Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

(St. Thomas, I Part, from q. 44 to q. 49)

The Gnostics, according to the testimony of St. Epiphanius, Haeres. 25 and 26, denied that the world was created by God. The Manichaeans, from the same, Haeres. 22 and following, and from Augustine, Haeres. 46, maintained two gods independent of themselves, one good, who was the author of the New Testament, of light, of spiritual and incorruptible things; the other evil, who was the author of the Old Testament, of darkness, and of visible and corruptible things.

Plato and Hermogenes, in Tertullian, de Praescript., part I, c. 33, and the Seleucians and Hermians, in St. Augustine, Haeres. 39, said that matter was not produced by God, but is coeternal with Him, from which He produced the visible world.

I say: Every being other than God, which in any way is, is efficiently caused by God¹.

It is of the faith by which we believe, in the Nicene and Constantinopolitan symbols, « in God, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. » And in cap. Firmiter, de summa Trinitate, book I of the Decretals, the Church in the Lateran Council I confesses « that the one God, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, is the one principle of all things, the Creator of all visible and invisible things, spiritual and corporeal. » Hence the First Council of Braga, canon 13, thus defines: « If anyone shall say that the creation of all flesh is not the workmanship of God, but of evil angels, as Manichaeus and Priscillian said: let him be anathema. »

The same is taught by the Vatican Council below, with article III being cited.

It is proved. First, from sacred Scripture. Genesis, I, 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; where under heaven all heavenly things, and under earth all lower things, are contained. Hence, Exodus, XX, 11: In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and all things that are in them; Isaiah, XLIV, 24: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching forth the heavens alone, establishing the earth; Psalm CXLV, 6: Who made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them; John, I, 3: All things were made through him; Romans, XI, 36: From him, and through him, and in him are all things; Acts, XVII, 24: God, who made the world and all things that are in it.

It is proved. Secondly, by reason. Whatever in any way is, is contained virtually and eminently in God. Therefore whatever in any way is, is participated and caused by God. — The consequence is evident; because, if there were some being that were not caused by God, that thing would not be contained virtually and eminently in God. — The antecedent is proved. God thus is

being through essence, so as to comprehend the whole ratio of being, according to its entire breadth and extension; for this is what the notions of pure act, infinite being, and infinitely perfect being import, which belong to God. Therefore everything that in whatever way is, is contained virtually and eminently in God; otherwise God would not contain the whole fullness of being.

You say: The essences of things are eternal, and do not depend on God: thus from eternity and independently of God man is a rational animal. Therefore.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent. The essences of things are eternal and do not depend on God with respect to the connection of predicate and subject, I concede; with respect to actual being, I deny: for this they have from God in time.

Hence you will infer that matter, concerning which the ancient philosophers erred most gravely, as the Angelic Doctor explains², is also produced by God; because, since God, as has been said, is the cause of being insofar as it is being, He is the cause of all things that pertain to the ratio of being. Prime matter, however, pertains to the ratio of corporeal being. For although according to itself it is not being in act, but only through substantial form, without which it is not produced specifically, nevertheless from it and form there comes to be being in act; and therefore, properly speaking, matter is not created, but concreated.

[I say: God is the first exemplar cause of all things¹; because God has the rationes, or ideas and exemplars, of all the things that He produces according to determinate species. For God, since He is an intelligent agent, does not act in a blind manner or by chance. But these ideas or exemplars are really nothing other than the divine essence, as it is participable by creatures in diverse ways, as St. Thomas teaches².

I say secondly: God is the final cause of all things³.

It is of faith. Thus it was defined by the Vatican Council, Constitution on the Catholic Faith, canon 5: « If anyone... shall have denied that the world was created for the glory of God; let him be anathema. »

*It is proved first * from Sacred Scripture. Proverbs, XVI, 4: The Lord has made all things for himself.

*It is proved secondly *by reason. That is the final cause of all things which the first and universal agent intends to communicate to all, and which all things intend, insofar as they can, to attain. But the divine goodness is that which God intends to communicate to all, and which all things intend to attain, by appetite whether rational, or sensible, or natural. Therefore.

