Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

St. Thomas, q. 64.

You will ask 1° whether the demons are blinded?

Blindness is the privation of the knowledge of truth.

I answer. Natural speculative knowledge of the demons in physical being has not been taken away, nor diminished¹, because it follows upon the very nature of the angel, who according to nature is intellect or mind. Hence it is commonly said, from Dionysius, c. 4, de Divin. nomin., that « the natural gifts remain whole in them. »

Supernatural speculative knowledge has not been totally taken away in them, but diminished²; because only as much is revealed to them of the divine decrees as is fitting, either through the mediation of the good angels, or through certain temporal effects of the divine power.

But of supernatural affective and effective knowledge producing the love of God they are totally deprived, as also of charity³, because they have no good affection toward God, or toward anything in relation to God.

You will ask 2° whether the demons are obstinate in evil.

I answer in the affirmative⁴. This is clear from Scripture. Psal., lxxiii, 23, it is said: The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually. If it always ascends, it never ceases. Psal., vi, 6: But in hell who shall confess to thee? Eccles., ix, 10: Neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge shall be in hell. Ioann., ix, 4: The night cometh, when no man can work. And to the Galat., vi, 10: Whilst we have time, let us work good.

You will ask 3° whence this obstinacy of the demons in evil arises.

I answer that a twofold cause is assigned⁵: one extrinsic, on the part of God denying grace; the other intrinsic, on the part of the created will immovably adhering to sin.

The reason for the first cause is taken from the state of damnation, as it is common to angels and men. For it is the state of the ultimate term, the state of the greatest misery, and the state of retribution according to the rigor of justice. Insofar as it is the state of the ultimate term, it requires the lack of the help that directs to the term. Insofar as it is the state of the greatest misery, where there is no order, but everlasting horror dwelleth, Iob, x, 22, and where there shall be neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge, Eccles., ix, 4, it requires the lack of every help ordering to good and to reason. Insofar finally as it is the state of rigorous justice, it requires that he who in the way cast away the grace by which he would order himself to his due end, once placed in the term, be deprived of it.

A difficulty occurs, however. How do the damned sin in that state? For they cannot do good without sufficient help. But he who cannot do good does not sin by not doing it; because for sinning it is required

that someone be able to do, and not do, what is commanded by law.

I answer that the damned sin in that state of damnation and obstinacy, because they incurred it of their own free will⁶: yet in such a way that by a sin of this kind they incur no further demerit, and that its whole malice is to be referred to the preceding fault by which they freely fell into the present necessity; just as happens in the case of a drunkard blaspheming, whose malice of blasphemy is referred to the will by which he freely made himself drunk.

The reason for the second cause is this⁷: because the angel, according to his connatural manner of proceeding, adheres immovably to the end to which he once determined himself by a certain judgment and perfect deliberation. This is proved. The dictate or judgment, certain and complete, formed by the angel — such as it was when he deliberated about his ultimate end, given his connatural manner of proceeding — is irrevocable and irreformable. Therefore the will, regulated by such a judgment, is likewise irrevocable and irreformable. — The consequence is clear, because the appetitive power in all things is proportioned to the apprehensive power by which it is regulated. Hence it is commonly said that the will is not borne except toward what is known, and in the manner in which it is known. — Proof of the antecedent. The angel does not reason discursively, as we said above, but by one and the same intuition comprehensively knows principles and conclusions, the end and the means, that is, by one and the same indivisible act he knows all things that can have agreement or disagreement, whether necessarily or contingently, with the principles or with the end. Therefore he apprehends immovably and irrevocably. — Proof of the consequence. This is why we apprehend first principles immovably and irrevocably, e.g., « anything either is or is not, » but conclusions changeably and revocably, because we apprehend first principles by one intuition and without discourse, but conclusions through discourse, in which there is room for error. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether there is sorrow in the demons.

I answer. Sorrow, insofar as it is a passion (say the same of

love, joy, and the like), cannot exist in the demons⁸; for in this sense it is proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a bodily organ, which the demons lack.

But sorrow, insofar as it is an act of the will, is in them; because sorrow taken in this sense is nothing other than the will's resistance to that which is or is not, namely when the being or not-being of a thing is perceived as disagreeable or as an evil that is one's own and conjoined. For two things are required for sorrow, namely the conjunction of some evil and the perception of this conjunction⁹. But the demons will many things to be which are not, and not to be which are, and they perceive these as evils that are their own and conjoined: thus, for example, they will to be blessed, to excel over all, to be adored by all, that all men be damned, etc.; they will not to be held fast, not to be punished by fire, not to be expelled from bodies, not to be sent into hell, etc. Therefore.

You will ask 5° whether the fire of hell is material and corporeal.

I answer in the affirmative¹⁰. This is clear from Scripture, which frequently designates the punishment of the damned by the name of fire, Iudith., XVI, 21; Iob., XX, 26; Isa., XXXIII, 14; more clearly Matth., V, 29 and 30, VII, 19, XIII, 30, XXV, 41. Nor does any reason compel us to understand it metaphorically, since if it is understood properly, no inconvenience follows.

