Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae

I answer: There are certain real relations in God.¹

The first proof is as follows. It is certain by faith that there are in God three really distinct persons, and that they are not really distinguished in absolute things, in which they are consubstantial. Therefore, they are distinguished in relative things, that is, in relations. I add: not in relations of reason, for these cannot produce a real distinction. Therefore, they are distinguished in real relations. Therefore, there are real relations in God. The major premise was proved in the first dissertation. The minor is self-evident. Hence the cited St. Thomas says that this conclusion is a matter of faith.

I answer secondly: There are in God four real relations of origin, namely: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration, or procession;² yet in such a way that active spiration is not really distinct from paternity and filiation, but only virtually distinct.³

The first part is proved. Real relations of origin are conceived in God according to the internal processions upon which they are founded. Consequently, there are as many real relations in God as are required by the internal processions. But there are two internal processions: one through the intellect, which is the procession of the Word; the other through the will, which is the procession of Love. Each requires two relations, namely, that of principle to that which proceeds from the principle, and conversely that of what proceeds to its principle.⁴ Therefore there are four real relations: paternity and filiation, founded upon the procession through the intellect; active spiration and passive spiration, founded upon the procession through the will.

The second part is proved. According to the commonly accepted principle,⁵ all things in God are really one and the same where there is no relative opposition. But the common active spiration which is in the Father and the Son is not opposed to paternity and filiation, but stands in a disparate relation to them. Therefore it is not really distinct from them.

For the understanding of this, it must be observed that relations in creatures are really distinguished on two grounds: first, by opposition to their correlatives; secondly, by their limitation, insofar as a created relation is, by that very fact, limited to its own species and cannot possess the species and perfection of other relations. Hence one and the same entity cannot be directed toward several terms, even if merely disparate, because of the limitation inherent in created relative reality. In divine things, however, this principle of limitation does not apply because of the amplitude of infinity; only the principle of correlative opposition remains. Therefore, since the relations of paternity and filiation are not relatively opposed to active spiration, they are not really distinct from it; rather, one and the same entity, by reason of its infinity, can regard diverse terms.

From this you may infer: 1º Although there are four real relations in God, there are nevertheless not four relative things, nor a quaternity, as was defined in the chapter Damnamus, De Summa Trinitate;⁶ 2º There are not four persons, because persons are constituted by opposed relations, not by disparate relations; hence active spiration does not constitute a person distinct from the person of the Father and the person of the Son.

I presuppose, as something commonly accepted against a few authors, that the divine essence, considered prior in conception to the relations, exists through its own proper and absolute existence; because, considered prior to the relations, it is pure act, therefore actually existing; it is an uncreated being, therefore existing of itself; it acts by understanding and willing, therefore it exists. Finally, existence itself is included in the very notion of divinity; for it is a being existing of itself, according to the text of Exodus III, 14: I am who am.

I answer: The divine relations or persons do not possess their own relative existences, but exist through one absolute existence of the essence.¹

The first proof. Absolute realities are not multiplied in God, because they are not relatively opposed to one another; and all things are one in God where relative opposition does not intervene, as has already been said. Hence, although there are three persons, there are not three acts of understanding, three acts of willing, or three powers. But the existence of a relation or person, which is improperly called relative, is something absolute. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1º The existence of a relation does not consist in an order toward a term, but in an order toward the subject in which it inheres. For the existence of a relation in creatures is nothing other than inherence (inesse), while in God it is subsistent being (esse per se). Therefore it is something absolute and not relative. 2º Existence belongs to a relation not according to the concept toward (ad), but according to the concept in (in): first, because the concept ad abstracts from existence, as will be said in the following article; secondly, because that which confers existence must exercise some causality with respect to it, whereas a mere term only terminates and does not actively cause anything. Therefore.

The second proof. The divine relations or persons exist through the absolute existence of the essence. Therefore relative existences are superfluous and indeed imply a contradiction. The antecedent and the consequence must be proved. The antecedent is proved. In God, existence is essentially identical with essence; for He is a being existing through itself. The essence is communicated to the relations or persons, and consequently so is its existence. But existence cannot be communicated to anything unless it renders that thing existent, just as wisdom or whiteness cannot be communicated to a man unless they render him wise or white. For the formal effect of a form is the form itself as communicated. Therefore the divine relations or persons exist through the absolute existence of the essence. The consequence as to its first part is proved. What already exists does not require another existence; for by the first existence it is already outside nothingness and outside all causes. Therefore relative existences are superfluous. The same consequence as to its second part is proved. 1º It implies a contradiction that what is already outside nothingness and outside all causes (which is the formal effect of existence) should again be placed outside nothingness and outside all causes. 2º It implies the existence of two ultimate actualities, or two ultimate termini of the same order and kind, because then neither would be ultimate. But existence is the ultimate actuality and the ultimate terminus of a thing. Therefore.

