Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

(On God, Part I, q. 2)

A proposition is called per se nota whose truth becomes known through itself and without a medium distinct from itself, just as the sun is called per se visible, because it is seen by itself and not through another, more luminous medium.

I say: This proposition, God is, is self-evident in itself, not to us.¹

The first part is proved. That proposition is per se known quoad se whose predicate is included in the ratio of the subject, as its definition or a part of the definition, as this one: « Man is an animal; » for by that very fact it is immediate and lacks an a priori middle for proof. But the existence of God is thus included in the ratio of God; for God is essentially His own esse, or is necessarily and essentially a being that exists, as we shall prove below. Therefore.

The second part is proved. That proposition is not self-known as regards us in which the quiddity of the subject does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but requires discourse in order to become known to us; because then it cannot become known to us at once whether the predicate belongs to the subject. But the quiddity of God does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but through discourse. Therefore. — The minor is evident: because what God is, we do not understand as soon as we hear this word, God, just as from the utterance of these terms, whole and part, being and non-being, we at once understand what a whole is, what a part is, what being is, what non-being is; but what God is, even the wise themselves understand through discourse and very imperfectly. Therefore.

Here you have refuted the opinion of those more recent thinkers who say that the notion of the existence of God is innate in us; for by this innate notion of God they understand nothing other than that, without discursus, even an easy one, from the sole apprehension of the terms themselves, a sound and attentive mind understands that God exists, just as from the sole apprehension of the terms, without discursus, the first principles are understood: Whatever is, either is or is not, the whole is greater than its part, as Honoratus Tournely himself, the defender of this opinion, explains. But this is the same as saying that it is per se notum quoad nos that God exists: which we attacked in the second part of the conclusion.

[What the cause was why certain men asserted that « for God to exist is self-known, so that its contrary cannot be thought, and thus that God exists cannot be demonstrated, » the Angelic Doctor explains thus, I Contra gentes, c. 10 and 11: « The aforesaid opinion arises partly indeed from custom, by which from the beginning men have been accustomed to hear and invoke the name of God. But custom, and especially that which is from the beginning, acquires the force of nature: whence it comes about that those things with which the mind is imbued from մանկություն, are held so firmly as if they were naturally and self-known. But partly it comes about from this, that there is no distinction made between what is self-known simply and what is known with respect to us. For simply indeed that God exists is self-known, since this very thing which God is, is His own esse (existence). But because we cannot conceive in mind this very thing which God is, that is, the essence, it remains unknown with respect to us. »]

[In establishing the existence of God there is a threefold rock equally to be avoided. — The first is that of those who affirm that no demonstration of the existence of God is to be undertaken, since it is to be held by faith alone and believed from revelation, concerning which we are certain from the authority of the human race. Such were the author of the work entitled Essai sur l'indifference en matiere de religion, and likewise Bautain, although led by another principle, who in his own apology addressed to the bishop of Strasbourg wrote: « I have the intimate persuasion, both as a Christian and as a philosopher, that reasoning alone cannot confer certitude on me concerning this primary truth, » namely, concerning the existence of God¹. These indeed bring into danger not only reason but faith as well. — The second, however, is that of those who say that at least no strict demonstration can be given concerning the same matter, because nothing prior to God is found from which, as from a principle, His existence may be proved. To be sure, most contend, and rightly, as it seems, that the existence of God cannot be established by the species of demonstration called a priori, or through the cause, or, as others say, from the antecedent, at least by a priority of order; nevertheless it is beyond doubt that the existence of God is proved a posteriori, which kind of demonstration others call a simultaneo, and St. Thomas uses this method, as we shall see presently. — The third, however, is that of those who deny that, by the very fact that this truth is established rationally, it can become an object of faith, that is, be believed at the same time by supernatural faith. Opposed to these is our Angelic Doctor, saying, in I Contra gentes, c. 4: « Since there is a twofold truth of divine intelligibles, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which exceeds the capacity of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man for belief. But this must first be shown concerning that one [concerning the existence of God] which can be reached by the inquiry of reason; lest perhaps it should seem to someone that, since it can be had by reason, it was uselessly handed down to be believed by supernatural inspiration². » And the Holy Doctor accordingly explains « the inconveniences which would follow if the truth of this were left to be investigated by reason alone. » — Presently we shall report the dogmatic definition issued by the Church concerning the existence of God.]

Although that God exists is not per se known with respect to us, as we said in the preceding article, nevertheless that it is demonstrable through effects is established from Scripture itself, Rom. 1:20: The invisible things of God, says the Apostle, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, his everlasting power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable, etc.

I suppose that by the name of God there is understood by all, even by atheists themselves, that than which a greater and better cannot be thought, that is, an intelligent substance, supremely and infinitely perfect in every genus. Atheists say that this is impossible in reality, chiefly on account of that collection in it of all perfections, some of which are opposed to one another, for example immutability and liberty.

[1° It is of faith that God exists. 1° The Apostle says, Hebr. XI, 6: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. Here the existence of God is proposed as an object of faith. — 2° Likewise, as of faith, the same truth was defined by the Vatican synod: « The holy catholic apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, etc. » « If anyone shall have denied the one true God, creator and lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema³. » — This truth from the beginning of the Church holds the first place in the Symbol of faith.]

Secondly, St. Thomas proves that God exists by five principal arguments.

The first is proposed thus. — A first mover altogether immobile is given. But that is God. Therefore God is given. — As regards the minor, it is clear: because the first mover altogether immobile is most pure act, lacking all potentiality. For a thing is mobile insofar as it is in potency to that to which it is moved; hence that which is altogether immobile lacks all potentiality, and thus is most pure act. But most pure act contains every imaginable perfection; for if it lacked any, it would be in potency to it, and thus it would not be most pure act, and so it is that than which nothing greater and better can be thought, consequently God.

The major is proved. Everything that is moved is moved by another. But in movers per se subordinated there cannot be given a regress to infinity. Therefore there is given a first mover which is not moved and is altogether immobile. — The minor is evident, because movers are called per se subordinated when one mover, in order to move, needs the actual influx of a superior, so that the last does not move or act unless moved, and this by another, and so always, until one comes to the first. But since the infinite is impertransibile, one cannot in it come to the first; hence, if a regress to infinity be posited, there would be no motion nor action. — The major is proved. The same thing cannot be mover and moved in the same respect. Therefore everything that is moved is moved by another. — The antecedent is proved. The same thing cannot be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing: for to be in potency with respect to something is to tend toward it, and thus to lack it; but to be in act with respect to something is already to have it; but something cannot be had and not had at the same time. But if the same thing in the same respect were mover and moved, it would be in act and potency with respect to the same thing; for a thing is moved insofar as it is in potency, since to be moved is to be reduced from potency to act, and a thing moves insofar as it is in act; for to move is to effect act. Therefore.

