Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

St. Thomas, articles of q. 29 until q. 38.

Person is rightly defined by Boethius, in the book On the Two Natures: "An individual substance of a rational nature." This definition Saint Thomas explains and defends here and elsewhere, and with him theologians commonly.¹

Whence you will infer that hypostasis and subsistence extend more broadly than person;² for what hypostasis and subsistence signify in the whole genus of substances, this name "person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.

The question here is one of no small difficulty: by what the divine persons are constituted. For its resolution.

Note 1° that relation involves a twofold concept, namely the concept of being in and the concept of being toward. The concept of being in is common to all accidents, and in the divine, to all relations, with this difference: that in created relations it implies inherence, since it is an accident; in the divine, subsistence, since it is substance, that is, identified with the divine nature; whence the foundation of the divine relation, insofar as it is real, is not something real and distinct, as in creatures, but the very identification with the divine nature. The concept of being toward is specific to relation, and by it relation is distinguished from other accidents, and diverse relations are disjoined from one another, insofar as they express a respect toward diverse terms.

Note 2° with Cajetan, whom John of St. Thomas and several other Thomists follow, that within the very concept of being toward a twofold concept, or twofold aspect, can again be distinguished: the first, insofar as it is a relative entity in itself, or in the signified act, and affecting the subject as that by which it is such; the second, insofar as it itself, in exercised act, actually refers as that which to the term. For it is prior to conceive the relation in itself, entitatively affecting the subject as that by which, than to conceive it as actually referring to the term: just as it is prior to conceive whiteness entitatively and in signified act as affecting the wall as that by which it is white, than to conceive it as actually rendering it white, although they occur at once and simultaneously in time.

Nor should you say that this concept of being toward, affecting the subject as that by which, or in signified act, coincides with the concept of being in. For the concept of being in pertains not only to the line of relative being, but also of absolute being, since it implies not only the inherence or subsistence of the toward itself, but also the intrinsic and absolute predicates of created or uncreated being: such that, if it be a created and accidental relation, it implies not only inherence, but also the character of a limited, dependent, potential being, etc., and all the perfections and imperfections of such an accident; if it be an uncreated relation, the concept of being in implies not only subsistent and real being, but also the very divine entity with all the attributes and perfections which are included in the word divine.

I say: The divine persons are constituted by relations, not under the concept of a form referring in exercised act, but under the concept of an entity or form affecting the subject and hypostatically subsisting.³

Proof by argument, by which various opinions are at the same time refuted. The divine persons are constituted by something real. But that real thing in the divine cannot be other than relation. Therefore.

The major premise is established. For the divine persons are real and are really distinguished from one another independently of the intellect; and that by which they are, and by which they are distinguished, is that by which they are constituted.

Proof of the minor. Every real thing that we can conceive in the divine persons is either the persons themselves considered entirely in themselves, or something absolute common to all, or something notional proper to each,⁴ and this notional element is threefold, namely origin, innascibility with respect to the person of the Father — concerning which the difficulty is greatest — and relation. But of all these grounds, none except relation can constitute a divine person. Therefore.

Each of the minor's parts must be proved.

Proof of the first part of the minor, against Praepositivus⁵ and Gregory of Rimini. That by which the divine persons are constituted in the character of such a person is that by which they are distinguished from one another. But the divine persons are not distinguished from one another in their entirety, otherwise they would differ by essence and in essence — in which, however, they agree. Therefore. Hence in the Fourth Lateran Council, Book I of the Decretals, chapter Firmiter, it is said: "The most holy Trinity is undivided according to the common essence, but distinct according to the personal properties." And in the Council of Florence, session 1, it is asserted that "the divine persons differ by their properties." Whence this opinion of Praepositivus, which Saint Thomas mentions below, q. 32, a. 2, o., is commonly rejected by theologians and marked with various censures.

