Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
First published 1754
Charles René Billuart, O.P.'s Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae (Liège, 1754) is his six-volume abridgment of the larger Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata (1746–1751). It condenses Aquinas's order and teaching into a reference manual while retaining the Dominican's characteristic distinctions, scholastic proofs, and historical material. The compendium belongs to the eighteenth-century consolidation of post-Tridentine Thomist education and helped carry Billuart's influential reading of Aquinas into later schools. Schola presents the Latin text with an English translation from its public-domain source.
Proemium I: De natura et dotibus theologiae
Ⅰ. Theologia, according to the etymology of the name, is discourse concerning God, so called from the twofold Greek expression θεος λογος; according to the signification of the name, it is the doctrine of divine things drawing conclusions from principles immediately revealed.
II. It is divided on the part of the subject into the theology of the blessed and the theology of wayfarers.
[The theology of the blessed rests upon the supernatural light of glory, and is twofold. One, which is called by St. Augustine matutinal cognition, is the very beatific vision, by which the blessed clearly see in the Word all the divine mysteries; it is essentially intuitive, because it consists in the very permanent act of vision. The other is called by the same Augustine vespertinal cognition: it is that by which the blessed, from principles known or seen in the divine essence by the light of glory, deduce, by the force of natural light, conclusions concerning the divine mysteries, and know them either through species infused by God or acquired by their own labor on the way; it is formally discursive, nor does it differ substantially from ours, which it surpasses only in clarity. The theology of wayfarers is that to which we devote ourselves in the present state, while we are on pilgrimage away from the Lord, Ⅱ Cor., v, 6: it deduces its conclusions, by the force of natural light, from principles of faith immediately revealed.]
On the part of the object it is divided into speculative, which rests in the sole consideration of divine things, such as the mystery of the Trinity, the Incarnation, etc., and practical or moral, which treats of matters pertaining to the direction of morals, such as human acts, sins, laws, etc.
On the part of mode, it is divided into positive, which treats of divine matters in a more diffuse, more elegant, and as it were oratorical style, and less accommodated to the rules of dialectic 1; and scholastic, which treats of the same matters in a manner of speaking more concise, more subtle, and more exact, according to the rules of dialectic, by expounding terms, opening the state of the question, defining, dividing, syllogizing, resolving objections, etc. 2
Hence you have that positive and scholastic theology do not differ from one another essentially and with respect to the object, for they have the same one, but only accidentally, with respect to a different method; and that those are mistaken who place positive theology in the knowledge of revealed truths which are contained in the Scriptures and traditions, and scholastic theology in the discursive deduction of conclusions from revealed truths: for thus positive theology would not be distinguished from faith, nor would it be theology, as is clear from its definition. Therefore positive theology truly does reason and from revealed truths infers and deduces other things, but not so accurately as scholastic theology, and only in this do they differ.
This more exact method, however, first began to be employed in the eighth century by St. John Damascene; it received an increase in the twelfth century from Peter Lombard, bishop of Paris, who for that reason was called the Master of the Sentences; and finally it received its completion in the thirteenth century from St. Thomas, the Angelic Doctor.
[The holy Church asserted by her supreme authority the usefulness, indeed also the necessity, of scholastic theology, against its detractors and despisers. Among the other propositions of Wyclif, the Council of Constance, sess. Ⅷ, condemned this one: «Universities, studies, colleges, and magisteria were introduced by vain chattering.» But she not only commended, but also prescribed the use of this method, by several decrees which accord perfectly with the following one issued by Honorius III: «Let some teachable men be assigned to the study of the theological profession, who, when they shall have become learned, may shine in the Church of God like the splendor of the firmament; from whom afterward a supply of doctors may be had, who, as stars destined to remain unto perpetual eternities, may be able to instruct very many unto justice: and if their own ecclesiastical revenues are not sufficient, let the aforesaid provide them with the necessities 3.»]
Ⅲ. By God’s ordinary law, besides the natural sciences, it was necessary that there be in the Church a certain doctrine according to revelation, that is, theology considered as to its substance, insofar as it abstracts from the positive and the scholastic. Because man is ordered to a supernatural end which exceeds the grasp of reason, and since, before the other animals, he is led by cognition, he ought to know this supernatural end, so that he may direct his intentions and actions toward it 4.
