Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

(St. Thomas, I Part, from q. 44 to q. 49)

The Gnostics, according to the testimony of St. Epiphanius, Haeres. 25 and 26, denied that the world was created by God. The Manichaeans, from the same, Haeres. 22 and following, and from Augustine, Haeres. 46, maintained two gods independent of themselves, one good, who was the author of the New Testament, of light, of spiritual and incorruptible things; the other evil, who was the author of the Old Testament, of darkness, and of visible and corruptible things.

Plato and Hermogenes, in Tertullian, de Praescript., part I, c. 33, and the Seleucians and Hermians, in St. Augustine, Haeres. 39, said that matter was not produced by God, but is coeternal with Him, from which He produced the visible world.

I say: Every being other than God, which in any way is, is efficiently caused by God¹.

It is of the faith by which we believe, in the Nicene and Constantinopolitan symbols, « in God, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. » And in cap. Firmiter, de summa Trinitate, book I of the Decretals, the Church in the Lateran Council I confesses « that the one God, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, is the one principle of all things, the Creator of all visible and invisible things, spiritual and corporeal. » Hence the First Council of Braga, canon 13, thus defines: « If anyone shall say that the creation of all flesh is not the workmanship of God, but of evil angels, as Manichaeus and Priscillian said: let him be anathema. »

The same is taught by the Vatican Council below, with article III being cited.

It is proved. First, from sacred Scripture. Genesis, I, 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; where under heaven all heavenly things, and under earth all lower things, are contained. Hence, Exodus, XX, 11: In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and all things that are in them; Isaiah, XLIV, 24: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching forth the heavens alone, establishing the earth; Psalm CXLV, 6: Who made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them; John, I, 3: All things were made through him; Romans, XI, 36: From him, and through him, and in him are all things; Acts, XVII, 24: God, who made the world and all things that are in it.

It is proved. Secondly, by reason. Whatever in any way is, is contained virtually and eminently in God. Therefore whatever in any way is, is participated and caused by God. — The consequence is evident; because, if there were some being that were not caused by God, that thing would not be contained virtually and eminently in God. — The antecedent is proved. God thus is

being through essence, so as to comprehend the whole ratio of being, according to its entire breadth and extension; for this is what the notions of pure act, infinite being, and infinitely perfect being import, which belong to God. Therefore everything that in whatever way is, is contained virtually and eminently in God; otherwise God would not contain the whole fullness of being.

You say: The essences of things are eternal, and do not depend on God: thus from eternity and independently of God man is a rational animal. Therefore.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent. The essences of things are eternal and do not depend on God with respect to the connection of predicate and subject, I concede; with respect to actual being, I deny: for this they have from God in time.

Hence you will infer that matter, concerning which the ancient philosophers erred most gravely, as the Angelic Doctor explains², is also produced by God; because, since God, as has been said, is the cause of being insofar as it is being, He is the cause of all things that pertain to the ratio of being. Prime matter, however, pertains to the ratio of corporeal being. For although according to itself it is not being in act, but only through substantial form, without which it is not produced specifically, nevertheless from it and form there comes to be being in act; and therefore, properly speaking, matter is not created, but concreated.

[I say: God is the first exemplar cause of all things¹; because God has the rationes, or ideas and exemplars, of all the things that He produces according to determinate species. For God, since He is an intelligent agent, does not act in a blind manner or by chance. But these ideas or exemplars are really nothing other than the divine essence, as it is participable by creatures in diverse ways, as St. Thomas teaches².

I say secondly: God is the final cause of all things³.

It is of faith. Thus it was defined by the Vatican Council, Constitution on the Catholic Faith, canon 5: « If anyone... shall have denied that the world was created for the glory of God; let him be anathema. »

*It is proved first * from Sacred Scripture. Proverbs, XVI, 4: The Lord has made all things for himself.

*It is proved secondly *by reason. That is the final cause of all things which the first and universal agent intends to communicate to all, and which all things intend, insofar as they can, to attain. But the divine goodness is that which God intends to communicate to all, and which all things intend to attain, by appetite whether rational, or sensible, or natural. Therefore.

— The minor is proved. God, as the first and universal agent and infinitely perfect, does not act for the sake of an end to be acquired, for he does not stand in need of our goods; but he acts for the sake of communicating his perfection, which is his goodness, and every created thing intends its own good and its own perfection, which is a likeness and participation of the divine goodness. Therefore.

Therefore God wills and acts on account of his goodness, not because he desires it, for what is desired is not yet had; but because he loves it perfectly, for love is also of what is present. But from the fact that he perfectly loves his goodness, he wills it to be communicated to others.]

Creation can be taken in a threefold way: 1° broadly, for any production whatsoever of any thing¹: in which sense Eccli., I, 4, it is said of Wisdom that she was created from the beginning; 2° equivocally, for an elevation to a higher grade: in which sense someone is said to be created bishop; 3° strictly, for the production of the whole being from nothing.

For which reason it must be observed that the preposition ex does not import a relation of affirmative causality, as though nothing were the matter of that thing which is produced, as when it is said, “A sword is made from iron;” but it imports the relation of a cause that is denied, so that ex nihilo is the same as non ex aliquo.

And so creation is the emanation of the whole being from the universal cause². For just as a particular emanation is from a particular non-being, as the production of fire from non-fire, so the universal emanation is altogether from non-being, and consequently from nothing.

I say: God produced things in being from nothing, that is, created them ³.

It is de fide; for we say in the Apostles’ Creed: « I believe in one God..., the Creator of heaven and earth. »

In the council Lateran. under Innocent III it is defined that “God created from nothing both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly.”

This definition was renewed more at length and more expressly by the Vatican council, where one reads⁴

The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will and every perfection; who, since he is one singular, altogether simple, and immutable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed as distinct from the world in reality and essence, most blessed in himself and from himself, and ineffably exalted above all things which besides him are and can be conceived.

This one true God, by His goodness and omnipotent power, not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, at once from the beginning of time, created from nothing both kinds of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and thereafter the human, as it were constituted in common from spirit and body.

Canons. — « 1° If anyone shall have denied the one true God, Creator and Lord of visible and invisible things, let him be anathema.

» 2° If anyone should not be ashamed to affirm that there is nothing besides matter, let him be anathema.

» 3° If anyone shall have said that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same, let him be anathema.

» 4° If anyone shall have said that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual things, have emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence by the manifestation or evolution of itself becomes all things; or finally that God is universal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the totality of things distinguished into genera, species, and individuals; let him be anathema.

» 5° If anyone does not confess that the world and all things contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced by God out of nothing according to their whole substance; or shall have said that God created, not by a will free from every necessity, but as necessarily as He necessarily loves Himself; or shall have denied that the world was established for the glory of God; let him be anathema. »

It is proved. First from Sacred Scripture. Genesis, I, 1, says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Judith, XIII, 24: Blessed be the Lord, who created heaven and earth. Ps. CXLVIII, 5: He commanded, and they were created. Wisdom, I, 14: He created all things that they might be. II Maccabees, VII, 28: I beg you, son, to look upon heaven and earth and all that are in them, that you may understand that God made them out of nothing, and the race of men.

