Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

St. Thomas, from q. 54 to q. 60.

You will ask 1° whether angels need species, for knowing themselves and other things besides themselves.

I answer 1°. The angel, for knowing itself, does not need an impressed species, but knows itself through its own substance, which takes the place of an impressed species, not of an expressed one¹.

Proof of the first part. The impressed species, a substitute for the object, is not necessary, except so that the object, which is outside the intellect, may become intimately present to it, and that which is material may become immaterial with an immateriality of the same order as the intellect that understands; for if the object is of itself intimately present to the intellect in intelligible being, the species is superfluous, as I said at length in the treatise on God, dissertation on the vision of God. But the substance of the angel is intimately present to its own intellect, and immaterial with an immateriality of the same order as it, as is clear. Therefore.

Proof of the second part, because, although the substance of the angel is in itself intelligible, since it is immaterial, it is not, however, in so great a degree of immateriality as to be actually understood², as we said of the essence of God in the treatise on God, dissertation 4. Hence for this an expressed species is required.

I answer 2°. The angel does not know things other than itself through its own substance, but for this it needs impressed species³.

Proof. For the cognition of any object it is required, as has already been said, that the object be intimately present to the intellect in intelligible being, either through itself, or through a species representative of it, according to that commonly received saying of Augustine: « From the object and the power, knowledge is born. » But created beings cannot be intimately present to the angelic intellect through themselves, that is, in their own entity, as is clear of itself. Nor can the substance of the angel be a representative species of them: for it is neither their likeness, nor their effect, nor at least their adequate cause; for although angels concur toward certain forms, it is not, however, immediately nor adequately, but only through local motion, by applying active things to passive things. Therefore, however much they may penetrate their own substance, they cannot in it, as in a cause, distinctly know other beings: since, as these are not contained in it adequately and distinctly, neither can they shine forth in it.

You will ask 2° whether the species by which the angel knows things other than itself are received from things, or innate and connatural.

I answer. The species of angels are not received from things, but implanted by God at their creation, and therefore connatural and innate⁴.

Proof 1°, from authority. Ezech., XXVIII, 12 and 13, it is said of Lucifer: Thou wast the seal of resemblance, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty..., in the day that thou wast created. Dionys., de Div. nom., c. 7: « Angels do not gather divine knowledge from divisible or sensible things. » And Aug., book II on Genes. ad litt., c. 8, n. 16: « The other things which are below [the Angels] are so created, that they first come to be in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own genus. » This can be understood only of creation in intelligible being, which they have through species.

Proof 2°, from reason⁵. The lower spiritual substances, namely human souls, have being akin to body, inasmuch as they are the forms of bodies, and therefore from this very mode of being it belongs to them that they attain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. Therefore angels, since they are wholly and immaterially absolved from bodies and subsist in intelligible being, do not attain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, but through an intelligible influx by which they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.

It is confirmed. An exterior material object cannot naturally act immediately upon a purely spiritual power, moving it and impressing upon it its own species. Nor can it be said that the exterior material object would not act upon the angel, but that the angel would act upon it, abstracting species from it; because, if the angel did not already have the species of those material objects beforehand, they would be unknown to it, and consequently it could not apply its power to them, nor operate upon them, so as to abstract species from them. Likewise, angels often know objects outside the sphere of their activity, upon which they therefore cannot operate. Finally, if the angel had its perfection from bodies, as our soul does, it would depend on them: which cannot be said.

The argument that is objected concerning the knowledge of future things will be resolved below.

You will ask 3° whether the species by which angels understand are universal, and the more universal, the higher the angels are.

By universal species we understand those that represent many things, and the more universal, the more things they represent, not only in general, but in particular and distinctly.

I answer affirmatively⁶. Because the more a created being is nearer and more like God in the intellectual order, the fewer and more universal are the species by which it understands. But angels

are nearer and more like God in the intellectual order than men are, and the higher angels more than the lower. Therefore. — The minor is certain. — Proof of the major. The more a created being is nearer and more like God in the intellectual order, the more it participates the divine perfections in that order. But God's perfection is that he understands all things through one medium, namely through his own essence, which is to him in place of a species. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether angels know material singulars. I answer affirmatively⁷. It is of faith.

Proof from Scripture. 1° No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to that of Psal. XC, 11: He hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. 2° According to the faith, these lower things are administered through angels, according to that of Hebr., I, 14: All are ministering spirits. But, if they did not have knowledge of singulars, they could have no providence over the things that are done in this world, since acts belong to singulars. Therefore.

