Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

Among the attributes which we conceive in God, some regard His being or substance, some His operation. Since being is prior to operating, we first treat of those things which regard the divine being, then of those things which regard His operation, as concerning knowledge, providence, etc. But since, as St. Thomas teaches in Contra gentes I, ch. 14, «for the knowledge of God one must use the way of removal,» or of negation, namely by removing from Him the imperfections of creatures, rather than the way of affirmation, by attributing to Him divine perfections which we are not able sufficiently to grasp, therefore with the Holy Doctor we begin from the negatives, and first treat of the simplicity of God, or the non-composition of the divine being. Whence there is:

St. Thomas, q. 3.

[Note that there is a twofold simplicity. One arises from potentiality and defect, which brings with it poverty and imperfection, and belongs to prime matter alone, which of itself is next to nothing. The other is that which proceeds from form and act, signifying the highest perfection and actuality. It is this latter that is at issue here.

You ask, first, whether God is a body.

From history it is certain that idolaters fashioned God, or rather their corporeal gods, and regarded as gods their wooden or marble or golden idols, or the sun, moon, plants, beasts, or men, Jupiter, Saturn, etc. — The same error is attributed to the Sadducees among the Jews. — Among Christians, moreover, Socrates, lib. Ⅵ Hist., cap. 7, and Sozomen, lib. Ⅷ, cap. 11, report that certain monks of Egypt from the sect of the Audians dreamed that God is a body. But whether Audaeus himself, the author of this sect, fell into this error remains an ambiguous matter, some affirming it, others denying it. — As to what ought to be thought of Tertullian in this grave question, the learned contend sharply among themselves. It is probable, indeed it seems certain to us, that he did not really hold that God is corporeal. He does indeed say, Contra Praxeam, cap. 7: «Who will deny that God is a body, even if God is spirit?» In the same work, cap. 29, he teaches that God is impassible, and in the book de Baptismo, cap. 11, he writes: «Alas, wretched unbelief, which denies to God his own properties, simplicity and power!» Moreover, impassibility and spirituality evidently exclude corporeity. It must therefore be judged that by body he understood substance, and that he spoke thus lest God be conceived as a certain merely ideal being. Besides, everyone knows that Tertullian often does not use words in their common sense, even when he is expounding common doctrine.

Resp. therefore to the question negatively¹. It is of faith.

Proof 1. Sacred Scripture. John, IV, 24: God is spirit. II to the Corinthians, III, 17: Now the Lord is spirit. I to Timothy, I, 17, God is called invisible; Baruch, III, 25, immense. All which can in no way belong to a body, but only to a spirit.

The testimonies of the Fathers, whose doctrine is openly consonant with this Catholic dogma, can be omitted. Proof 2 by a threefold reason². 1º God is the first unmoved mover, as is clear from what has been said above. But every body can be moved, either by local motion, passing from one place to another, or by the motion of alteration, receiving anew some accident. Therefore. — 2º God is the first being, as is established from what has been said before. But a body cannot be the first being. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The first being is act; for although in one and the same thing which passes from potency into act, potency is prior in time to act, yet act is prior to potency simply, because that which is in potency is not reduced to act except through a being in act. But every body is in potency, because the continuous, insofar as such, is divisible into parts to infinity. Therefore. — 3º God is that which is most noble among beings. But it is impossible for any body to be most noble among beings. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. A body is either living or non-living. If it is non-living, it is manifest that a living thing is nobler than it, at least substantially; if it is living, it does not live insofar as it is body, otherwise every body would live, but it lives through something else, just as our body lives through the soul. But that through which a body lives is nobler than the body. Therefore. You will say: In the Scriptures there are attributed to God things which befit only a body, as threefold extension, Job, XI, 8 and 9; arm, Ibid., XL, 4; eyes, Ps., XXXIII, 16; position, Is., III, 13, VI, 1; affections of the soul conjoined to the body, Genes., VI, 7, Ps., VI, 4. Therefore.

I reply that these and similar things must be understood in a non-proper and non-literal sense, but in an improper and metaphorical one³; for Scripture is wont to hand on to us spiritual and divine things under the likeness of corporeal things, so that it may accommodate itself to our mode of thinking and speaking. You will ask, secondly, whether in God there is a composition of matter and form.

Note: Although, according to the truth of the thing, every body and only a body is composed of matter and form, because nevertheless that is not conceded by all, therefore the Holy Doctor asks here whether God, although He is not a body, is nonetheless composed of matter and form.

I answer in the negative⁴.

This is proved by a threefold argument⁵. 1st. Because God is pure act. But in pure act there is no matter, which essentially involves potentiality. Therefore. — 2nd. God is good and perfect through his essence, not through participation. But that which is composed of matter and form is good through form, and thus through participation. Therefore. — 3rd. God is the first agent simply. But that which is the first agent simply ought to be primarily and through itself form. Therefore God is primarily and through himself form, not composed of matter and form. — The minor is proved. Each thing acts through its own form. Therefore that which is the first agent ought to be primarily and through itself form.