Proof of the second part of the minor. What is common to the three persons cannot constitute a particular person distinct from the others. But all absolute things in God are common to the three persons, as all theologians admit. Therefore. Whence this opinion, which is attributed to John of Ripa, Lychetus, and a few of the ancients, has already been banished from the schools, as at least erroneous and rash.

Proof of the third part of the minor, and first, that the person of the Father is not constituted by innascibility, against Vasquez and Alarcón: because innascibility is taken either formally or fundamentally. If formally, then it posits nothing,⁶ but expresses only the negation of a principle; but the person of the Father is real and is constituted by something real. If it is taken fundamentally, that is, as the foundation of such a negation, then either that foundation is absolute, and thus incapable of constituting a person, as we have said, or it is relative, which can be nothing other than the relation of paternity.

Proof again of the third part of the minor, namely that the persons are not constituted by active and passive origins,⁷ which opinion is commonly attributed to Saint Bonaventure.

Against the notion of origin is that it should constitute a person. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent, first: Person implies, from its essential concept, a fixed and permanent being, and being in the state of accomplished fact, since it is the ultimate term of nature, rendering it incommunicably subsistent. But origin is conceived essentially as being in the process of becoming: namely, active origin, as an influx and egress from a principle; passive origin, as a way and a tending toward a term. Therefore. — Proof, second, of the same antecedent: Active origin presupposes the person from whom it proceeds; for actions belong to supposits, and it is prior for the person to be than for the person to act. Therefore it does not constitute it. Passive origin, moreover, is presupposed for the constitution of the person, since it is the way toward constituting it; whence it cannot be said to constitute it formally, but only by way of process and causally: just as Peter is constituted formally a man by humanity, but only by way of process and causally by nativity: but the question here concerns the formal constitutive. Therefore.

It remains, then, that relation alone is the constitutive of the divine persons, because it alone is that by which they are distinguished from one another; and it alone distinguishes, because it alone brings opposition and incommunicability, for all absolute things are common to the three persons. Whence that celebrated saying of Boethius: "Substance affords unity, relation multiplies the Trinity," and that well-known saying of Anselm: "All things in the divine are one and the same, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way." And in the Second Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith, it is thus stated: "In the relation of the persons, number is discerned." And below: "By this alone do they suggest number, that they are toward one another."

By relation, I say, the persons are constituted: not indeed by relation in exercised act, or conceived as a form actually and in exercised act regarding, or as it were looking toward, the term as that which, for taken thus it presupposes the person and follows upon generation; but by relation conceived in signified act as that by which, according to quiddity, insofar as it affects the subject, and indeed substantially, as being identified with the divine nature, under which concept it has the character of a hypostatic and subsisting form. Note these things carefully for the solution of difficult objections.

Subsistence implies four things: 1° singularity, for things do not subsist in the universal; 2° a mode of existing through itself, independently of another sustaining it, which is called the perseity of independence; 3° a mode of existing incommunicably, or the incommunicability of a nature as suppositized and terminated to another term and supposit, which is called the perseity of incommunicability; 4° the very concrete instance of the nature by way of one possessing it, and as the quod-principle of operations.

I say, first: In God, considered in himself and with the relations and persons prescinded from, there is given an absolute subsistence, which exists through itself, independently of another sustaining it, and constitutes the quod-principle of acting.¹

So Augustine, book 7 of On the Trinity, chapter 4; Jerome, Letter 57, to Damasus; Cyril of Alexandria, and others, but above all Saint Thomas, cited in the margin.

Proof. God, considered in himself and with the relations and persons prescinded from, truly subsists. But not by a relative and personal subsistence. Therefore by an essential and absolute subsistence. — The minor is clear. — The major, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in several ways.

First: God, considered in himself as prescinded from the persons, creates and works ad extra — otherwise the works of the Trinity ad extra would not be undivided; likewise he is understood as understanding and willing in that prior consideration. Therefore he is also understood as subsisting. — The consequence is clear, since, subsistence being a substantial act, it belongs to the nature prior to operation, which by common concept is not a substantial act. Whence Saint Thomas says below, q. 75, a. 2, o.: "Nothing can operate through itself, except what subsists through itself." And that common axiom: "Actions belong to subsisting things."

