Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

(St. Thomas, Part I, from q. 50 to q. 64, and from q. 106 to q. 114)

D. Thomas qq. 50, 51 et 61.

Angel is a Greek word, meaning the same as the Latin messenger. Hence, if the force of the word is considered, it is a name of office, not of nature; and therefore it is sometimes applied in the Scriptures to whoever announces the will or law of God. Thus of John the Baptist it is said, Malach., III, 1, and Matth., XI, 10: Behold I send my angel. And the Apostle, I Cor., XI, 10, commands that the heads of women be veiled because of the angels, that is, the priests.

However, because the ministry of announcing is commonly entrusted by God to the heavenly spirits, it has been received by usage that this name is applied to signify those spiritual substances higher than men; and since among them there are diverse orders, it sometimes signifies those who are in the lowest order, sometimes generally all who are contained in the nine orders. And in this way we take it here.

You will ask 1° whether there are angels.

I answer in the affirmative¹. It is of faith, against the Sadducees. Act., XXIII, 8.

Proof. By the name angel we understand a spiritual, intellectual, created substance, higher than men. But it is certainly established from the Scriptures that such a substance is given. And first, that a created spiritual substance is given. Ps. CIII, 4:

Who makest thy angels spirits. Likewise Hebr., I, 1; Apocal., I, 7; Coloss., I, 16. But if spiritual, therefore intellectual. Likewise they are higher than men. Ps. VIII, 6, the prophet speaking of man, says: Thou hast made him a little less than the angels. And II Petr., II, 11: Whereas angels are greater in strength and power.

Augustine, on that verse of Psal. CIII, 4: Who makest thy angels spirits, says, n. 15: « We know that angels exist from faith, and we read it written that they have appeared to many, and we hold it, nor is it right for us to doubt this. But angels are spirits; and when they are spirits, they are not angels, but when they are sent, they become angels. For angel is a name of office, not of nature. Do you ask the name of this nature? It is spirit. Do you ask the office? It is angel. » St. Gregory the Great, Hom. 34 in Evang.: « Almost all the pages of sacred eloquence bear witness to angels and archangels. »

Hence the Lateran Council, under Innocent III, lib. I Decretal., cap. Firmiter, de summa Trinitate, thus defines: « We firmly believe... that God... at once from the beginning of time created both creatures out of nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and then the human, as it were common, constituted of spirit and body. »

Hence you will infer that the angels are devoid of all matter, and do not have bodies, even subtle and sensible ones, naturally united to themselves.

As for the holy Fathers who said that the angels are corporeal, not all of them understood corporeal as common sense bears it and in that strict sense in which we understand it here. For some said they are corporeal, that is, true substances; because among many of the ancients, body is used in two ways: first, properly, for a material and extended mass, and as it is opposed to immaterial substance, as we take it here; second, improperly, for that which is real and subsists, and is opposed to nothing, to the empty and the void, as we showed in the dissert. quarta Tract. de Deo uno; and in this sense some holy Fathers said that the angels are corporeal, that is, true and real

substances. Others said² that they are corporeal comparatively to God, because incorporeal substances are a mean between God and corporeal creatures: but a mean, compared to one extreme, appears as the other extreme, just as the lukewarm, compared to the hot, appears cold; and for this reason it is said that the angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, that there is in them anything of a corporeal nature. Some, finally, called body whatever is defined in a certain place, and is not everywhere, or even that which is potential and limited, although it were a pure spirit. Moreover, if any have judged the angels to be properly and strictly corporeal, against them we set the other Fathers cited, the sacred Scriptures, the consensus of the schools, and above all the definition of the Lateran Council.

You will ask 2° whether the angels sometimes assume bodies.

I answer in the affirmative³, so that their apparitions do not always occur according to imagination. For what is seen by an imaginary vision is only in the imagination of the one seeing, nor is it seen constantly in the same way and indifferently by all, as is clear in those dreaming and the deranged. But Scripture introduces the angels appearing in such a way that they were seen constantly in the same way and indifferently by all: thus the angels appearing to Abraham were seen constantly and in the same way by him and his whole household, and by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; likewise the angel of Tobias was seen constantly and in the same way by all.

If you say: Just as the imagination of one, so that of a whole multitude and of all who encounter it can be altered, so that the same thing is seen constantly by all in the same way according to an imaginary vision,

I answer 1°. Granted that this can happen absolutely, it does not, however, happen so ordinarily, and therefore the argument from what commonly occurs always holds. 2°. I deny the antecedent. For this would happen either by God acting specially, or by an angel. Not by God

acting specially, since these apparitions sometimes occur for evil and shameful purposes, as is clear in the succubus and incubus demon, likewise in the demon tempting Christ and Eve. Not by an angel; for the finite and limited power of an angel does not seem able to be borne at once to things so diverse and continued for so long. Besides, an evil angel could do nothing upon the imagination of Christ, to whom he appeared in the desert, nor upon the imagination of Eve, still innocent, to whom he appeared under the form of a serpent. Finally, this does not seem sufficiently to agree with Scripture's manner of speaking. For it is expressly said, Genes., XVIII, 2: There appeared to him (namely, to Abraham) three men, whom the Apostle, ad Hebr., XIII, 2, says were angels.

But an angel assumes a body when it is united to it according to substance as mover to the movable, in order to represent his own properties, or those of God, whose legate he is, using that body as his own⁴. And he can form that body for himself out of any elements or mixed bodies whatsoever, because all bodies are subject to angels as regards local motion. Regularly, however, it is formed out of air or vapor, because these kinds of matter can easily be thickened and thus receive and retain a shape, and be variously colored by the addition of some body, as is evident in clouds⁵.

You will ask 3° whether the angels, in the bodies they have assumed, truly exercise works of sensitive life.

I answer in the negative, because they do not live in them a sensitive life. Nor do they have sense organs, properly so called, but only their likeness, and so their actions are only vital by way of likeness. Hence Raphael said, Tob., XII, 19: I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you, but I use an invisible food and drink which cannot be seen by men.

You will ask 4° whether there are several angels distinct only in number within the same species.

I answer: There neither are nor can there be several angels distinct only in number within the same species⁶.

Proof. Numerical multiplication within the same species is repugnant to that to which matter signed by quantity, or an order to it, is repugnant. But to angels, complete immaterial substances, matter, or an order to it, is repugnant. Therefore. — The minor is established from what has been said. — Proof of the major. Numerical multiplication within the same species is repugnant to that to which the principle of such multiplication is repugnant. But only matter signed by quantity, or an order to it, is the principle of numerical multiplication within the same species. Therefore. — The difficulty is in the minor.

Proof of the minor. The principle of numerical multiplication within the same species necessarily involves two things: First, that it be intrinsic and substantial, because two individuals, e.g., Peter and Paul, differ substantially; for they are two substances of the same species really distinct. Second, that it so multiply the substance that it nevertheless does not multiply the species, but preserves one and the same specifically in several individuals. But it is repugnant that this be supplied except by matter signed by quantity, or without an order to it. Therefore. — Proof of the minor, and first, that this is supplied by matter signed by quantity. Matter is something intrinsic and substantial, and by reason of the quantity it has or connotes, of which it is the immediate recipient and not the form, it has parts of the same nature. Therefore this can bring about numerical multiplication, while specific unity is preserved. — It is now proved that this cannot be supplied except by matter alone. It cannot be supplied by form: first, because it is proper to form to constitute the species, that is, to furnish the essential predicates. Therefore of itself it does not make things differ only in number, but also in species; for since that which constitutes essentially is the same as what is constitutive and distinctive, it makes things differ essentially. Second, the principle of individuation must be a principle of incommunicability to several inferiors; for an individual is not further communicable to other, inferior individuals. But form, since it is the principle of the specific degree, which of itself is communicable to many individuals, cannot be the principle of such incommunicability. Therefore.

You will say: This doctrine of St. Thomas was formerly condemned by the University of Paris. Therefore.

I answer that this condemnation, made inconsiderately, was solemnly revoked in the year 1325, by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, with the consent of the dean, the chapter, and several other learned men, and that the doctrine of St. Thomas was celebrated with various praises.

You will ask 5° when the angels were created.

I answer that they were not created before the world, as some Greek Fathers held, but together with the world⁷.