You ask, thirdly, whether in God essence and esse are the same: that is, whether God is so simple that He lacks substantial composition from essence and existence; for here St. Thomas takes esse for existence.

I answer in the affirmative⁶.

It is proved by a threefold argument⁷. 1st. If existence were not of the essence of God, it would be caused either by His very essence, as a property, or by some extrinsic principle. But not the first, because what is not cannot give existence to itself: in this case, however, God is supposed not to exist. Nor the second either, otherwise God would not be the first efficient cause. Therefore the existence of God is of His essence. — 2nd. Because otherwise the essence would be in potency to existence, as to its act. But this is repugnant to most pure act, such as God is. Therefore. — 3rd. That which has being, and is not being, is a being by participation; just as that which has fire, and is not fire, is ignited by participation. But God is not a being by participation, but from Himself and through essence. Therefore.

You ask, fourth, whether God is in some genus or predicament.

I answer in the negative⁸.

It is proved. Whatever is placed in some genus or predicament is placed there either directly or properly as a species, or reductively as principles and privations; thus, for example, a point is reduced to the predicament of quantity. But God can be placed in a predicament in neither way: not directly as a species, because every species consists of genus and difference, whereas in God genus and difference cannot be conceived, since genus imports potentiality; nor even reductively, because that by which something is placed reductively in some predicament does not extend itself beyond that predicament, thus a point is a principle only of continuous quantity. But God is the principle of the whole of being, pervading all genera. Therefore. — On this question more fully in the Logic.

You ask, fifth, whether there are any accidents in God, or whether there is in Him accidental composition.

I respond negatively⁹; because the subject is compared to the accident as potency to act; for the subject, through the accident, is in some way in act. But to be in potency is altogether removed from God, as being most pure act. Therefore. You will ask, sixthly, whether God is so simple that He admits in Himself no composition whatsoever. I respond affirmatively¹⁰.

It is a matter of faith decided in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where it is said: «The essence, substance, or nature of God is one, altogether simple.»

It is proved by a fivefold argument. 1st. From the enumeration of the compositions which up to this point we have rejected from God: for in God there is no composition, neither of quantitative parts, because He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor composition from nature and suppositum; nor from essence and existence; nor composition of genus and difference; nor of subject and accident. Therefore in no way is He composite, but altogether simple. — 2nd. Every composite is posterior to its components and dependent on them. But God is the first being absolutely, depending on none. Therefore. — 3rd. Every composite is caused by something uniting diverse parts. But God is caused by none, since He is the first efficient cause. Therefore. — 4th. In every composite potency and act are found; for either one part is in potency to another, or all the parts are in potency to the whole. But God is most pure act, devoid of all potentiality. Therefore. — 5th. In every composite there is something, namely a part, which is not itself. But whatever is in God, is God. Therefore.

You say: The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity does not seem to cohere with the highest simplicity. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. The highest and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality. But in God there is a trinity of persons. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major. Supreme and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality in that in which the simplicity is, I concede in French; in another in which there is no simplicity, I deny it. But in God there is simplicity in the nature, whereas plurality is in the persons.

You ask, seventh, whether God enters into the composition of other things as a part, whether formal or material, or in any other way whatsoever.

I reply in the negative¹¹. It is, first, against Marcus Varro, who, as St. Augustine testifies, in book VII of the City of God, c. 6, held that God was the soul of the world; second, against the Almarians¹², who held that God is the formal principle of all things; third, against David of Dinant, who most foolishly held that God is prime matter; fourth, against Spinoza, who, with a similar error, taught that there is only one substance of the world, and that it is God, relying on this foundation, that in the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of one nature or attribute: in this consists the doctrine of Pantheism.

It is proved by a twofold reasoning. First, God is the first efficient cause of all things. But the efficient cause does not coincide numerically with the form of the thing made, but only specifically; thus a man generates another man, not himself: with the matter of the thing made, however, it does not coincide even specifically, for matter is in potency, whereas the efficient is in act. Therefore God is not the form or matter of the things made by Him. — Secondly, since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to Him to act first and per se. But that which enters into the composition of something is not what acts first and per se, but rather the composite does; for it is not the hand that acts, but the man through the hand, and fire heats through heat. Therefore.

It is proved. What composes as a part is less perfect than the whole which arises from it and another part. But it is repugnant that God be less perfect than any thing. Therefore.

You say: In the mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Word composes Christ with the human nature. Therefore God can enter into the composition of another.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent. If the divine Word composes Christ with the human nature by way of a material or formal part inhering, I deny the antecedent; by way of a term completing, actuating, and perfecting the human nature, I concede the antecedent. The first composition, as being mixed with imperfection, St. Doctor here rejects, not the second, which imports the highest perfection and which he admits in the Third Part. Indeed, it can be said that the two natures in Christ in no way have the character of part and counterpart. For it is of the notion of a counterpart that, together with another part, it constitutes a whole which is more perfect than either part separately; which does not occur here. — On this more fully in the treatise on the Incarnation.]

