part. For since it is sought formally explicitly on account of the particular moral goodness of this act, it is sought virtually explicitly on account of moral goodness as such, which, since in reality it is God, is sought virtually implicitly on account of God, and so it is not to enjoy that thing, but to use it.

Against this second answer the adversary rises up, from Augustine, ibid., c. 22, n. 20, when he had said: «Those things alone are to be enjoyed which we have called eternal and unchangeable.» He adds: «But the rest are to be used, so that we may be able to arrive at the enjoyment of those things.» But a virtual implicit relation, since it is natural, does not lead to the enjoyment of God. Therefore, 2°, St. Augustine, ibid., c. 22, n. 20, speaks thus: «It is asked whether a man is to be loved by another man for his own sake, or for the sake of something else. For if for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of something else, we use him. But it seems to me that he is to be loved for the sake of something else.» Therefore, according to Augustine, to love one's neighbor for his own sake, that is, on account of his particular goodness, is not to refer one's act sufficiently to God, since to love in this way is not to use one's neighbor, but to enjoy him.

I answer to 1. In the first place, Augustine did not say that the rest are to be used insofar as this use leads to happiness, but that the rest are to be used so that we may be able to arrive at happiness. Now he who performs a good act vitiated in no part uses creatures in such a way that, other things being applied, he can arrive at happiness; for it is necessary, in order to attain it, that he perform good and not evil acts, although these alone do not suffice. But even if Augustine had said that this use ought to lead to happiness, nothing would stand in the way; because it truly does lead to it, not indeed positively, but presuppositively and negatively: presuppositively, because, as I have already said, it is a prerequisite for the attainment of happiness that the act be morally good and vitiated in no part; negatively, because by performing morally good acts, one does not sin, and thus removes an impediment to happiness — which I call concurring negatively.

To 2. I distinguish Augustine's proposition and the consequence at the same time. If we love a man for his own sake, setting up our end in him, we enjoy him, I concede; not setting up our end in him, I deny. This solution or explanation is not mine, but Augustine's own, who in the same book, c. 33, n. 37, says: «But if you cling and remain [in the delight of a creature], placing in it the end of your joy, then you must truly and properly be said to enjoy it.» It is required, therefore, according to Augustine, that we be said to enjoy a creature, that we place our end in it. Now, he who performs a morally good act vitiated in no part — for example, one who, without the admixture of any evil circumstance, loves his parents, friends, upright men, moved by the particular moral goodness of this legitimate love — in no way sets up his end in those objects, but in moral goodness itself as such, which in reality is God. And let these things once said from Augustine suffice for the adversary's often-repeated instances drawn from the use and enjoyment of creatures.

You will object 4°: St. Augustine, book IX de Trinit., c. 7, n. 12, and c. 8, n. 13, says: «No one does anything willingly which he has not first said in his heart. This word is conceived by love, whether of the creature, or of the Creator... Therefore either by cupidity, or by charity. Not that the creature is not to be loved, but if that love is referred to the Creator, it will no longer be cupidity, but charity. For then it is cupidity, when the creature is loved for its own sake. Then it does not help him who uses it, but corrupts him who enjoys it.»

I answer that St. Augustine there takes charity in a broad sense, for the love of moral good, as is customary with him. Thus, book I de Grat. Christi et de Peccato orig., c. 21, n. 22: «As though, he says, a good will were something other than charity.» In Psal. CXXXVI: «It is charity itself which is called a good will.» And book VIII de Trinit., c. 10, n. 14: «What is love or charity..., but the love of good?» Thus, then, according to Augustine, the love of a creature — for example, of parents, of a wife, of children — according to the dictate of right reason, is charity in the sense stated, and is referred to God. But the love of a creature, by setting up one's end in it, or by infecting that love with an evil circumstance or an evil end, is cupidity; because it is not referred to God, not even virtually. Nor indeed can it be said that the love of parents, according to the dictate of reason, vitiated by no circumstance, is cupidity; because then not only would the one loving sin, but his love, being cupidity, would be evil — which can be said neither according to Augustine, nor according to the adversaries.

The adversary insists: Augustine, book III de Doct. christ., c. 10, n. 16, defining charity, says: «I call charity a movement of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake, and oneself and one's neighbor for the sake of God.» Therefore.