It is proved. Secondly, by a twofold argument. The first:⁵. If God had not made

if he were able to make something from nothing, he ought to produce all things from some presupposed thing. But the consequent is false. Therefore the antecedent also. — Proof of the minor. If God did not act except from something presupposed, that presupposed thing would not be caused by him; just as when an artisan makes a statue from wood, the wood is not caused by him. But the consequent is false, both because God is the universal cause of the whole of being, as is clear from the first article preceding; and because, if there were some being not caused by God, it would be a being from itself, consequently God, as being infinitely perfect. For by what could it be limited in its perfections? Not by another, since it would depend on no one, nor even on God; not by itself, since, being a necessary being, it would exclude from itself no perfection.

The second argument. Either something pre-existed for the things that God produced, or it did not. If the latter, we have what was intended. If the former, since one must not proceed to infinity, it is necessary to come to some first thing for which nothing pre-exists, and yet it was made by God, consequently made ex nihilo.

You say firstly: Among the ancient philosophers this axiom was commonly accepted: “From nothing, nothing comes to be.” Therefore.

I answer that this axiom is true concerning the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which alone the ancient philosophers considered, but not concerning emanation from a universal principle⁶.

You will press the point: Between being and nothing there is an infinite distance. But an infinite distance is impassable. Therefore.

I respond. I distinguish the major⁷. Between being and nothing there is an infinite distance positively, I deny; negatively, I concede. And in this sense, the minor having been distinguished, I deny the consequence. Therefore between being and nothing there is not an infinite distance thus positively, such that there is some infinite medium which must be traversed; but only thus, that not-being simply tends to being simply. Moreover, just as it can come about by a finite power that a transition be made from not-being in a certain respect to being in a certain respect, for example, from the not-being of fire to the being of fire; so it can come about by an infinite power that a transition be made from not-being simply to being simply.

You will press the point: What is coming to be has not yet been made. Therefore coming-to-be precedes having been made. Therefore a subject must be assigned in which that very coming-to-be is sustained. — I subsume: But in that which is created, a subject cannot be assigned in which the coming-to-be or being created is sustained, since it is from nothing. Therefore something cannot come to be from nothing.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent.⁸. What comes to be by a successive action is not yet done, I concede; by an instantaneous action, I deny. Thus, for example, while the air is being illuminated, it is illuminated; while the word is being formed in the mind, it is formed. Creation, however, is an instantaneous action; and thus, when something is created, it is created, and the term of creation is the created thing itself produced by that creation. — By this the other objection is anticipated.

You say 2°: in Wis. XI, 18, God is said to have created the orb of the earth, that is, the world, from invisible matter. Therefore, not from nothing.

I respond: I deny the consequence. By unseen matter, in Greek unformed, there is not understood matter stripped of every form; for thus it cannot exist, and in Genesis, I, 1, it is said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But by this there is understood a body then invisible and unformed; because on the first day, before light came to be, it was not visible to sight, nor was it adorned with plants, animals, men, etc. Therefore the sense of Holy Scripture is that from this body or unformed matter God produced distinct beings, plants, animals, man, etc. But God did not produce this matter from another matter, but from nothing, as St. Augustine, to be cited below, expressly asserts.

Hence you will infer that God did not, strictly speaking, create or produce all things out of nothing, seeing that both from the cited authority and from the first chapter of Genesis it is established that from pre-existing matter He produced plants and animals, and also formed man from the slime of the earth; likewise also that daily He produces many things, not out of nothing, but from a presupposed subject: but that He properly created, and creates, only certain things, such as heaven and earth, angels, and rational souls.

Yet in some sense, not altogether improper, it could be said that God created or made all things from nothing, insofar as He makes them, either wholly according to themselves, or according to their intrinsic and essential part, namely matter, from nothing. Hence St. Augustine, in book XII of Confessions, c. 8, says: “You, Lord, made the world from unformed matter, which You made from no thing, an almost nothing, whence You might make the great things which we sons of men marvel at.” And in book I of On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 6, n. 10: “God is most rightly believed to have made all things from nothing; because although all formed things were made from that matter, yet that very matter itself was made from absolutely nothing.” But if creare is taken generally, as being the same as to make or to produce, it is evident from the preceding first article that God in this sense created all things.

I say 1°: It is a dogma of faith that God alone has in fact created the universe.

It is established, first, from various passages of Sacred Scripture. Genesis, I, 1, relates that God created all things; whence there is no other creator besides him. Ecclesiasticus, I, 8: One is the most high Creator, almighty. Isaiah, XLIV, 24: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching forth the heavens alone, establishing the earth, and none is with me. Hebrews, III, 4: He that created all things is God.

To the same sense write the Holy Fathers: Athanasius, book III against the Arians; Cyril of Alexandria, book VI of the Treasury, c. 2; St. Augustine, book III On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 11; Damascene, book II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3. Thus it has been defined in the Apostles' Creed, in the Lateran council under Innocent III, in the Vatican council, concerning which in the preceding article.

I say secondly: To create belongs to God alone in such a way that no creature can be the principal cause of creating¹.

It is proved. First. More universal effects ought to be reduced to more universal causes². But the effect of creation is the most universal, and God alone is the most universal cause. Therefore. — The minor as to the second part is evident. It is proved. the first part. The effect of creation is not a particular being, or this or that being from something pre-existing, but is being simply and absolutely, or being according to its whole self, or according to all things that pertain to its ratio and substantial being. Therefore.

2° For creating there is principally required an infinite power³. But the power of no creature, but of God alone, is or can be infinite. Therefore. — The minor is evident. — Proof of the major. The greater the remoteness of the potency and the lesser the dispositions to that form, so much the greater power is required in the agent for producing the form from potency. Therefore, where there is no potency and no dispositions, as in creation, an infinite power is required.

I say thirdly: It is more probable that a creature cannot be assumed as a cause, even as an instrumental physical cause, of creation⁴.

Prob. It belongs to the notion of a physical instrumental cause that, through an action proper to itself, unless it be the very action itself, it operate dispositively toward the effect of the principal cause, though not indeed always and necessarily on the part of the thing effected, as though it ought always and necessarily to produce some disposition in the subject in which the effect of the principal cause is received. This indeed occurs in the instruments of creatures, which employ instruments from indigence, but not in the instruments of God. For, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, He can assume an immanent act, such as the willing or understanding of the agent, as an instrumental cause of a miracle, for example; but on the side of the mode of operating, namely by modifying through its proper action the action of the principal cause, so that it may operate in the mode of an inferior cause, and thus together with that elevated action and from it attain its effect. For if the instrument of itself effected nothing, but remained idle, it would not be in the genus of cause, nor

therefore an instrument, but a pure medium conveying the influx of the principal agent. — I assume the minor. But no action of a creature can concur, even instrumentally, in creation. Therefore. — I prove the minor assumed. The action of a creature, since it is an accident, depends on a subject in being and in operating. Therefore, if God were to act in the mode of that action and through it attain His effect, He would operate dependently on a presupposed subject, which is repugnant to creation, which is from nothing.