St. Thomas, q. 4.

[You ask, first, whether God is perfect.

It must be noted that perfectum¹, according to that from which the name is imposed, is the same as wholly made, or wholly reduced from potency to act; but according to that for the signifying of which the name has been transferred, perfectum is that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection. Here the question is about the perfect taken in this latter sense. Whence

I respond in the affirmative.

Proof.² God is the first principle of all things, not a material principle, but an efficient one. But this must be most perfect. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Just as matter, insofar as it is such, is in potency, so an agent, insofar as it is such, is in act. Therefore that which is the principle of all things, not material but efficient, is in no way in potency, but in act. But that which is in no way in potency, but in act, is supremely perfect; because, just as potency imports imperfection, so act imports perfection. Therefore. — This will be still more evident from the following resolution and from what is to be said concerning the infinity of God.

You ask, secondly, whether the perfections of all things are in God.

I answer in the affirmative³.

*It is proved, first, *from Scripture. Ps. 93, 9, it is said: He who planted the ear, shall he not hear, or he who formed the eye, does he not regard? Eccli., 24, 25: In me is all grace of the way and of the truth, in me is all hope of life and of truth. To the Romans, 11, 36: Of him, and through him, and in him are all things. And elsewhere.

Proof 2 by reason⁴. Whatever there is of perfection in the effect must be in its effective cause, either according to the same ratio, if it is a univocal cause, as man generates man; or in a more eminent mode, if it is an equivocal cause and of a higher order; thus formal heat produced by the sun is in the sun eminently and virtually, for no one gives what he does not have either formally or eminently. But God is the first effective cause of all things. Therefore.

Proof 3. God has every fullness of being. Therefore He has the perfections of all things. — The consequence is evident, because every perfection is a perfection of being, or every perfection is considered according to some esse: thus justice gives just being, goodness good being; and thus he who has the fullness of being has all perfections. — Proof of the antecedent. God is ipsum esse subsisting through itself essentially and from Himself, and has every fullness of being, since there is nothing by which He can be limited. Therefore.

Hence it is inferred that no creature can be similar to God according to the whole perfection of existing, because no creature can exist through itself, but is essentially a participated being. Nevertheless, because it too has existence, although participated, therefore creatures are similar to God, not according to the same specific or generic ratio, but according to a certain analogy, «in the way in which, says the Angelic Doctor⁵, those things which are from God are assimilated to him insofar as they are beings, to the first and universal principle of the whole of being.»]

St. Thomas, q. 6.

[You ask 1st¹ whether to be good belongs to God.

The goodness of God arises from His perfection.

“The good and being,” says the Angelic Doctor², “are the same in reality, but differ only according to ratio: which is made clear as follows. For the ratio of the good consists in this, that it be something appetible. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics I: ‘The good is what all things desire.’ But it is manifest that each thing is appetible insofar as it is perfect, for all things desire their perfection. Now each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act. Hence it is manifest that something is good insofar as it is a being; for esse is the actuality of every thing. Hence it is manifest that the good and being are the same in reality. But the good signifies the ratio of the appetible, which being does not signify.” And again³: “Each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect; for thus it is appetible, as was said above. But that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection.” Appetibility is an extrinsic denomination, so called from appetite. But the proper object of appetite is the good, which is constituted by perfection. Therefore, prior to the denomination there must be presupposed the ratio or root of the good, which can be nothing other than the perfection of a thing in its esse.

Response. To be good belongs chiefly to God⁴.

It is proved, 1º, from Scripture. In Ps. 105:1, 106:1, 117:1, it is said: Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good, and elsewhere.

Prob. 2º by reason. 1º That is good which is perfectly appetible. But God is most perfectly appetible. Therefore. — Prob. min. God is the cause of all the perfections which are in creatures. But all things appetite their own perfection. Therefore. — 2º Creatures, by that very fact that they are beings, are good, that is, they have the formal character of appetibility, and consequently, the formal character of perfection. But in creatures there is not perfection, or appetibility, or goodness through themselves, but by participation, from divine causality. Therefore, if the formal character of goodness belongs to creatures, much more does it belong to God to be good.

*You ask secondly * whether God is the highest good.

I reply with St. Thomas: “God is the highest good simply, and not only in some genus or order of things.”

Prob. 1st. Thus good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding question, insofar as all the desired perfections of created things are from him, as from the first cause. But God communicates goodness to all things, and yet he himself does not participate his own goodness from another, but is goodness itself subsisting through itself. Now goodness subsisting through itself is the greatest goodness, that is, goodness through essence, in the way in which being subsisting through itself is most perfect. Therefore God is the greatest goodness or the highest good. — 2nd. All the perfections and goodnesses of all things flow forth from God as from an equivocal cause⁵. But the effect is more excellently in an equivocal cause than in itself; for equivocal causes produce effects inferior to themselves. Therefore good is in God in a most excellent mode, and for this reason he is called the highest good.