I answer that we do not deny that Augustine often takes charity in the strict sense; but it cannot be denied that he also often takes it in the broad sense, for the love of good, as we have seen. Besides, the adversaries do not hold that we are bound to refer our works to God out of strict charity. To what purpose, then, do they press strict charity from Augustine?

Finally, if the first text of Augustine, and what the adversary appends to it, num. 238, saying, «whatever is done, is done by the love either of the creature or of the Creator, and consequently by cupidity or by charity,» if these, I say, are understood of strict and supernatural charity, in such a way that everything which is not from strict charity is from vicious cupidity, the following condemned propositions immediately arise. The first: «There are only two loves from which all our volitions and actions are born: the love of God, which does all things for God's sake, and which God rewards, and the love by which we love ourselves and the world, which does not refer to God what ought to be referred to him, and on this very account becomes evil.» This is 44 among the Quesnellian propositions. The following ones down to 59 are akin to it. The second: «Every love of a rational creature is either the vicious cupidity by which the world is loved, which is forbidden by John, or that praiseworthy charity by which God is loved as poured forth in the heart through the Holy Spirit.» This is 38 among the Baian propositions. The third: «Every deliberate human action is the love either of God or of the world: if of God, it is the charity of the Father; if of the world, it is the concupiscence of the flesh, that is, it is evil.» This is 7 among those condemned by Alexander VII.

You will object 5°: Augustine, book IV contra Iulian., c. 3, n. 21, addressing Julian, says: «Know that virtues are to be distinguished not by their duties, but by their ends. Now duty is that which is to be done, while the end is that on account of which it is to be done. When, therefore, a man does something in which he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it on account of that on account of which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning.» And below: «But whatever good is done by a man, and is not done on account of that on account of which true wisdom prescribes it be done, is, by that very fact of not having a right end, a sin.» Likewise below, n. 30, when Julian asks whether, if a pagan has clothed a naked man, it is a sin merely because it is not from faith, he answers: «Assuredly, insofar as it is not from faith, it is a sin — not because the deed itself, namely clothing the naked, is a sin, but because not to glory in the Lord concerning such a deed, only the impious man denies to be a sin.» From these it is evident that it is not enough for Augustine, in order that the agent not sin, that his work be good from its object, but further it is required that it be referred to God by another, further relation, which further relation can be nothing other than a virtual explicit one.

Before I answer, I observe that St. Augustine infers from these principles against Julian, that the works of infidels are sins, and their virtues vices. If, therefore, Augustine understood these things in such a way that an explicit relation is necessary, without which a man performing a work good from its object sins, as the adversaries understand and wish, they must admit that this inference, namely: «All the works of infidels are sins,» is of Augustine's mind, or confess that Augustine reasoned badly. They admit neither. It is therefore necessary that they confess that they do not understand the legitimate sense of Augustine. But what the legitimate sense of the holy Doctor is, we have set forth in good light in Diss. III de Gratia, a. 3, § 2, in our larger Work. And so now

I answer 1° that Augustine does not take these words, «not with a right end, not to glory in the Lord,» and similar ones, contradictorily or negatively, but contrarily, as though he were saying: To glory in something other than the Lord, and to act from a perverse end, is a sin — so that, that is, an affirmation is to be understood from a negation. In which sense, in Scripture, I Reg., XVIII, 9, Saul is said not to have looked upon David with right eyes. Thus St. Thomas and Estius interpret Augustine, as we have shown in the place cited de Gratia. And this is manifest from Augustine himself in the same c. 3 cited, n. 32: «Because, he says, they do it not with a faithful, but with an unfaithful will, that is, a foolish and harmful one.» Ibid., n. 22: «Some good things, then, can be done by those who do not do them well, by whom they are done. For it is a good thing that a man in peril be helped, especially an innocent one; but he who does this, if he does it loving the glory of men more than that of God, does not do the good well; because he who does not act with a good will does not do it as a good man. For far be it that a will should be, or be called, good, which glories in others, or in itself, and not in the Lord.»

