Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

The question is not about the physical constitution of the divine nature according as it is really in itself; for thus it is certain that all perfections, whether absolute or relative, really constitute God, since all are identified in the very nature of God, which in itself is most simple.

Nor again is the question about the divine nature taken broadly and in a certain ample signification for uncreated being, whereby it is distinguished from creatures, and which stands after the manner of a transcendens, and is found in all the attributes, in that proportional way in which the ratio of created being is imbibed in all the differences and modes of creatures.

But the question is about the nature or essence, strictly taken for that which is first conceived in God, as the font and origin of the other properties, from which it is therefore virtually distinguished, and in which, under this formal aspect, it is not conceived as transcendentally included; that is, about the metaphysical constitutive, or the essential difference of the divine nature, insofar as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state, as its essential difference and the origin of the other perfections, as rationality in man.

I say first: The nature or essence of God is not constituted metaphysically by aseity.

It is proved first by a fundamental argument. That is the formal constitutive of the divine nature which distinguishes it, not only from creatures, but also from the attributes, the persons, and the other divine formalities. But the ratio of ens a se does not provide this. Therefore, etc. — The major is evident; because here, as has been said, the question is not about the divine nature taken broadly for uncreated entity, under which ratio it is distinguished from created things, but about it taken strictly insofar as it is the root of the divine attributes, and thus virtually distinct from them. — The minor is proved. The ratio of ens a se, from its formal ratio, is a transcendent predicate of all the divine formalities or perfections, and is formally imbibed in them. But such a predicate does not distinguish the nature from the attributes. Therefore. — The major is evident; for everything that is in God is ens a se. — The minor is also evident, because nature and property are not distinguished by that through which they agree, and which is found formally in them all. This argument also militates against the opinion of Scotus, because infinity, in which he places the divine essence, is also a transcendent predicate.

To this fundamental argument the adversaries reply, first and commonly, that to be from oneself can be taken in a threefold way: first, for the negation of being from another as from a real cause with dependence; and thus, they say, whatever is in God is a being from itself. Second, for the negation of being from another as from a formal principle without dependence, and thus the eternal Father is a being from himself, but not the Son and the Holy Spirit. Third, for the negation of being from another as from a virtual cause, or root, and this belongs to the divine essence alone. They therefore admit that aseity in the first way does not constitute the divine nature, because thus it transcends all the attributes; nor even when taken in the second way, because otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit, as such, would not have the divine nature, since they have being from the Father as from a principle. Therefore aseity taken only in the third way is the constitutive of the divine nature, since it as such is not transcendent to the attributes, but their root.

On the contrary. This response manifestly begs the principle, and supposes or does not attain that which is at issue. Therefore it is of no force. — The antecedent is proved. Aseity taken in the third way, that is, not to be from another as from a root, but rather to be the root of others, constitutes the divine nature, they say. But this is not what is asked, for all admit that; rather, it is asked to which formality or ratio in God this belongs, namely, that it is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest: which this response of the adversaries in no way proves or shows, since they admit that it is not aseity in the first or second way. Therefore.

This argument is confirmed and more fully explained. To say that not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, constitutes nature, and conversely that to be from another as from a root constitutes properties, is to prove what nature is and what properties are in general, but not what they are in this particular matter, namely in God, or to which of His formalities they belong; and yet this is what is asked here. Therefore, the same as before. — The major is proved. Not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, likewise to be from another as from a root, are definitions of nature and of properties in general, which belong no more to God than to man or to other creatures. For in like manner I say of the nature of man that it is that which is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest, and of his property that it is from another as from a root; but if it be asked what it is in man that is not from another as from a root, but is the root of the others, I shall answer that it is rationality. And this is what is now asked in God and what the adversaries ought to assign in Him. It is not, as we have already said and as they admit, aseity in the first and second mode, nor, as is clear, aseity in the third mode. Therefore it is none of the things assigned by the adversaries; and this argument, of which I have not yet heard or seen a solution, has turned me, while wavering, to this opinion.