*You ask, third, *whether to be good through essence is proper to God.

I respond in the affirmative, and I prove it⁶. Each thing is good insofar as it is perfect; but it is perfect to the extent that it is in act. But to be in act belongs essentially to no creature, but to God alone. Therefore.]

St. Thomas, q. 7.

[You ask whether God is infinite according to essence and according to the ratio of being.

Note 1. The infinite is said to be that which lacks an end or limit. Hence, if it lacks essential limits, it will be infinite in essence; if it lacks limits in a certain genus of attribute, for example of quantity or of quality, it will be infinite in that genus. Here St. Thomas treats of the infinity of God with respect to essence, or to the ratio of being.

Note 2. The limiting terms of essence are either extrinsic or intrinsic. An extrinsic limiting term is the efficient cause, which, granted that it could produce an infinite effect, if it is infinite, can also produce that same effect as limited. Intrinsic limiting terms are either metaphysical, namely genus and difference by which a thing is constituted in a determinate and finite species, or physical, namely form and matter, or a receptive subject comporting itself in the mode of matter.

I answer that God is infinite according to essence and according to the ratio of being¹.

It is proved. God, as regards essence and the ratio of being, lacks every limiting factor. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. He cannot be limited extrinsically by an efficient cause, because he is a se; nor intrinsically by genus and difference, or matter and form, because, as we proved above, he is the most simple being, devoid of every composition, whether from genus and difference, or from matter and form, or from essence and existence; because, as we said, he is essentially his own esse, so that esse or existing in God, since it is his very essence, is not received in it, nor receptive of any further act, since existence is the ultimate of all actualities. Therefore.

Hence you will infer, first, that nothing other than God is infinite through essence ², because it is either composed of matter and form, or of genus and difference, by which it is limited to a determinate predicament, that is, it is enclosed within some highest genus; but if there be some form transcending all predicaments, such as existence, since nothing other than God is essentially its own esse or to exist, such existence in creatures is receivable in an essence and composes with it, and thus is limited by it; just as likewise essence, as receptive of existence, is limited by it, or at least by an order to it.

St. Thomas, q. 8.

[You ask whether God is immense.

Note 1. The immense is spoken of as it were as without measure. Hence, if it be considered as to the divine being, it is infinity; if as to duration, it is eternity; if as to place, it is incircumscribability. Here the discussion is about immensity taken in this last sense.

Note 2. Immensity and ubiquity, although they are sometimes taken for the same thing, are nevertheless not altogether the same. Immensity signifies actus primus, ubiquity actus secundus. Therefore, immensity is the aptitude or capacity of existing in all things and places, even infinite ones, if they were given. Ubiquity, however, is actual existence in all things and places that are. Wherefore immensity is an attribute of God, because it belongs to Him naturally and necessarily, and He possesses it from eternity and before the creation of things; ubiquity, however, is not an attribute of God, because it belongs to Him hypothetically and in time: namely, after creation and the existence of things He is everywhere, that is, in all created things, in which He was not before, not indeed through defect of Himself, but through defect of things.

I answer that, God is immense.

That God is immense is of faith. This was expressly defined in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where the council professes that it believes that God is immense. The Athanasian Symbol must be added, in which it is said: The Father immense, the Son immense, the Holy Spirit immense.

Concerning the mode of this immensity, the Angelic Doctor says ¹: “He is in all things by power, insofar as all things are subject to his power; he is by presence in all things, insofar as all things are naked and open to his eyes; he is in all things by essence, insofar as he is present to all things as the cause of being.”

I say therefore, first: God is everywhere by power.

It is against the Manichaeans, who said that spiritual and incorporeal things, as being good, are subject to the divine power, but not visible and corporeal things, which they posited to exist from a principle supremely evil.

Proof 1 from Scripture. From the Apostle, Ⅰ Cor., xii, 6: God works all things in all. And Acts, ⅩⅦ, 27 and 28: He is not far from each one of us; for in him we live, and move, and are.

Proof 2 from the Fathers. St. Augustine, book IV On Genesis according to the letter, ch. 12, n. 23: « Since we are other than God himself, we are not in him for any other reason than because he effects this, and this is his work whereby he contains all things, and whereby his wisdom reaches mightily from end to end and orders all things sweetly, Wis., VIII, 1; through which ordering we live, and are moved, and are. » St. Anselm, in the Monologion, ch. 22: « Since nothing can exist or be preserved without God, we are compelled to say that God is everywhere and always. » Hugh of St. Victor, book VII of the Theological Instruction, ch. 19: « Since we discern that the effect of the divine power is nowhere lacking, why do we doubt that this same power of God is present in all things? »

Proof 3 by reason. God created all things by His power, and all things are subjected to His power, as necessarily conserved in being by Him; otherwise the divine power would not be infinite. Therefore God is in all things through His power.