To the observation prefixed to the answer the adversary falls silent, although it is of the gravest weight. But against the answer he argues thus: Julian never admitted that works referred to an evil end were good. Therefore there was no controversy on this point between Augustine and Julian. — Proof of the antecedent. Augustine says to Julian, ibid., n. 19: «Now you see, I think, that it follows that the prudence of misers, by which they contrive kinds of petty gains, would be true virtue.» From which it is clear that, that virtues referred to an evil end are true virtues, is a consequence which Augustine deduces from Julian's principle, not Julian's own doctrine. Therefore.

I answer, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish: That virtues referred to an evil end are true virtues is a consequence which Augustine deduces from Julian's principle, and which Julian denied, I deny; and which Julian did not deny, and which Augustine supposed him to admit, I concede, and I deny the consequence. This is clear both from the text of Augustine cited in our answer, where, in refuting Julian, he shows that works done from an evil end are not good — for why indeed would Augustine have labored over this, if Julian had not admitted that they were good? — and from the very words objected and those that follow. For Augustine says, ibid.: «Now, however, you see, I think, that it follows that the prudence of misers, by which they contrive kinds of petty gains, would be true virtue... Therefore those virtues, base and misshapen by such an end, and therefore in no way genuine and true virtues, nevertheless seem to you both fair, «so that [the words are Julian's] they could sustain loss neither in their name, nor in their kind»...» Then, n. 21: «From which so great an absurdity follows for you, that you are compelled to call it true justice, even when you find avarice as its mistress.» Now Augustine could not have addressed Julian in this way, except by supposing him to admit the consequence which he deduced from his principle. Let there be an example: for instance, a Molinist arguing against a Thomist or an Augustinian, that from the positing of grace efficacious of itself, free will is destroyed, could not say to the Thomist or Augustinian: «Now you see, I think, that it follows that grace efficacious of itself destroys free will. Therefore the destruction of free will by grace efficacious of itself seems to you a true dogma. From which so great an absurdity follows for you, that you are compelled to call a dogma true which is heretical.» The Molinist could not, I say, speak thus, except by supposing the Thomist or Augustinian to admit the consequence, namely that from the positing of grace efficacious of itself free will is destroyed. So it is in our case.

Moreover, St. Thomas, as I have already said, understands Augustine as we do. Behold his words, 2ª 2ae, q. 23, a. 7, ad 1: «Augustine says in book IV contra Iulianum, that the act of an infidel, insofar as he is an infidel, is always a sin, even if he clothes the naked, or does some such thing, ordering it to the end of his infidelity.»

But, says the adversary, St. Thomas does not say that the dispute between Augustine and Julian was about good works referred to an evil end. — I answer that St. Thomas says that Augustine, writing against Julian, speaks of good works referred to an evil end, which is to say that St. Augustine disputed against Julian about works referred to an evil end, especially if attention is paid to what I said in the answer. But St. Thomas did not say only this. In the same reply, ad 1, speaking of the act of an infidel proceeding from a good of nature, not referred to an evil end, he does not say that it is evil, but «good of its kind, yet not perfectly good, because it lacks the due ordering to the ultimate end.» This is our second answer, as we shall soon see. And thus St. Thomas, by the twofold member of his answer, sums up the whole dispute between Augustine and Julian, which was both about the acts of infidels good from their object referred to an evil end, which are therefore evil, and about those acts not referred to an evil end, which are not perfectly good. To St. Thomas, as regards the interpretation of Augustine, I had joined the most celebrated Estius, doctor of Louvain, of whom the adversary is silent.

Finally, that our interpretation is legitimate is further established by this, that Augustine says in the objection that «only the impious man» denies that «not to glory in the Lord» concerning almsgiving is a sin. For if the holy Doctor does not take «not to glory in the Lord» contrarily, for that which is to glory in something other than the Lord and to act from an evil end, but contradictorily, for that which is not to refer explicitly to God, as the adversaries wish, it follows that all who agree with us — that is, almost all Catholic doctors, who deny that it is a sin not to refer a good work virtually explicitly to God — must be called impious; which the adversaries do not admit.

The adversary's answer to this instance seems singular to us. He says that in Augustine's time no Catholic denied the obligation of an explicit relation, but all Catholics agreed in that opinion, and therefore Augustine does not say that it would be impiety to deny it, but that only the impious man denies it. Hence it does not follow that we must now be called impious.