The second argument. — There is given a first efficient cause of all things, altogether uncaused. But this is God. Therefore God is given.—The minor is evident from the preceding argument. — The major is proved. Everything that comes to be, comes to be by another; for nothing can effect itself, otherwise it would be before it was. But in efficient causes subordinated per se there cannot be given a process to infinity, as is clear from the preceding argument; nor even in causes subordinated per accidens, if God does not exist. Therefore. — The last part of the minor is proved. Causes are called subordinated per accidens when one cause has received from another the power of acting, yet does not need its actual influx in order actually to act, as is clear in the son who has received from the father the power of begetting, whose actual influx, however, he does not need in order to beget⁴.

Although, therefore, a process to infinity in causes thus subordinated per accidens is not repugnant, if a first agent be given outside the collection of infinite causes, it is nevertheless repugnant if this first agent is not given; but if it is not God, there is no first agent outside the whole collection. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. Just as any cause is not from itself, but from another, so the whole collection is not from itself, but from another; because in all predicates that are not quantitative, of which sort is to be produced, the argument from the singulars to the whole holds good. But, as is supposed, no other causing thing is given outside the whole collection. Therefore it is repugnant for a process to infinity to be given, even in causes subordinated per accidens, if there is not a first agent outside the whole collection.

The third argument. — A necessary being is given, that is, one to which it belongs necessarily and from its own nature to exist. But such a being is God. Therefore God is given. — The minor is evident: 1° because a necessary being is a being a se, an unproduced being, independent, immutable, eternal, a being from which contingent things participate being; for what is through itself [or essentially] such, is the cause of the others which are such through accident, and thus a substantial being, spiritual, intelligent, the maker of all things. Therefore God. 2° A necessary being can be circumscribed by no limits in perfection. Therefore it is infinitely perfect. Therefore God. — The antecedent is proved. For by what can it be limited in perfection? Not by itself; for it is not the cause of itself, and if it were, it would confer upon itself every possible perfection; besides, what is necessary is only so much as it can be. Not by another, for it acknowledges nothing superior. Therefore.

The major is proved. If there were not given some necessary being, but all things in the nature of things were contingent and possible, then in point of fact no being would be given on the side of the thing ⁵. But the consequent is false. Therefore. — The consequence of the major is proved. Those things which state only possibility and contingency with respect to act cannot be reduced to that act except through a cause which necessarily contains that very act; thus, because water is in potency to heat, or is hot accidentally, it could never be heated unless there were given some being hot by its own nature, from which heat would flow into the water at least mediately or immediately. Therefore, if there is not given some necessary being to which it belongs by its own nature and necessarily to exist, in point of fact no being would be given on the side of the thing.

It is confirmed. Suppose that in fact there are no beings, as can happen if all things are contingent, for the contingent can be and not be; or at least imagine that there are none: from what will they have being, if there is no being existing necessarily? Not from themselves, for what is not cannot give itself that it be; not from another, for nothing else exists, as is supposed. Therefore they could not be. Therefore they would be and would not be possible: they would be, as is supposed, and they would not be, because there would be nothing from which they could have being. Therefore a necessary being must be admitted, from which all the rest have being.

The fourth argument. — There is given some being supremely perfect, supremely noble, being in the highest degree, which is the cause of every perfection in other things. But that is God. Therefore God is given. — The minor is clear from what has been said. — The major is proved. We see among beings that some are more or less beings, more or less perfect. But more and less are predicated of diverse things according as they approach more or less to something which is more such, and participate in it in diverse ways: just as that is hotter which approaches more to what is maximally hot and participates more in it. Therefore there is given in the nature of things some being supremely perfect, supremely noble, being in the highest degree, and indeed one which is the cause of other perfect things, whether efficient, or at least exemplary, inasmuch as from approach to or withdrawal from it, from greater or lesser participation, imitation, or falling away, the perfection of other things descends or is measured. For, according to the common axiom, the first in each genus is the cause of the rest which are of that genus, namely either an efficient or an exemplary cause.

Fifth argument. — There is given a highest provider and governor. But God is such. Therefore God is given. — The minor is evident, because by God we understand nothing other than the supreme divinity ruling and governing all things. — The major is proved. We see that some things which lack cognition operate not at random and by chance, but for an end; which is apparent from this, that they always or for the most part operate in the same way. The heavens, for example, are always moved in the same way; heavy things are borne always downward, light things always upward, etc. But things which do not have cognition do not tend toward an end unless directed by something cognizant and intelligent; just as an arrow would not reach the target unless it were directed by the archer. Therefore there is given a most wise governor and a certain supreme intelligence directing all things to their ends, which is God.

There is added a sixth argument akin to the preceding one, from the contemplation of this world, which is briefly set forth thus. — All the wondrous things that shine forth in this world, whether in heaven, or on earth, or in the sea, or in man himself alone, according to their structure, order, position, motion, disposition, beauty, variety, harmony in relation to their ends, cannot without madness be referred back to the chance concurrence of atoms, but must necessarily be ascribed to some supreme intelligence, the artificer and directress of all these things. But this is God, since by God all understand the supreme founder and ruler of the world. Therefore God is given. — The antecedent is proved. A work elaborated with exquisite skill, for example, a royal house, a clock, an elegant statue or painting, could not without madness be ascribed to chance or fortune, and not to a most skillful artificer. Therefore, a fortiori, the ordered and wondrous disposition of the whole world, indeed even of the human body alone, in which far more of art and industry shines forth than in the most exquisite works made by human art, cannot without madness be ascribed to the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, and not to a supreme intelligence. And indeed, if this world, wondrous with so great a variety of parts and with so fitting a disposition of all things to their ends, has been made by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, I should like them to say why by this same fortuitous concurrence of atoms there has not at some time likewise been produced a clock or a royal palace, a statue or a painting, and other things which we see to be made by human art; or, as Tully says ⁶, why the poems of Homer are not made similarly from the fortuitous concurrence of letters, or a royal house from a fortuitous heap of timbers and stones, or painted panels from the fortuitous falling of colors upon them. — You will see this argument more fully expounded in the authors.

Atheus, ἀ θεός in Greek, in Latin signifies the same as not God, or without God: whence atheism is ignorance or negation of divinity. — Hence there is a twofold species of atheism, namely negative atheism, which is nescience of God, or the lack of a notion of the existence of God, and positive atheism, which is the positive negation of the existence of God: the former arises from ignorance, the latter from error.