— The minor is proved. God, as the first and universal agent and infinitely perfect, does not act for the sake of an end to be acquired, for he does not stand in need of our goods; but he acts for the sake of communicating his perfection, which is his goodness, and every created thing intends its own good and its own perfection, which is a likeness and participation of the divine goodness. Therefore.

Therefore God wills and acts on account of his goodness, not because he desires it, for what is desired is not yet had; but because he loves it perfectly, for love is also of what is present. But from the fact that he perfectly loves his goodness, he wills it to be communicated to others.]

Creation can be taken in a threefold way: 1° broadly, for any production whatsoever of any thing¹: in which sense Eccli., I, 4, it is said of Wisdom that she was created from the beginning; 2° equivocally, for an elevation to a higher grade: in which sense someone is said to be created bishop; 3° strictly, for the production of the whole being from nothing.

For which reason it must be observed that the preposition ex does not import a relation of affirmative causality, as though nothing were the matter of that thing which is produced, as when it is said, “A sword is made from iron;” but it imports the relation of a cause that is denied, so that ex nihilo is the same as non ex aliquo.

And so creation is the emanation of the whole being from the universal cause². For just as a particular emanation is from a particular non-being, as the production of fire from non-fire, so the universal emanation is altogether from non-being, and consequently from nothing.

I say: God produced things in being from nothing, that is, created them ³.

It is de fide; for we say in the Apostles’ Creed: « I believe in one God..., the Creator of heaven and earth. »

In the council Lateran. under Innocent III it is defined that “God created from nothing both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly.”

This definition was renewed more at length and more expressly by the Vatican council, where one reads⁴

The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will and every perfection; who, since he is one singular, altogether simple, and immutable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed as distinct from the world in reality and essence, most blessed in himself and from himself, and ineffably exalted above all things which besides him are and can be conceived.

This one true God, by His goodness and omnipotent power, not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, at once from the beginning of time, created from nothing both kinds of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and thereafter the human, as it were constituted in common from spirit and body.

Canons. — « 1° If anyone shall have denied the one true God, Creator and Lord of visible and invisible things, let him be anathema.

» 2° If anyone should not be ashamed to affirm that there is nothing besides matter, let him be anathema.

» 3° If anyone shall have said that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same, let him be anathema.

» 4° If anyone shall have said that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual things, have emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence by the manifestation or evolution of itself becomes all things; or finally that God is universal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the totality of things distinguished into genera, species, and individuals; let him be anathema.

» 5° If anyone does not confess that the world and all things contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced by God out of nothing according to their whole substance; or shall have said that God created, not by a will free from every necessity, but as necessarily as He necessarily loves Himself; or shall have denied that the world was established for the glory of God; let him be anathema. »

It is proved. First from Sacred Scripture. Genesis, I, 1, says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Judith, XIII, 24: Blessed be the Lord, who created heaven and earth. Ps. CXLVIII, 5: He commanded, and they were created. Wisdom, I, 14: He created all things that they might be. II Maccabees, VII, 28: I beg you, son, to look upon heaven and earth and all that are in them, that you may understand that God made them out of nothing, and the race of men.

It is proved. Secondly, by a twofold argument. The first:⁵. If God had not made

if he were able to make something from nothing, he ought to produce all things from some presupposed thing. But the consequent is false. Therefore the antecedent also. — Proof of the minor. If God did not act except from something presupposed, that presupposed thing would not be caused by him; just as when an artisan makes a statue from wood, the wood is not caused by him. But the consequent is false, both because God is the universal cause of the whole of being, as is clear from the first article preceding; and because, if there were some being not caused by God, it would be a being from itself, consequently God, as being infinitely perfect. For by what could it be limited in its perfections? Not by another, since it would depend on no one, nor even on God; not by itself, since, being a necessary being, it would exclude from itself no perfection.

The second argument. Either something pre-existed for the things that God produced, or it did not. If the latter, we have what was intended. If the former, since one must not proceed to infinity, it is necessary to come to some first thing for which nothing pre-exists, and yet it was made by God, consequently made ex nihilo.

You say firstly: Among the ancient philosophers this axiom was commonly accepted: “From nothing, nothing comes to be.” Therefore.

I answer that this axiom is true concerning the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which alone the ancient philosophers considered, but not concerning emanation from a universal principle⁶.