It is proved secondly. God ought to be constituted through the grade of understanding. Therefore not through the grade of being, or of being from Himself. — The antecedent is proved. First, since God is the most perfect being, He ought to be constituted through the most perfect grade. But among the four grades constituting nature, namely, of being, of living, of sensing, and of understanding, the grade of understanding is the most perfect. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved secondly from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, question 93, article 3. Among creatures, only angels and men were made to the image of God, that is, they participate in and imitate something of the nature of God, because they are intellectual. Therefore the nature of God is constituted through the grade of understanding, and not through the grade of being, otherwise all creatures would have been made to the image of God.

I say secondly: Divine understanding, not radical but actual, under the formal aspect of ultimate actuality per se subsisting, metaphysically constitutes the divine nature. Hence the description of God will be this: A being understanding most supremely and most actually.

It is proved 1°. According to what we have just said in the second proof of the preceding conclusion, the divine nature is metaphysically constituted through the intellective grade; and since it is the purest act, devoid of all potentiality, it ought to be constituted through that which in that grade is most actual and has no shadow of potentiality. But such is actual understanding, and not radical understanding. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Either the discourse is about remote radical understanding, which is the immaterial substance itself, or about proximate radical understanding, which is the intellective power. But each of the two, in our manner of conceiving, is related to actual understanding in the mode of potency to act, or of first act to second. Therefore.

The 2nd conclusion is proved. That is constitutive of the nature of any thing, not what is first conceived in it in whatever way, otherwise the ratio of substance in man would be constitutive of human nature; but what is first conceived in it as something more actual and more perfect, whence it comes about that it is the root and origin of the other perfections. But among all the perfections of God, the first that is conceived as more actual and more perfect is not radical understanding or the potency of understanding, but understanding itself, most actual and most perfect. Therefore.

An objection is raised against the second conclusion: actual understanding is essentially an operation. But operation does not constitute the operating nature; rather, it presupposes it as constituted. Therefore.

*I respond. *I distinguish the minor. A finite operation which is an accident does not constitute the operating nature, but presupposes it as constituted: I concede the minor. An infinite operation subsisting through itself: I deny the minor. The disparity is that it belongs to the notion of an operation which is finite and an accident superadded to the operator, that it proceed from the operator itself, and therefore presuppose it as constituted. But indeed it does not belong to the notion of an infinite operation and one subsisting through itself that it proceed from the operator, but only that it be its ultimate act, identified with it without a virtual distinction. Because in an infinite being nothing can be conceived unless pure act remain in our concept; but the operating nature would not remain pure act, if it were conceived as distinct from its ultimate act proceeding from it and under the ratio of first act with respect to that act. Therefore operation as emanating from a principle and under the concept ab is not formally in God, which note well, but only eminently and virtually, insofar as the same entity in God eminently does the whole of what in created things an operation proceeding forth and the principle from which it proceeds do. And therefore it must be said that the divine nature is constituted by intellection, not under the ratio of operation as emanating, or under the concept ab, but under the ratio of ultimate actuality subsisting through itself.

It must be admitted that the opinion which holds that the divine essence is constituted by aseity is the more common. Although, however, at first sight it seems to be opposed to the opinion which our author defends, they can somehow be reconciled with one another. For a twofold way is open for knowing God: one a posteriori, by which we arrive at Being from itself, pre-containing all the perfections that are in creatures, and in a more eminent mode than they are in them; the other a priori, by which, by investigating the divine attributes and comparing them with one another, we acquire a more perfect knowledge of the divine essence, by determining among those same attributes that one which, in relation to us, has the character, as it were, of a specific difference, exhibiting more actually and more perfectly the divine nature itself, and from which consequently all the others are understood to flow forth.

These things having been posited, it seems possible to say that, if the matter concerns the metaphysical constitutive of God insofar as it is conceived and inferred of God in the first place a posteriori, according to the principle of causality, aseitas ought to be held as such a constitutive, as the arguments of those who stand for aseitas prove. But if the discussion is about the more actual and more determinate metaphysical constitutive according as it is discovered from demonstrations a priori, the supreme grade of understanding can be called the metaphysical constitutive of the divine essence, and in this sense Billuart, and others with him, argue correctly. But because those things which are arguments a priori disclose and declare the essence of a thing more, this latter explanation seems clearer, and therefore to be preferred.]

Whether and in what way they are distinguished from one another and from the essence?