You ask whether to create is proper to some divine person.

I respond that it is not proper to any one person, but common to the whole Trinity⁵:

1° — Because every agent acts something like itself; thus fire generates fire⁶. But to create is to produce the being of things. Therefore creating belongs to God according to his esse, which is his essence, which is common to the three persons.

2° — According to the common theological axiom, the works of the divinity ad extra are undivided and common to the three persons.

3° — The creating power, the wisdom or intellect through which it is created, the affection or will from which it is created, are common to the three persons. Therefore.

Nevertheless, because power is fittingly attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, love to the Holy Spirit, therefore in an accommodative sense the three persons are said to create in diverse ways: the Father is called the creator, the Son he through whom it is created, the Holy Spirit he from whom it is created.

I say first: Several worlds are possible¹.

It is proved. By the creation of one world the infinite power of God has not been exhausted. Therefore.

You say with the Cartesians: The world is indefinitely extended. Therefore several possible worlds do not exist. — Proof of the antecedent. The idea of extension and the idea of matter and of body are one and the same. But extension is indefinite; for if you conceive beyond the visible world, you conceive extension, and consequently you conceive matter and body. Therefore.

I respond. I deny the antecedent. As to the *proof, *I deny the major. For, according to the principles of Descartes, matter, extension, body, and space are one and the same. But, with any given point of eternity determined, in the preceding instant extension is conceived, and therefore matter; with any limit of matter posited, beyond it extension is conceived, consequently matter; finally, with any volition in God of not creating matter posited, extension is always conceived, and therefore matter. Therefore, in this system, matter is eternal, uncreated, and necessarily existing of itself; therefore another god.

I state secondly: the existing world is perfect.

Understand a perfection not essential, as is, for example, in a man consisting of body and soul as essential parts. For the world is not a substantial composite, an aggregate per accidens, but it has accidental perfection, insofar as it is furnished with all things necessary and due to it for its ends, which are two: one proximate, namely, that it be a fitting and useful dwelling for man; the other ultimate, namely, the glory of God. Therefore the perfection of the world must be considered as the perfection of an artifact, for instance of a building, namely according to the parts and their proportion to one another and disposition for attaining the end on account of which it was established. And this perfection, as is clear, does not consist in an indivisible, but admits of latitude. These points having been observed,

The conclusion is proved first from Holy Scripture. Genesis, I, 31: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. Deuteronomy, XXXII, 4: The works of God are perfect.

2° The world is furnished with all things necessary and due to it for attaining its ends, namely the utility of man and the glory of God. Indeed, 1° the natures of which it consists are whole and perfect; for God and nature, as the common adage has it, do not fail in necessary things, nor

abundant in superfluities. 2° There is in it a wondrous variety of things. 3° Most beautiful is the order of the seasons and of the days, and most wise the coordination and subordination among all these things; for non-living things are ordered to living things, vegetative living things to sensitive, sensitive things to man, man to God: so that, if certain things in the world, considered according to themselves, appear less perfect and defective, nevertheless, considered in relation to the harmony of the whole universe, they are good and perfect; just as, although shadows in a picture, considered according to themselves, are defective, nevertheless, considered in relation to the whole picture, whose colors by their aid shine forth more brightly, they are good and useful.

You say: There are many things in the world that argue imperfection. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. First, there are many useless things in the world, as so many individuals for the preservation of species, whereas they could be preserved in fewer: indeed many useless species, as flies, worms, fleas, lice, etc. Second, many things are incongruous and unbecoming, as monsters and sins. Third, many things are harmful, as poisons, unseasonable colds, excessive heats, etc. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I distinguish. There are many useless things, in this sense, that without them the world would still be perfect, I concede; in this sense, that, if they are posited, the world is imperfect, I deny. For since the perfection of the world, as I have said, does not consist in an indivisible, but admits of latitude, there can be in it more things whose presence neither necessarily requires nor whose absence necessarily requires, which, if they exist, nevertheless contribute to its perfection, such as to its enrichment, variety, ornament, and to other ends unknown to us.

To the second proof. Since nature, both in physical things and in moral things, is defectible from this, that it is from nothing, it belongs to the universal provider to permit that it sometimes fail, both lest many goods be lacking if all evils were prevented, and so that the beauty and completeness of opposites may shine forth more, just as a painter permits shadows in a picture, so that the colors may stand out more; and also because God is so powerful that from evil He draws forth good. St. Thomas explains this elegantly here, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2: « Concerning it, however, otherwise

there is a difference between one who has care of some particular thing and the universal provider; for the particular provider excludes defect from that which is subject to his care, as far as he can, but the universal provider permits some defect to occur in some particular thing, lest the good of the whole be impeded. Hence corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be against particular nature, yet they are nevertheless of the intention of universal nature, insofar as the defect of one turns to the good of another, or even of the whole universe; for the corruption of one is the generation of another, through which the species is preserved. Therefore, since God is the universal provider of the whole of being, it pertains to his providence to permit certain defects to exist in certain particular things, lest the perfect good of the universe be impeded. For if all evils were prevented, many goods would be lacking to the universe; for there would not be the life of the lion, if there were not the killing of animals, nor would there be the patience of martyrs, if there were not the persecution of tyrants. Hence Augustine says in Enchiridion, c. 11, n. 3: « God omnipotent would in no way permit any evil to exist in his works, unless he were omnipotent and good to such a degree that he would bring about good even from evil. »

To the third he proves it. Things which are harmful in one respect are useful in another. Thus poisons, when tempered, serve medicine; untimely colds and excessive heats, although per accidens they harm plants, are useful elsewhere to animals, insofar as they purify the air and consume harmful humors, etc.]

Created things persevere in the existence they have received, as both external and internal experience establishes. This perseverance of things in existing, taken on the part of the principle by which things are kept so that they may persevere in being, is called conservation.

A twofold conservation is distinguished¹: one is called positive,

either direct, or per se; the other is called negative, or indirect, or per accidens. The former is had when the thing conserved so depends on the conserver that without its positive action it cannot of itself continue to exist; thus water is heated by heat, and only through that same action of heat does it remain hot. The latter is either the non-destruction of a thing, or an action removing the principle by which the thing could be corrupted or destroyed, which action is not directly borne toward the conserved thing itself, but toward the causes upon the positing of which the thing itself could be corrupted or perish; as if someone keeps watch lest a boy fall into the fire, he conserves the boy indirectly.

I say, first: It can be doubtful to no one that created things are necessarily conserved by God indirectly, in order that they may persist in the existence they have received. For they persist for this reason, that God does not destroy them, although He could reduce them to nothing if He willed, just as He was able to produce them out of nothing into existence. But this divine will of not destroying things is their conservation, at least indirectly. Concerning this, therefore, there is no doubt. Hence the whole question is whether creatures necessarily require that they be conserved positively by God.

