Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

St. Thomas, q. 3.

[Note that there is a twofold simplicity. One arises from potentiality and defect, which brings with it poverty and imperfection, and belongs to prime matter alone, which of itself is next to nothing. The other is that which proceeds from form and act, signifying the highest perfection and actuality. It is this latter that is at issue here.

You ask, first, whether God is a body.

From history it is certain that idolaters fashioned God, or rather their corporeal gods, and regarded as gods their wooden or marble or golden idols, or the sun, moon, plants, beasts, or men, Jupiter, Saturn, etc. — The same error is attributed to the Sadducees among the Jews. — Among Christians, moreover, Socrates, lib. Ⅵ Hist., cap. 7, and Sozomen, lib. Ⅷ, cap. 11, report that certain monks of Egypt from the sect of the Audians dreamed that God is a body. But whether Audaeus himself, the author of this sect, fell into this error remains an ambiguous matter, some affirming it, others denying it. — As to what ought to be thought of Tertullian in this grave question, the learned contend sharply among themselves. It is probable, indeed it seems certain to us, that he did not really hold that God is corporeal. He does indeed say, Contra Praxeam, cap. 7: «Who will deny that God is a body, even if God is spirit?» In the same work, cap. 29, he teaches that God is impassible, and in the book de Baptismo, cap. 11, he writes: «Alas, wretched unbelief, which denies to God his own properties, simplicity and power!» Moreover, impassibility and spirituality evidently exclude corporeity. It must therefore be judged that by body he understood substance, and that he spoke thus lest God be conceived as a certain merely ideal being. Besides, everyone knows that Tertullian often does not use words in their common sense, even when he is expounding common doctrine.

Resp. therefore to the question negatively¹. It is of faith.

Proof 1. Sacred Scripture. John, IV, 24: God is spirit. II to the Corinthians, III, 17: Now the Lord is spirit. I to Timothy, I, 17, God is called invisible; Baruch, III, 25, immense. All which can in no way belong to a body, but only to a spirit.

The testimonies of the Fathers, whose doctrine is openly consonant with this Catholic dogma, can be omitted. Proof 2 by a threefold reason². 1º God is the first unmoved mover, as is clear from what has been said above. But every body can be moved, either by local motion, passing from one place to another, or by the motion of alteration, receiving anew some accident. Therefore. — 2º God is the first being, as is established from what has been said before. But a body cannot be the first being. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The first being is act; for although in one and the same thing which passes from potency into act, potency is prior in time to act, yet act is prior to potency simply, because that which is in potency is not reduced to act except through a being in act. But every body is in potency, because the continuous, insofar as such, is divisible into parts to infinity. Therefore. — 3º God is that which is most noble among beings. But it is impossible for any body to be most noble among beings. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. A body is either living or non-living. If it is non-living, it is manifest that a living thing is nobler than it, at least substantially; if it is living, it does not live insofar as it is body, otherwise every body would live, but it lives through something else, just as our body lives through the soul. But that through which a body lives is nobler than the body. Therefore. You will say: In the Scriptures there are attributed to God things which befit only a body, as threefold extension, Job, XI, 8 and 9; arm, Ibid., XL, 4; eyes, Ps., XXXIII, 16; position, Is., III, 13, VI, 1; affections of the soul conjoined to the body, Genes., VI, 7, Ps., VI, 4. Therefore.

I reply that these and similar things must be understood in a non-proper and non-literal sense, but in an improper and metaphorical one³; for Scripture is wont to hand on to us spiritual and divine things under the likeness of corporeal things, so that it may accommodate itself to our mode of thinking and speaking. You will ask, secondly, whether in God there is a composition of matter and form.

Note: Although, according to the truth of the thing, every body and only a body is composed of matter and form, because nevertheless that is not conceded by all, therefore the Holy Doctor asks here whether God, although He is not a body, is nonetheless composed of matter and form.

I answer in the negative⁴.

This is proved by a threefold argument⁵. 1st. Because God is pure act. But in pure act there is no matter, which essentially involves potentiality. Therefore. — 2nd. God is good and perfect through his essence, not through participation. But that which is composed of matter and form is good through form, and thus through participation. Therefore. — 3rd. God is the first agent simply. But that which is the first agent simply ought to be primarily and through itself form. Therefore God is primarily and through himself form, not composed of matter and form. — The minor is proved. Each thing acts through its own form. Therefore that which is the first agent ought to be primarily and through itself form.

You ask, thirdly, whether in God essence and esse are the same: that is, whether God is so simple that He lacks substantial composition from essence and existence; for here St. Thomas takes esse for existence.

I answer in the affirmative⁶.