A twofold cognition of God can be had: one explicit and formal, by which God is cognized under the concept of Divinity, namely, as He is the supreme cause of all things, necessary being, and other things of this sort; the other implicit and virtual, which is not terminated precisely at God as He is God, or under the concept of Divinity, but at the morally good, or at another object in whose cognition God, the cause of that good or object, is necessarily involved, and consequently is implicitly cognized. — Explicit and formal cognition is again divided into distinct and confused, namely, according as His nature or quiddity, that is, the constitutive factor of the divine being, is clearly conceived; or according as it is indeed cognized that God is the supreme and universal cause, but by a generic notion which does not disclose what God is in Himself, or that from which the divine essence is constituted.

There is likewise a twofold ignorance concerning the existence of God, from which negative atheism is constituted: one vincible, which depends on the will, insofar as through either negligence or malice a man does nothing to acquire knowledge; the other invincible, which, if perhaps it exists, does not depend on the will, and cannot be avoided through means placed within man's power.

Here it is asked whether negative atheists can be given, who are ignorant of the existence of God.

This question is posed either in the order of right, namely, whether they can be given, or in the order of fact, that is, whether they are in fact found. — In the order of fact, negative atheists do not exist, for man everywhere necessarily lives in society, and there is no people among whom the idea of God, however much obscured and disfigured, is not admitted.

But can there, in the order of right, exist a negative atheist, who so invincibly is ignorant of God that he does not know Him even confusedly as the supreme and universal cause?

Three principles borrowed from the Angelic Doctor are opportunely prefigured for the response:

First: “There is present in man a natural desire of knowing the cause, when he beholds the effect... If, therefore, the intellect of the rational creature cannot attain to the first cause of things, the desire of nature will remain vain¹.” — This principle is apparent even in children, in whom there is a natural curiosity.

But that desire manifests openly that, in the apprehension of the effect, the existence of the cause is apprehended at the same time, at least confusedly, which cause is evidently correlative to the effect; otherwise that desire would not exist, if the notion of the cause were lacking, which is the terminus of that very desire.

3rd, “That which is naturally desired by man is naturally known by the same man²,” or at least can be known. For, as Cajetan most rightly notes on this passage of St. Thomas, “nature does not bestow an inclination to something to which the whole power of nature is unable to lead;” otherwise man would naturally seek something from the knowing of which he would also naturally be held back; which implies a contradiction.

These points having been set down, the question is solved.

I say: Invincible ignorance concerning the existence of God as natural author cannot be given.

It is proved first from the Scriptures. Those who have been ignorant of God are called indiscriminately inexcusable, Rom. I, 20. Therefore they were ignorant vincibly and culpably. Moreover it is said, Ps. LXXVIII, 6: Pour out thy wrath upon the nations that have not known thee, and upon the kingdoms that have not invoked thy name. But the Prophet, inspired by God, would not say this unless their ignorance were vincible and culpable. Therefore.

It is proved secondly from the Fathers. Augustine says, In Ps. LXXIV: “God everywhere hidden, everywhere manifest, whom it is permitted to none to know as He is, and whom no one is permitted to be ignorant of.” Chrysostom, on these words: The heavens declare the glory of God, says, Hom. IX ad pop. Antioch.: “The Scythian, and the barbarian, and the Jew, and the Egyptian, and every man walking upon the earth, hears this voice... Upon this book alike both the unlettered and the wise will be able to look.” Gregory the Great, book XXVII of the Moral., c. 9: “Every man, by the very fact that he has been made rational, ought from reason to gather that He who made him is God.”

It is proved by the third argument, by which also sufficient satisfaction is made to the foundation of the contrary opinion:

[Our first conclusion is evidently inferred from the principles set forth above. For, on the one hand, creatures, both as regards their motion and disposition, and as regards their subordination in causality, and as regards their contingency, and finally as regards their diverse grades of perfection, are daily set before the eyes of man; and, insofar as they are effects dependent on a cause, they are of themselves suited to lead to the cognition of the existence of a first unmoved mover, of a first efficient cause, of a supreme intelligence ordering all things to an end, of a necessary and most perfect being: to all which is added consciousness of our temporary existence and of the imperfect nature of our intelligence. — On the other hand, there is the natural desire of knowing the cause which is apprehended confusedly by our mind as soon as in the cognition of an effect; and for the fulfilling of this desire, reason, by the natural power of reasoning in which it rejoices, is naturally fitted, as was said in the third principle set forth above. Therefore, if man, using reason, does not know the creator from creatures, it must deservedly be affirmed that he does not do what is in him, and that by a base and culpable sloth he certainly neglects to apply natural reason to the inquiry into the primary truth from which the rest flow, and which, if cut off, no other can stand. Invincible ignorance, therefore, is excluded by that very fact from him, according to the definition given. Elsewhere]

Secondly. Although the existence of God is not per se known with respect to us, as we said above, but is demonstrable from creatures, nevertheless this demonstration is so easy, so obvious, that there is no one of sound mind, however rustic or barbarous, who is not capable of it, or at least to whom, from the inspection of the world or of himself, some suspicion or conjectural opinion of some supreme numen or ruler does not occur, as is clear from the Scriptures and Fathers cited; once this has been set before him, he is bound to inquire who He is; and if he neglects this, he is ignorant in a vincible way. Therefore.

Add that, if a man could be invincibly ignorant of God, however wicked he might be, he would commit no mortal sin. For mortal sin is an offense against God; but one who is invincibly not known cannot be offended.

[Here the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII must be noted: « Philosophical or moral sin is a human act at variance with rational nature and right reason; theological and mortal sin, however, is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave it may be, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment. » — This proposition, which Arnaldus had fabricated and, as was his custom, attributed to his adversaries, was noted as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous.]

Negative atheism having been excluded, another question is raised, namely, whether positive atheists can be found, who by erroneous reasons persuade themselves that God does not exist.

Here again a distinction must be made. For positive atheists are commonly divided into practical and theoretical. — Practical atheists, while perceiving by reason that God exists, nevertheless so order their moral life as if God did not exist. Concerning such persons the question here is not raised; for sad experience, especially in these troubled and most wretched times, more than sufficiently demonstrates not only that atheists of this sort can be supposed, but that they are in fact found. — Theoretical atheists, however, if perhaps there are any, are those who assert that they hold in their mind that in truth God does not exist.

I say: first, it is more probable that theoretical atheists do not in fact exist as persons truly persuaded.

We say, first, more probably, because since the discourse concerns individuals, the question cannot be determined demonstratively. We say, second, atheists truly persuaded, because there is no question here of doubters, who are outside the case; for it seems that it cannot be denied that some doubt may arise and be able for a short time to occupy the mind.