I say secondly: For existing, creatures necessarily require that they be positively conserved by God. — It is against Durandus and others who stand for the necessity of negative conservation alone.

*It is proved, *first, from Holy Scripture. Wis., XI, 26: How could anything endure, unless thou hadst willed it, or be preserved if it had not been called by thee? Col., I, 16 and 17: All things were created through him and in him: and he is before all, and all things hold together in him. John, V, 17, Christ says: My Father works until now, and I work, namely by the operation whereby the world is preserved. And elsewhere.

*It is proved, *secondly, from the Fathers. Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, c. 10, § 1: “He is called All-holder (God), because he is the seat of all things, containing and embracing all things, and stabilizing, founding, and constraining all things, and rendering the universe indissoluble in himself.” Origen, book II of the Periarchon, c. 1, n. 3: “How do we live, and move, and are in God, unless because by his power he constrains and contains the universe

the world?» And below: «He fills and contains the whole world with the fullness of his power.» Aug., book IV On Genesis according to the Letter, ch. 12, no. 22: «It can be understood that God rested from founding the kinds of creature, because beyond that he no longer founded any new kinds; but thereafter, up to now and beyond, he works the administration of those same kinds which were then established... For the power of the Creator and the virtue of the omnipotent and all-sustaining one is the cause of subsisting for every creature; and if this virtue were ever to cease from governing the things that have been created, at the same time their species would cease, and every nature would collapse.» Thus several authors, and unanimously.

It is proved, third, by reason. Creatures, in the existence they have received, endure contingently, nor do they exist independently of God, but depend upon his will in existing. Therefore they necessarily require the positive conservation of God. — The consequence is proved:

1° From contingency. For from the fact that creatures are contingent, they have the account of their own existence not in themselves but in another, that is, in God. But when they in fact exist, they do not on that account lose the account of contingency, but are such that they can not be, just as, before they were, they so were not that they could be. Therefore, just as by force of contingency they need positively to have existence from another, so by reason of that same contingency they need to be positively conserved in existence by another.

2° From dependence on God. It is repugnant to suppose creatures altogether emancipated from dependence on the Creator, who not only created things, but also continually orders all things to the end, which is the communication of his goodness and the manifestation of his glory. But if creatures, in the existence received, conserve themselves of themselves, emancipation or complete independence both in being and in acting must be conceded to them, nor is there any longer any reason by which it may be proved that the world is governed by God, even in the least things. This consequence is most absurd. Therefore creatures need to be positively conserved by God.

3° From the will of God. Therefore created things exist, because God willed them to be; which act indeed, posited from eternity

it endures, namely in such a way that creatures, just as they were created by the divine will, so by that same will persevere in the existence they have received. Therefore, just as the will creating things is something positive, so also the divine will itself conserving the things is something positive.

Hence St. Thomas rightly says²: “It is necessary to say, both according to faith and according to reason, that creatures are conserved in being by God;” namely, by a positive conservation, whereby creatures are so conserved by God that they depend altogether upon him conserving them and cannot remain in being without him. “For the being of any creature depends upon God, such that they could not subsist even for a moment, but would be reduced to nothing, unless they were conserved in being by the operation of the divine power.”

Hence it is clear in what sense the conservation of created things is a continued creation. This saying, commonly stated and properly explained, has truth, whatever Bayle and with him a few of the older and more recent writers may say. For in God two distinct actions are not to be conceived, one by which He creates and another by which He conserves created things; nor is the existence of a thing one in the beginning of its creation and another when it endures in the same existence. Consequently conservation, whether it is considered on the part of the principle or on the part of the term, does not differ from creation. Yet creation, formally taken in itself, presupposes nothing, since it is the bringing-forth of the whole thing from nothing; on the contrary conservation implies an already existing thing to be conserved, to which there is continued the influx by which it was brought forth from nothing. Under this second respect, therefore, conservation differs from creation.]

(St. Thomas, Part I, from q. 50 to q. 64, and from q. 106 to q. 114)

D. Thomas qq. 50, 51 et 61.

Angel is a Greek word, meaning the same as the Latin messenger. Hence, if the force of the word is considered, it is a name of office, not of nature; and therefore it is sometimes applied in the Scriptures to whoever announces the will or law of God. Thus of John the Baptist it is said, Malach., III, 1, and Matth., XI, 10: Behold I send my angel. And the Apostle, I Cor., XI, 10, commands that the heads of women be veiled because of the angels, that is, the priests.

However, because the ministry of announcing is commonly entrusted by God to the heavenly spirits, it has been received by usage that this name is applied to signify those spiritual substances higher than men; and since among them there are diverse orders, it sometimes signifies those who are in the lowest order, sometimes generally all who are contained in the nine orders. And in this way we take it here.

You will ask 1° whether there are angels.

I answer in the affirmative¹. It is of faith, against the Sadducees. Act., XXIII, 8.

Proof. By the name angel we understand a spiritual, intellectual, created substance, higher than men. But it is certainly established from the Scriptures that such a substance is given. And first, that a created spiritual substance is given. Ps. CIII, 4:

Who makest thy angels spirits. Likewise Hebr., I, 1; Apocal., I, 7; Coloss., I, 16. But if spiritual, therefore intellectual. Likewise they are higher than men. Ps. VIII, 6, the prophet speaking of man, says: Thou hast made him a little less than the angels. And II Petr., II, 11: Whereas angels are greater in strength and power.

Augustine, on that verse of Psal. CIII, 4: Who makest thy angels spirits, says, n. 15: « We know that angels exist from faith, and we read it written that they have appeared to many, and we hold it, nor is it right for us to doubt this. But angels are spirits; and when they are spirits, they are not angels, but when they are sent, they become angels. For angel is a name of office, not of nature. Do you ask the name of this nature? It is spirit. Do you ask the office? It is angel. » St. Gregory the Great, Hom. 34 in Evang.: « Almost all the pages of sacred eloquence bear witness to angels and archangels. »

Hence the Lateran Council, under Innocent III, lib. I Decretal., cap. Firmiter, de summa Trinitate, thus defines: « We firmly believe... that God... at once from the beginning of time created both creatures out of nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and then the human, as it were common, constituted of spirit and body. »

Hence you will infer that the angels are devoid of all matter, and do not have bodies, even subtle and sensible ones, naturally united to themselves.

