Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

(On God, Part I, q. 2)

A proposition is called per se nota whose truth becomes known through itself and without a medium distinct from itself, just as the sun is called per se visible, because it is seen by itself and not through another, more luminous medium.

I say: This proposition, God is, is self-evident in itself, not to us.¹

The first part is proved. That proposition is per se known quoad se whose predicate is included in the ratio of the subject, as its definition or a part of the definition, as this one: « Man is an animal; » for by that very fact it is immediate and lacks an a priori middle for proof. But the existence of God is thus included in the ratio of God; for God is essentially His own esse, or is necessarily and essentially a being that exists, as we shall prove below. Therefore.

The second part is proved. That proposition is not self-known as regards us in which the quiddity of the subject does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but requires discourse in order to become known to us; because then it cannot become known to us at once whether the predicate belongs to the subject. But the quiddity of God does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but through discourse. Therefore. — The minor is evident: because what God is, we do not understand as soon as we hear this word, God, just as from the utterance of these terms, whole and part, being and non-being, we at once understand what a whole is, what a part is, what being is, what non-being is; but what God is, even the wise themselves understand through discourse and very imperfectly. Therefore.

Here you have refuted the opinion of those more recent thinkers who say that the notion of the existence of God is innate in us; for by this innate notion of God they understand nothing other than that, without discursus, even an easy one, from the sole apprehension of the terms themselves, a sound and attentive mind understands that God exists, just as from the sole apprehension of the terms, without discursus, the first principles are understood: Whatever is, either is or is not, the whole is greater than its part, as Honoratus Tournely himself, the defender of this opinion, explains. But this is the same as saying that it is per se notum quoad nos that God exists: which we attacked in the second part of the conclusion.

[What the cause was why certain men asserted that « for God to exist is self-known, so that its contrary cannot be thought, and thus that God exists cannot be demonstrated, » the Angelic Doctor explains thus, I Contra gentes, c. 10 and 11: « The aforesaid opinion arises partly indeed from custom, by which from the beginning men have been accustomed to hear and invoke the name of God. But custom, and especially that which is from the beginning, acquires the force of nature: whence it comes about that those things with which the mind is imbued from մանկություն, are held so firmly as if they were naturally and self-known. But partly it comes about from this, that there is no distinction made between what is self-known simply and what is known with respect to us. For simply indeed that God exists is self-known, since this very thing which God is, is His own esse (existence). But because we cannot conceive in mind this very thing which God is, that is, the essence, it remains unknown with respect to us. »]

[In establishing the existence of God there is a threefold rock equally to be avoided. — The first is that of those who affirm that no demonstration of the existence of God is to be undertaken, since it is to be held by faith alone and believed from revelation, concerning which we are certain from the authority of the human race. Such were the author of the work entitled Essai sur l'indifference en matiere de religion, and likewise Bautain, although led by another principle, who in his own apology addressed to the bishop of Strasbourg wrote: « I have the intimate persuasion, both as a Christian and as a philosopher, that reasoning alone cannot confer certitude on me concerning this primary truth, » namely, concerning the existence of God¹. These indeed bring into danger not only reason but faith as well. — The second, however, is that of those who say that at least no strict demonstration can be given concerning the same matter, because nothing prior to God is found from which, as from a principle, His existence may be proved. To be sure, most contend, and rightly, as it seems, that the existence of God cannot be established by the species of demonstration called a priori, or through the cause, or, as others say, from the antecedent, at least by a priority of order; nevertheless it is beyond doubt that the existence of God is proved a posteriori, which kind of demonstration others call a simultaneo, and St. Thomas uses this method, as we shall see presently. — The third, however, is that of those who deny that, by the very fact that this truth is established rationally, it can become an object of faith, that is, be believed at the same time by supernatural faith. Opposed to these is our Angelic Doctor, saying, in I Contra gentes, c. 4: « Since there is a twofold truth of divine intelligibles, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which exceeds the capacity of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man for belief. But this must first be shown concerning that one [concerning the existence of God] which can be reached by the inquiry of reason; lest perhaps it should seem to someone that, since it can be had by reason, it was uselessly handed down to be believed by supernatural inspiration². » And the Holy Doctor accordingly explains « the inconveniences which would follow if the truth of this were left to be investigated by reason alone. » — Presently we shall report the dogmatic definition issued by the Church concerning the existence of God.]