An attributum, properly taken, is commonly defined as a perfection simply simple¹, existing in God necessarily and formally, and consequent, according to our mode of conceiving, upon the essence as constituted.

The attributes are distinguished into absolute and relative. Those are called absolute which pertain to the divine being, as simplicity, immensity, etc. Relative, those which pertain to operations, as knowledge, providence, omnipotence, etc. Likewise, some are negative, which remove imperfections from God, as to be infinite, immense, immutable, etc., by which way God is better and more easily known; for it is easier to say what God is not than what He is. Some are affirmative, which are predicated of God affirmatively, as goodness, justice, etc.

But, although we speak of several attributes, it must be observed that they are not several really, on account of the supreme simplicity and unity of God, but are several only virtually, insofar as the most simple entity of God is equivalent to several created perfections really distinct.

Distinction is the lack of identity; for those things are said to be distinguished which are not the same. It is divided into a real distinction and a distinction of reason.

A real distinction is the absence of identity which is given on the part of the thing, independently of the intellect. It is twofold: one is real simply, which is called the major; the other is real modal, which is called the minor. The major real distinction is between complete entities which are separated from one another or can be separated, as between Peter and Paul, between body and soul. The minor real distinction is between a thing and its mode, as between Peter and his sitting, or between two modes, as between sitting and standing. They are called modes because they are minute entities which, although they cannot exist without a subject, nevertheless the subject can exist without them; hence they are said to be distinguished from it modally. But that such entities are given is established by sense itself and is proved in the Metaphysics.

A distinction of reason is the absence of identity under a concept alone between things which on the part of the thing are not distinct, but are one and the same. It is also twofold: one, of the reasoning reason, the other, of the reason reasoned. The first is that which is made without a foundation in the thing, as if you distinguish between Tully and Cicero, or if you conceive the same thing to be predicated of itself, saying, for example, Cicero is Cicero; for then I conceive the same suppositum, enunciated under the mode of subject and predicate, as if duplicated, whence there results in the mind a certain distinction. The second is that which is made with a foundation in the thing, as if you distinguish, for example, between justice and mercy in God; for although justice and mercy are really identified in the same divine essence and are one and the same in reality with it, yet because this simple essence is equivalent to justice and mercy really distinct in creatures, and thus is virtually manifold, it provides our intellect with a foundation for distinguishing them in God. Therefore, a twofold foundation can be assigned for this distinction. The first is the aforesaid eminence of the thing identifying to itself several perfections really distinct in lower things. The second is the imperfection of our intellect, which, since it cannot attain all these perfections at once, conceives them by distinct acts, as if they were distinct; whence there results a distinction in the intellect. This distinction, which, when it is considered in the intellect, is called a distinction of reason reasoned with a foundation in the thing, when it is considered in the thing, is called virtual; because it provides what a real distinction would provide, and is equivalent to it for the verification of contradictories concerning the same thing.

Scotus with his followers rejects this distinction of reasoned reason, or virtual distinction, and establishes another, which he calls actual, formal, from the nature of the thing: actual, because it is on the part of the thing before every concept of the mind; formal, because it is not between things that enjoy their own existence, but between formalities or modes of the same thing; from the nature of the thing, because it results from this, that the one is not of the formal concept of the other. He says that this distinction is not real, because it is not between things, although he admits that in this sense it is real, that it is on the part of the thing independently of the intellect; nor is it of reason, because, as has been said, it precedes every act of the intellect: whence, according to him, it is intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason.

The question, therefore, is by what distinction the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence. The same difficulty exists concerning the divine relations with respect to the essence, which, although it pertains to the treatise on the Trinity, will likewise be resolved here.

I suppose, first, against Gualterus, Abbot Joachim, the Palamites, and Gilbert, that neither the attributes are really entitatively distinguished from one another and from the essence, nor the relations from the essence in God; because the opposite opinion has been defined in the Lateran and Reims Councils, and this will be clear from the refutation of the Scotistic distinction. For if these are not distinguished actually formally, a fortiori they are not distinguished actually really.

I suppose, secondly, against the Aetians and the Nominalists, that these aforesaid things are distinguished by more than a distinction of reason reasoning: this will be evident from the assertion of the virtual distinction. Therefore

I say first: the divine attributes are not distinguished from one another and from the essence, nor the relations from the essence, by an actual formal distinction, commonly called Scotistic.