You will press the point: Between being and nothing there is an infinite distance. But an infinite distance is impassable. Therefore.

I respond. I distinguish the major⁷. Between being and nothing there is an infinite distance positively, I deny; negatively, I concede. And in this sense, the minor having been distinguished, I deny the consequence. Therefore between being and nothing there is not an infinite distance thus positively, such that there is some infinite medium which must be traversed; but only thus, that not-being simply tends to being simply. Moreover, just as it can come about by a finite power that a transition be made from not-being in a certain respect to being in a certain respect, for example, from the not-being of fire to the being of fire; so it can come about by an infinite power that a transition be made from not-being simply to being simply.

You will press the point: What is coming to be has not yet been made. Therefore coming-to-be precedes having been made. Therefore a subject must be assigned in which that very coming-to-be is sustained. — I subsume: But in that which is created, a subject cannot be assigned in which the coming-to-be or being created is sustained, since it is from nothing. Therefore something cannot come to be from nothing.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent.⁸. What comes to be by a successive action is not yet done, I concede; by an instantaneous action, I deny. Thus, for example, while the air is being illuminated, it is illuminated; while the word is being formed in the mind, it is formed. Creation, however, is an instantaneous action; and thus, when something is created, it is created, and the term of creation is the created thing itself produced by that creation. — By this the other objection is anticipated.

You say 2°: in Wis. XI, 18, God is said to have created the orb of the earth, that is, the world, from invisible matter. Therefore, not from nothing.

I respond: I deny the consequence. By unseen matter, in Greek unformed, there is not understood matter stripped of every form; for thus it cannot exist, and in Genesis, I, 1, it is said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But by this there is understood a body then invisible and unformed; because on the first day, before light came to be, it was not visible to sight, nor was it adorned with plants, animals, men, etc. Therefore the sense of Holy Scripture is that from this body or unformed matter God produced distinct beings, plants, animals, man, etc. But God did not produce this matter from another matter, but from nothing, as St. Augustine, to be cited below, expressly asserts.

Hence you will infer that God did not, strictly speaking, create or produce all things out of nothing, seeing that both from the cited authority and from the first chapter of Genesis it is established that from pre-existing matter He produced plants and animals, and also formed man from the slime of the earth; likewise also that daily He produces many things, not out of nothing, but from a presupposed subject: but that He properly created, and creates, only certain things, such as heaven and earth, angels, and rational souls.

Yet in some sense, not altogether improper, it could be said that God created or made all things from nothing, insofar as He makes them, either wholly according to themselves, or according to their intrinsic and essential part, namely matter, from nothing. Hence St. Augustine, in book XII of Confessions, c. 8, says: “You, Lord, made the world from unformed matter, which You made from no thing, an almost nothing, whence You might make the great things which we sons of men marvel at.” And in book I of On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 6, n. 10: “God is most rightly believed to have made all things from nothing; because although all formed things were made from that matter, yet that very matter itself was made from absolutely nothing.” But if creare is taken generally, as being the same as to make or to produce, it is evident from the preceding first article that God in this sense created all things.

I say 1°: It is a dogma of faith that God alone has in fact created the universe.

It is established, first, from various passages of Sacred Scripture. Genesis, I, 1, relates that God created all things; whence there is no other creator besides him. Ecclesiasticus, I, 8: One is the most high Creator, almighty. Isaiah, XLIV, 24: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching forth the heavens alone, establishing the earth, and none is with me. Hebrews, III, 4: He that created all things is God.

To the same sense write the Holy Fathers: Athanasius, book III against the Arians; Cyril of Alexandria, book VI of the Treasury, c. 2; St. Augustine, book III On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 11; Damascene, book II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3. Thus it has been defined in the Apostles' Creed, in the Lateran council under Innocent III, in the Vatican council, concerning which in the preceding article.

I say secondly: To create belongs to God alone in such a way that no creature can be the principal cause of creating¹.

It is proved. First. More universal effects ought to be reduced to more universal causes². But the effect of creation is the most universal, and God alone is the most universal cause. Therefore. — The minor as to the second part is evident. It is proved. the first part. The effect of creation is not a particular being, or this or that being from something pre-existing, but is being simply and absolutely, or being according to its whole self, or according to all things that pertain to its ratio and substantial being. Therefore.