Second: To subsist expresses the greatest perfection; for it expresses the most perfect mode of being. But every perfection belongs to God considered in himself, with the persons prescinded from. Therefore. — The minor is clear, both because God, considered in himself and prescinded from the relations, is pure and infinite act, being itself in itself and from itself, independently of anything else; and also because he draws no perfection from the relations, as we said above, but rather bestows his own upon them. Therefore.

Third: To be, or to exist through itself, belongs to God antecedently to the persons. Therefore also to subsist. — The consequence is clear, because by absolute subsistence we understand nothing other than the perseity of independence, that is, to exist through oneself; and elsewhere, in the principles of Saint Thomas, existence presupposes subsistence, for to exist through oneself is the act of a subsisting thing. — The antecedent, moreover, is manifest; for existence is something absolute, indeed the very essence of God, apart from any virtual distinction.

For the solution of objections, note that the adversaries do not deny that God, prescinded from the persons, exists through himself independently of anything else, and is the quod-principle of operations; but they deny that the formality by which he is such a constitutive can be called subsistence, because it does not afford incommunicability. We, however, say that it can be called subsistence — not simply, but with a qualification: absolute subsistence, or, if you prefer, inadequate subsistence — both because the holy Fathers spoke thus, and because, although the divine relation does not afford the perseity of independence, it is nonetheless called subsistence by the adversaries themselves, because it affords the perseity of incommunicability. Why, then, should not the formality of which we speak be called subsistence, since, although it does not afford the perseity of incommunicability, it nonetheless affords the perseity of independence, and the character of a quod-principle in acting? But since this is a question of terminology, I do not dwell on it longer.

I say, second: Besides absolute subsistence, there are in God three relative and personal subsistences.

So Saint Thomas here, q. 29, a. 2, ad 2, where he says: "Just as we say, in the plural, three persons and three subsistences in the divine, so the Greeks say three hypostases." And below, q. 40, a. 3, ad 2: "By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a Person, and is a someone, or hypostasis."

The first argument, a priori. According to the Catholic faith, there are in God three persons, three hypostases, three supposits. But person, hypostasis, and supposit are formally constituted by subsistence. Therefore there are in the divine three subsistences. — Proof of the consequence. For the multiplication of a substantive noun, such as supposit and person, the multiplication of the form is required. Whence, if there were in God but a single subsistence, even if modified by three relations — just as there is a single nature modified by three relations — we could no more say that there are three persons in the divine than three gods, but we would be bound to acknowledge a single person, on account of the unity of subsistence. Indeed, we could not even say three subsisting beings adjectivally, as we now say three divine beings, because adjectival names are not multiplied unless the supposit is multiplied — for example, the same man having several skills is not called several craftsmen; and if subsistence were not multiplied, the supposit, which subsistence formally constitutes, would not be multiplied, as we said just now.

The second argument, a priori. It belongs to the nature of subsistence as such — insofar as it abstracts from the communicable and the incommunicable — to render the nature as having being by way of a subsisting whole, and as a quod-principle of acting; for as the common axiom holds, "actions belong to subsisting things." And for this reason we admit in God, prescinded from the persons, an absolute subsistence, by which the quod-principle of the essential and common actions is constituted. But in God there are not only operations that are essential and common to the whole Trinity, but also notional² operations, proper to the divine persons — such as to generate, for the Father; to breathe forth, for the Son; to be breathed forth, for the Holy Spirit. Therefore there must be given, not only diverse modes of incommunicability, but true and distinct relative subsistences, by which are constituted distinct quod-principles of these notional actions — namely, the Father as the quod-principle of active generation, the Son as the quod-principle of active spiration, and indeed the Holy Spirit as the qui-term of this spiration: because, just as the quod-principle, so also the qui-term of this action must be subsisting; for just as actions, so too passions, or quasi-passions, belong to subsisting things.