As for the holy Fathers who said that the angels are corporeal, not all of them understood corporeal as common sense bears it and in that strict sense in which we understand it here. For some said they are corporeal, that is, true substances; because among many of the ancients, body is used in two ways: first, properly, for a material and extended mass, and as it is opposed to immaterial substance, as we take it here; second, improperly, for that which is real and subsists, and is opposed to nothing, to the empty and the void, as we showed in the dissert. quarta Tract. de Deo uno; and in this sense some holy Fathers said that the angels are corporeal, that is, true and real

substances. Others said² that they are corporeal comparatively to God, because incorporeal substances are a mean between God and corporeal creatures: but a mean, compared to one extreme, appears as the other extreme, just as the lukewarm, compared to the hot, appears cold; and for this reason it is said that the angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, that there is in them anything of a corporeal nature. Some, finally, called body whatever is defined in a certain place, and is not everywhere, or even that which is potential and limited, although it were a pure spirit. Moreover, if any have judged the angels to be properly and strictly corporeal, against them we set the other Fathers cited, the sacred Scriptures, the consensus of the schools, and above all the definition of the Lateran Council.

You will ask 2° whether the angels sometimes assume bodies.

I answer in the affirmative³, so that their apparitions do not always occur according to imagination. For what is seen by an imaginary vision is only in the imagination of the one seeing, nor is it seen constantly in the same way and indifferently by all, as is clear in those dreaming and the deranged. But Scripture introduces the angels appearing in such a way that they were seen constantly in the same way and indifferently by all: thus the angels appearing to Abraham were seen constantly and in the same way by him and his whole household, and by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; likewise the angel of Tobias was seen constantly and in the same way by all.

If you say: Just as the imagination of one, so that of a whole multitude and of all who encounter it can be altered, so that the same thing is seen constantly by all in the same way according to an imaginary vision,

I answer 1°. Granted that this can happen absolutely, it does not, however, happen so ordinarily, and therefore the argument from what commonly occurs always holds. 2°. I deny the antecedent. For this would happen either by God acting specially, or by an angel. Not by God

acting specially, since these apparitions sometimes occur for evil and shameful purposes, as is clear in the succubus and incubus demon, likewise in the demon tempting Christ and Eve. Not by an angel; for the finite and limited power of an angel does not seem able to be borne at once to things so diverse and continued for so long. Besides, an evil angel could do nothing upon the imagination of Christ, to whom he appeared in the desert, nor upon the imagination of Eve, still innocent, to whom he appeared under the form of a serpent. Finally, this does not seem sufficiently to agree with Scripture's manner of speaking. For it is expressly said, Genes., XVIII, 2: There appeared to him (namely, to Abraham) three men, whom the Apostle, ad Hebr., XIII, 2, says were angels.

But an angel assumes a body when it is united to it according to substance as mover to the movable, in order to represent his own properties, or those of God, whose legate he is, using that body as his own⁴. And he can form that body for himself out of any elements or mixed bodies whatsoever, because all bodies are subject to angels as regards local motion. Regularly, however, it is formed out of air or vapor, because these kinds of matter can easily be thickened and thus receive and retain a shape, and be variously colored by the addition of some body, as is evident in clouds⁵.

You will ask 3° whether the angels, in the bodies they have assumed, truly exercise works of sensitive life.

I answer in the negative, because they do not live in them a sensitive life. Nor do they have sense organs, properly so called, but only their likeness, and so their actions are only vital by way of likeness. Hence Raphael said, Tob., XII, 19: I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you, but I use an invisible food and drink which cannot be seen by men.

You will ask 4° whether there are several angels distinct only in number within the same species.

I answer: There neither are nor can there be several angels distinct only in number within the same species⁶.

Proof. Numerical multiplication within the same species is repugnant to that to which matter signed by quantity, or an order to it, is repugnant. But to angels, complete immaterial substances, matter, or an order to it, is repugnant. Therefore. — The minor is established from what has been said. — Proof of the major. Numerical multiplication within the same species is repugnant to that to which the principle of such multiplication is repugnant. But only matter signed by quantity, or an order to it, is the principle of numerical multiplication within the same species. Therefore. — The difficulty is in the minor.

Proof of the minor. The principle of numerical multiplication within the same species necessarily involves two things: First, that it be intrinsic and substantial, because two individuals, e.g., Peter and Paul, differ substantially; for they are two substances of the same species really distinct. Second, that it so multiply the substance that it nevertheless does not multiply the species, but preserves one and the same specifically in several individuals. But it is repugnant that this be supplied except by matter signed by quantity, or without an order to it. Therefore. — Proof of the minor, and first, that this is supplied by matter signed by quantity. Matter is something intrinsic and substantial, and by reason of the quantity it has or connotes, of which it is the immediate recipient and not the form, it has parts of the same nature. Therefore this can bring about numerical multiplication, while specific unity is preserved. — It is now proved that this cannot be supplied except by matter alone. It cannot be supplied by form: first, because it is proper to form to constitute the species, that is, to furnish the essential predicates. Therefore of itself it does not make things differ only in number, but also in species; for since that which constitutes essentially is the same as what is constitutive and distinctive, it makes things differ essentially. Second, the principle of individuation must be a principle of incommunicability to several inferiors; for an individual is not further communicable to other, inferior individuals. But form, since it is the principle of the specific degree, which of itself is communicable to many individuals, cannot be the principle of such incommunicability. Therefore.

You will say: This doctrine of St. Thomas was formerly condemned by the University of Paris. Therefore.

I answer that this condemnation, made inconsiderately, was solemnly revoked in the year 1325, by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, with the consent of the dean, the chapter, and several other learned men, and that the doctrine of St. Thomas was celebrated with various praises.

You will ask 5° when the angels were created.

I answer that they were not created before the world, as some Greek Fathers held, but together with the world⁷.

Thus the Lateran Council, cited above, defined, saying that God created the angelic and worldly creature at once from the beginning of time. Scripture favors this, Exod., XX, 11: In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them. But the angels are in the world and in heaven. And Eccli., XVIII, 1: He created all things together, not indeed with an instantaneous simultaneity, but with a simultaneity of uninterrupted time. Understand this also as regards species; for individuals of the rational soul are created daily.

If you say that Moses, in narrating the creation of all things, made no mention of the angels.

Augustine answers, lib. XI de Civit., c. 33, that the angels in the narrative of the world's creation were not passed over, but signified under the name of heaven or light⁸. Moreover, they were either passed over for this reason, or signified by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was speaking to an unrefined people, who could not yet grasp an incorporeal nature; and if it had been expressed to them that there were things above every corporeal nature, it would have been an occasion of idolatry for them, to which they were prone, and from which Moses especially intended to call them back. Nor does it matter that afterward, in the course of Genesis, he makes mention of angels; for he does this with such caution as to represent them under the appearance of bodies, and regularly to indicate that they are only ministers and messengers, so as thus to remove every occasion of idolatry.

It is also rightly answered, with St. Jerome, Epist. 139, that Moses did not make express mention of the angels,

because this was not part of his purpose, since there he intended only to describe the order of the creation of corporeal things and the series of days.

You will ask 6° where the angels were created.

I answer that it is more probable that they were created in the empyrean heaven⁹; because, since they precede all corporeal creatures in dignity, and preside over the whole of nature as its superiors, it was fitting that they should be created in the highest of the heavens. Scripture favors this, which, Ezech., XXVIII, 13 and 14, speaking of the first angel under the figure of the prince of Tyre, says: Thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God.... Thou a cherub stretched out and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God. And below, 16: And I cast thee out from the mountain of God, and destroyed thee, O covering cherub! Now Paradise, or the mountain of God, is the empyrean heaven, in which all the saints will be.

