Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

The question is not about the physical constitution of the divine nature according as it is really in itself; for thus it is certain that all perfections, whether absolute or relative, really constitute God, since all are identified in the very nature of God, which in itself is most simple.

Nor again is the question about the divine nature taken broadly and in a certain ample signification for uncreated being, whereby it is distinguished from creatures, and which stands after the manner of a transcendens, and is found in all the attributes, in that proportional way in which the ratio of created being is imbibed in all the differences and modes of creatures.

But the question is about the nature or essence, strictly taken for that which is first conceived in God, as the font and origin of the other properties, from which it is therefore virtually distinguished, and in which, under this formal aspect, it is not conceived as transcendentally included; that is, about the metaphysical constitutive, or the essential difference of the divine nature, insofar as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state, as its essential difference and the origin of the other perfections, as rationality in man.

I say first: The nature or essence of God is not constituted metaphysically by aseity.

It is proved first by a fundamental argument. That is the formal constitutive of the divine nature which distinguishes it, not only from creatures, but also from the attributes, the persons, and the other divine formalities. But the ratio of ens a se does not provide this. Therefore, etc. — The major is evident; because here, as has been said, the question is not about the divine nature taken broadly for uncreated entity, under which ratio it is distinguished from created things, but about it taken strictly insofar as it is the root of the divine attributes, and thus virtually distinct from them. — The minor is proved. The ratio of ens a se, from its formal ratio, is a transcendent predicate of all the divine formalities or perfections, and is formally imbibed in them. But such a predicate does not distinguish the nature from the attributes. Therefore. — The major is evident; for everything that is in God is ens a se. — The minor is also evident, because nature and property are not distinguished by that through which they agree, and which is found formally in them all. This argument also militates against the opinion of Scotus, because infinity, in which he places the divine essence, is also a transcendent predicate.

To this fundamental argument the adversaries reply, first and commonly, that to be from oneself can be taken in a threefold way: first, for the negation of being from another as from a real cause with dependence; and thus, they say, whatever is in God is a being from itself. Second, for the negation of being from another as from a formal principle without dependence, and thus the eternal Father is a being from himself, but not the Son and the Holy Spirit. Third, for the negation of being from another as from a virtual cause, or root, and this belongs to the divine essence alone. They therefore admit that aseity in the first way does not constitute the divine nature, because thus it transcends all the attributes; nor even when taken in the second way, because otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit, as such, would not have the divine nature, since they have being from the Father as from a principle. Therefore aseity taken only in the third way is the constitutive of the divine nature, since it as such is not transcendent to the attributes, but their root.

On the contrary. This response manifestly begs the principle, and supposes or does not attain that which is at issue. Therefore it is of no force. — The antecedent is proved. Aseity taken in the third way, that is, not to be from another as from a root, but rather to be the root of others, constitutes the divine nature, they say. But this is not what is asked, for all admit that; rather, it is asked to which formality or ratio in God this belongs, namely, that it is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest: which this response of the adversaries in no way proves or shows, since they admit that it is not aseity in the first or second way. Therefore.

This argument is confirmed and more fully explained. To say that not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, constitutes nature, and conversely that to be from another as from a root constitutes properties, is to prove what nature is and what properties are in general, but not what they are in this particular matter, namely in God, or to which of His formalities they belong; and yet this is what is asked here. Therefore, the same as before. — The major is proved. Not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, likewise to be from another as from a root, are definitions of nature and of properties in general, which belong no more to God than to man or to other creatures. For in like manner I say of the nature of man that it is that which is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest, and of his property that it is from another as from a root; but if it be asked what it is in man that is not from another as from a root, but is the root of the others, I shall answer that it is rationality. And this is what is now asked in God and what the adversaries ought to assign in Him. It is not, as we have already said and as they admit, aseity in the first and second mode, nor, as is clear, aseity in the third mode. Therefore it is none of the things assigned by the adversaries; and this argument, of which I have not yet heard or seen a solution, has turned me, while wavering, to this opinion.