The third argument, taken a posteriori from the mystery of the Incarnation. The human nature was united to the Word, not in something common to himself and the other persons — otherwise the three persons would be incarnate — but in something proper to himself. But it was united in his personal subsistence, supplying the place of created subsistence. Therefore there is given in the Son a personal subsistence virtually distinct from the absolute; and if in the Son, then by the same reasoning in the Father and the Holy Spirit as well.

That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father is a common and certain matter of faith, which Scripture expressly hands down. John 15:26: When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father; and this the First Council of Constantinople decisively defined against the Arians and the Macedonians — who, reducing the Son and the Holy Spirit to the order of creatures, said that the Son was made by the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit by the Son alone — by adding to the Nicene Creed these words concerning the Holy Spirit: "Who proceeds from the Father."

But the Greeks deny that he proceeds from the Son, though they do not deny every respect toward the Son in him. For they grant that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and that he is from the Father through the Son — indeed, that he is from the Son, that he flows forth, wells up, emanates, is breathed forth from the Son; but not that he proceeds from him, since they hold that this would imply two principles, and that the Father and the Son are not a single principle of that procession — because, in their usage, "to proceed" designates a procession from a principle which does not itself proceed from another. Whence the question appears to be almost one of terminology, born of ignorance or obstinacy.

I say: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.¹

Proof, first, from the authority of Scripture. Scripture asserts three things which cannot stand if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son: first, that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son; second, that the Son sends the Holy Spirit; third, that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son. Therefore:

First, the Holy Spirit receives from the Son. John 16:13-14:

He will not speak of himself; but whatever he shall hear, he shall speak, and the things that are to come he shall declare to you. He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine, and shall declare it to you. But in the divine, one person does not receive from another except because he proceeds from that other. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. What one receives from another is either something accidental or something substantial. But the Holy Spirit does not receive anything accidental from the Son, for both are devoid of accident. Therefore he receives something substantial, and indeed the very substance through a substantial action, which is to proceed in substance from the Son. Likewise, the Holy Spirit receives knowledge from the Son; for from him he hears whatever he will declare. But for him, to know is to be, as Augustine says, Tractate 99 on John, n. 4. And this is clear, since in God knowledge is not distinct from essence.

Second, the Son sends the Holy Spirit.² John 15:26: When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send you from the Father. And chapter 16:7: If I do not go, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you. But for the Holy Spirit to be sent by the Son is for him to proceed from him. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The sending of one by another occurs either as by a superior, through command; or as by one wiser, through counsel; or through procession or origin, as from a principle. But the Holy Spirit is not sent by the Son as by a superior, through command; nor as by one wiser, through counsel. Therefore as from a principle, through procession or origin.

Third, the Holy Spirit is called³ the Spirit of the Son. Acts 16:7: And when they had come into Mysia, they attempted to go into Bithynia, and the Spirit of Jesus did not allow them. Galatians 4:6: God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts; and elsewhere. From which I argue thus. The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son in the same way that he is called the Spirit of the Father, Matthew 10:20: The Spirit of your Father, who speaks in you. But he is called the Spirit of the Father precisely insofar as he proceeds from the Father. Therefore. — Likewise, the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son either because he proceeds from the Son, or because the Son proceeds from him. Not the second. Therefore the first. — Proof of the major. The Holy Spirit is not called the Spirit of the Son by reason of subjection or servitude, but as a coequal person. Therefore by reason of origin — namely, because he proceeds from the Son, or the Son from him; for nothing else can be assigned.