Probatur the proposition thus explained. — Those who display the species of unbelief with respect to the existence of God are men who from infancy were imbued with the notion of divinity and grew up in it, nor are they ignorant of the demonstrations by which the existence of God is most fully proved. Can it therefore come to pass that a man so put off nature and reason as to hold with firm subjective persuasion that which so openly conflicts with nature and reason? This indeed seems altogether incredible. Hence Seneca says: « They lie who say that they do not perceive that God exists; for although they may assure you of it by day, yet by night and when alone they doubt.¹ » And Bayle himself, certainly a man in this matter by no means suspect, and who knew by friendship or experience the chief atheists of his age, has these words in his Historical-Critical Dictionary: « It is highly probable that those who in gatherings of men are eager to attack the more commonly received truths of religion say more than they really think. Vanity has more place than conscience in their disputations.»² And in fact many who were celebrated as leaders of atheism, when near death, with mind clear considering the falsity of the glory which they had wished to procure for themselves by their denials, and seriously revolving the ineluctable question concerning the origin and end of man, were compelled to acknowledge and confess God, imploring him either as merciful or blaspheming him as an implacable judge. It is certain therefore that, although perhaps they had previously tried to persuade themselves that God does not exist, especially in order to indulge their desires more freely, they were not truly persuaded that he is not.

I say: 2º It is also probable that theoretical atheists truly and firmly persuaded cannot be given.

For whatever they may boast that they believe, those who call themselves atheists, it seems altogether impossible that a man possessed of reason should not be moved by the spectacle of the Universe, and should not in some way detect in the Universe traces of some supreme Mind. To be sure, darkness can be cast over so resplendent a truth, especially through the depravity of the passions; yet not in such a way that reason does not struggle against those darknesses and prevent a man from resting peacefully in the error of the non-existence of God. This at least must be believed by one to whom the honor of human nature is dear. And hence it is that those who profess atheism either display scepticism, by proclaiming universal doubt, or teach pantheism, by perverting the genuine notion of divinity, which they are unable to deny.

The question is not about the physical constitution of the divine nature according as it is really in itself; for thus it is certain that all perfections, whether absolute or relative, really constitute God, since all are identified in the very nature of God, which in itself is most simple.

Nor again is the question about the divine nature taken broadly and in a certain ample signification for uncreated being, whereby it is distinguished from creatures, and which stands after the manner of a transcendens, and is found in all the attributes, in that proportional way in which the ratio of created being is imbibed in all the differences and modes of creatures.

But the question is about the nature or essence, strictly taken for that which is first conceived in God, as the font and origin of the other properties, from which it is therefore virtually distinguished, and in which, under this formal aspect, it is not conceived as transcendentally included; that is, about the metaphysical constitutive, or the essential difference of the divine nature, insofar as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state, as its essential difference and the origin of the other perfections, as rationality in man.

I say first: The nature or essence of God is not constituted metaphysically by aseity.

It is proved first by a fundamental argument. That is the formal constitutive of the divine nature which distinguishes it, not only from creatures, but also from the attributes, the persons, and the other divine formalities. But the ratio of ens a se does not provide this. Therefore, etc. — The major is evident; because here, as has been said, the question is not about the divine nature taken broadly for uncreated entity, under which ratio it is distinguished from created things, but about it taken strictly insofar as it is the root of the divine attributes, and thus virtually distinct from them. — The minor is proved. The ratio of ens a se, from its formal ratio, is a transcendent predicate of all the divine formalities or perfections, and is formally imbibed in them. But such a predicate does not distinguish the nature from the attributes. Therefore. — The major is evident; for everything that is in God is ens a se. — The minor is also evident, because nature and property are not distinguished by that through which they agree, and which is found formally in them all. This argument also militates against the opinion of Scotus, because infinity, in which he places the divine essence, is also a transcendent predicate.

To this fundamental argument the adversaries reply, first and commonly, that to be from oneself can be taken in a threefold way: first, for the negation of being from another as from a real cause with dependence; and thus, they say, whatever is in God is a being from itself. Second, for the negation of being from another as from a formal principle without dependence, and thus the eternal Father is a being from himself, but not the Son and the Holy Spirit. Third, for the negation of being from another as from a virtual cause, or root, and this belongs to the divine essence alone. They therefore admit that aseity in the first way does not constitute the divine nature, because thus it transcends all the attributes; nor even when taken in the second way, because otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit, as such, would not have the divine nature, since they have being from the Father as from a principle. Therefore aseity taken only in the third way is the constitutive of the divine nature, since it as such is not transcendent to the attributes, but their root.

On the contrary. This response manifestly begs the principle, and supposes or does not attain that which is at issue. Therefore it is of no force. — The antecedent is proved. Aseity taken in the third way, that is, not to be from another as from a root, but rather to be the root of others, constitutes the divine nature, they say. But this is not what is asked, for all admit that; rather, it is asked to which formality or ratio in God this belongs, namely, that it is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest: which this response of the adversaries in no way proves or shows, since they admit that it is not aseity in the first or second way. Therefore.

This argument is confirmed and more fully explained. To say that not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, constitutes nature, and conversely that to be from another as from a root constitutes properties, is to prove what nature is and what properties are in general, but not what they are in this particular matter, namely in God, or to which of His formalities they belong; and yet this is what is asked here. Therefore, the same as before. — The major is proved. Not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, likewise to be from another as from a root, are definitions of nature and of properties in general, which belong no more to God than to man or to other creatures. For in like manner I say of the nature of man that it is that which is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest, and of his property that it is from another as from a root; but if it be asked what it is in man that is not from another as from a root, but is the root of the others, I shall answer that it is rationality. And this is what is now asked in God and what the adversaries ought to assign in Him. It is not, as we have already said and as they admit, aseity in the first and second mode, nor, as is clear, aseity in the third mode. Therefore it is none of the things assigned by the adversaries; and this argument, of which I have not yet heard or seen a solution, has turned me, while wavering, to this opinion.

It is proved secondly. God ought to be constituted through the grade of understanding. Therefore not through the grade of being, or of being from Himself. — The antecedent is proved. First, since God is the most perfect being, He ought to be constituted through the most perfect grade. But among the four grades constituting nature, namely, of being, of living, of sensing, and of understanding, the grade of understanding is the most perfect. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved secondly from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, question 93, article 3. Among creatures, only angels and men were made to the image of God, that is, they participate in and imitate something of the nature of God, because they are intellectual. Therefore the nature of God is constituted through the grade of understanding, and not through the grade of being, otherwise all creatures would have been made to the image of God.