The reason, however, is sought from the principle of Augustine commonly received, namely that God from eternity formed the ideas of the things to be produced, then impressed them upon the angelic mind, and at length produced them outwardly, so that the angelic species are derived and exemplified from the divine ideas. This being laid down, I thus reason with the author⁸: The ideal notions existing in God are effective of things, not only as to form, but also as to matter, and therefore they are likenesses of things as to both; and on this account things are known by God, not only in their universal nature on the part of form, but also in their singularity on the part of matter. But as natural things flow forth from the divine intellect according to matter and form, so as to be composed of both, so the forms or species of the angelic intellect flow forth for the knowing of both. And therefore through innate forms or species they know things in their singularity and universality, inasmuch as they are like the active forms, namely the ideas existing in the divine mind, although they themselves are not productive of things.

You will ask 5° whether angels know with certainty, by natural light, future things that are merely contingent, such as the free acts of man.

I answer. Negatively⁹.

Proof 1°, from the authority of Scripture and the Fathers. That which is a proper sign of divinity does not belong to angels. But to know future contingents is a proper sign of divinity. Therefore. — Proof of the minor 1°, from Scripture. Isa., XLI, 23: Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.

Proof 2°, from reason¹⁰. Future contingents cannot be known with certainty by angels, either in their causes, or in themselves. Not in their created causes, because these are contingent and indifferent to either alternative; nor in the uncreated cause, namely the free decree of God, which is by nature impervious to every created intellect. Not in themselves; for the reason God knows them with certainty in themselves is that he sees all things in his eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and encompasses it; hence his one glance is borne upon all things that are done throughout the whole of time, as though present, and he sees all things as they are in themselves, as we said concerning the knowledge of God, at q. 14. But the angelic intellect, and any created intellect whatever, falls short of the divine eternity. Therefore.

You will say: Angels have the species of future things before they come to be; for when future things become present, angels do not receive new species for knowing them, but know them through their innate ones, as we have said. But, once the species is given and the intellect is unimpeded, sufficient principles are posited for understanding the object. Therefore there is no reason why the knowledge of future things should be denied to angels. — It is confirmed. The truth of those future things, taken determinately, is something created. Therefore it is proportioned to some created intellect; why not to the angelic intellect, as the most perfect among created things?

I answer to this argument, which contains the height of the difficulty, from the author¹¹, that the angelic species are indeed representative in first act of all singulars, yet they do not represent them in second act, except while they exist; and this for a twofold reason. The first is that only when things exist do they have the nature by which they are assimilated to the species that are in the angel's mind; but while they are future, they do not yet have the nature by which they are assimilated to them. The second reason is that the angelic species does not represent in act, nor does the angel naturally know in act, except what in fact pertains to this universe. For the angel's knowledge is finite, and no more fitting boundary can be assigned to it than the breadth of this universe; and besides, if it were extended beyond the universe, since there would be no reason why it should be extended to one thing rather than another, it would attain all possible things, at least divisively. Moreover, outside this universe there is no cause except God; but for no created intellect is it connatural to know things in God. Furthermore, future things do not yet belong to the order of this universe, but will belong to it when they exist.

But these things are rooted in a higher principle of Sts. Augustine and Thomas, of which we have already spoken, namely that the angelic species do not represent the natures of things in just any way whatever, but according as those natures themselves descend and are derived from the divine ideas, from which the species themselves are also derived and exemplified; hence the angelic species, as has been said, have in representing what the divine ideas have in causing. Now the divine ideas cause natures in individuals successively. Therefore the species themselves, which are derived from these ideas, receive the power of representing natures in individuals successively, and thus they are apt to represent individuals when they are produced in the universe by the divine ideas themselves, not when they are not.

You will ask 6° whether angels naturally know the thoughts or secrets of hearts.

By the thoughts of hearts we here understand¹² the free immanent acts, both of intellect and of will, which are manifested neither by any exterior effect or sign, nor by the very will of the one thinking.

I answer. Negatively.

Proof 1°, from authority¹³. What is proper to God does not belong to angels. But to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor, from Scripture. Ⅱ Paralip., VI, 30, it is said: Be merciful, and render to every man according to his ways, which thou knowest him to have in his heart; for thou alone knowest the hearts of the children of men.

Proof 2°, from reason¹⁴. Things which depend on the free will of man alone and on God, apart from any dependence on natural causes or connection with them, are not naturally knowable by angels, but only by the one willing himself, and by God, to whom the will is subject. But the free acts of the will and intellect depend on the will alone and on God alone, apart from any dependence on natural causes or connection with them. Therefore. — The minor is certain. For no created cause, but God alone, who is the first and universal principle, and the last end of our will, can flow into it and act upon it and determine it, as has already been said; and this is clear, because the will itself has full dominion, absolute from every creature, and full indifference as to its own acts, so that it may posit them or not posit them, may revoke or continue those already posited. — Proof of the major. The angel does not have a natural power of understanding whatever is intelligible, but only that which pertains to the order of this universe, either as a part of it, or as having a connection with it. But the free internal act does not pertain to the order of this universe, nor does it have any connection with it. Therefore. — The major is clear from what was said in the preceding answer. — Proof of the minor. The order of the universe consists in the subordination and connection of natural causes, by which particulars are acted upon and ruled through universals, corporeal things through spiritual, and lower things through higher; hence, in order that something may pertain to the order of the universe, it must either be a higher cause suited by nature to move lower things, or depend upon them. But the free internal act is outside the whole order of natural causes, so that it depends on none of them, but only on the will freely and indifferently eliciting it, and on God alone determining it, as has already been said. Therefore.