You will ask 7° how great is the multitude of angels.

I answer that, according to Scripture, it is very great and astonishing. For it is said, Daniel, VII, 10: Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him. And Apocal., V, 11: Their number was thousands of thousands. By these manners of speaking an almost innumerable multitude is suggested. But according to St. Thomas¹⁰, following St. Dionysius, c. 14 de coelesti Hierarchia, it is reasonably said that the multitude of angels incomparably exceeds the multitude of material species. But how much the angels exceed the number of material species, and whether they exceed the number of men who have been, are, and will be: this seems to us uncertain, nor do we think sufficiently well-founded what is alleged by some for or against it.

St. Thomas, qq. 52 and 53.

You will ask 1° whether the angels are in a place.

I answer that they are in some manner in a place¹. It is clear from Scripture, which relates that the angels operate immediately around us, move themselves from place to place, and are in certain places. See Gen., XVIII, 2-16, and XIX, 1-22; Judges, II, 1-5; Tob., VIII, 3; Luke, II, 9-15; Matt., XXVIII, 2-7; Apoc., XII, 7.

You will ask 2° how the angels are in a place.

I answer. To be in a place is said in four ways: circumscriptively, definitively, sacramentally, and everywhere. To be in a place circumscriptively is for the thing located to be so surrounded or circumscribed by the place that the whole of the thing located corresponds to the whole of the containing place, and each part of the thing located to each part of the containing place, as liquid in a vessel. For something to be in a place definitively is for it to be so determined to one place that it is, as it were, bounded or defined by that place, and cannot at once and at the same time occupy another adequate place. To be in a place sacramentally is proper to the body of Christ in the Eucharist, and is to be under the species of bread and wine after the manner of a spiritual substance, yet in such a way that it can at the same time be elsewhere, if the bread and wine are consecrated elsewhere. To be everywhere is understood from the terms themselves.

It is certain that the angels are not everywhere, for that is proper to God; nor are they sacramentally, because that mode of existing is proper to Christ by force of the consecration; nor are they in a place circumscriptively, since, being pure spirits, they lack the quantity of mass which is the ground for being located circumscriptively. It remains, therefore, that they are in a place definitively.

You will ask 3° by what the angels are in a place.

I answer that they are in a connatural place through an operation that is virtually transient — that is, one that produces some effect outside itself².

Proof. An angel is in a place by that through which it really touches the place. But it does not really touch the place except through an operation virtually transient. Therefore. — The major is certain, both from the example of bodies — for a body is said to be in a place through its quantity, because through this it touches the place — and

from reason, because to be in a place is to be physically present to it and undistant, and consequently really to touch it.

Proof of the minor. 1° — Contact is twofold: one properly so called, which is of dimensive quantity, and this does not befit an angel; the other improperly so called, which is of the quantity of power, namely its act, or an operation virtually transient, by which it subjects a body or place to itself and makes it depend on itself. Therefore. 2° — An angel touches a place and becomes present to it by that through which it occupies a place now greater, now smaller, now indivisible. But it has this only through an operation virtually transient, which, since it is free, is terminated now at a great, now at a small, now at an indivisible place; for although this angelic operation is in itself and on the part of the angel indivisible, it is nevertheless virtually, and on the part of its term, divisible.

I said: « at least in a connatural place. » A connatural place is called that to which an angel applies itself by free will, and which it accordingly subjects to itself; a violent place, on the contrary, is that to which it is bound against its will, and by which it is thereby prevented from operating and existing elsewhere.

The common opinion of the Thomists, therefore, is that angels are in a violent place, not through operation, but through passion; because the ground of being located in spiritual substances is the contact of the power of the locatable thing and of the place, as has been said. But just as an angel, through operation, touches the body on which it acts, subjecting it to itself, so through passion it is touched by a body as by an instrument of a higher power, and is subjected to it and becomes present to it. Nor is this to change the formal grounds of existing in a place, but to assign them proportionately; just as we say that the body of Christ is in heaven through the contact of extensive quantity, and in the sacrament indivisibly through consecration.

Moreover, many think that angels, even in a violent place — as the demons in hell — operate more or less, according as they are more or less bound and prevented from operating here or there; for if those who are in the air, and are tormented by the fire of hell, are nonetheless permitted to operate, why not those existing in hell? But what do they do there?

They act upon others, tormenting one another; they act upon the souls of the reprobate, tormenting them, as instruments of divine justice.

From the preceding doctrine you will gather: 1° that an angel can be at once in several inadequate places, even distant ones, within the sphere of its activity, without existing in the middle — for example, in the four corners of a hall, without existing in the middle — because it can operate in the four corners without operating in the middle.

You will gather 2° that, if we speak strictly, an angel is not properly in a place, but only improperly so; because, speaking strictly and philosophically, only that place is properly called a place which circumscriptively contains the thing located — which does not befit angels, who are in a place rather by containing and subjecting the place to themselves through operation, than by being contained by it. If, however, we speak generally of place, so that whatever is really and substantially present to a place is said to be in that place, then angels are truly and properly in a place. Whence the author rightly observed that to be in a place is said equivocally of an angel and of a body³.

You will gather 3° that angels can be moved locally, namely in the same manner in which they are in a place⁴; because the local motion of angels is nothing other than the diverse contacts of diverse places, not at once, but successively. But since angels are not everywhere, they can touch diverse places successively. Therefore they can be moved locally. And Scripture openly teaches this. Thus Matt., XXVIII, 2: An angel of the Lord descended from heaven. Luke, I, 11: The angel Gabriel was sent to the virgin. Matt., IV, 11: Angels came and ministered to him. Job, I, 7 and II, 2, Satan says: I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it, and elsewhere many times.

You will gather 4° that an angel can pass by a discrete motion from one extreme to another, without passing through the middle⁵. Here

the imagination resists, because it does not transcend the continuum, and does not apprehend spiritual things except after the manner of bodily ones. Let the imagination, therefore, be dismissed, and let reason alone be heeded. But reason teaches that, since an angel is in a place through a free operation, which does not depend on the place, but makes the place depend on itself, it can operate in one place — say, at one end of this hall — and immediately operate at the opposite end, without operating in the middle, and thus pass from one extremity to the other, without passing through the middle.

St. Thomas, from q. 54 to q. 60.

You will ask 1° whether angels need species, for knowing themselves and other things besides themselves.

I answer 1°. The angel, for knowing itself, does not need an impressed species, but knows itself through its own substance, which takes the place of an impressed species, not of an expressed one¹.