I say secondly: God is everywhere by presence².

It is against the Deists, who, although they admit that all things are subject to the divine power, nevertheless deny that all things are administered by divine providence; in whose person it is said Job., xxii, 14: Clouds are his hiding-place, nor does he consider our affairs, and he walks about the hinges of heaven.

Prob. 1º from Scripture. Ps. ⅭⅩⅩⅩⅧ, 7 and 8: Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy face? If I shall ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I shall descend into hell, thou art present. The Apostle, in Hebr., Ⅳ, 13: All things are naked and open to his eyes.

Proof 2 from the Fathers. St. Augustine, sermon 132³, ch. 2, n. 2: “You fear God alone... He himself is to be feared in public, he himself in secret. You go forth, you are seen; you enter, you are seen; the lamp is burning, he sees you; the lamp has been extinguished, he sees you; you enter your chamber, he sees you; you are occupied in your heart, he sees you. Fear him, him whose care it is that he see you, and even by fearing, be chaste. Or, if you wish to sin, seek where he may not see you, and do what you will.” So say many.

Proof 3 from reason. To be everywhere, or in all things, by presence, is nothing other than to cognize all these things. But God cognizes all things with most perfect cognition; for He is infinite in every genus of perfections, among which is cognition. Therefore God is in all things by presence.

I say thirdly: God is everywhere by essence.

It is against certain philosophers, “who, although they said that all things pertain to the providence of God, nevertheless held that not all things were created immediately by God, but that he immediately created the first creatures, and those created the others⁴.” It is also against the gentiles, who imagined God to be corporeal. It is moreover against the Socinians and certain Calvinists, among whom Vorstius, to whom from among Catholics Augustine of Gubbio is to be added, in Psal. ⅭⅩⅩⅩⅧ. For these teach that God indeed is everywhere by power and operation, but that according to substance he is only in heaven, in the manner in which the sun, existing substantially in its own sphere, has an influence on sublunary things.

*It is proved, first, *from Scripture. Job, XI, 8 and 9: He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? deeper than hell, and whence will you know? the measure of him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. Jeremiah, XXIII, 24: Do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord. Other texts will be found below cited by Augustine.

Proof 2 from the Fathers. Augustine, Epistle 187⁵, c. 4, n. 14: “God is diffused through all things; for He Himself says through the Prophet: I fill heaven and earth... God is everywhere diffused substantially.” St. Bernard, On the Song of Songs, sermon 3, n. 4: “You are wholly everywhere among creatures, creating and containing; but no creature can express Your infinity, although there is none that cannot in some part indicate Your power. You are wholly everywhere by existence, but not equally in all things by efficiency.” The same author again splendidly, Sermon iv on diverse matters: “Where is He? What have I said, wretch that I am? But where is He not? He is higher than heaven, deeper than hell, broader than the earth, more widely diffused than the sea. He is nowhere and He is everywhere, because He is absent from none, nor is He contained by any place. He Himself is here, but I am not here. How much more likely it would seem that You were not here, and that I were here, O Lord!” Let these two stand for all.

*It is proved thirdly *by reason. The divine virtue or power which bestows existence on all things that are and continually preserves them is not in God an accident, but is really the very essence or substance of God itself. But God is in all things by his power, as has been said. Therefore God is in all things by his essence or substance. St. Anselm thus renders this argument, de Incarnat., ch. 4: “The being of God and his power are the same. Therefore, just as the power of God is always and everywhere, so whatever God is, is also everywhere and always.”

How the immensity of God ought to be understood, Augustine explains most wisely, at the same time forestalling the difficulties that can present themselves to the mind, Epist. 187⁶, on the presence of God to Dardanus, chap. 4, no. 11 and 14: “In the very fact that God is said to be diffused everywhere, a carnal thought must be resisted, and the mind must be withdrawn from the senses of the body, lest we suppose that God is diffused through all things by a kind of spatial magnitude, just as earth, or moisture, or air, or this light is diffused (for every magnitude of this kind is less in its part than in the whole); but rather in this way, as wisdom is great, even in a man whose body is small. And if there are two wise men, of whom one is larger in body, neither is wiser; that wisdom is not greater in the larger, smaller in the smaller, or smaller in one than in two; but it is as great in this one as in that one, and as great in each one as in both together: for if they are altogether equally wise, the two do not know more than each singly, just as if they are equally immortal, the two do not live more than each singly...”

