Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

The end, setting aside its various senses, is here taken for that one of the causes which entices the agent to act, and is defined as « that for the sake of which something is done », or, « that for the sake of which the agent acts. »

From this you will infer, 1°, that the end is the principle in matters to be done by man, and the first of all causes¹. Whence it is commonly said that the end stands to matters of action as the principle stands to matters of speculation; for as the intellect is moved from principles to conclusions, so the will is moved by the end to the means.

You will infer, 2°, that end and good are the same materially²; because the will cannot be moved or allured except by a true or apparent good, which is its adequate object. They differ, however, formally, because good is so called insofar as it is agreeable to the appetite, the end insofar as it moves to the means; for it is that for the sake of which something is done.

You will infer, 3°, that the end, since it is first in intention, is last in execution, whence it is called the end³; because, in order that the end be obtained in reality, the means must precede.

You will infer, 4°, that the end does not move, nor exert final causality, unless apprehended⁴; because the will is not borne except toward what is known.

The various divisions of the end.

First, the end is divided into the end for the sake of which and the end for which⁵. The end for the sake of which is the thing which is sought; the end for which is the person or subject for whom the end for the sake of which is sought: thus the end for the sake of which, in the physician, is health; the end for which is the sick person, for whom he seeks health. This division, however, is not into two distinct ends, but into two things integrating one total end; for the end for the sake of which, e.g., health, is not sought in itself and in the abstract, but as good for the sick person.

2° The end is divided into the objective end, or the end which, and the formal end, or the end by which⁶. The objective end, or the end which, is the thing or object which we desire to attain; the formal end, or the end by which, is its attainment and possession: thus riches are the objective end of the miser, their acquisition the formal end⁷. This division, like the preceding, is not a division into two distinct ends, but into two formalities or things integrating one total end; for the miser does not intend riches except in order to possess them.

3° The end is divided into the end of the work and the end of the agent⁸. The end of the work is that to which the work tends by its own nature; the end of the agent is that which the agent sets for himself at will: e.g., in almsgiving, the end of the work is relief of the poor, the end of the agent is either God, or vainglory, or fornication; it can also be the very end of the work, for they sometimes coincide. The end of the work is called physical, proper, intrinsic, and universal; the end of the agent is called moral, extrinsic, and particular.

4° It is divided into the primary or principal end, and the secondary or less principal end. The primary is that which is per se intended first, or which per se moves the agent first; the secondary is that which is intended or moves not per se first, but secondarily and consequently, with something else presupposed; and therefore it is subordinated to the primary end, not as a means, but either as an effect, or as something consequently annexed to it. Thus the primary end of the recitation of the Breviary is divine worship, the secondary the stipend.

5° It is divided into the end effected and the end obtained. The end effected is that which comes to be and is produced by the operation of the agent, as health by the operation of the physician; the end obtained is that which is acquired by the operation of the agent, but not produced, as the prize of a contest. These two ends do not differ in the manner of causing, for each causes insofar as it is in the intention, but in the manner of being; because the one exists before the operation, and is called antecedent, the other after the operation, and is called consequent.

6° Finally, it is divided into the ultimate end and the non-ultimate end. The ultimate end is that which is desired for the sake of no other, but for the sake of which the rest are desired; the non-ultimate end, or intermediate end, is that which indeed is desired on its own account, yet with relation and dependence upon a further end.

Concerning this last division into the ultimate end and the non-ultimate or intermediate end

You will ask, whether the intermediate end truly and properly has the character of an end.

I answer affirmatively.

Proof. Not only to means, but also to ends, it belongs to be subordinated to other perfections, and yet to be desired on their own account and for their own sake. Therefore the character of an end belongs to them, not an ultimate one, since an end subordinated to another end cannot be ultimate in that series. Therefore it is intermediate. — Proof of the antecedent. There are certain means which are not desired as merely and precisely useful, giving simply a passage to the end, but as importing in themselves a desirable goodness sufficient to terminate some motion in that genus, although subordinately and dependently on a further goodness: e.g., savory food is desired for the sake of health, health for the sake of the exercise of virtue, virtue for the sake of God. Savory food, health, and virtue, in that series, have in themselves a sufficient goodness, by reason of which they are desired, yet not in such a way that their own goodness is not itself subordinated to a further good; for the very savor of the food conduces to health, the goodness of health to virtue, the honorableness of virtue to God. Therefore.