Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

St. Thomas, q. 6.

[You ask 1st¹ whether to be good belongs to God.

The goodness of God arises from His perfection.

“The good and being,” says the Angelic Doctor², “are the same in reality, but differ only according to ratio: which is made clear as follows. For the ratio of the good consists in this, that it be something appetible. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics I: ‘The good is what all things desire.’ But it is manifest that each thing is appetible insofar as it is perfect, for all things desire their perfection. Now each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act. Hence it is manifest that something is good insofar as it is a being; for esse is the actuality of every thing. Hence it is manifest that the good and being are the same in reality. But the good signifies the ratio of the appetible, which being does not signify.” And again³: “Each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect; for thus it is appetible, as was said above. But that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection.” Appetibility is an extrinsic denomination, so called from appetite. But the proper object of appetite is the good, which is constituted by perfection. Therefore, prior to the denomination there must be presupposed the ratio or root of the good, which can be nothing other than the perfection of a thing in its esse.

Response. To be good belongs chiefly to God⁴.

It is proved, 1º, from Scripture. In Ps. 105:1, 106:1, 117:1, it is said: Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good, and elsewhere.

Prob. 2º by reason. 1º That is good which is perfectly appetible. But God is most perfectly appetible. Therefore. — Prob. min. God is the cause of all the perfections which are in creatures. But all things appetite their own perfection. Therefore. — 2º Creatures, by that very fact that they are beings, are good, that is, they have the formal character of appetibility, and consequently, the formal character of perfection. But in creatures there is not perfection, or appetibility, or goodness through themselves, but by participation, from divine causality. Therefore, if the formal character of goodness belongs to creatures, much more does it belong to God to be good.

*You ask secondly * whether God is the highest good.

I reply with St. Thomas: “God is the highest good simply, and not only in some genus or order of things.”

Prob. 1st. Thus good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding question, insofar as all the desired perfections of created things are from him, as from the first cause. But God communicates goodness to all things, and yet he himself does not participate his own goodness from another, but is goodness itself subsisting through itself. Now goodness subsisting through itself is the greatest goodness, that is, goodness through essence, in the way in which being subsisting through itself is most perfect. Therefore God is the greatest goodness or the highest good. — 2nd. All the perfections and goodnesses of all things flow forth from God as from an equivocal cause⁵. But the effect is more excellently in an equivocal cause than in itself; for equivocal causes produce effects inferior to themselves. Therefore good is in God in a most excellent mode, and for this reason he is called the highest good.

*You ask, third, *whether to be good through essence is proper to God.

I respond in the affirmative, and I prove it⁶. Each thing is good insofar as it is perfect; but it is perfect to the extent that it is in act. But to be in act belongs essentially to no creature, but to God alone. Therefore.]