Indeed, that end can be known through faith, when it is possessed, and God could absolutely infuse it without any theology at all; but, according to the common course of divine providence, faith can neither be had, nor propagated, nor preserved and defended, without theology. For faith, which according to the Apostle is from hearing, and hearing through the word of God, I Rom., X, 17, is generated, nourished, defended, not by a simple narration of the mysteries, but by discourses, congruities, examples, and various other considerations, by which the obscurity of the Scriptures is elucidated, Tradition is proved, the credibility of the mysteries is demonstrated, and the cavils, cunning devices, and sophisms of heretics attacking them are detected and refuted; and all this is proper to theology: whence Augustine, in book XIV of On the Trinity, chap. 1, says that through it “the most health-giving faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened.” Yet it is not necessary for every man to be a theologian in order to be saved, but faith suffices for him by which he simply professes those things that must necessarily be believed by all. Hence Augustine, ibid.: “By this knowledge,” he says, “very many of the faithful do not excel, although they excel in faith, which alone suffices.”
IV. As regards scholastic theology, into which heretics have raged, and which certain theologians depress more than is fair, if it is considered in itself, it is also necessary in the Church, and has always flourished from its beginning: because, so considered, it is nothing other than theology according to substance, which we just now said to be necessary. For theology according to itself is scientia, but every scientia is argumentative and in this sense scholastic.
But, if it be considered according to the state which it now has in the schools, it is not necessary, since the Church stood for a long time without it; yet it is exceedingly useful: because through this faith is admirably engendered, nourished, and defended, as is evident both from the experience of so many distinguished men who have happily employed it against the profane novelties of heretics, and from the very nature of exact dialectic. For to speak in a concise, simple, and open style, with the prolixity of words cut away, to remove the equivocations of terms, to open and fix the state of the question, to define, to divide, to syllogize, to solve objections, these, I say, which are proper to scholastic theology, no one will deny to help in persuading and defending the truth.
To be sure, the Apostle, Coloss., II, 8, and the holy Fathers everywhere disapprove philosophy, not considered according to itself, but insofar as men misuse it for the deception of others and to the detriment of the faith, over which it sometimes wishes to domineer 5.
The Apostles and the Fathers of the earlier centuries, however, did not make use of these 6, so that the whole of what belongs to the faith, and the conversion of the whole world, might be attributed not to human power or wisdom, but to God; but, once the faith had been planted and made firm, and the conversion of the world accomplished, God willed that both secular power and secular wisdom should serve the end of this Religion, in order to show that the world, through the victory of faith, has been made subject to Him, both as to power and as to wisdom.
V. Theology is truly a science 7, if indeed it deduces conclusions from certain and immutable principles. Nor is it an objection that it lacks actual evidence; for to the notion of a true subalternated science, such as the theology of wayfarers with respect to the theology of the blessed, radical evidence suffices, or that it proceeds from principles manifested in the subalternating science and radically per se known: otherwise there would be few demonstrations, since there are few syllogisms whose premises must not be proved through others better known.
Ⅵ. The formal object which of theology is God under the ratio of deity 8, because it is that which is attained principally and for its own sake by theology, and by reason of which the other things are attained. The formal object by which is virtual and mediate revelation, by which it is distinguished from faith, which rests upon immediate revelation, and from metaphysics, which proceeds by natural light alone. The material and adequate object, however, is every thing that falls under virtual and mediate revelation.
Ⅶ. Theology is an entitatively natural habitus, because it is acquired by human study, or through natural acts, as experience shows. Nor does it stand in the way that its principles, namely the articles of faith, and its object, namely God, are supernatural: because the principles which are the articles of faith do not influence the conclusion except remotely and by means of natural discourse; but an effect savors more of the nature of the proximate cause than of the remote one. Likewise, God is not the specificative object of theology except insofar as He underlies virtual revelation, or natural discourse, under which ratio He is formally something natural.