Although that God exists is not per se known with respect to us, as we said in the preceding article, nevertheless that it is demonstrable through effects is established from Scripture itself, Rom. 1:20: The invisible things of God, says the Apostle, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, his everlasting power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable, etc.

I suppose that by the name of God there is understood by all, even by atheists themselves, that than which a greater and better cannot be thought, that is, an intelligent substance, supremely and infinitely perfect in every genus. Atheists say that this is impossible in reality, chiefly on account of that collection in it of all perfections, some of which are opposed to one another, for example immutability and liberty.

[1° It is of faith that God exists. 1° The Apostle says, Hebr. XI, 6: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. Here the existence of God is proposed as an object of faith. — 2° Likewise, as of faith, the same truth was defined by the Vatican synod: « The holy catholic apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, etc. » « If anyone shall have denied the one true God, creator and lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema³. » — This truth from the beginning of the Church holds the first place in the Symbol of faith.]

Secondly, St. Thomas proves that God exists by five principal arguments.

The first is proposed thus. — A first mover altogether immobile is given. But that is God. Therefore God is given. — As regards the minor, it is clear: because the first mover altogether immobile is most pure act, lacking all potentiality. For a thing is mobile insofar as it is in potency to that to which it is moved; hence that which is altogether immobile lacks all potentiality, and thus is most pure act. But most pure act contains every imaginable perfection; for if it lacked any, it would be in potency to it, and thus it would not be most pure act, and so it is that than which nothing greater and better can be thought, consequently God.

The major is proved. Everything that is moved is moved by another. But in movers per se subordinated there cannot be given a regress to infinity. Therefore there is given a first mover which is not moved and is altogether immobile. — The minor is evident, because movers are called per se subordinated when one mover, in order to move, needs the actual influx of a superior, so that the last does not move or act unless moved, and this by another, and so always, until one comes to the first. But since the infinite is impertransibile, one cannot in it come to the first; hence, if a regress to infinity be posited, there would be no motion nor action. — The major is proved. The same thing cannot be mover and moved in the same respect. Therefore everything that is moved is moved by another. — The antecedent is proved. The same thing cannot be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing: for to be in potency with respect to something is to tend toward it, and thus to lack it; but to be in act with respect to something is already to have it; but something cannot be had and not had at the same time. But if the same thing in the same respect were mover and moved, it would be in act and potency with respect to the same thing; for a thing is moved insofar as it is in potency, since to be moved is to be reduced from potency to act, and a thing moves insofar as it is in act; for to move is to effect act. Therefore.

The second argument. — There is given a first efficient cause of all things, altogether uncaused. But this is God. Therefore God is given.—The minor is evident from the preceding argument. — The major is proved. Everything that comes to be, comes to be by another; for nothing can effect itself, otherwise it would be before it was. But in efficient causes subordinated per se there cannot be given a process to infinity, as is clear from the preceding argument; nor even in causes subordinated per accidens, if God does not exist. Therefore. — The last part of the minor is proved. Causes are called subordinated per accidens when one cause has received from another the power of acting, yet does not need its actual influx in order actually to act, as is clear in the son who has received from the father the power of begetting, whose actual influx, however, he does not need in order to beget⁴.

Although, therefore, a process to infinity in causes thus subordinated per accidens is not repugnant, if a first agent be given outside the collection of infinite causes, it is nevertheless repugnant if this first agent is not given; but if it is not God, there is no first agent outside the whole collection. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. Just as any cause is not from itself, but from another, so the whole collection is not from itself, but from another; because in all predicates that are not quantitative, of which sort is to be produced, the argument from the singulars to the whole holds good. But, as is supposed, no other causing thing is given outside the whole collection. Therefore it is repugnant for a process to infinity to be given, even in causes subordinated per accidens, if there is not a first agent outside the whole collection.

The third argument. — A necessary being is given, that is, one to which it belongs necessarily and from its own nature to exist. But such a being is God. Therefore God is given. — The minor is evident: 1° because a necessary being is a being a se, an unproduced being, independent, immutable, eternal, a being from which contingent things participate being; for what is through itself [or essentially] such, is the cause of the others which are such through accident, and thus a substantial being, spiritual, intelligent, the maker of all things. Therefore God. 2° A necessary being can be circumscribed by no limits in perfection. Therefore it is infinitely perfect. Therefore God. — The antecedent is proved. For by what can it be limited in perfection? Not by itself; for it is not the cause of itself, and if it were, it would confer upon itself every possible perfection; besides, what is necessary is only so much as it can be. Not by another, for it acknowledges nothing superior. Therefore.