2° For creating there is principally required an infinite power³. But the power of no creature, but of God alone, is or can be infinite. Therefore. — The minor is evident. — Proof of the major. The greater the remoteness of the potency and the lesser the dispositions to that form, so much the greater power is required in the agent for producing the form from potency. Therefore, where there is no potency and no dispositions, as in creation, an infinite power is required.

I say thirdly: It is more probable that a creature cannot be assumed as a cause, even as an instrumental physical cause, of creation⁴.

Prob. It belongs to the notion of a physical instrumental cause that, through an action proper to itself, unless it be the very action itself, it operate dispositively toward the effect of the principal cause, though not indeed always and necessarily on the part of the thing effected, as though it ought always and necessarily to produce some disposition in the subject in which the effect of the principal cause is received. This indeed occurs in the instruments of creatures, which employ instruments from indigence, but not in the instruments of God. For, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, He can assume an immanent act, such as the willing or understanding of the agent, as an instrumental cause of a miracle, for example; but on the side of the mode of operating, namely by modifying through its proper action the action of the principal cause, so that it may operate in the mode of an inferior cause, and thus together with that elevated action and from it attain its effect. For if the instrument of itself effected nothing, but remained idle, it would not be in the genus of cause, nor

therefore an instrument, but a pure medium conveying the influx of the principal agent. — I assume the minor. But no action of a creature can concur, even instrumentally, in creation. Therefore. — I prove the minor assumed. The action of a creature, since it is an accident, depends on a subject in being and in operating. Therefore, if God were to act in the mode of that action and through it attain His effect, He would operate dependently on a presupposed subject, which is repugnant to creation, which is from nothing.

You ask whether to create is proper to some divine person.

I respond that it is not proper to any one person, but common to the whole Trinity⁵:

1° — Because every agent acts something like itself; thus fire generates fire⁶. But to create is to produce the being of things. Therefore creating belongs to God according to his esse, which is his essence, which is common to the three persons.

2° — According to the common theological axiom, the works of the divinity ad extra are undivided and common to the three persons.

3° — The creating power, the wisdom or intellect through which it is created, the affection or will from which it is created, are common to the three persons. Therefore.

Nevertheless, because power is fittingly attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, love to the Holy Spirit, therefore in an accommodative sense the three persons are said to create in diverse ways: the Father is called the creator, the Son he through whom it is created, the Holy Spirit he from whom it is created.

I say first: Several worlds are possible¹.

It is proved. By the creation of one world the infinite power of God has not been exhausted. Therefore.

You say with the Cartesians: The world is indefinitely extended. Therefore several possible worlds do not exist. — Proof of the antecedent. The idea of extension and the idea of matter and of body are one and the same. But extension is indefinite; for if you conceive beyond the visible world, you conceive extension, and consequently you conceive matter and body. Therefore.

I respond. I deny the antecedent. As to the *proof, *I deny the major. For, according to the principles of Descartes, matter, extension, body, and space are one and the same. But, with any given point of eternity determined, in the preceding instant extension is conceived, and therefore matter; with any limit of matter posited, beyond it extension is conceived, consequently matter; finally, with any volition in God of not creating matter posited, extension is always conceived, and therefore matter. Therefore, in this system, matter is eternal, uncreated, and necessarily existing of itself; therefore another god.

I state secondly: the existing world is perfect.

Understand a perfection not essential, as is, for example, in a man consisting of body and soul as essential parts. For the world is not a substantial composite, an aggregate per accidens, but it has accidental perfection, insofar as it is furnished with all things necessary and due to it for its ends, which are two: one proximate, namely, that it be a fitting and useful dwelling for man; the other ultimate, namely, the glory of God. Therefore the perfection of the world must be considered as the perfection of an artifact, for instance of a building, namely according to the parts and their proportion to one another and disposition for attaining the end on account of which it was established. And this perfection, as is clear, does not consist in an indivisible, but admits of latitude. These points having been observed,

The conclusion is proved first from Holy Scripture. Genesis, I, 31: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. Deuteronomy, XXXII, 4: The works of God are perfect.