I say secondly: Divine understanding, not radical but actual, under the formal aspect of ultimate actuality per se subsisting, metaphysically constitutes the divine nature. Hence the description of God will be this: A being understanding most supremely and most actually.

It is proved 1°. According to what we have just said in the second proof of the preceding conclusion, the divine nature is metaphysically constituted through the intellective grade; and since it is the purest act, devoid of all potentiality, it ought to be constituted through that which in that grade is most actual and has no shadow of potentiality. But such is actual understanding, and not radical understanding. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Either the discourse is about remote radical understanding, which is the immaterial substance itself, or about proximate radical understanding, which is the intellective power. But each of the two, in our manner of conceiving, is related to actual understanding in the mode of potency to act, or of first act to second. Therefore.

The 2nd conclusion is proved. That is constitutive of the nature of any thing, not what is first conceived in it in whatever way, otherwise the ratio of substance in man would be constitutive of human nature; but what is first conceived in it as something more actual and more perfect, whence it comes about that it is the root and origin of the other perfections. But among all the perfections of God, the first that is conceived as more actual and more perfect is not radical understanding or the potency of understanding, but understanding itself, most actual and most perfect. Therefore.

An objection is raised against the second conclusion: actual understanding is essentially an operation. But operation does not constitute the operating nature; rather, it presupposes it as constituted. Therefore.

*I respond. *I distinguish the minor. A finite operation which is an accident does not constitute the operating nature, but presupposes it as constituted: I concede the minor. An infinite operation subsisting through itself: I deny the minor. The disparity is that it belongs to the notion of an operation which is finite and an accident superadded to the operator, that it proceed from the operator itself, and therefore presuppose it as constituted. But indeed it does not belong to the notion of an infinite operation and one subsisting through itself that it proceed from the operator, but only that it be its ultimate act, identified with it without a virtual distinction. Because in an infinite being nothing can be conceived unless pure act remain in our concept; but the operating nature would not remain pure act, if it were conceived as distinct from its ultimate act proceeding from it and under the ratio of first act with respect to that act. Therefore operation as emanating from a principle and under the concept ab is not formally in God, which note well, but only eminently and virtually, insofar as the same entity in God eminently does the whole of what in created things an operation proceeding forth and the principle from which it proceeds do. And therefore it must be said that the divine nature is constituted by intellection, not under the ratio of operation as emanating, or under the concept ab, but under the ratio of ultimate actuality subsisting through itself.

It must be admitted that the opinion which holds that the divine essence is constituted by aseity is the more common. Although, however, at first sight it seems to be opposed to the opinion which our author defends, they can somehow be reconciled with one another. For a twofold way is open for knowing God: one a posteriori, by which we arrive at Being from itself, pre-containing all the perfections that are in creatures, and in a more eminent mode than they are in them; the other a priori, by which, by investigating the divine attributes and comparing them with one another, we acquire a more perfect knowledge of the divine essence, by determining among those same attributes that one which, in relation to us, has the character, as it were, of a specific difference, exhibiting more actually and more perfectly the divine nature itself, and from which consequently all the others are understood to flow forth.

These things having been posited, it seems possible to say that, if the matter concerns the metaphysical constitutive of God insofar as it is conceived and inferred of God in the first place a posteriori, according to the principle of causality, aseitas ought to be held as such a constitutive, as the arguments of those who stand for aseitas prove. But if the discussion is about the more actual and more determinate metaphysical constitutive according as it is discovered from demonstrations a priori, the supreme grade of understanding can be called the metaphysical constitutive of the divine essence, and in this sense Billuart, and others with him, argue correctly. But because those things which are arguments a priori disclose and declare the essence of a thing more, this latter explanation seems clearer, and therefore to be preferred.]

Whether and in what way they are distinguished from one another and from the essence?

An attributum, properly taken, is commonly defined as a perfection simply simple¹, existing in God necessarily and formally, and consequent, according to our mode of conceiving, upon the essence as constituted.

The attributes are distinguished into absolute and relative. Those are called absolute which pertain to the divine being, as simplicity, immensity, etc. Relative, those which pertain to operations, as knowledge, providence, omnipotence, etc. Likewise, some are negative, which remove imperfections from God, as to be infinite, immense, immutable, etc., by which way God is better and more easily known; for it is easier to say what God is not than what He is. Some are affirmative, which are predicated of God affirmatively, as goodness, justice, etc.

But, although we speak of several attributes, it must be observed that they are not several really, on account of the supreme simplicity and unity of God, but are several only virtually, insofar as the most simple entity of God is equivalent to several created perfections really distinct.

Distinction is the lack of identity; for those things are said to be distinguished which are not the same. It is divided into a real distinction and a distinction of reason.

A real distinction is the absence of identity which is given on the part of the thing, independently of the intellect. It is twofold: one is real simply, which is called the major; the other is real modal, which is called the minor. The major real distinction is between complete entities which are separated from one another or can be separated, as between Peter and Paul, between body and soul. The minor real distinction is between a thing and its mode, as between Peter and his sitting, or between two modes, as between sitting and standing. They are called modes because they are minute entities which, although they cannot exist without a subject, nevertheless the subject can exist without them; hence they are said to be distinguished from it modally. But that such entities are given is established by sense itself and is proved in the Metaphysics.

A distinction of reason is the absence of identity under a concept alone between things which on the part of the thing are not distinct, but are one and the same. It is also twofold: one, of the reasoning reason, the other, of the reason reasoned. The first is that which is made without a foundation in the thing, as if you distinguish between Tully and Cicero, or if you conceive the same thing to be predicated of itself, saying, for example, Cicero is Cicero; for then I conceive the same suppositum, enunciated under the mode of subject and predicate, as if duplicated, whence there results in the mind a certain distinction. The second is that which is made with a foundation in the thing, as if you distinguish, for example, between justice and mercy in God; for although justice and mercy are really identified in the same divine essence and are one and the same in reality with it, yet because this simple essence is equivalent to justice and mercy really distinct in creatures, and thus is virtually manifold, it provides our intellect with a foundation for distinguishing them in God. Therefore, a twofold foundation can be assigned for this distinction. The first is the aforesaid eminence of the thing identifying to itself several perfections really distinct in lower things. The second is the imperfection of our intellect, which, since it cannot attain all these perfections at once, conceives them by distinct acts, as if they were distinct; whence there results a distinction in the intellect. This distinction, which, when it is considered in the intellect, is called a distinction of reason reasoned with a foundation in the thing, when it is considered in the thing, is called virtual; because it provides what a real distinction would provide, and is equivalent to it for the verification of contradictories concerning the same thing.

