Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I answer: The divine relations, besides the absolute perfection of the essence which they implicitly include, do not, by virtue of their relative concept, contribute another relative perfection virtually distinct from the absolute perfection. Thus hold certain Thomists against other Thomists.

The first proof. A thing is good and perfect insofar as it either exists in act or implies an order to existence. But the divine relations, by virtue of the concept ad and insofar as they are pure references to a term, neither exist nor imply an order to existence; they do so only by virtue of the concept in, that is, by reason of the divine essence which they include. Therefore. The major premise is from St. Thomas, here q. 5, a. 3, c., and is evident because the will is directed toward something only under the aspect of existence; and only that is good and perfect which the will desires. The minor premise is also from the Holy Doctor, q. 2 of De Potentia, a. 5, c., where he says: “A relation, insofar as it is a relation, does not have that it be something, but only that it be toward something.” This is also evident from reason, because a relation, according to what is proper to it and insofar as it is a pure reference, regards nothing except by ordering it to a term, since its whole being consists in being related to another. But it cannot order its existence to a term, because the existence of a relation is not toward a term but toward a subject. Therefore, considered in itself and by virtue of the concept ad, it does not imply an order to existence but abstracts from it. Compare the second proof of the preceding article.

The second proof. The notion of perfection must be taken according to an order toward a subject considered in itself and terminating in that subject. But a relation, by virtue of its proper concept, does not regard any subject considered in itself and terminating there, but rather by reason of a term. Therefore. The minor premise is from St. Thomas, here a. 2, where he establishes the difference between relation and the other categories. In the other categories besides relation, such as quantity and quality, the proper notion of the genus is taken according to a comparison with the subject considered in itself and with reference to itself. Thus quantity is called a measure of substance, and quality a disposition of substance. But the proper notion of relation is not taken according to a comparison with the subject considered in itself and terminating there, but by comparison with something outside it, namely a term. This is also evident from reason, because by the very fact that a concept is relative, although it regards a subject, it nevertheless regards it by ordering it to a term and by reason of the term, since its whole being consists in being related to another. The major premise is proved. Perfection must regard the subject capable of perfection according to a proportion with that subject. But if it does not regard the subject in itself, but only by reason of the term, it will not be proportioned to the subject but to the term, which is the reason why the subject is regarded. Therefore.

The third proof is from absurd consequences. If relations in God contribute and multiply relative perfection, it follows: 1º That there will be three magnitudes, three goodnesses, three perfections; consequently three great beings, three good beings, and three perfect beings taken substantively, against Augustine as cited above. 2º That all three persons together will be something more perfect, at least extensively, than one person alone, against the same Augustine, Book VI of De Trinitate, c. 8, n. 9, and Book VIII, c. 1, n. 2, and Sermon 38 De Tempore,¹ where he says: “The Father alone is as great as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit together.” 3º That no person would be infinitely perfect, because no person would possess every perfection whatsoever. For filiation and the relative perfection of filiation would be lacking to the Father, just as paternity and the relative perfection of paternity would be lacking to the Son. For just as there is relative opposition among the relations, so also there would be relative opposition among the relative perfections. Therefore the Father would not be formally infinitely perfect, nor likewise the Son. 4º That equality among the divine persons would be destroyed. The first proof. By the very fact that paternity is a relative perfection distinct from filiation, it must differ from filiation specifically, or quasi-specifically and essentially; both because paternity and filiation do not differ merely numerically, as two paternities or two filiations do, and because a merely numerical distinction arises from potentiality and matter, which are absent from God. Hence whatever differs in God differs specifically and essentially. But whatever differs specifically and essentially from another is necessarily unequal in perfection to it, because species are like numbers, one of which always exceeds or is exceeded by another. The second proof. On this hypothesis, the Father and the Son would be more perfect than the Holy Spirit, because the Father, in addition to the perfection of paternity, and the Son, in addition to the perfection of filiation, would possess the perfection of active spiration; whereas the Holy Spirit would possess only one perfection, namely that of passive spiration. Therefore.