It is proved by the first argument drawn from the Scriptures. Those things which are actually and formally distinguished in reality from someone cannot be predicated of him in the abstract, but rather denied; because, since the abstract includes of itself nothing other than what it explicates, if it were predicated of that from which it is formally and actually distinguished in reality, there would not be an identity of predicate and subject, as is clear in these predications: “Peter is humanity, is justice, is goodness.” But, according to the Scriptures, the attributes are predicated of God in the abstract; thus John, xiv, 6: Christ said of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life. Hence St. Bernard, when at the Council of Reims he was asked to set forth in writing what he thought against Gilbert, said, “let it be written with an iron stylus, with an adamantine point, and carved in flint, that the divine essence, form, nature, deity, goodness, wisdom, virtue, power, greatness, truly is God.” Therefore.

It is proved secondly. The Council of Reims against Gilbert of Poitiers, and the Lateran Council², under Innocent III, condemned and rejected the truly and properly real distinction in divine things: this the Scotists admit. But the actual formal distinction before every concept of the mind is truly and properly real. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Whatever it may be, whether substance, or mode, or identity, or distinction, or accident, or action, is truly and properly real, if it is or can be on the side of the thing independently of the intellect; for this is the definition of a truly and properly real being. But Scotus’s actual formal distinction is on the side of the thing independently of the intellect. Therefore.

It is proved thirdly by a twofold argument. The first is set forth thus. God is supremely simple. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with a formal real distinction. Therefore. — The major is certain by faith. — The minor is proved. A formal real distinction in God imports a formal real composition in God, namely in the manner in which there is distinction. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with a formal real composition. Therefore. — The minor is evident and admitted. — The major is proved: first, composition is the union of things distinct. But things formally and really distinct in God, if there are any, are united to the divinity and to one another. Therefore a formal real distinction in God imports a real composition in God. The same major is proved secondly. From a real entitative distinction in God, if it were granted, the Fathers inferred, and used to infer against Walter and Gilbert, a real entitative composition in God. Therefore from a formal real distinction in God, a formal real composition in God is legitimately inferred.

The second argument is sought from the supreme unity of God, and is thus formed. « Just as God is most simple, so He is most one, indeed most one of all, if that could be said, » says Saint Bernard. But a real formal distinction is opposed to this supreme unity: both because, as Father Henno himself admits, it imports a real formal plurality, whereas plurality is diametrically opposed to unity; and because distinction stands to unity as composition to simplicity. But real formal composition overthrows supreme simplicity, as the opponents admit. Therefore a real formal distinction destroys supreme unity.

I say secondly: the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence, and likewise the relations from the essence, by a virtual distinction, or a distinction of reasoned reason, not indeed the greater one, which is by way of excluder and excluded, but the lesser, which is by way of implicit and explicit.

The first part is proved. Those things are said to be distinguished virtually which, although in themselves they are a most simple thing, nevertheless are equivalent to several really distinct things and produce diverse effects; hence they provide our intellect with a foundation for forming distinct inadequate concepts as though of things really distinct; from this there results in the mind a certain distinction, which is called a distinction of reason reasoned-out, or with a foundation in the thing. But in God the attributes, relations, and essence are one most simple thing, as is clear from what has been said, yet equivalent to several really distinct things in creatures, producing diverse effects, and thence providing our intellect with a foundation for forming diverse inadequate concepts of it; from this there results in the intellect a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing. Therefore.

*The second part is proved. *A greater distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, or one which stands after the manner of the excluding and the excluded, is that by which one thing, with a foundation in the thing, is so prescinded from another that it in no way, even implicitly, includes that other in its concept, but remains in potency to it as something contractible and perfectible by it as by something extraneous. But such a distinction cannot be conceived in God. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Whatever is divine, or whatever is conceived in God, ought to be conceived as most pure act and as a being infinite in the genus of being. But it is repugnant to conceive, with a foundation in the thing, most pure act and infinite being as in potency, contractible and perfectible by another as by something extraneous; for this would be to destroy the concept of most pure act, to whose ratio it belongs to exclude all potentiality and imperfection, and the concept of infinite being, to whose ratio it belongs to include at least implicitly every ratio of being. Therefore.

