Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I answer: There are certain real relations in God.¹

The first proof is as follows. It is certain by faith that there are in God three really distinct persons, and that they are not really distinguished in absolute things, in which they are consubstantial. Therefore, they are distinguished in relative things, that is, in relations. I add: not in relations of reason, for these cannot produce a real distinction. Therefore, they are distinguished in real relations. Therefore, there are real relations in God. The major premise was proved in the first dissertation. The minor is self-evident. Hence the cited St. Thomas says that this conclusion is a matter of faith.

I answer secondly: There are in God four real relations of origin, namely: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration, or procession;² yet in such a way that active spiration is not really distinct from paternity and filiation, but only virtually distinct.³

The first part is proved. Real relations of origin are conceived in God according to the internal processions upon which they are founded. Consequently, there are as many real relations in God as are required by the internal processions. But there are two internal processions: one through the intellect, which is the procession of the Word; the other through the will, which is the procession of Love. Each requires two relations, namely, that of principle to that which proceeds from the principle, and conversely that of what proceeds to its principle.⁴ Therefore there are four real relations: paternity and filiation, founded upon the procession through the intellect; active spiration and passive spiration, founded upon the procession through the will.

The second part is proved. According to the commonly accepted principle,⁵ all things in God are really one and the same where there is no relative opposition. But the common active spiration which is in the Father and the Son is not opposed to paternity and filiation, but stands in a disparate relation to them. Therefore it is not really distinct from them.

For the understanding of this, it must be observed that relations in creatures are really distinguished on two grounds: first, by opposition to their correlatives; secondly, by their limitation, insofar as a created relation is, by that very fact, limited to its own species and cannot possess the species and perfection of other relations. Hence one and the same entity cannot be directed toward several terms, even if merely disparate, because of the limitation inherent in created relative reality. In divine things, however, this principle of limitation does not apply because of the amplitude of infinity; only the principle of correlative opposition remains. Therefore, since the relations of paternity and filiation are not relatively opposed to active spiration, they are not really distinct from it; rather, one and the same entity, by reason of its infinity, can regard diverse terms.

From this you may infer: 1º Although there are four real relations in God, there are nevertheless not four relative things, nor a quaternity, as was defined in the chapter Damnamus, De Summa Trinitate;⁶ 2º There are not four persons, because persons are constituted by opposed relations, not by disparate relations; hence active spiration does not constitute a person distinct from the person of the Father and the person of the Son.