Thus the Lateran Council, cited above, defined, saying that God created the angelic and worldly creature at once from the beginning of time. Scripture favors this, Exod., XX, 11: In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them. But the angels are in the world and in heaven. And Eccli., XVIII, 1: He created all things together, not indeed with an instantaneous simultaneity, but with a simultaneity of uninterrupted time. Understand this also as regards species; for individuals of the rational soul are created daily.

If you say that Moses, in narrating the creation of all things, made no mention of the angels.

Augustine answers, lib. XI de Civit., c. 33, that the angels in the narrative of the world's creation were not passed over, but signified under the name of heaven or light⁸. Moreover, they were either passed over for this reason, or signified by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was speaking to an unrefined people, who could not yet grasp an incorporeal nature; and if it had been expressed to them that there were things above every corporeal nature, it would have been an occasion of idolatry for them, to which they were prone, and from which Moses especially intended to call them back. Nor does it matter that afterward, in the course of Genesis, he makes mention of angels; for he does this with such caution as to represent them under the appearance of bodies, and regularly to indicate that they are only ministers and messengers, so as thus to remove every occasion of idolatry.

It is also rightly answered, with St. Jerome, Epist. 139, that Moses did not make express mention of the angels,

because this was not part of his purpose, since there he intended only to describe the order of the creation of corporeal things and the series of days.

You will ask 6° where the angels were created.

I answer that it is more probable that they were created in the empyrean heaven⁹; because, since they precede all corporeal creatures in dignity, and preside over the whole of nature as its superiors, it was fitting that they should be created in the highest of the heavens. Scripture favors this, which, Ezech., XXVIII, 13 and 14, speaking of the first angel under the figure of the prince of Tyre, says: Thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God.... Thou a cherub stretched out and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God. And below, 16: And I cast thee out from the mountain of God, and destroyed thee, O covering cherub! Now Paradise, or the mountain of God, is the empyrean heaven, in which all the saints will be.

You will ask 7° how great is the multitude of angels.

I answer that, according to Scripture, it is very great and astonishing. For it is said, Daniel, VII, 10: Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him. And Apocal., V, 11: Their number was thousands of thousands. By these manners of speaking an almost innumerable multitude is suggested. But according to St. Thomas¹⁰, following St. Dionysius, c. 14 de coelesti Hierarchia, it is reasonably said that the multitude of angels incomparably exceeds the multitude of material species. But how much the angels exceed the number of material species, and whether they exceed the number of men who have been, are, and will be: this seems to us uncertain, nor do we think sufficiently well-founded what is alleged by some for or against it.

St. Thomas, qq. 52 and 53.

You will ask 1° whether the angels are in a place.

I answer that they are in some manner in a place¹. It is clear from Scripture, which relates that the angels operate immediately around us, move themselves from place to place, and are in certain places. See Gen., XVIII, 2-16, and XIX, 1-22; Judges, II, 1-5; Tob., VIII, 3; Luke, II, 9-15; Matt., XXVIII, 2-7; Apoc., XII, 7.

You will ask 2° how the angels are in a place.

I answer. To be in a place is said in four ways: circumscriptively, definitively, sacramentally, and everywhere. To be in a place circumscriptively is for the thing located to be so surrounded or circumscribed by the place that the whole of the thing located corresponds to the whole of the containing place, and each part of the thing located to each part of the containing place, as liquid in a vessel. For something to be in a place definitively is for it to be so determined to one place that it is, as it were, bounded or defined by that place, and cannot at once and at the same time occupy another adequate place. To be in a place sacramentally is proper to the body of Christ in the Eucharist, and is to be under the species of bread and wine after the manner of a spiritual substance, yet in such a way that it can at the same time be elsewhere, if the bread and wine are consecrated elsewhere. To be everywhere is understood from the terms themselves.

It is certain that the angels are not everywhere, for that is proper to God; nor are they sacramentally, because that mode of existing is proper to Christ by force of the consecration; nor are they in a place circumscriptively, since, being pure spirits, they lack the quantity of mass which is the ground for being located circumscriptively. It remains, therefore, that they are in a place definitively.

You will ask 3° by what the angels are in a place.

I answer that they are in a connatural place through an operation that is virtually transient — that is, one that produces some effect outside itself².

Proof. An angel is in a place by that through which it really touches the place. But it does not really touch the place except through an operation virtually transient. Therefore. — The major is certain, both from the example of bodies — for a body is said to be in a place through its quantity, because through this it touches the place — and

from reason, because to be in a place is to be physically present to it and undistant, and consequently really to touch it.

Proof of the minor. 1° — Contact is twofold: one properly so called, which is of dimensive quantity, and this does not befit an angel; the other improperly so called, which is of the quantity of power, namely its act, or an operation virtually transient, by which it subjects a body or place to itself and makes it depend on itself. Therefore. 2° — An angel touches a place and becomes present to it by that through which it occupies a place now greater, now smaller, now indivisible. But it has this only through an operation virtually transient, which, since it is free, is terminated now at a great, now at a small, now at an indivisible place; for although this angelic operation is in itself and on the part of the angel indivisible, it is nevertheless virtually, and on the part of its term, divisible.

I said: « at least in a connatural place. » A connatural place is called that to which an angel applies itself by free will, and which it accordingly subjects to itself; a violent place, on the contrary, is that to which it is bound against its will, and by which it is thereby prevented from operating and existing elsewhere.

The common opinion of the Thomists, therefore, is that angels are in a violent place, not through operation, but through passion; because the ground of being located in spiritual substances is the contact of the power of the locatable thing and of the place, as has been said. But just as an angel, through operation, touches the body on which it acts, subjecting it to itself, so through passion it is touched by a body as by an instrument of a higher power, and is subjected to it and becomes present to it. Nor is this to change the formal grounds of existing in a place, but to assign them proportionately; just as we say that the body of Christ is in heaven through the contact of extensive quantity, and in the sacrament indivisibly through consecration.

Moreover, many think that angels, even in a violent place — as the demons in hell — operate more or less, according as they are more or less bound and prevented from operating here or there; for if those who are in the air, and are tormented by the fire of hell, are nonetheless permitted to operate, why not those existing in hell? But what do they do there?

They act upon others, tormenting one another; they act upon the souls of the reprobate, tormenting them, as instruments of divine justice.

From the preceding doctrine you will gather: 1° that an angel can be at once in several inadequate places, even distant ones, within the sphere of its activity, without existing in the middle — for example, in the four corners of a hall, without existing in the middle — because it can operate in the four corners without operating in the middle.

You will gather 2° that, if we speak strictly, an angel is not properly in a place, but only improperly so; because, speaking strictly and philosophically, only that place is properly called a place which circumscriptively contains the thing located — which does not befit angels, who are in a place rather by containing and subjecting the place to themselves through operation, than by being contained by it. If, however, we speak generally of place, so that whatever is really and substantially present to a place is said to be in that place, then angels are truly and properly in a place. Whence the author rightly observed that to be in a place is said equivocally of an angel and of a body³.

You will gather 3° that angels can be moved locally, namely in the same manner in which they are in a place⁴; because the local motion of angels is nothing other than the diverse contacts of diverse places, not at once, but successively. But since angels are not everywhere, they can touch diverse places successively. Therefore they can be moved locally. And Scripture openly teaches this. Thus Matt., XXVIII, 2: An angel of the Lord descended from heaven. Luke, I, 11: The angel Gabriel was sent to the virgin. Matt., IV, 11: Angels came and ministered to him. Job, I, 7 and II, 2, Satan says: I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it, and elsewhere many times.

You will gather 4° that an angel can pass by a discrete motion from one extreme to another, without passing through the middle⁵. Here

the imagination resists, because it does not transcend the continuum, and does not apprehend spiritual things except after the manner of bodily ones. Let the imagination, therefore, be dismissed, and let reason alone be heeded. But reason teaches that, since an angel is in a place through a free operation, which does not depend on the place, but makes the place depend on itself, it can operate in one place — say, at one end of this hall — and immediately operate at the opposite end, without operating in the middle, and thus pass from one extremity to the other, without passing through the middle.

St. Thomas, from q. 54 to q. 60.

You will ask 1° whether angels need species, for knowing themselves and other things besides themselves.

I answer 1°. The angel, for knowing itself, does not need an impressed species, but knows itself through its own substance, which takes the place of an impressed species, not of an expressed one¹.