An objection is raised against the first conclusion. Such as the distinction is, such is the contradiction. But before every operation of the mind concerning the divine essence, attributes, and relations, a certain contradiction is affirmed, or rather contradictories are verified. Therefore. — The major is certain. — The minor is proved. Thus, before every operation of the mind, it is truly said: “God is formally God by deity, not by justice. The intellect generates, the will does not generate. The essence is communicated to the Son, paternity is not communicated.” Therefore. Thus says Franciscus Henno.

I respond. First, I retort the argument. The distinction is such as the contradiction is. But between the divine essence and the relations there is not only a formal contradiction, that is, as regards the formalities, but a real entitative contradiction, that is, as regards the entities; for truly the essence is communicated to the Son not only formally but really and entitatively, whereas paternity is not; otherwise the Father would be distinguished from the Son only formally and not really entitatively, which cannot be admitted. Therefore.

Response. 2nd, directly to the argument, which totters on every side, and 1st, the major can be denied, although Father Henno calls it certain. For of a thing simply and formally one, but virtually distinct and multiple, the same can be affirmed and denied, and thus statements that seem contradictory can be verified, because those things are not truly and properly contradictory except which are affirmed and denied of the same thing under the same ratio; but where the thing is virtually distinct and multiple, those things which seem contradictory are not enunciated of the same thing under the same ratio, but under a different one. Thus the divine essence, insofar as it is equivalent to the created intellect, generates; insofar as it is equivalent to the will, it does not generate. The divine essence, insofar as it is absolute, is communicated; insofar as it is equivalent to the relative, it is not communicated. For note well that the things which in creatures are really distinguished are identified in God, their natures being preserved. — Consequently, following upon these points, the minor too must be denied, namely that properly so called contradictories are verified of the divine essence, attributes, and relations.

But for the sake of greater clarity, I distinguish the major. Such a distinction is formally or virtually such as a contradiction is, I concede the major. Such a distinction is always formally such as a contradiction is, I deny the major. For it suffices, as has been said, that there be a virtual distinction which is equivalent to an actual real distinction, such as the eminence or virtual multiplicity of the divine entity. For by that title it is called a virtual distinction, because by reason of the infinite entity it furnishes eminently what a real distinction would furnish formally. Hence you will infer that the formal distinction itself, which the Scotists so greatly vaunt, does not suffice to verify a strictly real contradiction in divine things. For since for this there is required a distinction strictly real, or equivalent to what is strictly real—for, they say, the distinction ought to be such as the contradiction is—and since their formal distinction is neither strictly real nor equivalent to it, it follows that it is not sufficient for this effect, unlike our virtual distinction, which is equivalent to what is strictly real.

[With the distinction having been established that can be admitted among the attributes of God when compared to one another and when referred to the divine essence, it must be inquired whether they differ among themselves by a certain pre-eminence.

You ask therefore, first, whether all the attributes in God are equal.

I respond. First, if the discourse is about the attributes insofar as they are on the part of the thing, they are equal, not by a positive equality which would require a real distinction, but by a negative equality, which consists in the negation of excess; for in reality they are one and the same.

I respond. Secondly, if the discourse is about those things as they are conceived by us, the matter is under a distinction. Either they are considered under the ratio of uncreated and infinite being, which they include transcendentally, and thus they are equal; because this ratio, as being indivisible and unique, is imbibed equally by all. Or they are considered under an explicit ratio and by analogy to similar perfections in creatures, and thus they are unequal secundum quid; because intellect, for example, explicates greater perfections than will, and so of the rest.

You ask secondly whether God and the blessed also make a distinction of reason between the essence and the attributes.

Resp. more probably in the negative, because the foundations of the distinctio ratiocinata are, partly the eminence of the thing, partly the imperfection of the intellect attaining the thing by diverse inadequate concepts. But God attains His most eminent essence by a single intuition; likewise the blessed also, at least by the beatific vision, because they know God by a single and most simple species, namely the divine essence performing the office both of the impressed species and of the expressed species.

I said, at least by the beatific vision; because it does not seem repugnant that the blessed, through another cognition than that which they have outside the Word, may be able to form diverse concepts of the essence of God, and thus form a distinction of reason.]