Proof of the first part. The impressed species, a substitute for the object, is not necessary, except so that the object, which is outside the intellect, may become intimately present to it, and that which is material may become immaterial with an immateriality of the same order as the intellect that understands; for if the object is of itself intimately present to the intellect in intelligible being, the species is superfluous, as I said at length in the treatise on God, dissertation on the vision of God. But the substance of the angel is intimately present to its own intellect, and immaterial with an immateriality of the same order as it, as is clear. Therefore.

Proof of the second part, because, although the substance of the angel is in itself intelligible, since it is immaterial, it is not, however, in so great a degree of immateriality as to be actually understood², as we said of the essence of God in the treatise on God, dissertation 4. Hence for this an expressed species is required.

I answer 2°. The angel does not know things other than itself through its own substance, but for this it needs impressed species³.

Proof. For the cognition of any object it is required, as has already been said, that the object be intimately present to the intellect in intelligible being, either through itself, or through a species representative of it, according to that commonly received saying of Augustine: « From the object and the power, knowledge is born. » But created beings cannot be intimately present to the angelic intellect through themselves, that is, in their own entity, as is clear of itself. Nor can the substance of the angel be a representative species of them: for it is neither their likeness, nor their effect, nor at least their adequate cause; for although angels concur toward certain forms, it is not, however, immediately nor adequately, but only through local motion, by applying active things to passive things. Therefore, however much they may penetrate their own substance, they cannot in it, as in a cause, distinctly know other beings: since, as these are not contained in it adequately and distinctly, neither can they shine forth in it.

You will ask 2° whether the species by which the angel knows things other than itself are received from things, or innate and connatural.

I answer. The species of angels are not received from things, but implanted by God at their creation, and therefore connatural and innate⁴.

Proof 1°, from authority. Ezech., XXVIII, 12 and 13, it is said of Lucifer: Thou wast the seal of resemblance, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty..., in the day that thou wast created. Dionys., de Div. nom., c. 7: « Angels do not gather divine knowledge from divisible or sensible things. » And Aug., book II on Genes. ad litt., c. 8, n. 16: « The other things which are below [the Angels] are so created, that they first come to be in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own genus. » This can be understood only of creation in intelligible being, which they have through species.

Proof 2°, from reason⁵. The lower spiritual substances, namely human souls, have being akin to body, inasmuch as they are the forms of bodies, and therefore from this very mode of being it belongs to them that they attain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. Therefore angels, since they are wholly and immaterially absolved from bodies and subsist in intelligible being, do not attain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, but through an intelligible influx by which they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.

It is confirmed. An exterior material object cannot naturally act immediately upon a purely spiritual power, moving it and impressing upon it its own species. Nor can it be said that the exterior material object would not act upon the angel, but that the angel would act upon it, abstracting species from it; because, if the angel did not already have the species of those material objects beforehand, they would be unknown to it, and consequently it could not apply its power to them, nor operate upon them, so as to abstract species from them. Likewise, angels often know objects outside the sphere of their activity, upon which they therefore cannot operate. Finally, if the angel had its perfection from bodies, as our soul does, it would depend on them: which cannot be said.

The argument that is objected concerning the knowledge of future things will be resolved below.

You will ask 3° whether the species by which angels understand are universal, and the more universal, the higher the angels are.

By universal species we understand those that represent many things, and the more universal, the more things they represent, not only in general, but in particular and distinctly.

I answer affirmatively⁶. Because the more a created being is nearer and more like God in the intellectual order, the fewer and more universal are the species by which it understands. But angels

are nearer and more like God in the intellectual order than men are, and the higher angels more than the lower. Therefore. — The minor is certain. — Proof of the major. The more a created being is nearer and more like God in the intellectual order, the more it participates the divine perfections in that order. But God's perfection is that he understands all things through one medium, namely through his own essence, which is to him in place of a species. Therefore.

You will ask 4° whether angels know material singulars. I answer affirmatively⁷. It is of faith.

Proof from Scripture. 1° No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to that of Psal. XC, 11: He hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. 2° According to the faith, these lower things are administered through angels, according to that of Hebr., I, 14: All are ministering spirits. But, if they did not have knowledge of singulars, they could have no providence over the things that are done in this world, since acts belong to singulars. Therefore.

The reason, however, is sought from the principle of Augustine commonly received, namely that God from eternity formed the ideas of the things to be produced, then impressed them upon the angelic mind, and at length produced them outwardly, so that the angelic species are derived and exemplified from the divine ideas. This being laid down, I thus reason with the author⁸: The ideal notions existing in God are effective of things, not only as to form, but also as to matter, and therefore they are likenesses of things as to both; and on this account things are known by God, not only in their universal nature on the part of form, but also in their singularity on the part of matter. But as natural things flow forth from the divine intellect according to matter and form, so as to be composed of both, so the forms or species of the angelic intellect flow forth for the knowing of both. And therefore through innate forms or species they know things in their singularity and universality, inasmuch as they are like the active forms, namely the ideas existing in the divine mind, although they themselves are not productive of things.

You will ask 5° whether angels know with certainty, by natural light, future things that are merely contingent, such as the free acts of man.

I answer. Negatively⁹.

Proof 1°, from the authority of Scripture and the Fathers. That which is a proper sign of divinity does not belong to angels. But to know future contingents is a proper sign of divinity. Therefore. — Proof of the minor 1°, from Scripture. Isa., XLI, 23: Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.

Proof 2°, from reason¹⁰. Future contingents cannot be known with certainty by angels, either in their causes, or in themselves. Not in their created causes, because these are contingent and indifferent to either alternative; nor in the uncreated cause, namely the free decree of God, which is by nature impervious to every created intellect. Not in themselves; for the reason God knows them with certainty in themselves is that he sees all things in his eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and encompasses it; hence his one glance is borne upon all things that are done throughout the whole of time, as though present, and he sees all things as they are in themselves, as we said concerning the knowledge of God, at q. 14. But the angelic intellect, and any created intellect whatever, falls short of the divine eternity. Therefore.

You will say: Angels have the species of future things before they come to be; for when future things become present, angels do not receive new species for knowing them, but know them through their innate ones, as we have said. But, once the species is given and the intellect is unimpeded, sufficient principles are posited for understanding the object. Therefore there is no reason why the knowledge of future things should be denied to angels. — It is confirmed. The truth of those future things, taken determinately, is something created. Therefore it is proportioned to some created intellect; why not to the angelic intellect, as the most perfect among created things?

I answer to this argument, which contains the height of the difficulty, from the author¹¹, that the angelic species are indeed representative in first act of all singulars, yet they do not represent them in second act, except while they exist; and this for a twofold reason. The first is that only when things exist do they have the nature by which they are assimilated to the species that are in the angel's mind; but while they are future, they do not yet have the nature by which they are assimilated to them. The second reason is that the angelic species does not represent in act, nor does the angel naturally know in act, except what in fact pertains to this universe. For the angel's knowledge is finite, and no more fitting boundary can be assigned to it than the breadth of this universe; and besides, if it were extended beyond the universe, since there would be no reason why it should be extended to one thing rather than another, it would attain all possible things, at least divisively. Moreover, outside this universe there is no cause except God; but for no created intellect is it connatural to know things in God. Furthermore, future things do not yet belong to the order of this universe, but will belong to it when they exist.