Proof of the first part. The impressed species, a substitute for the object, is not necessary, except so that the object, which is outside the intellect, may become intimately present to it, and that which is material may become immaterial with an immateriality of the same order as the intellect that understands; for if the object is of itself intimately present to the intellect in intelligible being, the species is superfluous, as I said at length in the treatise on God, dissertation on the vision of God. But the substance of the angel is intimately present to its own intellect, and immaterial with an immateriality of the same order as it, as is clear. Therefore.

Proof of the second part, because, although the substance of the angel is in itself intelligible, since it is immaterial, it is not, however, in so great a degree of immateriality as to be actually understood², as we said of the essence of God in the treatise on God, dissertation 4. Hence for this an expressed species is required.

I answer 2°. The angel does not know things other than itself through its own substance, but for this it needs impressed species³.

Proof. For the cognition of any object it is required, as has already been said, that the object be intimately present to the intellect in intelligible being, either through itself, or through a species representative of it, according to that commonly received saying of Augustine: « From the object and the power, knowledge is born. » But created beings cannot be intimately present to the angelic intellect through themselves, that is, in their own entity, as is clear of itself. Nor can the substance of the angel be a representative species of them: for it is neither their likeness, nor their effect, nor at least their adequate cause; for although angels concur toward certain forms, it is not, however, immediately nor adequately, but only through local motion, by applying active things to passive things. Therefore, however much they may penetrate their own substance, they cannot in it, as in a cause, distinctly know other beings: since, as these are not contained in it adequately and distinctly, neither can they shine forth in it.

You will ask 2° whether the species by which the angel knows things other than itself are received from things, or innate and connatural.

I answer. The species of angels are not received from things, but implanted by God at their creation, and therefore connatural and innate⁴.

Proof 1°, from authority. Ezech., XXVIII, 12 and 13, it is said of Lucifer: Thou wast the seal of resemblance, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty..., in the day that thou wast created. Dionys., de Div. nom., c. 7: « Angels do not gather divine knowledge from divisible or sensible things. » And Aug., book II on Genes. ad litt., c. 8, n. 16: « The other things which are below [the Angels] are so created, that they first come to be in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own genus. » This can be understood only of creation in intelligible being, which they have through species.

Proof 2°, from reason⁵. The lower spiritual substances, namely human souls, have being akin to body, inasmuch as they are the forms of bodies, and therefore from this very mode of being it belongs to them that they attain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. Therefore angels, since they are wholly and immaterially absolved from bodies and subsist in intelligible being, do not attain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, but through an intelligible influx by which they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.

It is confirmed. An exterior material object cannot naturally act immediately upon a purely spiritual power, moving it and impressing upon it its own species. Nor can it be said that the exterior material object would not act upon the angel, but that the angel would act upon it, abstracting species from it; because, if the angel did not already have the species of those material objects beforehand, they would be unknown to it, and consequently it could not apply its power to them, nor operate upon them, so as to abstract species from them. Likewise, angels often know objects outside the sphere of their activity, upon which they therefore cannot operate. Finally, if the angel had its perfection from bodies, as our soul does, it would depend on them: which cannot be said.

The argument that is objected concerning the knowledge of future things will be resolved below.

You will ask 3° whether the species by which angels understand are universal, and the more universal, the higher the angels are.

By universal species we understand those that represent many things, and the more universal, the more things they represent, not only in general, but in particular and distinctly.

I answer affirmatively⁶. Because the more a created being is nearer and more like God in the intellectual order, the fewer and more universal are the species by which it understands. But angels

are nearer and more like God in the intellectual order than men are, and the higher angels more than the lower. Therefore. — The minor is certain. — Proof of the major. The more a created being is nearer and more like God in the intellectual order, the more it participates the divine perfections in that order. But God's perfection is that he understands all things through one medium, namely through his own essence, which is to him in place of a species. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether angels know material singulars. I answer affirmatively⁷. It is of faith.

Proof from Scripture. 1° No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to that of Psal. XC, 11: He hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. 2° According to the faith, these lower things are administered through angels, according to that of Hebr., I, 14: All are ministering spirits. But, if they did not have knowledge of singulars, they could have no providence over the things that are done in this world, since acts belong to singulars. Therefore.

The reason, however, is sought from the principle of Augustine commonly received, namely that God from eternity formed the ideas of the things to be produced, then impressed them upon the angelic mind, and at length produced them outwardly, so that the angelic species are derived and exemplified from the divine ideas. This being laid down, I thus reason with the author⁸: The ideal notions existing in God are effective of things, not only as to form, but also as to matter, and therefore they are likenesses of things as to both; and on this account things are known by God, not only in their universal nature on the part of form, but also in their singularity on the part of matter. But as natural things flow forth from the divine intellect according to matter and form, so as to be composed of both, so the forms or species of the angelic intellect flow forth for the knowing of both. And therefore through innate forms or species they know things in their singularity and universality, inasmuch as they are like the active forms, namely the ideas existing in the divine mind, although they themselves are not productive of things.

You will ask 5° whether angels know with certainty, by natural light, future things that are merely contingent, such as the free acts of man.

I answer. Negatively⁹.

Proof 1°, from the authority of Scripture and the Fathers. That which is a proper sign of divinity does not belong to angels. But to know future contingents is a proper sign of divinity. Therefore. — Proof of the minor 1°, from Scripture. Isa., XLI, 23: Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.

Proof 2°, from reason¹⁰. Future contingents cannot be known with certainty by angels, either in their causes, or in themselves. Not in their created causes, because these are contingent and indifferent to either alternative; nor in the uncreated cause, namely the free decree of God, which is by nature impervious to every created intellect. Not in themselves; for the reason God knows them with certainty in themselves is that he sees all things in his eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and encompasses it; hence his one glance is borne upon all things that are done throughout the whole of time, as though present, and he sees all things as they are in themselves, as we said concerning the knowledge of God, at q. 14. But the angelic intellect, and any created intellect whatever, falls short of the divine eternity. Therefore.

You will say: Angels have the species of future things before they come to be; for when future things become present, angels do not receive new species for knowing them, but know them through their innate ones, as we have said. But, once the species is given and the intellect is unimpeded, sufficient principles are posited for understanding the object. Therefore there is no reason why the knowledge of future things should be denied to angels. — It is confirmed. The truth of those future things, taken determinately, is something created. Therefore it is proportioned to some created intellect; why not to the angelic intellect, as the most perfect among created things?

I answer to this argument, which contains the height of the difficulty, from the author¹¹, that the angelic species are indeed representative in first act of all singulars, yet they do not represent them in second act, except while they exist; and this for a twofold reason. The first is that only when things exist do they have the nature by which they are assimilated to the species that are in the angel's mind; but while they are future, they do not yet have the nature by which they are assimilated to them. The second reason is that the angelic species does not represent in act, nor does the angel naturally know in act, except what in fact pertains to this universe. For the angel's knowledge is finite, and no more fitting boundary can be assigned to it than the breadth of this universe; and besides, if it were extended beyond the universe, since there would be no reason why it should be extended to one thing rather than another, it would attain all possible things, at least divisively. Moreover, outside this universe there is no cause except God; but for no created intellect is it connatural to know things in God. Furthermore, future things do not yet belong to the order of this universe, but will belong to it when they exist.

But these things are rooted in a higher principle of Sts. Augustine and Thomas, of which we have already spoken, namely that the angelic species do not represent the natures of things in just any way whatever, but according as those natures themselves descend and are derived from the divine ideas, from which the species themselves are also derived and exemplified; hence the angelic species, as has been said, have in representing what the divine ideas have in causing. Now the divine ideas cause natures in individuals successively. Therefore the species themselves, which are derived from these ideas, receive the power of representing natures in individuals successively, and thus they are apt to represent individuals when they are produced in the universe by the divine ideas themselves, not when they are not.

You will ask 6° whether angels naturally know the thoughts or secrets of hearts.

By the thoughts of hearts we here understand¹² the free immanent acts, both of intellect and of will, which are manifested neither by any exterior effect or sign, nor by the very will of the one thinking.

I answer. Negatively.

Proof 1°, from authority¹³. What is proper to God does not belong to angels. But to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor, from Scripture. Ⅱ Paralip., VI, 30, it is said: Be merciful, and render to every man according to his ways, which thou knowest him to have in his heart; for thou alone knowest the hearts of the children of men.