The major is proved. If there were not given some necessary being, but all things in the nature of things were contingent and possible, then in point of fact no being would be given on the side of the thing ⁵. But the consequent is false. Therefore. — The consequence of the major is proved. Those things which state only possibility and contingency with respect to act cannot be reduced to that act except through a cause which necessarily contains that very act; thus, because water is in potency to heat, or is hot accidentally, it could never be heated unless there were given some being hot by its own nature, from which heat would flow into the water at least mediately or immediately. Therefore, if there is not given some necessary being to which it belongs by its own nature and necessarily to exist, in point of fact no being would be given on the side of the thing.

It is confirmed. Suppose that in fact there are no beings, as can happen if all things are contingent, for the contingent can be and not be; or at least imagine that there are none: from what will they have being, if there is no being existing necessarily? Not from themselves, for what is not cannot give itself that it be; not from another, for nothing else exists, as is supposed. Therefore they could not be. Therefore they would be and would not be possible: they would be, as is supposed, and they would not be, because there would be nothing from which they could have being. Therefore a necessary being must be admitted, from which all the rest have being.

The fourth argument. — There is given some being supremely perfect, supremely noble, being in the highest degree, which is the cause of every perfection in other things. But that is God. Therefore God is given. — The minor is clear from what has been said. — The major is proved. We see among beings that some are more or less beings, more or less perfect. But more and less are predicated of diverse things according as they approach more or less to something which is more such, and participate in it in diverse ways: just as that is hotter which approaches more to what is maximally hot and participates more in it. Therefore there is given in the nature of things some being supremely perfect, supremely noble, being in the highest degree, and indeed one which is the cause of other perfect things, whether efficient, or at least exemplary, inasmuch as from approach to or withdrawal from it, from greater or lesser participation, imitation, or falling away, the perfection of other things descends or is measured. For, according to the common axiom, the first in each genus is the cause of the rest which are of that genus, namely either an efficient or an exemplary cause.

Fifth argument. — There is given a highest provider and governor. But God is such. Therefore God is given. — The minor is evident, because by God we understand nothing other than the supreme divinity ruling and governing all things. — The major is proved. We see that some things which lack cognition operate not at random and by chance, but for an end; which is apparent from this, that they always or for the most part operate in the same way. The heavens, for example, are always moved in the same way; heavy things are borne always downward, light things always upward, etc. But things which do not have cognition do not tend toward an end unless directed by something cognizant and intelligent; just as an arrow would not reach the target unless it were directed by the archer. Therefore there is given a most wise governor and a certain supreme intelligence directing all things to their ends, which is God.

There is added a sixth argument akin to the preceding one, from the contemplation of this world, which is briefly set forth thus. — All the wondrous things that shine forth in this world, whether in heaven, or on earth, or in the sea, or in man himself alone, according to their structure, order, position, motion, disposition, beauty, variety, harmony in relation to their ends, cannot without madness be referred back to the chance concurrence of atoms, but must necessarily be ascribed to some supreme intelligence, the artificer and directress of all these things. But this is God, since by God all understand the supreme founder and ruler of the world. Therefore God is given. — The antecedent is proved. A work elaborated with exquisite skill, for example, a royal house, a clock, an elegant statue or painting, could not without madness be ascribed to chance or fortune, and not to a most skillful artificer. Therefore, a fortiori, the ordered and wondrous disposition of the whole world, indeed even of the human body alone, in which far more of art and industry shines forth than in the most exquisite works made by human art, cannot without madness be ascribed to the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, and not to a supreme intelligence. And indeed, if this world, wondrous with so great a variety of parts and with so fitting a disposition of all things to their ends, has been made by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, I should like them to say why by this same fortuitous concurrence of atoms there has not at some time likewise been produced a clock or a royal palace, a statue or a painting, and other things which we see to be made by human art; or, as Tully says ⁶, why the poems of Homer are not made similarly from the fortuitous concurrence of letters, or a royal house from a fortuitous heap of timbers and stones, or painted panels from the fortuitous falling of colors upon them. — You will see this argument more fully expounded in the authors.

Atheus, ἀ θεός in Greek, in Latin signifies the same as not God, or without God: whence atheism is ignorance or negation of divinity. — Hence there is a twofold species of atheism, namely negative atheism, which is nescience of God, or the lack of a notion of the existence of God, and positive atheism, which is the positive negation of the existence of God: the former arises from ignorance, the latter from error.