You will say: By the sole consent of the one thinking, his thought becomes able to be made manifest to an angel, as is commonly admitted. But the consent of the one thinking adds nothing to the knowability of his thought, but only an extrinsic denomination. Therefore before that consent it was knowable by the angel.

I answer that, although the consent of the one thinking adds nothing directly to the knowability of his thought, it nevertheless adds something indirectly, inasmuch as it makes his thought in some way pertain to the one to whom he directs it. But the angel knows whatever pertains to himself.

You will ask 7° whether angels naturally know the mysteries of grace.

I answer negatively¹⁵. This is clear from the preceding answer. For if the angel cannot know the thoughts of another that depend on his will, much less can he know those things that depend on the will of God alone. And thus the Apostle argues, I Cor., II, 11: For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So also the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.

You will ask 8° whether the angel is always understanding in act.

I answer that the angel necessarily always understands himself in act¹⁶.

Proof. The angel understands himself through his own substance, as through an intelligible species, as has been said. But his own substance is always intimately present to his intellect, and always informs it in intelligible being. Therefore he always necessarily understands it in act; just as, if an eye

kept open were continuously informed by the species of some illuminated object, it would always necessarily see it.

You will ask 9° whether the angel is properly and formally discursive.

I answer. Negatively¹⁷.

Proof. To reason discursively, properly and formally, is to know one thing that is less known from another that is more known, by distinct acts of cognition, such that one prior cognition is the cause of the other, or such that from the prior cognition of one the cognition of the other is brought forth, as happens in us, who, on account of the weakness of our intellectual light, cannot know at once and at the same time the principles and the conclusions included in them. But angels do not know in this way; rather, on account of the fullness of their intellectual light and the universality of their species, they immediately, at first and in a single glance, attain the whole power of the principles, and consequently what is contained in them and can be deduced from them: and therefore they are called intelligences. Therefore.

As to the will,

You will ask whether the angel loves himself and God necessarily as to exercise.

I answer 1°. It seems more probable that the angel loves himself necessarily as to exercise.

Proof 1°. The angel knows himself necessarily as to exercise, as has been said above. Therefore he necessarily wills to know himself; for although this knowledge is necessary, it is nevertheless voluntary. — I subsume. But to will to know oneself is to love oneself; for it is to will a good to oneself, since it is a good for the angel that he know himself.

Proof 2°. Every motion is reduced to some motion determined by nature, just as in an animal all motions are reduced to the motion of the heart, which flows from the animal's nature as its inseparable property. Therefore in the angel, just as every act of understanding is reduced to the knowledge of self, as to the first cognition determined by nature, so all his love is reduced to the love of self, as to the first

love determined by nature; for understanding and willing proceed at an equal pace, and are causes of one another in a different genus.

We do not, therefore, derive this necessary love from the substance of the angel as from an object, as the defenders of the opposite opinion suppose; for we admit that no object, except the universal and infinite good, namely God clearly seen, can fill the capacity of our will and necessarily seize it. But we derive it from the angel's own substance as from a principle from which it flows as a property. And hence the chief objections that are raised are resolved.

I answer 2°. The angel loves God with a love necessary as to exercise.

This follows from the preceding; because it is impossible that the angel love himself with a love necessary as to exercise, without at the same time, and with the same necessity, loving the author and preserver of himself as a good proper to himself.

But immediately a difficulty arises. The angel loves himself after sin with the very same necessity with which he loves himself before sin; for the reasons of the first answer hold good for every state. If, then, from the necessary love of self as to exercise there necessarily follows a necessary love of God as to exercise, it follows that the angel, after sin and in the actual state of sin, loves God with a love necessary as to exercise. But how can an actual love of God stand together with an actual hatred of him, an actual turning toward him with an actual turning away from him? Nor may you say that in sin there is an actual aversion from God only as supernatural author, which can stand together with an actual turning to God as natural author; for on the contrary, while the angel sins directly against God as supernatural author, he sins indirectly against him as natural author, as we shall say below. He is, therefore, actually turned away by sin from God as natural author, and at the same time turned toward God as natural author by a necessary love.

I answer briefly, that the demons hold God in hatred as supernatural author and just avenger of their crime,

but that they love him as natural author, and are turned toward God as natural author physically and necessarily by nature, but are turned away from him morally and freely by sin: in which there is no contradiction, because these are not predicated of the same thing under the same aspect and in the same manner.