Proof 2°, from reason¹⁴. Things which depend on the free will of man alone and on God, apart from any dependence on natural causes or connection with them, are not naturally knowable by angels, but only by the one willing himself, and by God, to whom the will is subject. But the free acts of the will and intellect depend on the will alone and on God alone, apart from any dependence on natural causes or connection with them. Therefore. — The minor is certain. For no created cause, but God alone, who is the first and universal principle, and the last end of our will, can flow into it and act upon it and determine it, as has already been said; and this is clear, because the will itself has full dominion, absolute from every creature, and full indifference as to its own acts, so that it may posit them or not posit them, may revoke or continue those already posited. — Proof of the major. The angel does not have a natural power of understanding whatever is intelligible, but only that which pertains to the order of this universe, either as a part of it, or as having a connection with it. But the free internal act does not pertain to the order of this universe, nor does it have any connection with it. Therefore. — The major is clear from what was said in the preceding answer. — Proof of the minor. The order of the universe consists in the subordination and connection of natural causes, by which particulars are acted upon and ruled through universals, corporeal things through spiritual, and lower things through higher; hence, in order that something may pertain to the order of the universe, it must either be a higher cause suited by nature to move lower things, or depend upon them. But the free internal act is outside the whole order of natural causes, so that it depends on none of them, but only on the will freely and indifferently eliciting it, and on God alone determining it, as has already been said. Therefore.

You will say: By the sole consent of the one thinking, his thought becomes able to be made manifest to an angel, as is commonly admitted. But the consent of the one thinking adds nothing to the knowability of his thought, but only an extrinsic denomination. Therefore before that consent it was knowable by the angel.

I answer that, although the consent of the one thinking adds nothing directly to the knowability of his thought, it nevertheless adds something indirectly, inasmuch as it makes his thought in some way pertain to the one to whom he directs it. But the angel knows whatever pertains to himself.

You will ask 7° whether angels naturally know the mysteries of grace.

I answer negatively¹⁵. This is clear from the preceding answer. For if the angel cannot know the thoughts of another that depend on his will, much less can he know those things that depend on the will of God alone. And thus the Apostle argues, I Cor., II, 11: For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So also the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.

You will ask 8° whether the angel is always understanding in act.

I answer that the angel necessarily always understands himself in act¹⁶.

Proof. The angel understands himself through his own substance, as through an intelligible species, as has been said. But his own substance is always intimately present to his intellect, and always informs it in intelligible being. Therefore he always necessarily understands it in act; just as, if an eye

kept open were continuously informed by the species of some illuminated object, it would always necessarily see it.

You will ask 9° whether the angel is properly and formally discursive.

I answer. Negatively¹⁷.

Proof. To reason discursively, properly and formally, is to know one thing that is less known from another that is more known, by distinct acts of cognition, such that one prior cognition is the cause of the other, or such that from the prior cognition of one the cognition of the other is brought forth, as happens in us, who, on account of the weakness of our intellectual light, cannot know at once and at the same time the principles and the conclusions included in them. But angels do not know in this way; rather, on account of the fullness of their intellectual light and the universality of their species, they immediately, at first and in a single glance, attain the whole power of the principles, and consequently what is contained in them and can be deduced from them: and therefore they are called intelligences. Therefore.

As to the will,

You will ask whether the angel loves himself and God necessarily as to exercise.

I answer 1°. It seems more probable that the angel loves himself necessarily as to exercise.

Proof 1°. The angel knows himself necessarily as to exercise, as has been said above. Therefore he necessarily wills to know himself; for although this knowledge is necessary, it is nevertheless voluntary. — I subsume. But to will to know oneself is to love oneself; for it is to will a good to oneself, since it is a good for the angel that he know himself.

Proof 2°. Every motion is reduced to some motion determined by nature, just as in an animal all motions are reduced to the motion of the heart, which flows from the animal's nature as its inseparable property. Therefore in the angel, just as every act of understanding is reduced to the knowledge of self, as to the first cognition determined by nature, so all his love is reduced to the love of self, as to the first

love determined by nature; for understanding and willing proceed at an equal pace, and are causes of one another in a different genus.

We do not, therefore, derive this necessary love from the substance of the angel as from an object, as the defenders of the opposite opinion suppose; for we admit that no object, except the universal and infinite good, namely God clearly seen, can fill the capacity of our will and necessarily seize it. But we derive it from the angel's own substance as from a principle from which it flows as a property. And hence the chief objections that are raised are resolved.

I answer 2°. The angel loves God with a love necessary as to exercise.

This follows from the preceding; because it is impossible that the angel love himself with a love necessary as to exercise, without at the same time, and with the same necessity, loving the author and preserver of himself as a good proper to himself.

But immediately a difficulty arises. The angel loves himself after sin with the very same necessity with which he loves himself before sin; for the reasons of the first answer hold good for every state. If, then, from the necessary love of self as to exercise there necessarily follows a necessary love of God as to exercise, it follows that the angel, after sin and in the actual state of sin, loves God with a love necessary as to exercise. But how can an actual love of God stand together with an actual hatred of him, an actual turning toward him with an actual turning away from him? Nor may you say that in sin there is an actual aversion from God only as supernatural author, which can stand together with an actual turning to God as natural author; for on the contrary, while the angel sins directly against God as supernatural author, he sins indirectly against him as natural author, as we shall say below. He is, therefore, actually turned away by sin from God as natural author, and at the same time turned toward God as natural author by a necessary love.

I answer briefly, that the demons hold God in hatred as supernatural author and just avenger of their crime,

but that they love him as natural author, and are turned toward God as natural author physically and necessarily by nature, but are turned away from him morally and freely by sin: in which there is no contradiction, because these are not predicated of the same thing under the same aspect and in the same manner.

D. Thomas, q. 62

You will ask 1° whether the angels were blessed in their creation.

I answer 1°. The angels were created in natural beatitude¹; because natural beatitude, which is not beatitude simply speaking, but only in a certain respect, consists in the perfect knowledge and love of God as natural author. But the angels had both from the beginning of their creation, as was proved in the preceding article.

If you say, that from this it follows that demons are even now blessed with natural beatitude, because in them there remains a perfect knowledge and love of God as natural author, I deny the inference; because that knowledge and love of God as author of nature is not to be called beatitude in a certain respect, except insofar as it preserves the perfect subordination owed to God as natural author. Now, the evil angels were disordered by sin from God as author of nature; because by sinning directly against God as supernatural author, they sinned indirectly against him as natural author, as we shall say below.

I answer 2°. The angels were not created in supernatural beatitude²; because supernatural beatitude is not something of nature, but the end of nature. But the end is not had at once from the beginning. Therefore. — It is confirmed. Of the nature of perfect and supernatural beatitude is stability, that is, unlosability and confirmation in good. But the angels, as soon as they were created, were not stable and confirmed in good, which the fall of some shows. Therefore.

You will ask 2° whether the angel needed actual grace in order to turn himself to God as the object of supernatural beatitude.

I answer affirmatively³. Because no will can be borne toward that which is above its nature and the powers of nature, unless it is aided by some other supernatural principle, which is called the help of grace; because the natural inclination of the will is only toward that which is fitting according to its nature. But God, as he is the object of supernatural beatitude, is above every created nature and the powers of nature. Therefore.

But that this grace was efficacious of itself, and not merely sufficient, we shall prove against the Jansenists and Molinists in the treatise de Gratia.

You will ask 3° whether the angels were created in sanctifying grace.

I answer 1°. It seems certain that all the angels had sanctifying grace before they arrived at the term of beatitude or damnation.

Proof. The good angels merited beatitude. But the principle of merit is sanctifying grace: The evil one stood not in the truth, Ioann., VIII, 44. But to stand in the truth is to remain in justice and holiness, as Chrysostom interprets, Hom. 53 in Ioann. and St. Leo, Serm. 10 de Quadrag. Likewise, they kept not their principality, in the epistle of Iudae, 6. But by the name of principality is understood the excellence of grace. Hence Jerome, on chapter III of Oseae, says: « The demons, having fallen from their own dignity and possessing nothing of their ancient grace, are greedy. »

It is confirmed. What was granted to the first man ought not to be denied to the angel. But the first man, before he sinned, had been endowed with sanctifying grace, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. V, can. 1.

I answer 2°. It is more probable that the angels received sanctifying grace in their creation⁴.

