Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I say first: Several worlds are possible¹.

It is proved. By the creation of one world the infinite power of God has not been exhausted. Therefore.

You say with the Cartesians: The world is indefinitely extended. Therefore several possible worlds do not exist. — Proof of the antecedent. The idea of extension and the idea of matter and of body are one and the same. But extension is indefinite; for if you conceive beyond the visible world, you conceive extension, and consequently you conceive matter and body. Therefore.

I respond. I deny the antecedent. As to the *proof, *I deny the major. For, according to the principles of Descartes, matter, extension, body, and space are one and the same. But, with any given point of eternity determined, in the preceding instant extension is conceived, and therefore matter; with any limit of matter posited, beyond it extension is conceived, consequently matter; finally, with any volition in God of not creating matter posited, extension is always conceived, and therefore matter. Therefore, in this system, matter is eternal, uncreated, and necessarily existing of itself; therefore another god.

I state secondly: the existing world is perfect.

Understand a perfection not essential, as is, for example, in a man consisting of body and soul as essential parts. For the world is not a substantial composite, an aggregate per accidens, but it has accidental perfection, insofar as it is furnished with all things necessary and due to it for its ends, which are two: one proximate, namely, that it be a fitting and useful dwelling for man; the other ultimate, namely, the glory of God. Therefore the perfection of the world must be considered as the perfection of an artifact, for instance of a building, namely according to the parts and their proportion to one another and disposition for attaining the end on account of which it was established. And this perfection, as is clear, does not consist in an indivisible, but admits of latitude. These points having been observed,

The conclusion is proved first from Holy Scripture. Genesis, I, 31: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. Deuteronomy, XXXII, 4: The works of God are perfect.

2° The world is furnished with all things necessary and due to it for attaining its ends, namely the utility of man and the glory of God. Indeed, 1° the natures of which it consists are whole and perfect; for God and nature, as the common adage has it, do not fail in necessary things, nor

abundant in superfluities. 2° There is in it a wondrous variety of things. 3° Most beautiful is the order of the seasons and of the days, and most wise the coordination and subordination among all these things; for non-living things are ordered to living things, vegetative living things to sensitive, sensitive things to man, man to God: so that, if certain things in the world, considered according to themselves, appear less perfect and defective, nevertheless, considered in relation to the harmony of the whole universe, they are good and perfect; just as, although shadows in a picture, considered according to themselves, are defective, nevertheless, considered in relation to the whole picture, whose colors by their aid shine forth more brightly, they are good and useful.

You say: There are many things in the world that argue imperfection. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. First, there are many useless things in the world, as so many individuals for the preservation of species, whereas they could be preserved in fewer: indeed many useless species, as flies, worms, fleas, lice, etc. Second, many things are incongruous and unbecoming, as monsters and sins. Third, many things are harmful, as poisons, unseasonable colds, excessive heats, etc. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I distinguish. There are many useless things, in this sense, that without them the world would still be perfect, I concede; in this sense, that, if they are posited, the world is imperfect, I deny. For since the perfection of the world, as I have said, does not consist in an indivisible, but admits of latitude, there can be in it more things whose presence neither necessarily requires nor whose absence necessarily requires, which, if they exist, nevertheless contribute to its perfection, such as to its enrichment, variety, ornament, and to other ends unknown to us.

To the second proof. Since nature, both in physical things and in moral things, is defectible from this, that it is from nothing, it belongs to the universal provider to permit that it sometimes fail, both lest many goods be lacking if all evils were prevented, and so that the beauty and completeness of opposites may shine forth more, just as a painter permits shadows in a picture, so that the colors may stand out more; and also because God is so powerful that from evil He draws forth good. St. Thomas explains this elegantly here, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2: « Concerning it, however, otherwise

there is a difference between one who has care of some particular thing and the universal provider; for the particular provider excludes defect from that which is subject to his care, as far as he can, but the universal provider permits some defect to occur in some particular thing, lest the good of the whole be impeded. Hence corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be against particular nature, yet they are nevertheless of the intention of universal nature, insofar as the defect of one turns to the good of another, or even of the whole universe; for the corruption of one is the generation of another, through which the species is preserved. Therefore, since God is the universal provider of the whole of being, it pertains to his providence to permit certain defects to exist in certain particular things, lest the perfect good of the universe be impeded. For if all evils were prevented, many goods would be lacking to the universe; for there would not be the life of the lion, if there were not the killing of animals, nor would there be the patience of martyrs, if there were not the persecution of tyrants. Hence Augustine says in Enchiridion, c. 11, n. 3: « God omnipotent would in no way permit any evil to exist in his works, unless he were omnipotent and good to such a degree that he would bring about good even from evil. »

To the third he proves it. Things which are harmful in one respect are useful in another. Thus poisons, when tempered, serve medicine; untimely colds and excessive heats, although per accidens they harm plants, are useful elsewhere to animals, insofar as they purify the air and consume harmful humors, etc.]