A twofold cognition of God can be had: one explicit and formal, by which God is cognized under the concept of Divinity, namely, as He is the supreme cause of all things, necessary being, and other things of this sort; the other implicit and virtual, which is not terminated precisely at God as He is God, or under the concept of Divinity, but at the morally good, or at another object in whose cognition God, the cause of that good or object, is necessarily involved, and consequently is implicitly cognized. — Explicit and formal cognition is again divided into distinct and confused, namely, according as His nature or quiddity, that is, the constitutive factor of the divine being, is clearly conceived; or according as it is indeed cognized that God is the supreme and universal cause, but by a generic notion which does not disclose what God is in Himself, or that from which the divine essence is constituted.

There is likewise a twofold ignorance concerning the existence of God, from which negative atheism is constituted: one vincible, which depends on the will, insofar as through either negligence or malice a man does nothing to acquire knowledge; the other invincible, which, if perhaps it exists, does not depend on the will, and cannot be avoided through means placed within man's power.

Here it is asked whether negative atheists can be given, who are ignorant of the existence of God.

This question is posed either in the order of right, namely, whether they can be given, or in the order of fact, that is, whether they are in fact found. — In the order of fact, negative atheists do not exist, for man everywhere necessarily lives in society, and there is no people among whom the idea of God, however much obscured and disfigured, is not admitted.

But can there, in the order of right, exist a negative atheist, who so invincibly is ignorant of God that he does not know Him even confusedly as the supreme and universal cause?

Three principles borrowed from the Angelic Doctor are opportunely prefigured for the response:

First: “There is present in man a natural desire of knowing the cause, when he beholds the effect... If, therefore, the intellect of the rational creature cannot attain to the first cause of things, the desire of nature will remain vain¹.” — This principle is apparent even in children, in whom there is a natural curiosity.

But that desire manifests openly that, in the apprehension of the effect, the existence of the cause is apprehended at the same time, at least confusedly, which cause is evidently correlative to the effect; otherwise that desire would not exist, if the notion of the cause were lacking, which is the terminus of that very desire.

3rd, “That which is naturally desired by man is naturally known by the same man²,” or at least can be known. For, as Cajetan most rightly notes on this passage of St. Thomas, “nature does not bestow an inclination to something to which the whole power of nature is unable to lead;” otherwise man would naturally seek something from the knowing of which he would also naturally be held back; which implies a contradiction.

These points having been set down, the question is solved.

I say: Invincible ignorance concerning the existence of God as natural author cannot be given.

It is proved first from the Scriptures. Those who have been ignorant of God are called indiscriminately inexcusable, Rom. I, 20. Therefore they were ignorant vincibly and culpably. Moreover it is said, Ps. LXXVIII, 6: Pour out thy wrath upon the nations that have not known thee, and upon the kingdoms that have not invoked thy name. But the Prophet, inspired by God, would not say this unless their ignorance were vincible and culpable. Therefore.

It is proved secondly from the Fathers. Augustine says, In Ps. LXXIV: “God everywhere hidden, everywhere manifest, whom it is permitted to none to know as He is, and whom no one is permitted to be ignorant of.” Chrysostom, on these words: The heavens declare the glory of God, says, Hom. IX ad pop. Antioch.: “The Scythian, and the barbarian, and the Jew, and the Egyptian, and every man walking upon the earth, hears this voice... Upon this book alike both the unlettered and the wise will be able to look.” Gregory the Great, book XXVII of the Moral., c. 9: “Every man, by the very fact that he has been made rational, ought from reason to gather that He who made him is God.”

It is proved by the third argument, by which also sufficient satisfaction is made to the foundation of the contrary opinion:

[Our first conclusion is evidently inferred from the principles set forth above. For, on the one hand, creatures, both as regards their motion and disposition, and as regards their subordination in causality, and as regards their contingency, and finally as regards their diverse grades of perfection, are daily set before the eyes of man; and, insofar as they are effects dependent on a cause, they are of themselves suited to lead to the cognition of the existence of a first unmoved mover, of a first efficient cause, of a supreme intelligence ordering all things to an end, of a necessary and most perfect being: to all which is added consciousness of our temporary existence and of the imperfect nature of our intelligence. — On the other hand, there is the natural desire of knowing the cause which is apprehended confusedly by our mind as soon as in the cognition of an effect; and for the fulfilling of this desire, reason, by the natural power of reasoning in which it rejoices, is naturally fitted, as was said in the third principle set forth above. Therefore, if man, using reason, does not know the creator from creatures, it must deservedly be affirmed that he does not do what is in him, and that by a base and culpable sloth he certainly neglects to apply natural reason to the inquiry into the primary truth from which the rest flow, and which, if cut off, no other can stand. Invincible ignorance, therefore, is excluded by that very fact from him, according to the definition given. Elsewhere]