It is proved secondly. God ought to be constituted through the grade of understanding. Therefore not through the grade of being, or of being from Himself. — The antecedent is proved. First, since God is the most perfect being, He ought to be constituted through the most perfect grade. But among the four grades constituting nature, namely, of being, of living, of sensing, and of understanding, the grade of understanding is the most perfect. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved secondly from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, question 93, article 3. Among creatures, only angels and men were made to the image of God, that is, they participate in and imitate something of the nature of God, because they are intellectual. Therefore the nature of God is constituted through the grade of understanding, and not through the grade of being, otherwise all creatures would have been made to the image of God.

I say secondly: Divine understanding, not radical but actual, under the formal aspect of ultimate actuality per se subsisting, metaphysically constitutes the divine nature. Hence the description of God will be this: A being understanding most supremely and most actually.

It is proved 1°. According to what we have just said in the second proof of the preceding conclusion, the divine nature is metaphysically constituted through the intellective grade; and since it is the purest act, devoid of all potentiality, it ought to be constituted through that which in that grade is most actual and has no shadow of potentiality. But such is actual understanding, and not radical understanding. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Either the discourse is about remote radical understanding, which is the immaterial substance itself, or about proximate radical understanding, which is the intellective power. But each of the two, in our manner of conceiving, is related to actual understanding in the mode of potency to act, or of first act to second. Therefore.

The 2nd conclusion is proved. That is constitutive of the nature of any thing, not what is first conceived in it in whatever way, otherwise the ratio of substance in man would be constitutive of human nature; but what is first conceived in it as something more actual and more perfect, whence it comes about that it is the root and origin of the other perfections. But among all the perfections of God, the first that is conceived as more actual and more perfect is not radical understanding or the potency of understanding, but understanding itself, most actual and most perfect. Therefore.

An objection is raised against the second conclusion: actual understanding is essentially an operation. But operation does not constitute the operating nature; rather, it presupposes it as constituted. Therefore.

*I respond. *I distinguish the minor. A finite operation which is an accident does not constitute the operating nature, but presupposes it as constituted: I concede the minor. An infinite operation subsisting through itself: I deny the minor. The disparity is that it belongs to the notion of an operation which is finite and an accident superadded to the operator, that it proceed from the operator itself, and therefore presuppose it as constituted. But indeed it does not belong to the notion of an infinite operation and one subsisting through itself that it proceed from the operator, but only that it be its ultimate act, identified with it without a virtual distinction. Because in an infinite being nothing can be conceived unless pure act remain in our concept; but the operating nature would not remain pure act, if it were conceived as distinct from its ultimate act proceeding from it and under the ratio of first act with respect to that act. Therefore operation as emanating from a principle and under the concept ab is not formally in God, which note well, but only eminently and virtually, insofar as the same entity in God eminently does the whole of what in created things an operation proceeding forth and the principle from which it proceeds do. And therefore it must be said that the divine nature is constituted by intellection, not under the ratio of operation as emanating, or under the concept ab, but under the ratio of ultimate actuality subsisting through itself.

It must be admitted that the opinion which holds that the divine essence is constituted by aseity is the more common. Although, however, at first sight it seems to be opposed to the opinion which our author defends, they can somehow be reconciled with one another. For a twofold way is open for knowing God: one a posteriori, by which we arrive at Being from itself, pre-containing all the perfections that are in creatures, and in a more eminent mode than they are in them; the other a priori, by which, by investigating the divine attributes and comparing them with one another, we acquire a more perfect knowledge of the divine essence, by determining among those same attributes that one which, in relation to us, has the character, as it were, of a specific difference, exhibiting more actually and more perfectly the divine nature itself, and from which consequently all the others are understood to flow forth.

These things having been posited, it seems possible to say that, if the matter concerns the metaphysical constitutive of God insofar as it is conceived and inferred of God in the first place a posteriori, according to the principle of causality, aseitas ought to be held as such a constitutive, as the arguments of those who stand for aseitas prove. But if the discussion is about the more actual and more determinate metaphysical constitutive according as it is discovered from demonstrations a priori, the supreme grade of understanding can be called the metaphysical constitutive of the divine essence, and in this sense Billuart, and others with him, argue correctly. But because those things which are arguments a priori disclose and declare the essence of a thing more, this latter explanation seems clearer, and therefore to be preferred.]