Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

Note. Actions which proceed from man are of a twofold kind¹. Some are called of man, others human. Those actions are properly called human which proceed from man inasmuch as he is man, that is, inasmuch as he differs from irrational creatures, not only as to substance, but also as to the mode of operating; now man differs from other irrational creatures as to the mode of operating in this, that he acts freely, and is thus master of his own acts, such that he performs them or does not perform them at will: whence those actions alone are properly called human, which proceed from a deliberate will. But the actions which indeed proceed from man, but not from a deliberate will, are actions of man. And although some can be called human as to substance, yet not as to the mode, nor properly according to moral theology, which considers man as he is a moral agent, and his actions as they are worthy of praise or blame, and have the character of merit or demerit. And so all human acts are acts of man, but not the reverse.

I say 1°: Man, in all his acts which are distinguished from the end itself, acts for the sake of the end².

Proof, by going through the acts of the will, and at the same time the chief objections are forestalled. Among the acts of the will, some are concerned with the means, as consent, choice, and use; others again with the end in the order of execution, as the possession or fruition of the end, and delight or joy; finally there are certain acts commanded by the will, namely the passive use of the other powers.

Concerning the acts which are concerned with the means, there is no difficulty; for since the will is borne toward them for the sake of attaining the end, it is clear that acts of this kind are for the sake of the end.

As to the first volition of the end, although it is not from a preceding love of the end, since it is itself the first volition of it, or the first love, it is nevertheless caused by the end. Therefore it is for the sake of the end. — Proof of the antecedent. The causality of the end consists not only in this, that it moves and allures the will toward the means out of love of itself, but also that it moves the will to the love and desire of itself on account of its own intrinsic goodness, just as principles move not only to assent to the conclusion, but also to assent to themselves on account of their own intrinsic truth. Therefore the first volition, or the first love of the end, is caused by the end. Concerning the efficacious intention of the end, which presupposes the first volition, there is no difficulty, as is evident.

As to the acts of the other powers commanded by the will as such, it is manifest that they are for the sake of the end, since the will commands them out of love of the end, namely that through them, as through means, it may attain the end.

I said, in the acts which are distinguished from the end itself, on account of possession and delight. For the possession is the end by which; the delight naturally following upon possession is its complement. Whence neither possession nor delight are reckoned in number together with the end itself; but from the end which and the end by which, and its complement, one total and complete end is composed. But an end is not for the sake of an end.

You will ask whether the indeliberate and necessary actions of man, which are not human acts, are not also for the sake of an end.

I answer that they are for the sake of an end³, whether imagined, as when someone suddenly moves his hand or foot, or naturally desired, as when someone without attention scratches his beard to relieve an itch; yet not for the sake of an end preordained by reason and to which man moves himself out of his own judgment and deliberation. And because the Author treats here of acts in the moral order, such as only deliberate and properly human acts are, he resolves the question proposed concerning those alone, and said that only properly human acts are for the sake of an end.

For the resolution of the second question, note that each thing acts for the sake of an end in the manner in which it knows it; because the end does not cause, except as apprehended. Now the end can be known in two ways, materially and formally. To know the end only materially is to know the goodness of the end, as something fitting and desirable, stopping there. To know the end formally is to know not only the goodness of the end as fitting, but also to know the proportion of the end to the one desiring and to the means, and conversely the proportion of the means and of the one desiring to the end — that the end is worthy that such a one should pursue it and such means be employed, and in turn that such means are suitable and proportioned to this end. Those things, therefore, which know the end formally, act for the sake of it formally and as moving themselves toward it; those which know it only materially, act for the sake of it only materially and as moved by another. This having been noted,

I say: it is proper to a rational nature to act for the sake of an end formally and by moving itself; but to brutes, to act materially and as moved by another⁴.

Proof. He is said to act for the sake of the end formally and by moving himself, who apprehends the end together with the proportion of it to the means and of the means to the end, and from that apprehension and judgment of reason freely moves himself to the end, as is clear from what was noted above. But this is proper to a rational nature, and not to brutes. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: both because that proportion between the end and the means is something intelligible, and not sensible; and because only a rational nature has dominion over its own acts through free will, by which it freely moves itself to the end. Therefore.

Many things can be objected concerning brutes, which seem to act for the sake of an end formally: e.g., a dog desires food, and for its sake breaks its chains; a swallow desires a nest, and for its sake gathers straw. But these things properly pertain to the natural philosophers and are resolved from what has been said, namely by saying that brutes do not apprehend nor desire the end and the means formally, but only materially, under the aspect of a fitting good, insofar as from the end and the means one total object of their appetite is composed; thus, e.g., the swallow is not borne toward the nest formally as toward an end, nor toward the straw formally as toward a means and out of desire for the nest, but by natural instinct is borne in the same way toward both as toward a fitting good. Now natural instinct is a certain vehement motion impressed upon brutes by nature, or by the author of nature, for the pursuit of the good fitting to them.