2° The world is furnished with all things necessary and due to it for attaining its ends, namely the utility of man and the glory of God. Indeed, 1° the natures of which it consists are whole and perfect; for God and nature, as the common adage has it, do not fail in necessary things, nor

abundant in superfluities. 2° There is in it a wondrous variety of things. 3° Most beautiful is the order of the seasons and of the days, and most wise the coordination and subordination among all these things; for non-living things are ordered to living things, vegetative living things to sensitive, sensitive things to man, man to God: so that, if certain things in the world, considered according to themselves, appear less perfect and defective, nevertheless, considered in relation to the harmony of the whole universe, they are good and perfect; just as, although shadows in a picture, considered according to themselves, are defective, nevertheless, considered in relation to the whole picture, whose colors by their aid shine forth more brightly, they are good and useful.

You say: There are many things in the world that argue imperfection. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. First, there are many useless things in the world, as so many individuals for the preservation of species, whereas they could be preserved in fewer: indeed many useless species, as flies, worms, fleas, lice, etc. Second, many things are incongruous and unbecoming, as monsters and sins. Third, many things are harmful, as poisons, unseasonable colds, excessive heats, etc. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I distinguish. There are many useless things, in this sense, that without them the world would still be perfect, I concede; in this sense, that, if they are posited, the world is imperfect, I deny. For since the perfection of the world, as I have said, does not consist in an indivisible, but admits of latitude, there can be in it more things whose presence neither necessarily requires nor whose absence necessarily requires, which, if they exist, nevertheless contribute to its perfection, such as to its enrichment, variety, ornament, and to other ends unknown to us.

To the second proof. Since nature, both in physical things and in moral things, is defectible from this, that it is from nothing, it belongs to the universal provider to permit that it sometimes fail, both lest many goods be lacking if all evils were prevented, and so that the beauty and completeness of opposites may shine forth more, just as a painter permits shadows in a picture, so that the colors may stand out more; and also because God is so powerful that from evil He draws forth good. St. Thomas explains this elegantly here, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2: « Concerning it, however, otherwise

there is a difference between one who has care of some particular thing and the universal provider; for the particular provider excludes defect from that which is subject to his care, as far as he can, but the universal provider permits some defect to occur in some particular thing, lest the good of the whole be impeded. Hence corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be against particular nature, yet they are nevertheless of the intention of universal nature, insofar as the defect of one turns to the good of another, or even of the whole universe; for the corruption of one is the generation of another, through which the species is preserved. Therefore, since God is the universal provider of the whole of being, it pertains to his providence to permit certain defects to exist in certain particular things, lest the perfect good of the universe be impeded. For if all evils were prevented, many goods would be lacking to the universe; for there would not be the life of the lion, if there were not the killing of animals, nor would there be the patience of martyrs, if there were not the persecution of tyrants. Hence Augustine says in Enchiridion, c. 11, n. 3: « God omnipotent would in no way permit any evil to exist in his works, unless he were omnipotent and good to such a degree that he would bring about good even from evil. »

To the third he proves it. Things which are harmful in one respect are useful in another. Thus poisons, when tempered, serve medicine; untimely colds and excessive heats, although per accidens they harm plants, are useful elsewhere to animals, insofar as they purify the air and consume harmful humors, etc.]

Created things persevere in the existence they have received, as both external and internal experience establishes. This perseverance of things in existing, taken on the part of the principle by which things are kept so that they may persevere in being, is called conservation.

A twofold conservation is distinguished¹: one is called positive,

either direct, or per se; the other is called negative, or indirect, or per accidens. The former is had when the thing conserved so depends on the conserver that without its positive action it cannot of itself continue to exist; thus water is heated by heat, and only through that same action of heat does it remain hot. The latter is either the non-destruction of a thing, or an action removing the principle by which the thing could be corrupted or destroyed, which action is not directly borne toward the conserved thing itself, but toward the causes upon the positing of which the thing itself could be corrupted or perish; as if someone keeps watch lest a boy fall into the fire, he conserves the boy indirectly.