[Contenson, himself a Thomist, with certain outsiders, contradicts this, saying that “if theology is radically supernatural, it is also such entitatively.” And he strives to prove this by this twofold reasoning: that “the object of theology is God considered according to those notions which surpass every created or creatable nature; in a word, insofar as he is known by faith, which indeed is borne toward God as supernatural author; but theology treats of God under the light of divine revelation, nor does it use any principles, means, or motives other than the supernatural articles of faith 9.” Although the object of theology and its principles are supernatural, it cannot be denied that its habit is acquired by human study, or through natural acts, and not infused supernaturally. Hence it seems truer that this habit is formally natural.]
VIII. Theology, whether according to habitus or according to act, is more certain in itself than the other natural sciences, because it has certainty from divine revelation, ignorant of being deceived, into which it is ultimately resolved 10. The natural sciences, however, have certainty from the natural light of human reason, which, although the object about which it is occupied is sometimes most certain, is nevertheless through sin wrapped in darkness and liable to error: hence, although in other sciences there can be greater objective certainty, there is not nevertheless subjective certainty in itself.
But as regards us, theology is not more certain than the other natural sciences; because that is said to be more certain as regards us which is more proportioned to the intellect and satisfies and quiets it more; and this the natural sciences provide by reason of the evidence which theology lacks, inasmuch as it rests upon obscure revelation.
Ⅸ. A theological conclusion, as such, although it is in itself more certain than the other natural sciences, is nevertheless not certain with the certitude of faith, nor does it pertain to faith; because a theological conclusion, reduplicatively as such, is not immediately revealed, nor does it rest on the motive of faith alone, but is only virtually and mediately revealed in its premises, from which it is deduced through human discourse: hence we assent to it, not precisely on account of revelation, but because by natural light we perceive it to be connected with revealed truth; faith, however, or the supernatural certitude of faith, rests upon revelation alone and immediate.
We have previously set forth theology, according to the scholastic method for the use of the schools, especially the Thomistic, distributed into 19 tomes, which, the Lord blessing it, was not displeasing to many; now, that the wishes of those and of others may be satisfied, we present its Compendium, briefer in speculative matters, because less necessary, somewhat more ample in moral matters, because more necessary. There have been added vindications of certain assertions against one or another neoteric assailant. Likewise we have appended to the treatise on Faith a brief dissertation on the principal motives of the credibility of the Christian Religion against the deists of today. Make use of these things, Reader, and fare well.
Tractatus I: De Deo et Ejus Attributis
Dissertatio I: De Dei existentia
(On God, Part I, q. 2)
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
A proposition is called per se nota whose truth becomes known through itself and without a medium distinct from itself, just as the sun is called per se visible, because it is seen by itself and not through another, more luminous medium.
I say: This proposition, God is, is self-evident in itself, not to us.1
The first part is proved. That proposition is per se known quoad se whose predicate is included in the ratio of the subject, as its definition or a part of the definition, as this one: « Man is an animal; » for by that very fact it is immediate and lacks an a priori middle for proof. But the existence of God is thus included in the ratio of God; for God is essentially His own esse, or is necessarily and essentially a being that exists, as we shall prove below. Therefore.
The second part is proved. That proposition is not self-known as regards us in which the quiddity of the subject does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but requires discourse in order to become known to us; because then it cannot become known to us at once whether the predicate belongs to the subject. But the quiddity of God does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but through discourse. Therefore. — The minor is evident: because what God is, we do not understand as soon as we hear this word, God, just as from the utterance of these terms, whole and part, being and non-being, we at once understand what a whole is, what a part is, what being is, what non-being is; but what God is, even the wise themselves understand through discourse and very imperfectly. Therefore.
Here you have refuted the opinion of those more recent thinkers who say that the notion of the existence of God is innate in us; for by this innate notion of God they understand nothing other than that, without discursus, even an easy one, from the sole apprehension of the terms themselves, a sound and attentive mind understands that God exists, just as from the sole apprehension of the terms, without discursus, the first principles are understood: Whatever is, either is or is not, the whole is greater than its part, as Honoratus Tournely himself, the defender of this opinion, explains. But this is the same as saying that it is per se notum quoad nos that God exists: which we attacked in the second part of the conclusion.