Proof, 1°, from the Fathers. Augustine, book XII de Civit., c. 9: « Who made a good will in the angels, he says, but he who created them with a good will, that is, with a chaste love by which they might cling to him, at once both founding their nature and bestowing grace upon them? » Basil, on Psal. xxxi: « In their first constitution, and as it were in the very mass of their own substance, they had implanted in them one holiness. »

Proof from a fitting reason⁵. According to Augustine, book VIII super Genes. ad litt., c. 3, n. 6, God, in the creation of corporeal nature, implanted in all things the seminal reasons of their natural effects, as is evident in animals, plants, etc. Therefore it is likely that he also implanted in the angels, elevated to the supernatural order, at their creation the seminal reasons of their supernatural effects. — I subsume. But sanctifying grace is the seed of all supernatural acts and gifts, even of supernatural beatitude itself; whence it is called, I Ioann., III, 9, the seed of God. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether the angels obtained grace and glory according to the quantity of their natural endowments.

I answer. The angels received the supernatural gifts of grace and glory according to the quantity of their natural perfections⁶, so that the more perfect and superior they were in nature, the more grace and glory they received: not, however, as though the natural perfections of the angels were dispositions toward grace and glory — that is Pelagian — but because God, gratuitously and from mere good pleasure, willed to preserve a certain proportion between the natural endowments of the angels and his supernatural gifts, granting greater grace to those more perfect in natural endowments, and lesser to those less perfect: which he did not observe in man.

With the author in this part, theologians commonly hold, and before them the holy Fathers. Basil, de Spiritu sancto, c. 16,

says: « The powers of the heavens have from the Holy Spirit the measure of sanctification, according to the portion by which they surpass one another. » Damascene, book II de Fide orthod., c. 3: « Through the Word all the angels were created, and through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit they received all the numbers of perfection; yet in such a way that each, according to his own dignity and class, is a partaker of light and grace. »

This indeed can be demonstrated by no reason, since it depends solely on the will of God, to whom it was thus pleasing to dispose concerning the angels, and not concerning men.

There is, however, a fitting reason⁷. God, through his wisdom, established diverse degrees in angelic nature. But just as he ordained that very nature toward attaining grace and natural beatitude, so it is likely that he ordained the diverse degrees of angelic nature toward diverse degrees of grace and glory: just as, if a builder polishes stones for building a house, from the very fact that he fits some more beautifully and fittingly, he seems to ordain them for a more honored part of the house. Therefore it thus seems that God ordained the angels whom he made of a higher and more perfect nature toward greater gifts of graces and a fuller beatitude.

You will ask, 5° whether the angels merited their supernatural beatitude.

I answer affirmatively⁸; because beatitude is the reward of virtue, which ought to be conferred on account of virtuous works, which are merits. Add that it is more noble to have it thus through merits, than by a gratuitous title.

You will ask, 6° how the angels merited their supernatural beatitude: whether through works subsequent to it, or concomitant, or preceding it?

I answer that they merited it through works preceding it in time⁹; because that manner of meriting glory is the most connatural of all. For merit stands to reward as the way to the term, and cause to effect. Therefore it is to be attributed to the angels.

You will ask, 7° whether the angel had beatitude immediately after one perfectly meritorious act.

I answer affirmatively¹⁰.

For the explanation and proof of this response, it must be observed that the act of charity which the angels elicited in the instant of their creation was not free as to specification, but only as to exercise: because they did not move themselves toward it, since before this they were not in act, but were moved by God specially moving them, and therefore under the aspect of good only; for otherwise God does not move specially. But after, through this prior act, they were in act, and thence were able to move themselves, out of their own full deliberation, toward the object under indifference, so that they could choose good or evil, and thus had freedom even as to specification; the evil ones broke forth into sin, the good stood fast in good, with perfect freedom both as to specification and as to exercise.

We say, therefore, that immediately after this fully meritorious act, and not after the first, the angels received beatitude. Because, although freedom as to specification with respect to good and evil is not absolutely required for merit, and therefore we admit that through an act necessary as to specification the angels merited beatitude; nevertheless it is reasonably deferred, in a nature capable of sin, that the conferring of the reward wait until a fully perfect merit has preceded, proceeding from one's own deliberation and perfect freedom, both as to specification and as to exercise, so that he who was able to do evil and did not may thus be rewarded and crowned. And it is of this fully free act that the response is to be understood.

You will ask, 8° in how many instants the way of the angels was completed.

For the resolution of this question, note that, since the angel is above the time of corporeal things, diverse instants, in those things which pertain to angels, are taken only according to succession in their acts, so that there are as many

instants of angelic time as there are diverse operations of theirs, whether according to substance, or according to intrinsic mode, not coexisting, but succeeding one another; because, if they existed at once, however diverse, they would not constitute time, of whose nature is before and after, but would be measured by a single instant. Whence it can also happen that one angelic instant corresponds to several instants of our time, if indeed it continues the same operation for some while.

To ask, therefore, in how many instants the way of the angels was completed, is to ask how many intrinsically diverse actions they successively elicited from the first instant of their creation up to the term of damnation or glorification inclusively, that is, including also the instant in which they were either damned or glorified.

I answer 1°. The way of the evil angels was completed in three instants. This is the common opinion.

Proof. There are as many instants in the angels as there are in them distinct operations succeeding one another. But by three distinct operations succeeding one another, the evil angels completed their way: 1° they merited, like the good angels, through conversion to God; 2° they sinned; 3° they received the punishment of sin against their will. But that this last operation is distinct from the second, and cannot be simultaneous with it, is evident, because no one can be affected at once with the greatest delight and the greatest sorrow, nor be at once in the way and outside the way. But the angel, in the instant of sin, was affected with the greatest delight and complacency in his own perfection, and was in the way; in the instant of damnation he was affected with the greatest sorrow, and was outside the way. Therefore.

I answer 2°. As to the way of the good angels, theologians are divided, even the Thomists. Some hold that it was completed in three instants, like the way of the evil angels, because in the former, as in the latter, there were three distinct operations succeeding one another up to the term of glorification inclusively, namely: 1° there was in them, in the instant of creation, an act of charity free as to exercise, not as to specification, common to the good and the evil; 2° afterward there was an act of charity perfectly free as to specification and as to exercise; 3° finally, the attainment of glory. Others hold that it was completed in two instants, because they hold that the second act is not distinct from the first, but is the first continued. Either is probable, but the question is not of such moment as to detain us long.

You will ask 9° how long each of these two or three instants lasted, by correspondence to our time.

I answer. The first instant, in which the good and evil angels merited imperfectly, lasted a single instant of our time; because that instant was the instant of creation, wholly indivisible, and after it, perfect freedom having been attained, the good merited perfectly, the evil sinned, and thence became unbendable, these in evil, those in good.

The second instant, in which the good angels merited perfectly and the evil ones sinned, corresponds to a portion of our time, because in our time, after an instant, a portion follows. But how long did this time last? It is uncertain. This alone is established, that the evil angels were damned before the fall of Adam, since indeed one of them, under the guise of a serpent, tempted Eve.

The third instant, in which the good were first glorified, and the evil damned, coexists with an instant of our time; because the actions of God do not depend on time, but are instantaneous. But as to permanence, both — glorification as well as damnation — are measured by a participated eternity.

St. Thomas, q. 63.

You will ask 1° how the angels sinned.

That the angels sinned is certain by faith. For it is said, Job, IV, 18: In his angels he found wickedness. But the difficulty is how an angel sinned, or could have sinned.

I answer that the angel sinned from ignorance or error — not taken specially and strictly for the assent by which someone assents to something false as true, or for the speculative judgment by which someone judges evil to be good; but from error or ignorance taken generally, for an actual inconsideration by which someone does not attend to, nor actually and practically consider, what he could and ought to have considered. The angel therefore did not err by judging something to be good which is not good, but by not considering the higher good to which his own good ought to have been referred. For the angelic intellect proposed to the will its own excellence as good and to be loved, and in this there was no error; but it did not propose it, as it could and ought to have, as to be loved with subjection to the divine rule, and with order to God as its author and supernatural end: in which there is a defect of actual practical consideration, and hence an ignorance or error which is called that of a wrong choice. Now while the angel loved this excellence thus proposed, without subjection and order to God as his supernatural end, he sinned.

You will ask 2° what was the first sin of the angels.

I answer that it was pride¹.