God, therefore, is diffused through all things. For He Himself says through the Prophet, Jerem., xxiii, 24: I fill heaven and earth; and what I set down a little before concerning His wisdom, Wis., viii, 1: She reaches mightily from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly; and likewise it is written, ibid., i, 7: The Spirit of the Lord has filled the orb of the earth; and to Him it is said in a certain psalm, Ps. cxxxviii, 7. Whither shall I go from thy spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy face? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I descend into hell, thou art present. But God is thus diffused through all things, not so that He may be a quality of the world, but the substance creating the world, ruling the world without labor and containing it without burden. (Yet not through spaces of places, as though diffused by bulk, so that in one half of the world He should be half in body, and in the other half half,) and thus wholly through the whole; but wholly in heaven alone, and wholly in earth alone, and wholly in heaven and in earth, and contained by no place, but wholly everywhere in Himself.

D. Thomas, q. 9.

[You will ask 1° whether God is altogether immutable.

I answer affirmatively¹.

This is against the Stoics, who, on the testimony of Origen, book III contra Celsum, held that God is a mutable body; and against the Socinians, who taught that God is mutable, not indeed in his substance, but in his decrees.

Proof 1°. This is of faith. The Council of Nicaea I: «Those who say that the Son of God is either created or mutable, the catholic and apostolic Church anathematizes.» In the Council of Lateran IV it was defined that God is immutable.

Proof 2°, from Scripture. Num., XXIII, 19: God is not as a man, that he should lie, nor as the son of man, that he should be changed. Malach., III, 6: I am the Lord, and I change not. James, I, 17: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.

Proof 3°, from reason², which is virtually threefold. For the nature of change there is required: 1° potentiality together with privation, as the term from which; 2° a form newly to be acquired, as the term to which; 3° a subject receptive, in succession, of several forms. But the first is excluded in God by reason of pure act, the second by reason of infinite perfection, the third by reason of supreme simplicity. Therefore.

It is confirmed. If God could be changed, he would be changed either for the better, or for the worse, or into something equal; or he would lose what he has, or acquire what he does not have. But it is manifest that all these imply imperfection.

You will say: God has become, and daily becomes, operative from non-operative, as is clear in the creation of the world, which took place in time, and is continued in the daily production of new effects. Therefore he is changed.

I answer, I deny the antecedent. For God from eternity effects what comes to be in time, because his operation, formally immanent and virtually transient, is not distinct from himself; for it is nothing other than his very will, by which he wills from eternity that something come to be in time; whence the whole change lies on the side of the creature. He is not, however, denominated from eternity as creating or operating, because the extrinsic denomination of creator or operator depends on the effect produced in time.

This difficulty St. Augustine excellently dispels, book XII de Civitate Dei, ch. 17, n. 2: «Because, he says, whatever new thing occurs to them [the gentile philosophers] as needing to be done, they do by a new plan, since indeed they bear mutable minds; assuredly, thinking not of God — whom they cannot conceive — but of themselves in his place, they compare not him, but themselves; not to him, but to themselves. But it is not lawful for us to believe that God is affected in one way when he is at rest, and in another when he operates; for he is not even to be said to be "affected," as though something should come to be in his nature that was not there before. For he who is affected undergoes something, and everything that undergoes something is mutable. Let no sluggishness, then, no sloth, no inactivity be thought of in his rest, just as neither labor, effort, nor industry is to be thought of in his work. He knows, at rest, how to act, and, acting, how to rest. He can bring to a new work a plan that is not new, but everlasting; nor, by repenting because he had previously ceased, does he begin to do what he had not done. But even if he ceased before and operated afterward — which I know not how it can be understood by man — this at least, without doubt, which is called before and after, existed in things which before did not exist and afterward did exist. But in him, no later will changed or took away an earlier will; rather, by one and the same everlasting and immutable will, he both brought it about that the things he founded should not exist for as long as they did not exist, and that they should exist afterward, when they began to exist — hence perhaps wonderfully showing to those who are able to see such things how little he needed them, but rather founded them by his gratuitous goodness: he, without them, from an eternity lacking a beginning, remained in no less beatitude.»

You will ask 2° whether to be immutable is proper to God.

I answer affirmatively³.

Proof. Every creature is mutable, either according to substantial being, as sublunary bodies; or according to local being only, as the heavenly bodies; or according to order to an end and the application of its power to diverse things, as in the angels; or according to various accidental perfections, as are all created, finite, and imperfect beings; or finally, according to being and non-being, as again, universally, all creatures which are in the power of the one creating and conserving them, as regards being and non-being. But God is mutable in none of these ways, as will be clear to one running through them one by one, and as is clear from what was said in the first question. Therefore.]

St. Thomas, q. 10.

[Eternity is defined by Boethius, Consol. phil., III, 2: « The whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unending life. » This definition is commonly received.

It is explained¹. It is called possession, and not duration: not that eternity is not duration, as will be said below, but because duration, by force of the term, implies a certain distinction of parts, which must not be understood in the divine being. Boethius therefore said possession, speaking metaphorically, to designate the immutability and unfailingness of eternity; for that which is possessed is held firmly and quietly.