But these things are rooted in a higher principle of Sts. Augustine and Thomas, of which we have already spoken, namely that the angelic species do not represent the natures of things in just any way whatever, but according as those natures themselves descend and are derived from the divine ideas, from which the species themselves are also derived and exemplified; hence the angelic species, as has been said, have in representing what the divine ideas have in causing. Now the divine ideas cause natures in individuals successively. Therefore the species themselves, which are derived from these ideas, receive the power of representing natures in individuals successively, and thus they are apt to represent individuals when they are produced in the universe by the divine ideas themselves, not when they are not.

You will ask 6° whether angels naturally know the thoughts or secrets of hearts.

By the thoughts of hearts we here understand¹² the free immanent acts, both of intellect and of will, which are manifested neither by any exterior effect or sign, nor by the very will of the one thinking.

I answer. Negatively.

Proof 1°, from authority¹³. What is proper to God does not belong to angels. But to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor, from Scripture. Ⅱ Paralip., VI, 30, it is said: Be merciful, and render to every man according to his ways, which thou knowest him to have in his heart; for thou alone knowest the hearts of the children of men.

Proof 2°, from reason¹⁴. Things which depend on the free will of man alone and on God, apart from any dependence on natural causes or connection with them, are not naturally knowable by angels, but only by the one willing himself, and by God, to whom the will is subject. But the free acts of the will and intellect depend on the will alone and on God alone, apart from any dependence on natural causes or connection with them. Therefore. — The minor is certain. For no created cause, but God alone, who is the first and universal principle, and the last end of our will, can flow into it and act upon it and determine it, as has already been said; and this is clear, because the will itself has full dominion, absolute from every creature, and full indifference as to its own acts, so that it may posit them or not posit them, may revoke or continue those already posited. — Proof of the major. The angel does not have a natural power of understanding whatever is intelligible, but only that which pertains to the order of this universe, either as a part of it, or as having a connection with it. But the free internal act does not pertain to the order of this universe, nor does it have any connection with it. Therefore. — The major is clear from what was said in the preceding answer. — Proof of the minor. The order of the universe consists in the subordination and connection of natural causes, by which particulars are acted upon and ruled through universals, corporeal things through spiritual, and lower things through higher; hence, in order that something may pertain to the order of the universe, it must either be a higher cause suited by nature to move lower things, or depend upon them. But the free internal act is outside the whole order of natural causes, so that it depends on none of them, but only on the will freely and indifferently eliciting it, and on God alone determining it, as has already been said. Therefore.

You will say: By the sole consent of the one thinking, his thought becomes able to be made manifest to an angel, as is commonly admitted. But the consent of the one thinking adds nothing to the knowability of his thought, but only an extrinsic denomination. Therefore before that consent it was knowable by the angel.

I answer that, although the consent of the one thinking adds nothing directly to the knowability of his thought, it nevertheless adds something indirectly, inasmuch as it makes his thought in some way pertain to the one to whom he directs it. But the angel knows whatever pertains to himself.

You will ask 7° whether angels naturally know the mysteries of grace.

I answer negatively¹⁵. This is clear from the preceding answer. For if the angel cannot know the thoughts of another that depend on his will, much less can he know those things that depend on the will of God alone. And thus the Apostle argues, I Cor., II, 11: For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So also the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.

You will ask 8° whether the angel is always understanding in act.

I answer that the angel necessarily always understands himself in act¹⁶.

Proof. The angel understands himself through his own substance, as through an intelligible species, as has been said. But his own substance is always intimately present to his intellect, and always informs it in intelligible being. Therefore he always necessarily understands it in act; just as, if an eye

kept open were continuously informed by the species of some illuminated object, it would always necessarily see it.

You will ask 9° whether the angel is properly and formally discursive.

I answer. Negatively¹⁷.

Proof. To reason discursively, properly and formally, is to know one thing that is less known from another that is more known, by distinct acts of cognition, such that one prior cognition is the cause of the other, or such that from the prior cognition of one the cognition of the other is brought forth, as happens in us, who, on account of the weakness of our intellectual light, cannot know at once and at the same time the principles and the conclusions included in them. But angels do not know in this way; rather, on account of the fullness of their intellectual light and the universality of their species, they immediately, at first and in a single glance, attain the whole power of the principles, and consequently what is contained in them and can be deduced from them: and therefore they are called intelligences. Therefore.

As to the will,

You will ask whether the angel loves himself and God necessarily as to exercise.

I answer 1°. It seems more probable that the angel loves himself necessarily as to exercise.

Proof 1°. The angel knows himself necessarily as to exercise, as has been said above. Therefore he necessarily wills to know himself; for although this knowledge is necessary, it is nevertheless voluntary. — I subsume. But to will to know oneself is to love oneself; for it is to will a good to oneself, since it is a good for the angel that he know himself.

Proof 2°. Every motion is reduced to some motion determined by nature, just as in an animal all motions are reduced to the motion of the heart, which flows from the animal's nature as its inseparable property. Therefore in the angel, just as every act of understanding is reduced to the knowledge of self, as to the first cognition determined by nature, so all his love is reduced to the love of self, as to the first

love determined by nature; for understanding and willing proceed at an equal pace, and are causes of one another in a different genus.

We do not, therefore, derive this necessary love from the substance of the angel as from an object, as the defenders of the opposite opinion suppose; for we admit that no object, except the universal and infinite good, namely God clearly seen, can fill the capacity of our will and necessarily seize it. But we derive it from the angel's own substance as from a principle from which it flows as a property. And hence the chief objections that are raised are resolved.

I answer 2°. The angel loves God with a love necessary as to exercise.

This follows from the preceding; because it is impossible that the angel love himself with a love necessary as to exercise, without at the same time, and with the same necessity, loving the author and preserver of himself as a good proper to himself.

But immediately a difficulty arises. The angel loves himself after sin with the very same necessity with which he loves himself before sin; for the reasons of the first answer hold good for every state. If, then, from the necessary love of self as to exercise there necessarily follows a necessary love of God as to exercise, it follows that the angel, after sin and in the actual state of sin, loves God with a love necessary as to exercise. But how can an actual love of God stand together with an actual hatred of him, an actual turning toward him with an actual turning away from him? Nor may you say that in sin there is an actual aversion from God only as supernatural author, which can stand together with an actual turning to God as natural author; for on the contrary, while the angel sins directly against God as supernatural author, he sins indirectly against him as natural author, as we shall say below. He is, therefore, actually turned away by sin from God as natural author, and at the same time turned toward God as natural author by a necessary love.

I answer briefly, that the demons hold God in hatred as supernatural author and just avenger of their crime,

but that they love him as natural author, and are turned toward God as natural author physically and necessarily by nature, but are turned away from him morally and freely by sin: in which there is no contradiction, because these are not predicated of the same thing under the same aspect and in the same manner.