I am mistaken, if this answer does not seem a paradox to everyone, except perhaps the Louvain school. For it is incredible that all the Catholic schools, with the exception, so far as I know, of the Louvain school, should have departed for so many years, in the matter of a divine precept, from the opinion in which all Catholics agreed in Augustine's time, and should have fallen into the opposite error, without the Church, or the supreme Pontiffs, or the bishops raising any objection. It would be pleasant to know where, when, and by what author this error first crept into the Catholic schools.

I answer, 2°, to the principal argument, that works which are without the faith that operates through love, yet from a right natural end, are called by Augustine sins in a broad sense, taking sin for everything that falls short of its end, and lacks the fullness of its perfection, or, as St. Thomas cited above says, for «not perfectly good» — such as are works of this kind, which, since they are not done from charity, are sterile with regard to the kingdom of heaven. In the same sense he says that the virtues of philosophers are not true virtues, but vices; because, although they can be, even if rarely, without an evil end, as Augustine admits, book de Spiritu et Litt., they nevertheless do not lead to eternal life. For Augustine speaks of virtues and good works, not morally and according to the philosophers, but insofar as they are meritorious of the heavenly kingdom, or, as he says in the same chapter 3, n. 33, «by which alone a man can be brought to the eternal gift and kingdom of God.»

Against this answer the adversary argues thus: Julian conceded that his good works were not meritorious of eternal life. Therefore Augustine is not treating them as meritorious.

I answer, I distinguish the consequence. He is not treating them as meritorious, that is, in order to prove that they are not meritorious, I concede: for this Julian conceded; in order to prove that they ought not to be called absolutely good, I deny.

The adversary insists: If St. Augustine had held our opinion, Julian could have answered him that these very works could in some sense be called good; for this is what we say.

I answer that this too is conceded to Julian by Augustine at the end of the chapter, as we shall soon see. And do the adversaries themselves not concede that works of this kind are in some sense good?

The adversary replies: Augustine, ibid., says: «It cannot be that we are good sterilely.» Therefore, if these works are good, they are meritorious.

I answer, I distinguish the consequence. If these works are good with a supernatural goodness, in Augustine's sense, they are meritorious, I concede; if they are good with a merely moral goodness, I subdistinguish. They are meritorious of a temporal reward, I concede; of an eternal one, I deny.

But Augustine himself peremptorily settles the matter at the end of this chapter 3, n. 33, concluding his whole dissertation with Julian in the following words, which the adversary has scarcely touched: «Take this briefly, says the holy Doctor, lest perhaps, since you err in the matters themselves as greatly as it is possible to err, I should seem to be contending with you about words... Since you at least concede that the works of infidels, which seem good to you, do not bring them to eternal salvation and the kingdom; know that we call that good of men, that good will, that good work, incapable of being conferred on anyone without the grace of God which is given through the one Mediator of God and men, by which alone a man can be brought to the eternal gift and kingdom of God. Accordingly, let all the other things which seem among men to have something of praise, seem to you true virtues, seem good works, and done without any sin at all... Let wills of this kind be called, according to you, good trees: it suffices that before God they are barren, and on this account not good.» By these words it is clearer than daylight that St. Augustine contends against Julian for this one thing: that the works and virtues of infidels which are not referred to an evil end are, in this sense, not good, because they fall short of the order of eternal life, and in that sense are called sins and vices, because they lack the fullness of their perfection; but this being granted, he allows that in another sense they may be called good and virtues. Certain lighter objections which are raised from the often-cited chapter 3 I omit, because they are easily resolved from what has been said.

Finally, the adversary concludes and infers that this precept of explicitly referring all one's actions to God is not intolerable, as I had objected, from the fact that a counsel concerning the same relation is not intolerable, as I concede. But the learned man is mistaken. For a counsel concerning a difficult matter can be tolerable, and a precept concerning the same matter intolerable, because a precept binds, a counsel does not. Thus a counsel of perpetual chastity, of religious poverty and obedience, is tolerable; but a precept would be intolerable.

Many other things bearing on this question, and here omitted, are to be sought in the first and second edition of it, printed at Ypres. For here my one purpose was to answer the Reverend Father Maugis.