Proof from Scripture. Tob., IV, 14, it is said: In it (pride) all ruin took its beginning. Eccli., X, 15: Pride is the beginning of all sin. Isa., XIV, 12 and 13, it is said of the devil under the figure of the king of Babylon: How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer..., who saidst in thy heart: I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God. And Ezech., XXVIII, 17, under the figure of the king of Tyre, it is said of the same Lucifer: Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty. This will be further evident from the following answer.

You will ask 3° concerning what object the angel was first proud.

I answer. The object concerning which the angel first was proud was both beatitudes, natural as well as supernatural², inasmuch as he desired to remain in natural beatitude, delighting in it as in a perfection and excellence

owed to him by nature, and by which he would uniquely surpass other creatures, and by refusing supernatural beatitude, inasmuch as it was to be obtained through the special grace of God, and was to be common to men inferior to him. And in this he sought a likeness to God, seeking to have in his own domain a singular beatitude owed to him by connatural right, and not from grace and as it were on sufferance: which is proper to God.

Now it must be observed that two acts of pride are not to be distinguished here, one concerning natural beatitude, the other concerning supernatural beatitude; but there is one act and one pride, choosing rather to remain in his own private beatitude, because it was singular and owed to him connaturally by the right of creation, than to have the supernatural beatitude common to others inferior to him, and from the grace of God, as it were on sufferance — which, however, he would not have refused, if he could have had it by the power of nature without grace, and as his own, not to be shared with others: all of which belongs to pride, and is proper to the proud, who prefer to remain in a lower degree than to be raised to a higher one by the help of others.

Proof of the answer from the Fathers. Gregory, bk. XXXIV Moral., ch. 17, says that «the angels lost their participated loftiness, because they desired a private one.» Augustine, bk. XII de Civit., ch. 1: «The evil angels, delighted with their own power, as though they were their own good to themselves, flowed away from the higher good, common to all and beatifying, to what was their own.» Bernard, serm. 17 in Cant., n. 5, speaking of the evil angel: «He contrived to have subjects (namely, men), disdaining companions. They are weaker, he says, and inferior in nature; it is not fitting that they be fellow-citizens, nor equals in glory.» St. Thomas expressly teaches the same here, a. 3, o. Add that a more fitting object for the first pride of the angels cannot be assigned than their last end, both natural and supernatural, inordinately desired.

You will ask 4° whether an angel could have sinned in the instant of his creation.

I answer in the negative³; because the first act of the will in the ange-

-ls, although it was from the eliciting will, was nevertheless from God specially moving and applying it. Therefore it could not have been sinful; for God is not a defective principle, and otherwise the sin would be traced back to him. — Proof of the antecedent. An operation which begins with the being of the thing and is the principle of the rest, such as is the first act of the will in the angels, is from that from which the nature is: thus the motion of the heart in an animal, and the upward motion in fire, are from the generator. But the nature of the angel is from God. Therefore.

Nor does it stand in the way that in the first instant of his creation he could have merited, and indeed did merit: because for merit the freedom of contradiction suffices, which he possessed, as is clear in Christ and in those confirmed in grace; but for sin the freedom of contrariety is required, namely that one be able to do evil and not do it, which freedom the angel then lacked.

St. Thomas, q. 64.

You will ask 1° whether the demons are blinded?

Blindness is the privation of the knowledge of truth.

I answer. Natural speculative knowledge of the demons in physical being has not been taken away, nor diminished¹, because it follows upon the very nature of the angel, who according to nature is intellect or mind. Hence it is commonly said, from Dionysius, c. 4, de Divin. nomin., that « the natural gifts remain whole in them. »

Supernatural speculative knowledge has not been totally taken away in them, but diminished²; because only as much is revealed to them of the divine decrees as is fitting, either through the mediation of the good angels, or through certain temporal effects of the divine power.

But of supernatural affective and effective knowledge producing the love of God they are totally deprived, as also of charity³, because they have no good affection toward God, or toward anything in relation to God.

You will ask 2° whether the demons are obstinate in evil.

I answer in the affirmative⁴. This is clear from Scripture. Psal., lxxiii, 23, it is said: The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually. If it always ascends, it never ceases. Psal., vi, 6: But in hell who shall confess to thee? Eccles., ix, 10: Neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge shall be in hell. Ioann., ix, 4: The night cometh, when no man can work. And to the Galat., vi, 10: Whilst we have time, let us work good.

You will ask 3° whence this obstinacy of the demons in evil arises.

I answer that a twofold cause is assigned⁵: one extrinsic, on the part of God denying grace; the other intrinsic, on the part of the created will immovably adhering to sin.

The reason for the first cause is taken from the state of damnation, as it is common to angels and men. For it is the state of the ultimate term, the state of the greatest misery, and the state of retribution according to the rigor of justice. Insofar as it is the state of the ultimate term, it requires the lack of the help that directs to the term. Insofar as it is the state of the greatest misery, where there is no order, but everlasting horror dwelleth, Iob, x, 22, and where there shall be neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge, Eccles., ix, 4, it requires the lack of every help ordering to good and to reason. Insofar finally as it is the state of rigorous justice, it requires that he who in the way cast away the grace by which he would order himself to his due end, once placed in the term, be deprived of it.

A difficulty occurs, however. How do the damned sin in that state? For they cannot do good without sufficient help. But he who cannot do good does not sin by not doing it; because for sinning it is required

that someone be able to do, and not do, what is commanded by law.

I answer that the damned sin in that state of damnation and obstinacy, because they incurred it of their own free will⁶: yet in such a way that by a sin of this kind they incur no further demerit, and that its whole malice is to be referred to the preceding fault by which they freely fell into the present necessity; just as happens in the case of a drunkard blaspheming, whose malice of blasphemy is referred to the will by which he freely made himself drunk.

The reason for the second cause is this⁷: because the angel, according to his connatural manner of proceeding, adheres immovably to the end to which he once determined himself by a certain judgment and perfect deliberation. This is proved. The dictate or judgment, certain and complete, formed by the angel — such as it was when he deliberated about his ultimate end, given his connatural manner of proceeding — is irrevocable and irreformable. Therefore the will, regulated by such a judgment, is likewise irrevocable and irreformable. — The consequence is clear, because the appetitive power in all things is proportioned to the apprehensive power by which it is regulated. Hence it is commonly said that the will is not borne except toward what is known, and in the manner in which it is known. — Proof of the antecedent. The angel does not reason discursively, as we said above, but by one and the same intuition comprehensively knows principles and conclusions, the end and the means, that is, by one and the same indivisible act he knows all things that can have agreement or disagreement, whether necessarily or contingently, with the principles or with the end. Therefore he apprehends immovably and irrevocably. — Proof of the consequence. This is why we apprehend first principles immovably and irrevocably, e.g., « anything either is or is not, » but conclusions changeably and revocably, because we apprehend first principles by one intuition and without discourse, but conclusions through discourse, in which there is room for error. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether there is sorrow in the demons.

I answer. Sorrow, insofar as it is a passion (say the same of

love, joy, and the like), cannot exist in the demons⁸; for in this sense it is proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a bodily organ, which the demons lack.

But sorrow, insofar as it is an act of the will, is in them; because sorrow taken in this sense is nothing other than the will's resistance to that which is or is not, namely when the being or not-being of a thing is perceived as disagreeable or as an evil that is one's own and conjoined. For two things are required for sorrow, namely the conjunction of some evil and the perception of this conjunction⁹. But the demons will many things to be which are not, and not to be which are, and they perceive these as evils that are their own and conjoined: thus, for example, they will to be blessed, to excel over all, to be adored by all, that all men be damned, etc.; they will not to be held fast, not to be punished by fire, not to be expelled from bodies, not to be sent into hell, etc. Therefore.

You will ask 5° whether the fire of hell is material and corporeal.

I answer in the affirmative¹⁰. This is clear from Scripture, which frequently designates the punishment of the damned by the name of fire, Iudith., XVI, 21; Iob., XX, 26; Isa., XXXIII, 14; more clearly Matth., V, 29 and 30, VII, 19, XIII, 30, XXV, 41. Nor does any reason compel us to understand it metaphorically, since if it is understood properly, no inconvenience follows.

Reason also persuades us of this¹¹; because the fire by which the bodies of the damned will be tormented is fittingly held to be corporeal, since a fitting instrument for tormenting bodies must be corporeal, nor can a punishment be fittingly adapted to a body except a corporeal one. But, according to Scripture, Matth., XXV, 41, that fire is common to the demons and to the damned men. Therefore.