It is proved by a threefold argument⁷. 1st. If existence were not of the essence of God, it would be caused either by His very essence, as a property, or by some extrinsic principle. But not the first, because what is not cannot give existence to itself: in this case, however, God is supposed not to exist. Nor the second either, otherwise God would not be the first efficient cause. Therefore the existence of God is of His essence. — 2nd. Because otherwise the essence would be in potency to existence, as to its act. But this is repugnant to most pure act, such as God is. Therefore. — 3rd. That which has being, and is not being, is a being by participation; just as that which has fire, and is not fire, is ignited by participation. But God is not a being by participation, but from Himself and through essence. Therefore.

You ask, fourth, whether God is in some genus or predicament.

I answer in the negative⁸.

It is proved. Whatever is placed in some genus or predicament is placed there either directly or properly as a species, or reductively as principles and privations; thus, for example, a point is reduced to the predicament of quantity. But God can be placed in a predicament in neither way: not directly as a species, because every species consists of genus and difference, whereas in God genus and difference cannot be conceived, since genus imports potentiality; nor even reductively, because that by which something is placed reductively in some predicament does not extend itself beyond that predicament, thus a point is a principle only of continuous quantity. But God is the principle of the whole of being, pervading all genera. Therefore. — On this question more fully in the Logic.

You ask, fifth, whether there are any accidents in God, or whether there is in Him accidental composition.

I respond negatively⁹; because the subject is compared to the accident as potency to act; for the subject, through the accident, is in some way in act. But to be in potency is altogether removed from God, as being most pure act. Therefore. You will ask, sixthly, whether God is so simple that He admits in Himself no composition whatsoever. I respond affirmatively¹⁰.

It is a matter of faith decided in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where it is said: «The essence, substance, or nature of God is one, altogether simple.»

It is proved by a fivefold argument. 1st. From the enumeration of the compositions which up to this point we have rejected from God: for in God there is no composition, neither of quantitative parts, because He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor composition from nature and suppositum; nor from essence and existence; nor composition of genus and difference; nor of subject and accident. Therefore in no way is He composite, but altogether simple. — 2nd. Every composite is posterior to its components and dependent on them. But God is the first being absolutely, depending on none. Therefore. — 3rd. Every composite is caused by something uniting diverse parts. But God is caused by none, since He is the first efficient cause. Therefore. — 4th. In every composite potency and act are found; for either one part is in potency to another, or all the parts are in potency to the whole. But God is most pure act, devoid of all potentiality. Therefore. — 5th. In every composite there is something, namely a part, which is not itself. But whatever is in God, is God. Therefore.

You say: The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity does not seem to cohere with the highest simplicity. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. The highest and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality. But in God there is a trinity of persons. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major. Supreme and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality in that in which the simplicity is, I concede in French; in another in which there is no simplicity, I deny it. But in God there is simplicity in the nature, whereas plurality is in the persons.

You ask, seventh, whether God enters into the composition of other things as a part, whether formal or material, or in any other way whatsoever.

I reply in the negative¹¹. It is, first, against Marcus Varro, who, as St. Augustine testifies, in book VII of the City of God, c. 6, held that God was the soul of the world; second, against the Almarians¹², who held that God is the formal principle of all things; third, against David of Dinant, who most foolishly held that God is prime matter; fourth, against Spinoza, who, with a similar error, taught that there is only one substance of the world, and that it is God, relying on this foundation, that in the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of one nature or attribute: in this consists the doctrine of Pantheism.

It is proved by a twofold reasoning. First, God is the first efficient cause of all things. But the efficient cause does not coincide numerically with the form of the thing made, but only specifically; thus a man generates another man, not himself: with the matter of the thing made, however, it does not coincide even specifically, for matter is in potency, whereas the efficient is in act. Therefore God is not the form or matter of the things made by Him. — Secondly, since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to Him to act first and per se. But that which enters into the composition of something is not what acts first and per se, but rather the composite does; for it is not the hand that acts, but the man through the hand, and fire heats through heat. Therefore.

It is proved. What composes as a part is less perfect than the whole which arises from it and another part. But it is repugnant that God be less perfect than any thing. Therefore.

You say: In the mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Word composes Christ with the human nature. Therefore God can enter into the composition of another.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent. If the divine Word composes Christ with the human nature by way of a material or formal part inhering, I deny the antecedent; by way of a term completing, actuating, and perfecting the human nature, I concede the antecedent. The first composition, as being mixed with imperfection, St. Doctor here rejects, not the second, which imports the highest perfection and which he admits in the Third Part. Indeed, it can be said that the two natures in Christ in no way have the character of part and counterpart. For it is of the notion of a counterpart that, together with another part, it constitutes a whole which is more perfect than either part separately; which does not occur here. — On this more fully in the treatise on the Incarnation.]