It is called possession of life², rather than of being: 1° because that which is truly eternal is not only a being, but a living being; 2° because living itself extends in a certain way to operation, whereas being does not; but eternity is the permanence of a thing invariable in being and in operating.

It is called of unending life³, to designate that eternity neither has nor can have a beginning and an end.

It is called possession⁴, whole and simultaneous⁵, to signify that eternity lacks division and succession according to before and after, such as is found in time, of whose nature it is to be successive, since it is the measure of motion. But eternity consists in a single now, or everlasting and indivisible instant, which is never past nor future, but always now.

It is called perfect⁶, to exclude the now of time, which, although it is whole and simultaneous, and has no parts, is nevertheless not something perfect in the nature of duration, since it vanishes immediately, nor is anything perfectly possessed in it.

The sense, therefore, of Boethius's definition is that eternity is the whole and simultaneous and unfailing duration of a living being, lacking succession, beginning, and end.

From this you will gather⁷, that eternity differs from aeviternity and time, not precisely because eternity lacks a beginning and an end, and aeviternity has a beginning but not an end, while time has a beginning and an end; for this difference is only accidental. For even if it were supposed that aeviternity had no beginning, and that time would have neither beginning nor end, they would nevertheless still be distinguished from eternity. Their true difference, therefore, lies in this: that aeviternity is the duration of a thing immutable as to substantial being, but mutable accidentally, for instance as regards place or operation, as in the angels; hence, on this score, it is not wholly simultaneous. And time is the duration of a thing variable as to being and operating; for it is the measure of motion according to before and after: hence in no respect is it wholly simultaneous, but flows through parts. But eternity, on the other hand, is the wholly simultaneous duration of a being invariable in being and in operating.

You will ask whether God, and He alone, is eternal.

I answer in the affirmative⁸.

Proof 1°. It is of faith, as defined in the Fourth Lateran Council: « We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal, immense, etc. »

Proof 2°, from Scripture. Deuter., XXXII, 40: I live forever. Ps. IX, 8: The Lord endures forever. Ps. CI, 28: You are the very same, and your years do not fail. Dan., VI, 26: He is the living and eternal God forever. II Machab., I, 24 and 25: God the creator of all things..., alone excellent, alone just, alone omnipotent and eternal.

Proof 3°, from reason⁹. Eternity follows upon immutability, just as time follows upon motion. But God, and He alone, is essentially immutable. Therefore God, and He alone, is essentially eternal.

Nor is He only eternal, but He is really His own eternity¹⁰, just as He is His own goodness and His own wisdom; because He is His own being, which belongs to no creature. But eternity is nothing other than the duration of the divine being, or the divine being itself enduring. It is, however, virtually distinct from the divine being, as are the other attributes, because duration and being in creatures pertain to diverse genera. And although duration in creatures is not distinguished entitatively from the thing enduring — for it is the very thing enduring — it is nevertheless distinguished modally; for it is a mode of the thing: so that, although there cannot be duration without the existence of the thing, there can nevertheless be existence without duration properly so called, as if a thing should cease to be as soon as it began to be.

When, therefore, certain words of past, present, or future time are said of God, as in Apoc., I, 8: The Lord God, who is, and who was, and who is to come, these are not to be understood as though God were successively varied through present, past, and future, but because His eternity includes all the differences of times. Similarly, when successive operations of God are designated, the succession must not be taken on the side of the principle, but on the side of the effects.

Augustine illustrates this truth splendidly, Tract. 99 in Ioann., n. 5: « Concerning that which is everlasting, without beginning and without end, whatever word of any time is used — whether of the past, the present, or the future — it is not used falsely. For although that immutable and ineffable nature does not admit was and will be, but only is; for it truly is, because it cannot be changed, and therefore it was fitting for it alone to say: I am who am, and: You shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you. Exod., III, 14: nevertheless, on account of the mutability of the times in which our mortality and our mutability are engaged, we say, not falsely, both was, and will be, and is. He was in past ages, He is in the present, He will be in the future. He was, because He was never absent; He will be, because He will never be absent; He is, because He always is. For He does not, as though He now were not, perish with things past; nor, as one who does not remain, does He slip away with things present; nor, as one who had not been, will He arise with things future. Accordingly, although human speech varies according to the passing of the times, concerning Him who through no times could fail, can fail, or will be able to fail, the words of any time whatsoever are truly spoken. »]

St. Thomas, q. 11.

[Note 1. One does not add any reality over and above being, but only the negation of division. One signifies nothing other than undivided being, as appears from this very fact, that one is convertible with being¹. Now this transcendental one is opposed privatively to multitude², because it signifies the privation of division. But quantitative one, which is the principle of number and is what is treated here, is opposed to multitude relatively, because quantitative unity stands to multitude as measure to the thing measured; for multitude is measured by unity repeated.

Note 2. When we ask whether God is one, the question is not about positive and specific unity, by which something is undivided being in itself and divided from any other of the same species, but about numerical and exclusive unity, by which another being of the same nature is excluded — in the sense in which the sun is one. We ask, therefore, whether God is sole and the only God, such that, besides him, there is no other God.