The holy Fathers also hold this: Basil, Orat. 24; Chrysostom, hom. 44 in Matth.; Augustine, lib. XXI de Civit., c. 9 and 10; Gregory, lib. IV Dialog., and the theologians commonly; so that, although this opinion is not of faith, because the Church

has determined nothing about this matter, it nevertheless seems to be held with certainty. Indeed the Author, in the place cited, Supplem., a. 6, proves that the fire of hell is of the same specific nature as ours; yet that it differs according to certain accidents, namely that it does not need bodily fuel, as ours does, that it is dark, that it burns more sharply, etc.

You will ask 6° how the demons are tormented by the corporeal fire of hell.

I answer. The fire of hell torments the demons insofar as, as an instrument of the divine power, it binds their powers so that they cannot operate, whether internally or externally, according as they will and where they will, and consequently, as to place, so that they are not where they will, and are where they will not, because they are not in a place except through operation, as was said before¹². So it is commonly held, with the Author, not only by the Thomists, but also by many outsiders.

Proof 1° from Scripture, which explains that punishment of fire by way of binding and detention. Thus in II Petr., II, 4, it is said: God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them, dragged down by ropes of hell, into tartarus, to be tormented. Epist. Iudae, 6: But the angels who kept not their own principality, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness. Apocal., XX, 2 and 3: And he (the angel) laid hold of the dragon, the old serpent, who is the devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years, and cast him into the abyss. Likewise in the Old Testament, Isa., XXIV, 17, 18, 22, and Thren., III, 47.

Proof 2° from the Fathers. Gregory, lib. IV Dialog., c. 29; Julian of Toledo, lib. II Prognosticorum, c. 17; Augustine, lib. XXI de Civit., c. 10, where he says of the demon: « He is so bound by the fire, that receiving punishment from it, he conceives horror from that conjunction. »

Proof 3° from reason. This binding of the demons by fire is possible and fitting. It is possible, because fire does not achieve this by natural power, but by the power of the divine might and justice, of which it is the instrument, whether physical, as the

Thomists hold, concerning which see the Tract. de Sacram., or moral, as others hold; for either suffices for the conclusion.

It is fitting, because it is proportioned to the fault of the demons, both as to the manner of sinning and as to the gravity of the fault. As to the manner of sinning, because such was the pride of the demons, that they willed so to excel that they were unwilling to be subject even to God himself. Therefore they are fittingly subjected to a most vile corporeal thing, by which, as though imprisoned, they are held and pressed down forever, so that that common saying is verified: « By what things a man sins, by these he shall be punished. »

It is also proportioned as to the gravity of the fault, because it is most afflictive and the bitterest of all punishments. For an evil is the more bitter, the more it is disagreeable to the nature that suffers it; for in this disagreeableness, given its apprehension, lies the very nature of an afflictive evil. But nothing can be conceived more disagreeable to angelic nature than this binding by fire. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. 1° By this binding the demon is subjected, as has already been said, to a most vile thing, as an inferior to a superior, whereas yet it is the dignity and excellence of the demons that, by the law of nature, all corporeal things ought to be subject to them. 2° The powers of the demons are bound, both in relation to themselves, so that they cannot understand the many things they would wish, and on the contrary are compelled to think of many things they would not wish, and externally, in relation to place, because they are hindered from operating where they would wish, and are compelled to operate where they would not wish, and consequently are hindered from being where they would wish, and are held where they would not wish, as though in a narrow prison; because, as has been said, they are in a place through operation. But the nature of the demons is most active, and the more so, the more subtle and perfect it is. Therefore the binding by which they are hindered from acting as they will is most repugnant and violent to them, and hence the sorrow is the bitterest of all, since from repugnance and violence the bitterness of sorrow is born, as we have said.

You will ask 7° whether the demons, besides this binding, suffer no other more bitter punishment from the fire.

I answer that not a few hold that, besides this binding, the demons and separated souls suffer from the fire of hell a sorrow similar to that which the soul united to the body perceives, while the body which it informs is being burned. But other Thomists, and more commonly, rest in the binding alone. For the rest, I see no implication of contradiction why God, through fire as through an instrument of his power, could not torment the demons and separated souls, just as the soul is tormented and tortured while the body which it informs is burned. But whether it is so is uncertain, and to tell the truth, St. Thomas, both here and in the Suppl. cited, where he treats this matter, makes no mention of this manner, but only of the binding.

D. Thomas, qq. 106 et 107.

You will ask 1° whether the angels speak.

I answer in the affirmative¹.

It is evident 1° from Scripture. Isa., VI, 3, it is said: Seraphim cried one to another. Daniel., VIII, 16: And I heard the voice of a man between Ulai, and he called, and said: Gabriel, make this man to understand the vision. In the Epist. canon. Iudae, 9: When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the body of Moses..., he said: The Lord command thee. And the Apostle, I ad Cor., XIII, 1: If I speak with the tongues of men, and of angels.

It is also established by reason; because the angels compose a society or commonwealth which is governed intellectually. But without speech, neither society nor governance can subsist. And this reason holds also for separated souls.

You will ask 2° how the angels speak.

I answer that one angel speaks to another through the ordering or direction of his concepts toward the other².

Proof. To speak to another is nothing other than to manifest a concept of the mind to another. But one angel manifests to another the concept of his mind, by this, that he orders and directs it, as something to be manifested, toward the other. Therefore. — The minor, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in two ways: 1° The angelic concept is manifested by that through which the obstacle by which its manifestation was being hidden and impeded is removed. But, once the said ordering and direction have been posited, an obstacle of this kind is removed. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. In us, the interior concept of the mind is closed off, as it were, by a twofold obstacle: first indeed, by the will itself, which can retain the concept of the mind within, or direct it outward; second, by the grossness of the body, whence it comes about that, when the will orders a concept to be manifested to another, it is not at once known by the other, but a sensible sign must be employed. But this second obstacle does not apply in the angel, and the first ceases through the voluntary direction of the concept to be manifested to another. Therefore.

Proof 2° of the first minor³. The angel, through innate species, without any other impression or action of the object upon him, is by nature such as to understand whatever pertains to him and is placed within the sphere of his natural knowability, otherwise he would not be, by his own nature, perfect in knowable being. But by this, that one angel directs his concept toward another, wishing to manifest and communicate it to him, he brings it about that this concept is among the things pertaining to that other; because he thus wills it to be communicated to him, and to pertain to him, and consequently to be within the sphere of his natural knowability. Therefore, once this direction has been posited, the concept of the one speaking is manifested to him.

You will ask 3° whether an angel can speak to another at any distance whatever.

I answer in the affirmative⁴. It is evident 1° from Scripture. Luc., XVI, 24, where the rich feaster, placed in hell, was speaking to Abraham, who was in the limbo of the Fathers. 2° by reason, because angelic speech consists in

an intellectual operation. But intellectual operation is entirely independent of place and time; for even our own intellectual operation is through abstraction from the here and now, except accidentally, on the part of the phantasms. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether the higher angels illumine the lower. I answer in the affirmative⁵.

Proof. To illumine is nothing other than to manifest the truth — not simply (for that is done through speech), but with mastery and teaching, that is, in an artful manner, by disposing and fitting the things to be understood, or the truths, so that by the force of such a disposition the other may be able to perceive them; for then one is, as it were, clarifying and illumining the mind of the other for the perceiving of the truth. But since the higher angels have more universal species, and understand more perfectly, more subtly, and more loftily than the lower, they can divide and unfold these more universal and more perfect concepts, and thus fit them to the understanding of the lower and communicate them to them: this is to illumine. But that they do this is evident, because the more agents are established in the participation of the divine goodness, the more they strive to pour forth their perfections into others, after the likeness of the divine goodness, which communicates itself to all. Therefore the angels, who are in the fullest participation of the divine goodness, impart to their subjects whatever they participate from God.

[You will ask 5° in what illumination and speech differ.

I answer that they differ, 1°, because, as we have already said, illumination takes place by way of mastery and teaching, strengthening the intellect; speech, by the simple manifestation of a concept. And hence, 2°, for illumining it is required that a truth previously unknown be manifested; for speech it suffices that there be a manifestative direction of a concept, whether it concern a thing unknown or known — for angels, like us, can speak of things known; whether it concern matters pertinent or impertinent; whether with the intention of teaching or

of learning, as when angels speak to God, and a disciple to a master⁶. 3° Illumination is the manifestation of a truth as it depends on the first truth, which alone is the light and rule of truth, as if you should say: « Heaven was created by God. » But to speak is to open one's own concept, whether the truth of it depends on God, or on the freedom of a creature, as if you should say: « I wish to do this, or to learn it, » and it can be false. From which you have that every illumination is speech, but not every speech is illumination.