Proof, second, from the Greek Fathers who flourished before the schism, and from the general councils. Saint Athanasius, Oration 3 Against the Arians: "Whoever," he says, "has the Spirit, has this from the Word." And in the Creed inscribed under his name: "The Holy Spirit, from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding." Saint Basil, book 5 Against Eunomius, proves that the Holy Spirit is third in order in the Most Holy Trinity, and second from the Son, "in that he has his being from him." Saint Epiphanius, in the Ancoratus, n. 8: "The Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son..., proceeding from the Father and the Son." Saint Cyril of Alexandria, with the Synod of Alexandria, in the Letter to Nestorius, n. 10: "Although the Spirit subsists in his own person, and is considered eternal in himself insofar as he is, and is not the Son, he is nevertheless not foreign to him, since he is named the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth; and accordingly he also proceeds from him and from God the Father."

Moreover, this letter of Saint Cyril was read and approved in five general councils — the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth. The same truth, with the Greeks present and consenting, was afterward defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, under Innocent III; the Second Council of Lyons, under Gregory X; and the Council of Florence, under Eugene IV.

Proof by arguments. First: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be distinguished from him; for the persons are distinguished solely by relation of origin.⁴ Therefore. The Council of Florence employed this argument against the Greeks, although the Scotists do not admit it.

Second: All things in the divine are common, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, as the commonly received axiom holds. But between the Father and the Son there is no relative opposition by reason of active spiration. Therefore this is common to both.

Third: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son would not have the whole essence of the Father, and accordingly would not be the Son, nor coequal with the Father. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. He would not have the same will as the Father; for if he had it, he would produce the Holy Spirit through it, just as the Father produces him. Therefore. Suppose you say: The Son has the same intellect as the Father, and yet does not produce a Word as the Father does; likewise, the Holy Spirit has the same will as the Father, yet does not produce another Holy Spirit, as the Father does.

Response: the disparity is that the Son, proceeding through the intellect, by his very procession exhausts the whole fecundity of the divine intellect, since he is its adequate term; and thus there remains no other Word to be produced. Likewise the Holy Spirit, proceeding through the will, equally exhausts the whole fecundity of the divine will, as being its adequate term; whence there remains no other term to be produced. But when the Word, through his generation, receives the will from the Father, this will is not yet conceived as exhausted, nor as having its adequate term through the procession of the Holy Spirit, since the Word is conceived as proceeding prior to the Holy Spirit. And therefore the will is no less fecund in the Son for the production of the Holy Spirit than it is in the Father.

Fourth: Whatever is not against the nature of something is not impossible. But to be a principle of the Holy Spirit is not against the nature of the Son — not insofar as he is God, since the Father, who is God, is a principle of the Holy Spirit; nor insofar as he is Son, since the procession of the Holy Spirit is one thing, that of the Son another. Nor is it repugnant that what is from a principle according to one procession should itself be the principle of another procession, just as the Son is from the Father as from a principle, and the Son himself is the principle of another. It remains, then, that it is not impossible for the Son to be a principle of the Holy Spirit. But in the divine, to be and to be able are not different. Therefore the Son is a principle of the Holy Spirit.⁵

You will ask, first, whether it is rightly said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

I answer affirmatively.⁶ For thus spoke the Greek Fathers, and among the Latins, Saint Hilary, book 12 On the Trinity. The reason is that the Son has from the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him. Therefore it can be said that the Father, through the Son, breathes forth the Holy Spirit; or, what is the same, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son — in the same sense in which this is also said of the operations ad extra, John 1:3: All things were made through him.

You will ask, second, whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.

I answer affirmatively.⁷

Proof, first, from the Fathers. Augustine, book 5 On the Trinity, ch. 14, n. 15: "It must be confessed," he says, "that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles." The same is held by Basil, book 2 Against Eunomius; and Anselm, in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit.

Proof, second, from the councils. The Second Council of Lyons: "We condemn," it says, "those who have presumed with rash daring to assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles, and not as from one." This is reported in the chapter Fideli, On the Supreme Trinity, in the Liber Sextus of the Decretals, and the Council of Florence, in the letter of union: "We define that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son... as from one principle and a single spiration."