I say, first: It can be doubtful to no one that created things are necessarily conserved by God indirectly, in order that they may persist in the existence they have received. For they persist for this reason, that God does not destroy them, although He could reduce them to nothing if He willed, just as He was able to produce them out of nothing into existence. But this divine will of not destroying things is their conservation, at least indirectly. Concerning this, therefore, there is no doubt. Hence the whole question is whether creatures necessarily require that they be conserved positively by God.

I say secondly: For existing, creatures necessarily require that they be positively conserved by God. — It is against Durandus and others who stand for the necessity of negative conservation alone.

*It is proved, *first, from Holy Scripture. Wis., XI, 26: How could anything endure, unless thou hadst willed it, or be preserved if it had not been called by thee? Col., I, 16 and 17: All things were created through him and in him: and he is before all, and all things hold together in him. John, V, 17, Christ says: My Father works until now, and I work, namely by the operation whereby the world is preserved. And elsewhere.

*It is proved, *secondly, from the Fathers. Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, c. 10, § 1: “He is called All-holder (God), because he is the seat of all things, containing and embracing all things, and stabilizing, founding, and constraining all things, and rendering the universe indissoluble in himself.” Origen, book II of the Periarchon, c. 1, n. 3: “How do we live, and move, and are in God, unless because by his power he constrains and contains the universe

the world?» And below: «He fills and contains the whole world with the fullness of his power.» Aug., book IV On Genesis according to the Letter, ch. 12, no. 22: «It can be understood that God rested from founding the kinds of creature, because beyond that he no longer founded any new kinds; but thereafter, up to now and beyond, he works the administration of those same kinds which were then established... For the power of the Creator and the virtue of the omnipotent and all-sustaining one is the cause of subsisting for every creature; and if this virtue were ever to cease from governing the things that have been created, at the same time their species would cease, and every nature would collapse.» Thus several authors, and unanimously.

It is proved, third, by reason. Creatures, in the existence they have received, endure contingently, nor do they exist independently of God, but depend upon his will in existing. Therefore they necessarily require the positive conservation of God. — The consequence is proved:

1° From contingency. For from the fact that creatures are contingent, they have the account of their own existence not in themselves but in another, that is, in God. But when they in fact exist, they do not on that account lose the account of contingency, but are such that they can not be, just as, before they were, they so were not that they could be. Therefore, just as by force of contingency they need positively to have existence from another, so by reason of that same contingency they need to be positively conserved in existence by another.

2° From dependence on God. It is repugnant to suppose creatures altogether emancipated from dependence on the Creator, who not only created things, but also continually orders all things to the end, which is the communication of his goodness and the manifestation of his glory. But if creatures, in the existence received, conserve themselves of themselves, emancipation or complete independence both in being and in acting must be conceded to them, nor is there any longer any reason by which it may be proved that the world is governed by God, even in the least things. This consequence is most absurd. Therefore creatures need to be positively conserved by God.

3° From the will of God. Therefore created things exist, because God willed them to be; which act indeed, posited from eternity

it endures, namely in such a way that creatures, just as they were created by the divine will, so by that same will persevere in the existence they have received. Therefore, just as the will creating things is something positive, so also the divine will itself conserving the things is something positive.

Hence St. Thomas rightly says²: “It is necessary to say, both according to faith and according to reason, that creatures are conserved in being by God;” namely, by a positive conservation, whereby creatures are so conserved by God that they depend altogether upon him conserving them and cannot remain in being without him. “For the being of any creature depends upon God, such that they could not subsist even for a moment, but would be reduced to nothing, unless they were conserved in being by the operation of the divine power.”

Hence it is clear in what sense the conservation of created things is a continued creation. This saying, commonly stated and properly explained, has truth, whatever Bayle and with him a few of the older and more recent writers may say. For in God two distinct actions are not to be conceived, one by which He creates and another by which He conserves created things; nor is the existence of a thing one in the beginning of its creation and another when it endures in the same existence. Consequently conservation, whether it is considered on the part of the principle or on the part of the term, does not differ from creation. Yet creation, formally taken in itself, presupposes nothing, since it is the bringing-forth of the whole thing from nothing; on the contrary conservation implies an already existing thing to be conserved, to which there is continued the influx by which it was brought forth from nothing. Under this second respect, therefore, conservation differs from creation.]