I say: God is one.

This is against polytheism. Blind and insane paganism, wholly given over to idolatry, went so far that, according to the testimony of Eusebius, book V of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 15, Hesiod numbered thirty thousand gods.

Among Christians, however, not a few heretics have attacked the unity of God — especially those who admitted two eternal principles, independent and equal: one good, the author of invisible things; the other evil, the cause of visible things. Such were the Gnostics, in the second century; the Marcionites, so called from Marcion, in the same century; the Valentinians, from Valentinus, in the same century. He set up two principles in such a way that he called one depth and the other silence, male and female, from whose combination came forth thirty aeons, that is, thirty ages. The Manichaeans, in the third century, so called from Manes or Manichaeus, their leader. In later centuries the Albigensians and others were followers of these. The Tritheists, other enemies of the unity of God, toward the end of the sixth century, said that the three divine persons were three gods.

Against all these the proposition is proved.

1. Against those who accept the Old Testament, such as were very many Jews according to Annat in the Apparatus, book VII, art. 1 — it is proved from that text of Deut., VI, 4: Hear, Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord. And ibid., XXXII, 39: See that I am he alone, and there is no other God besides me.

Against the heretics who accept the New Testament, it is proved from that text of Mark, XII, 32: Well, Master, you have said truly that God is one, and there is no other besides him. And John, XVII, 3: This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God. And 1 Cor., VIII, 4 and 6: We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no God but one... Yet for us there is one God. To these and other similar texts are added the professions of faith in the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, and Athanasian creeds, and the consensus of all the Fathers in their writings.

Against the pagans and all others whatsoever, it is proved by a threefold argument³.

The first argument is drawn from the supreme simplicity of God. Singularity belongs to the essence or nature of God. But it is repugnant for a being essentially singular to be multiple. Therefore. — The minor is clear, because singularity cannot be multiplied; otherwise, if it could be multiplied, it would be common to many, and would then no longer be singular: thus, if the singularity or haecceity by which Socrates is this man belonged to the essence of human nature, as rationality does, there would be only one man in the world. — Proof of the major. God is singular, or this God, through that by which he is God. But he is essentially God. Therefore he is essentially this God, that is, singularity belongs to his essence. — Proof of the major; because, if he were God through one thing, and this God through another, the divine nature would have to be contracted by a haecceity or individual difference, and so there would be in God a certain composition, and not supreme simplicity. Therefore.

The second argument is drawn from the infinite perfection of God. God is an infinitely perfect being. But there cannot be two or more infinitely perfect beings. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. If there were two infinitely perfect beings, they would have to differ from each other. But that by which they would differ would be either an imperfection — and this cannot be said, because an infinitely perfect being admits no imperfection — or it would be a perfection, and neither can this be said, since otherwise the one would lack a perfection that the other would have, and thus that first one would not be infinitely perfect. Therefore. — Akin to this is this other argument. God is the highest being, the highest good. But what is highest has neither anything greater nor anything equal to it, otherwise it would not be highest. Therefore, one.

The third argument is drawn from the unity and order of the universe. By the name "God" we understand the supreme ruler and governor of the world. But the governor of the world is one alone. Therefore God is one alone. — Proof of the minor. The diverse and unequal beings of the world, some higher, some lower, are so ordered that some serve and are coordinated with others by a fixed law. But they cannot come together in this way into one order unless they are ordered by one, because it belongs to one thing per se to be the cause of one, and many things are not the cause of one except accidentally, namely insofar as they are in some way one.

This argument is pressed further. If there were two or more gods, either one would suffice for the governance of the whole universe, such that he alone would do entirely and in every way what the other does; or he would not suffice, but would need the help of the other, such that one would do one thing or in one way, and the other would do another thing or in another way. If the first, then that other is superfluous; but nothing is more absurd than to posit a superfluous God. If the second, then neither is God, because neither is omnipotent, neither is the maker of all things, and the ordering of things — which is the most perfect thing in the whole universe — is an accidental effect, namely, from many causes fortuitously concurring into one.

Likewise, either one would necessarily agree with the other in the governance of the universe, such that he could not dissent from the other, or he would be free and could dissent from him. If the first, then he is not God, since he is dependent on the other and subject to him. If the second, in the case where he should dissent and wish to dispose of the things of the universe in another way, either one would prevail in this war and subject all creatures to himself, and thus the other, unwarlike and conquered, would not be God; or neither would prevail, but each would subject to himself a certain portion of creatures, and thus neither would be God, because neither would be omnipotent, neither would subject all creatures to himself, and the order of the universe would be dissolved. Therefore it is manifestly necessary to posit a single governor of the world.

As for what might be objected concerning the three divine persons, this does not stand in the way, because they govern through one and the same nature, one will, and one and the same omnipotence.]