Proof, third, by arguments. First: The Father and the Son are one in all things in which the opposition of relation does not distinguish them. But in this — namely, in being a principle of the Holy Spirit — they are not relatively opposed. Therefore. Second: Because in the Father and the Son there is one spirative power. Whence, just as, because there is one deity in the three persons, they are not called three gods; so, because there is one spirative power in the Father and the Son, they are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Spirit.

You will ask, third, whether this word Filioque was rightly added to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.

I answer affirmatively: because this addition was made by legitimate authority, namely that of the Church, and for a necessary cause, namely, that the error then spreading rather widely among the Greeks against the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son might be effectively suppressed. Whence the Greeks themselves, at the Second Council of Lyons, approved this addition and the Creed, and, repeating this addition three times, sang it together with the Latins during the solemnities of the Mass. And the Council of Florence, after the matter had been most diligently discussed, in the definition of faith to which all the Greeks subscribed together with the Latins, except Mark of Ephesus, says thus: "We define, moreover, that the explanation of those words Filioque, for the sake of declaring the truth, and under a pressing necessity at that time, was licitly and reasonably inserted into the Creed." Therefore.

Saint Thomas, q. 43.

It is asked, first, whether it belongs to any divine person to be sent.

I answer affirmatively.¹ John 3:17 says: God sent his Son into the world. Ibid., 5:36, Christ says of himself: The works themselves which I do give testimony of me, that the Father has sent me. Likewise, ibid., 6:58: The living Father has sent me. Likewise, ibid., 8:16: I am not alone, but I and he who sent me, the Father. Of the Holy Spirit, ibid., 14:26: The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name. And ibid., 15:26: The Paraclete, whom I will send to you from the Father. And so in many places.

The reason is:² In the notion of mission two things are implied, of which one is the relation to him by whom he is sent; the other is the relation of the one sent to the term to which he is sent. For by the fact that someone is sent, a certain procession of the one sent from the sender is shown — either according to command, as a lord sends a servant; or according to counsel and persuasion, as when a counselor is said to send a king to war; or according to origin, as when a flower is said to be sent forth from a tree, or radiance from the sun. Likewise, a relation to the term to which he is sent is shown — either that he should begin to be where before he was not, or that he should begin to be in some new way in which he was not before. Now, although mission cannot belong to a divine person according to command or counsel, it can nonetheless belong according as it implies a procession of origin from the sender. Likewise, although on the part of the term it cannot belong according as it implies being where he was not before, it can nonetheless belong according as it implies a new manner of existing in another: just as the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, according as he began to be in the world in a new way through the flesh assumed, and yet before this he was in the world, as is said in John 1:10. Therefore.

Hence you will infer, first, that the mission of the divine persons can be defined thus: The procession of origin of one person from another, together with a new manner of existing in another.

You will infer,³ second, that the Father is not sent, since he proceeds from no one. He can, however, be given; for although no one can send himself, he can nevertheless give himself.

You will infer,⁴ third, that not just any person sends, if mission is taken properly and adequately, but only that person to whom it belongs to be the principle of the one who is sent; because, as has been said, mission taken properly and adequately implies two things, namely, the origin of the person sent from the sender, and the relation to the term to which he is sent. And thus the Son is sent only by the Father; the Holy Spirit, by the Father and the Son. But if mission is taken improperly and inadequately, for the mere relation of the one sent to the term or effect to which he is sent, then it can be that the whole Trinity works this effect. And it is in this sense that Saint Augustine, book 2 On the Trinity, chapter 5, n. 8, must be understood, where he interprets that verse of Isaiah 48:16, Now the Lord God has sent me, and his Spirit, of the person of the Word, whom he says was sent by the Holy Spirit, that he might be incarnate. Many, however, interpret this of the human nature of Christ, according to which he was sent by the Holy Spirit to preach.

It is asked, second, whether mission should be called eternal, or temporal.