Secondly. Although the existence of God is not per se known with respect to us, as we said above, but is demonstrable from creatures, nevertheless this demonstration is so easy, so obvious, that there is no one of sound mind, however rustic or barbarous, who is not capable of it, or at least to whom, from the inspection of the world or of himself, some suspicion or conjectural opinion of some supreme numen or ruler does not occur, as is clear from the Scriptures and Fathers cited; once this has been set before him, he is bound to inquire who He is; and if he neglects this, he is ignorant in a vincible way. Therefore.

Add that, if a man could be invincibly ignorant of God, however wicked he might be, he would commit no mortal sin. For mortal sin is an offense against God; but one who is invincibly not known cannot be offended.

[Here the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII must be noted: « Philosophical or moral sin is a human act at variance with rational nature and right reason; theological and mortal sin, however, is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave it may be, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment. » — This proposition, which Arnaldus had fabricated and, as was his custom, attributed to his adversaries, was noted as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous.]

Negative atheism having been excluded, another question is raised, namely, whether positive atheists can be found, who by erroneous reasons persuade themselves that God does not exist.

Here again a distinction must be made. For positive atheists are commonly divided into practical and theoretical. — Practical atheists, while perceiving by reason that God exists, nevertheless so order their moral life as if God did not exist. Concerning such persons the question here is not raised; for sad experience, especially in these troubled and most wretched times, more than sufficiently demonstrates not only that atheists of this sort can be supposed, but that they are in fact found. — Theoretical atheists, however, if perhaps there are any, are those who assert that they hold in their mind that in truth God does not exist.

I say: first, it is more probable that theoretical atheists do not in fact exist as persons truly persuaded.

We say, first, more probably, because since the discourse concerns individuals, the question cannot be determined demonstratively. We say, second, atheists truly persuaded, because there is no question here of doubters, who are outside the case; for it seems that it cannot be denied that some doubt may arise and be able for a short time to occupy the mind.

Probatur the proposition thus explained. — Those who display the species of unbelief with respect to the existence of God are men who from infancy were imbued with the notion of divinity and grew up in it, nor are they ignorant of the demonstrations by which the existence of God is most fully proved. Can it therefore come to pass that a man so put off nature and reason as to hold with firm subjective persuasion that which so openly conflicts with nature and reason? This indeed seems altogether incredible. Hence Seneca says: « They lie who say that they do not perceive that God exists; for although they may assure you of it by day, yet by night and when alone they doubt.¹ » And Bayle himself, certainly a man in this matter by no means suspect, and who knew by friendship or experience the chief atheists of his age, has these words in his Historical-Critical Dictionary: « It is highly probable that those who in gatherings of men are eager to attack the more commonly received truths of religion say more than they really think. Vanity has more place than conscience in their disputations.»² And in fact many who were celebrated as leaders of atheism, when near death, with mind clear considering the falsity of the glory which they had wished to procure for themselves by their denials, and seriously revolving the ineluctable question concerning the origin and end of man, were compelled to acknowledge and confess God, imploring him either as merciful or blaspheming him as an implacable judge. It is certain therefore that, although perhaps they had previously tried to persuade themselves that God does not exist, especially in order to indulge their desires more freely, they were not truly persuaded that he is not.

I say: 2º It is also probable that theoretical atheists truly and firmly persuaded cannot be given.

For whatever they may boast that they believe, those who call themselves atheists, it seems altogether impossible that a man possessed of reason should not be moved by the spectacle of the Universe, and should not in some way detect in the Universe traces of some supreme Mind. To be sure, darkness can be cast over so resplendent a truth, especially through the depravity of the passions; yet not in such a way that reason does not struggle against those darknesses and prevent a man from resting peacefully in the error of the non-existence of God. This at least must be believed by one to whom the honor of human nature is dear. And hence it is that those who profess atheism either display scepticism, by proclaiming universal doubt, or teach pantheism, by perverting the genuine notion of divinity, which they are unable to deny.