[What the cause was why certain men asserted that « for God to exist is self-known, so that its contrary cannot be thought, and thus that God exists cannot be demonstrated, » the Angelic Doctor explains thus, I Contra gentes, c. 10 and 11: « The aforesaid opinion arises partly indeed from custom, by which from the beginning men have been accustomed to hear and invoke the name of God. But custom, and especially that which is from the beginning, acquires the force of nature: whence it comes about that those things with which the mind is imbued from մանկություն, are held so firmly as if they were naturally and self-known. But partly it comes about from this, that there is no distinction made between what is self-known simply and what is known with respect to us. For simply indeed that God exists is self-known, since this very thing which God is, is His own esse (existence). But because we cannot conceive in mind this very thing which God is, that is, the essence, it remains unknown with respect to us. »]
Articulus II: Utrum sit Deus, et quibus rationibus demonstretur?
[In establishing the existence of God there is a threefold rock equally to be avoided. — The first is that of those who affirm that no demonstration of the existence of God is to be undertaken, since it is to be held by faith alone and believed from revelation, concerning which we are certain from the authority of the human race. Such were the author of the work entitled Essai sur l'indifference en matiere de religion, and likewise Bautain, although led by another principle, who in his own apology addressed to the bishop of Strasbourg wrote: « I have the intimate persuasion, both as a Christian and as a philosopher, that reasoning alone cannot confer certitude on me concerning this primary truth, » namely, concerning the existence of God1. These indeed bring into danger not only reason but faith as well. — The second, however, is that of those who say that at least no strict demonstration can be given concerning the same matter, because nothing prior to God is found from which, as from a principle, His existence may be proved. To be sure, most contend, and rightly, as it seems, that the existence of God cannot be established by the species of demonstration called a priori, or through the cause, or, as others say, from the antecedent, at least by a priority of order; nevertheless it is beyond doubt that the existence of God is proved a posteriori, which kind of demonstration others call a simultaneo, and St. Thomas uses this method, as we shall see presently. — The third, however, is that of those who deny that, by the very fact that this truth is established rationally, it can become an object of faith, that is, be believed at the same time by supernatural faith. Opposed to these is our Angelic Doctor, saying, in I Contra gentes, c. 4: « Since there is a twofold truth of divine intelligibles, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which exceeds the capacity of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man for belief. But this must first be shown concerning that one [concerning the existence of God] which can be reached by the inquiry of reason; lest perhaps it should seem to someone that, since it can be had by reason, it was uselessly handed down to be believed by supernatural inspiration2. » And the Holy Doctor accordingly explains « the inconveniences which would follow if the truth of this were left to be investigated by reason alone. » — Presently we shall report the dogmatic definition issued by the Church concerning the existence of God.]
Although that God exists is not per se known with respect to us, as we said in the preceding article, nevertheless that it is demonstrable through effects is established from Scripture itself, Rom. 1:20: The invisible things of God, says the Apostle, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, his everlasting power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable, etc.
I suppose that by the name of God there is understood by all, even by atheists themselves, that than which a greater and better cannot be thought, that is, an intelligent substance, supremely and infinitely perfect in every genus. Atheists say that this is impossible in reality, chiefly on account of that collection in it of all perfections, some of which are opposed to one another, for example immutability and liberty.
[1° It is of faith that God exists. 1° The Apostle says, Hebr. XI, 6: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. Here the existence of God is proposed as an object of faith. — 2° Likewise, as of faith, the same truth was defined by the Vatican synod: « The holy catholic apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, etc. » « If anyone shall have denied the one true God, creator and lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema3. » — This truth from the beginning of the Church holds the first place in the Symbol of faith.]
Secondly, St. Thomas proves that God exists by five principal arguments.
The first is proposed thus. — A first mover altogether immobile is given. But that is God. Therefore God is given. — As regards the minor, it is clear: because the first mover altogether immobile is most pure act, lacking all potentiality. For a thing is mobile insofar as it is in potency to that to which it is moved; hence that which is altogether immobile lacks all potentiality, and thus is most pure act. But most pure act contains every imaginable perfection; for if it lacked any, it would be in potency to it, and thus it would not be most pure act, and so it is that than which nothing greater and better can be thought, consequently God.