I answer: The divine relations, besides the absolute perfection of the essence which they implicitly include, do not, by virtue of their relative concept, contribute another relative perfection virtually distinct from the absolute perfection. Thus hold certain Thomists against other Thomists.

The first proof. A thing is good and perfect insofar as it either exists in act or implies an order to existence. But the divine relations, by virtue of the concept ad and insofar as they are pure references to a term, neither exist nor imply an order to existence; they do so only by virtue of the concept in, that is, by reason of the divine essence which they include. Therefore. The major premise is from St. Thomas, here q. 5, a. 3, c., and is evident because the will is directed toward something only under the aspect of existence; and only that is good and perfect which the will desires. The minor premise is also from the Holy Doctor, q. 2 of De Potentia, a. 5, c., where he says: “A relation, insofar as it is a relation, does not have that it be something, but only that it be toward something.” This is also evident from reason, because a relation, according to what is proper to it and insofar as it is a pure reference, regards nothing except by ordering it to a term, since its whole being consists in being related to another. But it cannot order its existence to a term, because the existence of a relation is not toward a term but toward a subject. Therefore, considered in itself and by virtue of the concept ad, it does not imply an order to existence but abstracts from it. Compare the second proof of the preceding article.

The second proof. The notion of perfection must be taken according to an order toward a subject considered in itself and terminating in that subject. But a relation, by virtue of its proper concept, does not regard any subject considered in itself and terminating there, but rather by reason of a term. Therefore. The minor premise is from St. Thomas, here a. 2, where he establishes the difference between relation and the other categories. In the other categories besides relation, such as quantity and quality, the proper notion of the genus is taken according to a comparison with the subject considered in itself and with reference to itself. Thus quantity is called a measure of substance, and quality a disposition of substance. But the proper notion of relation is not taken according to a comparison with the subject considered in itself and terminating there, but by comparison with something outside it, namely a term. This is also evident from reason, because by the very fact that a concept is relative, although it regards a subject, it nevertheless regards it by ordering it to a term and by reason of the term, since its whole being consists in being related to another. The major premise is proved. Perfection must regard the subject capable of perfection according to a proportion with that subject. But if it does not regard the subject in itself, but only by reason of the term, it will not be proportioned to the subject but to the term, which is the reason why the subject is regarded. Therefore.

The third proof is from absurd consequences. If relations in God contribute and multiply relative perfection, it follows: 1º That there will be three magnitudes, three goodnesses, three perfections; consequently three great beings, three good beings, and three perfect beings taken substantively, against Augustine as cited above. 2º That all three persons together will be something more perfect, at least extensively, than one person alone, against the same Augustine, Book VI of De Trinitate, c. 8, n. 9, and Book VIII, c. 1, n. 2, and Sermon 38 De Tempore,¹ where he says: “The Father alone is as great as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit together.” 3º That no person would be infinitely perfect, because no person would possess every perfection whatsoever. For filiation and the relative perfection of filiation would be lacking to the Father, just as paternity and the relative perfection of paternity would be lacking to the Son. For just as there is relative opposition among the relations, so also there would be relative opposition among the relative perfections. Therefore the Father would not be formally infinitely perfect, nor likewise the Son. 4º That equality among the divine persons would be destroyed. The first proof. By the very fact that paternity is a relative perfection distinct from filiation, it must differ from filiation specifically, or quasi-specifically and essentially; both because paternity and filiation do not differ merely numerically, as two paternities or two filiations do, and because a merely numerical distinction arises from potentiality and matter, which are absent from God. Hence whatever differs in God differs specifically and essentially. But whatever differs specifically and essentially from another is necessarily unequal in perfection to it, because species are like numbers, one of which always exceeds or is exceeded by another. The second proof. On this hypothesis, the Father and the Son would be more perfect than the Holy Spirit, because the Father, in addition to the perfection of paternity, and the Son, in addition to the perfection of filiation, would possess the perfection of active spiration; whereas the Holy Spirit would possess only one perfection, namely that of passive spiration. Therefore.