Scotus with his followers rejects this distinction of reasoned reason, or virtual distinction, and establishes another, which he calls actual, formal, from the nature of the thing: actual, because it is on the part of the thing before every concept of the mind; formal, because it is not between things that enjoy their own existence, but between formalities or modes of the same thing; from the nature of the thing, because it results from this, that the one is not of the formal concept of the other. He says that this distinction is not real, because it is not between things, although he admits that in this sense it is real, that it is on the part of the thing independently of the intellect; nor is it of reason, because, as has been said, it precedes every act of the intellect: whence, according to him, it is intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason.

The question, therefore, is by what distinction the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence. The same difficulty exists concerning the divine relations with respect to the essence, which, although it pertains to the treatise on the Trinity, will likewise be resolved here.

I suppose, first, against Gualterus, Abbot Joachim, the Palamites, and Gilbert, that neither the attributes are really entitatively distinguished from one another and from the essence, nor the relations from the essence in God; because the opposite opinion has been defined in the Lateran and Reims Councils, and this will be clear from the refutation of the Scotistic distinction. For if these are not distinguished actually formally, a fortiori they are not distinguished actually really.

I suppose, secondly, against the Aetians and the Nominalists, that these aforesaid things are distinguished by more than a distinction of reason reasoning: this will be evident from the assertion of the virtual distinction. Therefore

I say first: the divine attributes are not distinguished from one another and from the essence, nor the relations from the essence, by an actual formal distinction, commonly called Scotistic.

It is proved by the first argument drawn from the Scriptures. Those things which are actually and formally distinguished in reality from someone cannot be predicated of him in the abstract, but rather denied; because, since the abstract includes of itself nothing other than what it explicates, if it were predicated of that from which it is formally and actually distinguished in reality, there would not be an identity of predicate and subject, as is clear in these predications: “Peter is humanity, is justice, is goodness.” But, according to the Scriptures, the attributes are predicated of God in the abstract; thus John, xiv, 6: Christ said of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life. Hence St. Bernard, when at the Council of Reims he was asked to set forth in writing what he thought against Gilbert, said, “let it be written with an iron stylus, with an adamantine point, and carved in flint, that the divine essence, form, nature, deity, goodness, wisdom, virtue, power, greatness, truly is God.” Therefore.

It is proved secondly. The Council of Reims against Gilbert of Poitiers, and the Lateran Council², under Innocent III, condemned and rejected the truly and properly real distinction in divine things: this the Scotists admit. But the actual formal distinction before every concept of the mind is truly and properly real. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Whatever it may be, whether substance, or mode, or identity, or distinction, or accident, or action, is truly and properly real, if it is or can be on the side of the thing independently of the intellect; for this is the definition of a truly and properly real being. But Scotus’s actual formal distinction is on the side of the thing independently of the intellect. Therefore.

It is proved thirdly by a twofold argument. The first is set forth thus. God is supremely simple. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with a formal real distinction. Therefore. — The major is certain by faith. — The minor is proved. A formal real distinction in God imports a formal real composition in God, namely in the manner in which there is distinction. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with a formal real composition. Therefore. — The minor is evident and admitted. — The major is proved: first, composition is the union of things distinct. But things formally and really distinct in God, if there are any, are united to the divinity and to one another. Therefore a formal real distinction in God imports a real composition in God. The same major is proved secondly. From a real entitative distinction in God, if it were granted, the Fathers inferred, and used to infer against Walter and Gilbert, a real entitative composition in God. Therefore from a formal real distinction in God, a formal real composition in God is legitimately inferred.

The second argument is sought from the supreme unity of God, and is thus formed. « Just as God is most simple, so He is most one, indeed most one of all, if that could be said, » says Saint Bernard. But a real formal distinction is opposed to this supreme unity: both because, as Father Henno himself admits, it imports a real formal plurality, whereas plurality is diametrically opposed to unity; and because distinction stands to unity as composition to simplicity. But real formal composition overthrows supreme simplicity, as the opponents admit. Therefore a real formal distinction destroys supreme unity.

I say secondly: the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence, and likewise the relations from the essence, by a virtual distinction, or a distinction of reasoned reason, not indeed the greater one, which is by way of excluder and excluded, but the lesser, which is by way of implicit and explicit.

The first part is proved. Those things are said to be distinguished virtually which, although in themselves they are a most simple thing, nevertheless are equivalent to several really distinct things and produce diverse effects; hence they provide our intellect with a foundation for forming distinct inadequate concepts as though of things really distinct; from this there results in the mind a certain distinction, which is called a distinction of reason reasoned-out, or with a foundation in the thing. But in God the attributes, relations, and essence are one most simple thing, as is clear from what has been said, yet equivalent to several really distinct things in creatures, producing diverse effects, and thence providing our intellect with a foundation for forming diverse inadequate concepts of it; from this there results in the intellect a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing. Therefore.

*The second part is proved. *A greater distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, or one which stands after the manner of the excluding and the excluded, is that by which one thing, with a foundation in the thing, is so prescinded from another that it in no way, even implicitly, includes that other in its concept, but remains in potency to it as something contractible and perfectible by it as by something extraneous. But such a distinction cannot be conceived in God. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Whatever is divine, or whatever is conceived in God, ought to be conceived as most pure act and as a being infinite in the genus of being. But it is repugnant to conceive, with a foundation in the thing, most pure act and infinite being as in potency, contractible and perfectible by another as by something extraneous; for this would be to destroy the concept of most pure act, to whose ratio it belongs to exclude all potentiality and imperfection, and the concept of infinite being, to whose ratio it belongs to include at least implicitly every ratio of being. Therefore.

An objection is raised against the first conclusion. Such as the distinction is, such is the contradiction. But before every operation of the mind concerning the divine essence, attributes, and relations, a certain contradiction is affirmed, or rather contradictories are verified. Therefore. — The major is certain. — The minor is proved. Thus, before every operation of the mind, it is truly said: “God is formally God by deity, not by justice. The intellect generates, the will does not generate. The essence is communicated to the Son, paternity is not communicated.” Therefore. Thus says Franciscus Henno.

I respond. First, I retort the argument. The distinction is such as the contradiction is. But between the divine essence and the relations there is not only a formal contradiction, that is, as regards the formalities, but a real entitative contradiction, that is, as regards the entities; for truly the essence is communicated to the Son not only formally but really and entitatively, whereas paternity is not; otherwise the Father would be distinguished from the Son only formally and not really entitatively, which cannot be admitted. Therefore.