Reason also persuades us of this¹¹; because the fire by which the bodies of the damned will be tormented is fittingly held to be corporeal, since a fitting instrument for tormenting bodies must be corporeal, nor can a punishment be fittingly adapted to a body except a corporeal one. But, according to Scripture, Matth., XXV, 41, that fire is common to the demons and to the damned men. Therefore.

The holy Fathers also hold this: Basil, Orat. 24; Chrysostom, hom. 44 in Matth.; Augustine, lib. XXI de Civit., c. 9 and 10; Gregory, lib. IV Dialog., and the theologians commonly; so that, although this opinion is not of faith, because the Church

has determined nothing about this matter, it nevertheless seems to be held with certainty. Indeed the Author, in the place cited, Supplem., a. 6, proves that the fire of hell is of the same specific nature as ours; yet that it differs according to certain accidents, namely that it does not need bodily fuel, as ours does, that it is dark, that it burns more sharply, etc.

You will ask 6° how the demons are tormented by the corporeal fire of hell.

I answer. The fire of hell torments the demons insofar as, as an instrument of the divine power, it binds their powers so that they cannot operate, whether internally or externally, according as they will and where they will, and consequently, as to place, so that they are not where they will, and are where they will not, because they are not in a place except through operation, as was said before¹². So it is commonly held, with the Author, not only by the Thomists, but also by many outsiders.

Proof 1° from Scripture, which explains that punishment of fire by way of binding and detention. Thus in II Petr., II, 4, it is said: God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them, dragged down by ropes of hell, into tartarus, to be tormented. Epist. Iudae, 6: But the angels who kept not their own principality, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness. Apocal., XX, 2 and 3: And he (the angel) laid hold of the dragon, the old serpent, who is the devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years, and cast him into the abyss. Likewise in the Old Testament, Isa., XXIV, 17, 18, 22, and Thren., III, 47.

Proof 2° from the Fathers. Gregory, lib. IV Dialog., c. 29; Julian of Toledo, lib. II Prognosticorum, c. 17; Augustine, lib. XXI de Civit., c. 10, where he says of the demon: « He is so bound by the fire, that receiving punishment from it, he conceives horror from that conjunction. »

Proof 3° from reason. This binding of the demons by fire is possible and fitting. It is possible, because fire does not achieve this by natural power, but by the power of the divine might and justice, of which it is the instrument, whether physical, as the

Thomists hold, concerning which see the Tract. de Sacram., or moral, as others hold; for either suffices for the conclusion.

It is fitting, because it is proportioned to the fault of the demons, both as to the manner of sinning and as to the gravity of the fault. As to the manner of sinning, because such was the pride of the demons, that they willed so to excel that they were unwilling to be subject even to God himself. Therefore they are fittingly subjected to a most vile corporeal thing, by which, as though imprisoned, they are held and pressed down forever, so that that common saying is verified: « By what things a man sins, by these he shall be punished. »

It is also proportioned as to the gravity of the fault, because it is most afflictive and the bitterest of all punishments. For an evil is the more bitter, the more it is disagreeable to the nature that suffers it; for in this disagreeableness, given its apprehension, lies the very nature of an afflictive evil. But nothing can be conceived more disagreeable to angelic nature than this binding by fire. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. 1° By this binding the demon is subjected, as has already been said, to a most vile thing, as an inferior to a superior, whereas yet it is the dignity and excellence of the demons that, by the law of nature, all corporeal things ought to be subject to them. 2° The powers of the demons are bound, both in relation to themselves, so that they cannot understand the many things they would wish, and on the contrary are compelled to think of many things they would not wish, and externally, in relation to place, because they are hindered from operating where they would wish, and are compelled to operate where they would not wish, and consequently are hindered from being where they would wish, and are held where they would not wish, as though in a narrow prison; because, as has been said, they are in a place through operation. But the nature of the demons is most active, and the more so, the more subtle and perfect it is. Therefore the binding by which they are hindered from acting as they will is most repugnant and violent to them, and hence the sorrow is the bitterest of all, since from repugnance and violence the bitterness of sorrow is born, as we have said.

You will ask 7° whether the demons, besides this binding, suffer no other more bitter punishment from the fire.

I answer that not a few hold that, besides this binding, the demons and separated souls suffer from the fire of hell a sorrow similar to that which the soul united to the body perceives, while the body which it informs is being burned. But other Thomists, and more commonly, rest in the binding alone. For the rest, I see no implication of contradiction why God, through fire as through an instrument of his power, could not torment the demons and separated souls, just as the soul is tormented and tortured while the body which it informs is burned. But whether it is so is uncertain, and to tell the truth, St. Thomas, both here and in the Suppl. cited, where he treats this matter, makes no mention of this manner, but only of the binding.