I answer that it must be called temporal only;⁵ because, besides the relation to an eternal principle, it implies a relation to a temporal term through which it is completed in the character of a mission. Therefore it must be called temporal only; just as creation, although its principle is eternal, is nevertheless not called eternal but temporal, because the effect which it connotes is temporal.

It is asked, third, whether the invisible mission of the divine persons is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Note, before answering, that mission, on the part of the term or temporal effect which it connotes, is divided into visible and invisible. Visible mission is that which occurs in some effect or sensible sign manifesting the person sent, as when the Word was sent that he might be incarnate, or when the Holy Spirit was sent upon the Apostles under the appearance of fire. Invisible mission is that which occurs in some spiritual and invisible effect, such as occurs in the justification of a sinner through the gift of grace. Now these missions differ: first, in that in visible mission one person is sent and is manifested without the other; whereas in invisible mission two proceeding persons are sent, and although the Father is not sent, he nevertheless comes and communicates himself to the soul together with the others, according to that word of Christ, John 14:23: If anyone loves me..., my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our dwelling with him; second, in that visible mission can occur through any visible thing, whereas invisible mission occurs only through a supernatural gift produced in the soul. And since there are various supernatural gifts — such as sanctifying grace, actual help, gratuitously given grace, the gift of faith, etc. — the question is whether invisible mission occurs only according to the gift of sanctifying, that is, justifying, grace; or whether it is only through sanctifying grace that the soul is disposed and perfected so as to be a fit temple and dwelling for the divine person sent; for in mission it is not grace alone that is sent, or given, so to speak, but the divine persons themselves. With these points noted, to the question.

I answer affirmatively;⁶ because a divine person is sent precisely when he exists in a new manner in another. But it is through sanctifying grace alone that a divine person exists in a new manner in a human being. Therefore. — The major is clear from the definition of mission. — Proof of the minor. The common manner in which God is in all creatures is through immensity, namely through essence, presence, and power. Besides this common manner, however, there is one special manner which belongs to the rational nature, by which God is said to be in it as the known in the knower, and the beloved in the lover — namely, when a rational creature has God invisibly present to itself through grace and charity, and is made a temple of God and his dwelling. But this occurs only through sanctifying grace and charity, by which a man so has God that he can freely use and enjoy him as a friend possessed. Therefore.

From this gather that a threefold invisible mission of the divine persons occurs in a human being: the first, in the first justification of the person; the second, in every increase of grace; the third, in beatitude, in which God will be in the soul in a new and special manner through the union of his essence as an intelligible species.

It is asked, fourth, whether by invisible mission the divine persons become substantially present to the soul, such that, if per impossibile they were not substantially present through immensity, they would nonetheless be so by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace.

I answer affirmatively.⁷

Proof, first, from sacred Scripture. Romans 5:5 says: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us. Here a distinction is made between the charity given and the Spirit given. But Sacred Scripture would distinguish between the two in vain, if the Spirit were not substantially present, but present only in the gift of charity.

Second, on account of this kind of presence by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace, the just man is called a temple of God, 1 Corinthians 3:16: Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you? and immediately after: The temple of God is holy, which you are. This, however, cannot be verified of the gifts of grace, from which a temple does not follow, but only of the divine persons themselves — as of the Holy Spirit, of whom it is said: He dwells in you.

Third, the divine persons, by invisible mission by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace, are present to the soul otherwise than through immensity; otherwise, as often as anything were produced in the soul, it would be said to be sent, since they are substantially present through immensity wherever anything is produced. But unless they are specially and substantially present to the soul by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace, they will be present only through immensity, insofar, that is, as they would produce some effect in the soul. Therefore.

If you object that God is in the just man through grace as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover, but that the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover is present only objectively, and not substantially: I answer that through sanctifying grace God is in the knower and lover in such a way that the knower and lover is his temple, and freely enjoys him; and for this, objective presence does not suffice, but substantial presence is required.