Response. 2nd, directly to the argument, which totters on every side, and 1st, the major can be denied, although Father Henno calls it certain. For of a thing simply and formally one, but virtually distinct and multiple, the same can be affirmed and denied, and thus statements that seem contradictory can be verified, because those things are not truly and properly contradictory except which are affirmed and denied of the same thing under the same ratio; but where the thing is virtually distinct and multiple, those things which seem contradictory are not enunciated of the same thing under the same ratio, but under a different one. Thus the divine essence, insofar as it is equivalent to the created intellect, generates; insofar as it is equivalent to the will, it does not generate. The divine essence, insofar as it is absolute, is communicated; insofar as it is equivalent to the relative, it is not communicated. For note well that the things which in creatures are really distinguished are identified in God, their natures being preserved. — Consequently, following upon these points, the minor too must be denied, namely that properly so called contradictories are verified of the divine essence, attributes, and relations.

But for the sake of greater clarity, I distinguish the major. Such a distinction is formally or virtually such as a contradiction is, I concede the major. Such a distinction is always formally such as a contradiction is, I deny the major. For it suffices, as has been said, that there be a virtual distinction which is equivalent to an actual real distinction, such as the eminence or virtual multiplicity of the divine entity. For by that title it is called a virtual distinction, because by reason of the infinite entity it furnishes eminently what a real distinction would furnish formally. Hence you will infer that the formal distinction itself, which the Scotists so greatly vaunt, does not suffice to verify a strictly real contradiction in divine things. For since for this there is required a distinction strictly real, or equivalent to what is strictly real—for, they say, the distinction ought to be such as the contradiction is—and since their formal distinction is neither strictly real nor equivalent to it, it follows that it is not sufficient for this effect, unlike our virtual distinction, which is equivalent to what is strictly real.

[With the distinction having been established that can be admitted among the attributes of God when compared to one another and when referred to the divine essence, it must be inquired whether they differ among themselves by a certain pre-eminence.

You ask therefore, first, whether all the attributes in God are equal.

I respond. First, if the discourse is about the attributes insofar as they are on the part of the thing, they are equal, not by a positive equality which would require a real distinction, but by a negative equality, which consists in the negation of excess; for in reality they are one and the same.

I respond. Secondly, if the discourse is about those things as they are conceived by us, the matter is under a distinction. Either they are considered under the ratio of uncreated and infinite being, which they include transcendentally, and thus they are equal; because this ratio, as being indivisible and unique, is imbibed equally by all. Or they are considered under an explicit ratio and by analogy to similar perfections in creatures, and thus they are unequal secundum quid; because intellect, for example, explicates greater perfections than will, and so of the rest.

You ask secondly whether God and the blessed also make a distinction of reason between the essence and the attributes.

Resp. more probably in the negative, because the foundations of the distinctio ratiocinata are, partly the eminence of the thing, partly the imperfection of the intellect attaining the thing by diverse inadequate concepts. But God attains His most eminent essence by a single intuition; likewise the blessed also, at least by the beatific vision, because they know God by a single and most simple species, namely the divine essence performing the office both of the impressed species and of the expressed species.

I said, at least by the beatific vision; because it does not seem repugnant that the blessed, through another cognition than that which they have outside the Word, may be able to form diverse concepts of the essence of God, and thus form a distinction of reason.]

Among the attributes which we conceive in God, some regard His being or substance, some His operation. Since being is prior to operating, we first treat of those things which regard the divine being, then of those things which regard His operation, as concerning knowledge, providence, etc. But since, as St. Thomas teaches in Contra gentes I, ch. 14, «for the knowledge of God one must use the way of removal,» or of negation, namely by removing from Him the imperfections of creatures, rather than the way of affirmation, by attributing to Him divine perfections which we are not able sufficiently to grasp, therefore with the Holy Doctor we begin from the negatives, and first treat of the simplicity of God, or the non-composition of the divine being. Whence there is:

St. Thomas, q. 3.

[Note that there is a twofold simplicity. One arises from potentiality and defect, which brings with it poverty and imperfection, and belongs to prime matter alone, which of itself is next to nothing. The other is that which proceeds from form and act, signifying the highest perfection and actuality. It is this latter that is at issue here.

You ask, first, whether God is a body.

From history it is certain that idolaters fashioned God, or rather their corporeal gods, and regarded as gods their wooden or marble or golden idols, or the sun, moon, plants, beasts, or men, Jupiter, Saturn, etc. — The same error is attributed to the Sadducees among the Jews. — Among Christians, moreover, Socrates, lib. Ⅵ Hist., cap. 7, and Sozomen, lib. Ⅷ, cap. 11, report that certain monks of Egypt from the sect of the Audians dreamed that God is a body. But whether Audaeus himself, the author of this sect, fell into this error remains an ambiguous matter, some affirming it, others denying it. — As to what ought to be thought of Tertullian in this grave question, the learned contend sharply among themselves. It is probable, indeed it seems certain to us, that he did not really hold that God is corporeal. He does indeed say, Contra Praxeam, cap. 7: «Who will deny that God is a body, even if God is spirit?» In the same work, cap. 29, he teaches that God is impassible, and in the book de Baptismo, cap. 11, he writes: «Alas, wretched unbelief, which denies to God his own properties, simplicity and power!» Moreover, impassibility and spirituality evidently exclude corporeity. It must therefore be judged that by body he understood substance, and that he spoke thus lest God be conceived as a certain merely ideal being. Besides, everyone knows that Tertullian often does not use words in their common sense, even when he is expounding common doctrine.

Resp. therefore to the question negatively¹. It is of faith.

Proof 1. Sacred Scripture. John, IV, 24: God is spirit. II to the Corinthians, III, 17: Now the Lord is spirit. I to Timothy, I, 17, God is called invisible; Baruch, III, 25, immense. All which can in no way belong to a body, but only to a spirit.

The testimonies of the Fathers, whose doctrine is openly consonant with this Catholic dogma, can be omitted. Proof 2 by a threefold reason². 1º God is the first unmoved mover, as is clear from what has been said above. But every body can be moved, either by local motion, passing from one place to another, or by the motion of alteration, receiving anew some accident. Therefore. — 2º God is the first being, as is established from what has been said before. But a body cannot be the first being. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The first being is act; for although in one and the same thing which passes from potency into act, potency is prior in time to act, yet act is prior to potency simply, because that which is in potency is not reduced to act except through a being in act. But every body is in potency, because the continuous, insofar as such, is divisible into parts to infinity. Therefore. — 3º God is that which is most noble among beings. But it is impossible for any body to be most noble among beings. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. A body is either living or non-living. If it is non-living, it is manifest that a living thing is nobler than it, at least substantially; if it is living, it does not live insofar as it is body, otherwise every body would live, but it lives through something else, just as our body lives through the soul. But that through which a body lives is nobler than the body. Therefore. You will say: In the Scriptures there are attributed to God things which befit only a body, as threefold extension, Job, XI, 8 and 9; arm, Ibid., XL, 4; eyes, Ps., XXXIII, 16; position, Is., III, 13, VI, 1; affections of the soul conjoined to the body, Genes., VI, 7, Ps., VI, 4. Therefore.