Whence you will conclude that a lower angel does not illumine a higher⁷; because, although a lower angel speaks to a higher, manifesting to him his concepts, he nevertheless does not do this by way of illumination and mastery, by dividing, distinguishing, and fitting his concepts to the capacity of the higher, and strengthening his intellect, since he is of an inferior and more imperfect light.

You will ask 6° whether the good angels illumine the demons.

I answer⁸ that through the holy angels many things concerning the divine mysteries are revealed to the demons, when divine justice requires that certain things be done through the demons, either for the punishment of the wicked, or for the exercise of the good: just as in human affairs the assessors of a judge reveal his sentence to the executioners. Revelations of this kind, however, if they are compared with the angels who reveal them, are illuminations, because they order them to God; but on the part of the demons they are not illuminations, because they do not order them to God, but to the fulfillment of their own iniquity. Now for true illumination it is required that the manifestation of truth be ordered to God, without which there is nothing but darkness.]

St. Thomas, qq. 113 and 114.

You will ask 1° whether men are guarded by angels.

I answer affirmatively.¹ This is of faith, expressed in many places of Scripture. Psal. XC, 11: He hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. Genes., XXXII, 23 and XLVIII, 16; Matth., XVIII, 10; Luc., II, 9; Act., XII, 7, and elsewhere.

It is urged by reason². Man, established in the state of this life, is as it were on a certain road by which he must journey toward his homeland; on which road many dangers threaten man, both from within and from without. Therefore, just as guards are given to men walking along an unsafe road, so too to each man, as long as he is a wayfarer, a guardian angel is assigned. But when he has already reached the end of the road, then he will not have a guardian angel, but will have in the kingdom an angel reigning together with him, or in hell a demon punishing him.

You will ask 2° whether many men are guarded by one angel, or individual men by individual angels.

I answer that individual men are guarded by individual angels from birth.³

The first part is gathered from Act., XII, 15. When the maidservant reported that Peter was standing at the door, the faithful, not believing it to be Peter, said: It is his angel. Whence Jerome, on chapter XVIII of Matth., says: « Great is the dignity of souls, that each one should have, from the very rise of its birth, an angel assigned to its guardianship. »

It is urged by reason⁴. Divine providence, of which the guardianship of angels is a certain execution with regard to men, is concerned principally with those things which remain forever; but it is concerned with the things that pass away insofar as it itself orders them to

everlasting realities. But men are not incorruptible only as regards their common species, as other creatures are, but also as regards the proper forms of each individual, which are rational souls. Therefore the providence of God is related to individual men just as it is related to individual genera or species of corruptible things. — I subsume. But it is probable that different angels are set over different species of things. Therefore it is also reasonable that different angels should be assigned to different men for their guardianship.

The second part is against certain ancients, who said that a guardian angel is given only after Baptism.⁵ And 1° this is expressly asserted by Jerome, as cited. 2° It is proved by reason. The benefits which are provided by God to man insofar as he has a rational nature are shown to him from the very time that, by being born, he receives such a nature. But the guardianship of angels is such a benefit. Therefore.

Besides the Guardian Angels assigned from birth to individual private persons, the Fathers and theologians commonly acknowledge that special ones are moreover assigned to popes, kings, and other public persons and superiors, to direct them in those things which pertain to the government of the multitude committed to them.⁶ Likewise, a special one is also assigned to every nation, kingdom, province, city, diocese, religious order, community, college, confraternity, etc. It is also highly probable that an angel specially assigned is present to every priest celebrating, to assist him in the celebration of so great a mystery, and to offer his prayers and hosts to God.⁷ This is gathered from those words of the Canon of the Mass: « Command these things to be borne by the hands of thy holy angel to thy altar on high, etc. »

You will ask 3° what are the offices of the guardian angels toward us.

I answer 1° To illuminate the intellect, not by infusing species, but by adapting truths to our grasp, or by representing them under the likenesses of sensible things; and thus they instruct and teach, and suggest good thoughts; the will

too they arouse, by urging and exhorting to good, etc. They supply occasions of good, and remove occasions of evil. So it is found in Genes., XVI, 7 and XVIII, 2; Exod., XXIII, 20 seqq.; Iudith, XIII, 20; Tob., VI, 4, XI, 2 seqq., XII, 1 seqq.; Act., V, 19, and elsewhere.

2° — They offer our prayers and vows to God, Tob., III, 25 and XII, 12; Apocal., VIII, 3: not that God may thereby know them, but that they themselves may join their own prayers to our prayers.

3° — They avert external harm, help in dangers, in war, especially in death, put to flight diseases, pestilences, etc., Genes., XLVIII, 16; IV Reg., VI, 17 and XIX, 35; Tob., VI, 4 seqq., and elsewhere.

4° — They keep off and restrain demons, lest they do harm, or lest they do as much harm as they would wish, whether in temporal things or in spiritual things, Tob., VI, 16 seqq. and VIII, 3.

And although we continually receive so many and so great benefits from the guardian angels, we are so ungrateful that we scarcely recall the memory of such distinguished benefactors, whom it would be fitting to honor with special worship and reverence.

You will ask 4° whether guardian angels ever forsake their charges.

I answer that they never forsake them entirely,⁸ but sometimes in part and in a certain respect. The reason is that the guardianship of an angel, as we have said, is a certain execution of divine providence exercised generally with regard to men. But neither man, nor anything else, is entirely withdrawn from divine providence. Therefore. Sometimes, however, an angel does leave his charge in a certain respect, namely insofar as he does not prevent him either from being subjected to some tribulation, or from falling into sin, according to the order of the divine judgments. And in this sense Babylon and the house of Israel are said in the Scriptures to have been forsaken by the angels.

You will ask 5° whether angels grieve over our evils.

I answer negatively,⁹ because grief concerns those things which are against the will. But since angels have their will

conformed in all things to the divine will, nothing can happen against their will. Indeed, they do not will the sins and evils of men in themselves, but they do approve the will of God in permitting and avenging them.

[You will ask 6° from which order the guardian angels are. I answer¹⁰ that the guardian angels of private persons are from the lowest order, because to announce the least things pertains to the angels of the lowest order; and to attend to what concerns the salvation of one private person seems to be something minimal among the offices of angels. But the guardian angels of a multitude, or of those who preside over a multitude, are from other, higher orders, because the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus, then, the guardianship of the human multitude pertains to the Principalities, or perhaps to the Archangels, who are called the princes of the angels. Further, according to St. Gregory, Hom. 34 in Evang., the Virtues have guardianship over all corporeal natures, the Powers have guardianship over the demons, and the Principalities or Dominations have guardianship over good spirits.]

You will ask 7° whether demons assail and tempt men.

I answer affirmatively,¹¹ both because of envy, by which they strive to impede the progress of men, and because of pride, by which they usurp a likeness of divine power, assigning to themselves determinate ministers for the assault and ruin of men, just as God assigns determinate angels for the salvation of men. And this is clear from Genes., III, 1 seqq.; ad Ephes., VI, 11 seqq.; i ad Tim., II, 14; I Petr., V, 8 and 9, and from daily and unhappy experience.

You will ask 8° whether each person has his own evil angel for trial, just as each has a good one for guardianship.

I answer that many think so, following Origen, Hom. 12 in Luc.; Gregory of Nyssa, Tract. de vita Moysis; Cassian, Collat. 8, cap. 17, and St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 11, a. 5, o.

Others deny it: 1° because this opinion has no foundation, neither in Scripture nor in tradition, but rather seems to have arisen from the superstition of the pagans, who assigned two genii to each man; 2° because there are many men incapable of exercise toward virtue, such as children and the insane; 3° because it is not likely that God would permit demons continually to lie in wait for men, who are already, from other causes, quite weak.

To those who are reported to have held the contrary, they answer that Origen abounds in many other errors; that the other Fathers do not agree with Gregory of Nyssa; that the works of Cassian were declared apocryphal by Pope Gelasius; and that St. Thomas, indeed, reports this opinion, but does not approve it.