I reply that these and similar things must be understood in a non-proper and non-literal sense, but in an improper and metaphorical one³; for Scripture is wont to hand on to us spiritual and divine things under the likeness of corporeal things, so that it may accommodate itself to our mode of thinking and speaking. You will ask, secondly, whether in God there is a composition of matter and form.

Note: Although, according to the truth of the thing, every body and only a body is composed of matter and form, because nevertheless that is not conceded by all, therefore the Holy Doctor asks here whether God, although He is not a body, is nonetheless composed of matter and form.

I answer in the negative⁴.

This is proved by a threefold argument⁵. 1st. Because God is pure act. But in pure act there is no matter, which essentially involves potentiality. Therefore. — 2nd. God is good and perfect through his essence, not through participation. But that which is composed of matter and form is good through form, and thus through participation. Therefore. — 3rd. God is the first agent simply. But that which is the first agent simply ought to be primarily and through itself form. Therefore God is primarily and through himself form, not composed of matter and form. — The minor is proved. Each thing acts through its own form. Therefore that which is the first agent ought to be primarily and through itself form.

You ask, thirdly, whether in God essence and esse are the same: that is, whether God is so simple that He lacks substantial composition from essence and existence; for here St. Thomas takes esse for existence.

I answer in the affirmative⁶.

It is proved by a threefold argument⁷. 1st. If existence were not of the essence of God, it would be caused either by His very essence, as a property, or by some extrinsic principle. But not the first, because what is not cannot give existence to itself: in this case, however, God is supposed not to exist. Nor the second either, otherwise God would not be the first efficient cause. Therefore the existence of God is of His essence. — 2nd. Because otherwise the essence would be in potency to existence, as to its act. But this is repugnant to most pure act, such as God is. Therefore. — 3rd. That which has being, and is not being, is a being by participation; just as that which has fire, and is not fire, is ignited by participation. But God is not a being by participation, but from Himself and through essence. Therefore.

You ask, fourth, whether God is in some genus or predicament.

I answer in the negative⁸.

It is proved. Whatever is placed in some genus or predicament is placed there either directly or properly as a species, or reductively as principles and privations; thus, for example, a point is reduced to the predicament of quantity. But God can be placed in a predicament in neither way: not directly as a species, because every species consists of genus and difference, whereas in God genus and difference cannot be conceived, since genus imports potentiality; nor even reductively, because that by which something is placed reductively in some predicament does not extend itself beyond that predicament, thus a point is a principle only of continuous quantity. But God is the principle of the whole of being, pervading all genera. Therefore. — On this question more fully in the Logic.

You ask, fifth, whether there are any accidents in God, or whether there is in Him accidental composition.

I respond negatively⁹; because the subject is compared to the accident as potency to act; for the subject, through the accident, is in some way in act. But to be in potency is altogether removed from God, as being most pure act. Therefore. You will ask, sixthly, whether God is so simple that He admits in Himself no composition whatsoever. I respond affirmatively¹⁰.

It is a matter of faith decided in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where it is said: «The essence, substance, or nature of God is one, altogether simple.»

It is proved by a fivefold argument. 1st. From the enumeration of the compositions which up to this point we have rejected from God: for in God there is no composition, neither of quantitative parts, because He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor composition from nature and suppositum; nor from essence and existence; nor composition of genus and difference; nor of subject and accident. Therefore in no way is He composite, but altogether simple. — 2nd. Every composite is posterior to its components and dependent on them. But God is the first being absolutely, depending on none. Therefore. — 3rd. Every composite is caused by something uniting diverse parts. But God is caused by none, since He is the first efficient cause. Therefore. — 4th. In every composite potency and act are found; for either one part is in potency to another, or all the parts are in potency to the whole. But God is most pure act, devoid of all potentiality. Therefore. — 5th. In every composite there is something, namely a part, which is not itself. But whatever is in God, is God. Therefore.

You say: The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity does not seem to cohere with the highest simplicity. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. The highest and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality. But in God there is a trinity of persons. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major. Supreme and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality in that in which the simplicity is, I concede in French; in another in which there is no simplicity, I deny it. But in God there is simplicity in the nature, whereas plurality is in the persons.

You ask, seventh, whether God enters into the composition of other things as a part, whether formal or material, or in any other way whatsoever.

I reply in the negative¹¹. It is, first, against Marcus Varro, who, as St. Augustine testifies, in book VII of the City of God, c. 6, held that God was the soul of the world; second, against the Almarians¹², who held that God is the formal principle of all things; third, against David of Dinant, who most foolishly held that God is prime matter; fourth, against Spinoza, who, with a similar error, taught that there is only one substance of the world, and that it is God, relying on this foundation, that in the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of one nature or attribute: in this consists the doctrine of Pantheism.

It is proved by a twofold reasoning. First, God is the first efficient cause of all things. But the efficient cause does not coincide numerically with the form of the thing made, but only specifically; thus a man generates another man, not himself: with the matter of the thing made, however, it does not coincide even specifically, for matter is in potency, whereas the efficient is in act. Therefore God is not the form or matter of the things made by Him. — Secondly, since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to Him to act first and per se. But that which enters into the composition of something is not what acts first and per se, but rather the composite does; for it is not the hand that acts, but the man through the hand, and fire heats through heat. Therefore.

It is proved. What composes as a part is less perfect than the whole which arises from it and another part. But it is repugnant that God be less perfect than any thing. Therefore.

You say: In the mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Word composes Christ with the human nature. Therefore God can enter into the composition of another.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent. If the divine Word composes Christ with the human nature by way of a material or formal part inhering, I deny the antecedent; by way of a term completing, actuating, and perfecting the human nature, I concede the antecedent. The first composition, as being mixed with imperfection, St. Doctor here rejects, not the second, which imports the highest perfection and which he admits in the Third Part. Indeed, it can be said that the two natures in Christ in no way have the character of part and counterpart. For it is of the notion of a counterpart that, together with another part, it constitutes a whole which is more perfect than either part separately; which does not occur here. — On this more fully in the treatise on the Incarnation.]