The major is proved. Everything that is moved is moved by another. But in movers per se subordinated there cannot be given a regress to infinity. Therefore there is given a first mover which is not moved and is altogether immobile. — The minor is evident, because movers are called per se subordinated when one mover, in order to move, needs the actual influx of a superior, so that the last does not move or act unless moved, and this by another, and so always, until one comes to the first. But since the infinite is impertransibile, one cannot in it come to the first; hence, if a regress to infinity be posited, there would be no motion nor action. — The major is proved. The same thing cannot be mover and moved in the same respect. Therefore everything that is moved is moved by another. — The antecedent is proved. The same thing cannot be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing: for to be in potency with respect to something is to tend toward it, and thus to lack it; but to be in act with respect to something is already to have it; but something cannot be had and not had at the same time. But if the same thing in the same respect were mover and moved, it would be in act and potency with respect to the same thing; for a thing is moved insofar as it is in potency, since to be moved is to be reduced from potency to act, and a thing moves insofar as it is in act; for to move is to effect act. Therefore.
The second argument. — There is given a first efficient cause of all things, altogether uncaused. But this is God. Therefore God is given.—The minor is evident from the preceding argument. — The major is proved. Everything that comes to be, comes to be by another; for nothing can effect itself, otherwise it would be before it was. But in efficient causes subordinated per se there cannot be given a process to infinity, as is clear from the preceding argument; nor even in causes subordinated per accidens, if God does not exist. Therefore. — The last part of the minor is proved. Causes are called subordinated per accidens when one cause has received from another the power of acting, yet does not need its actual influx in order actually to act, as is clear in the son who has received from the father the power of begetting, whose actual influx, however, he does not need in order to beget4.
Although, therefore, a process to infinity in causes thus subordinated per accidens is not repugnant, if a first agent be given outside the collection of infinite causes, it is nevertheless repugnant if this first agent is not given; but if it is not God, there is no first agent outside the whole collection. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. Just as any cause is not from itself, but from another, so the whole collection is not from itself, but from another; because in all predicates that are not quantitative, of which sort is to be produced, the argument from the singulars to the whole holds good. But, as is supposed, no other causing thing is given outside the whole collection. Therefore it is repugnant for a process to infinity to be given, even in causes subordinated per accidens, if there is not a first agent outside the whole collection.
The third argument. — A necessary being is given, that is, one to which it belongs necessarily and from its own nature to exist. But such a being is God. Therefore God is given. — The minor is evident: 1° because a necessary being is a being a se, an unproduced being, independent, immutable, eternal, a being from which contingent things participate being; for what is through itself [or essentially] such, is the cause of the others which are such through accident, and thus a substantial being, spiritual, intelligent, the maker of all things. Therefore God. 2° A necessary being can be circumscribed by no limits in perfection. Therefore it is infinitely perfect. Therefore God. — The antecedent is proved. For by what can it be limited in perfection? Not by itself; for it is not the cause of itself, and if it were, it would confer upon itself every possible perfection; besides, what is necessary is only so much as it can be. Not by another, for it acknowledges nothing superior. Therefore.
The major is proved. If there were not given some necessary being, but all things in the nature of things were contingent and possible, then in point of fact no being would be given on the side of the thing 5. But the consequent is false. Therefore. — The consequence of the major is proved. Those things which state only possibility and contingency with respect to act cannot be reduced to that act except through a cause which necessarily contains that very act; thus, because water is in potency to heat, or is hot accidentally, it could never be heated unless there were given some being hot by its own nature, from which heat would flow into the water at least mediately or immediately. Therefore, if there is not given some necessary being to which it belongs by its own nature and necessarily to exist, in point of fact no being would be given on the side of the thing.
It is confirmed. Suppose that in fact there are no beings, as can happen if all things are contingent, for the contingent can be and not be; or at least imagine that there are none: from what will they have being, if there is no being existing necessarily? Not from themselves, for what is not cannot give itself that it be; not from another, for nothing else exists, as is supposed. Therefore they could not be. Therefore they would be and would not be possible: they would be, as is supposed, and they would not be, because there would be nothing from which they could have being. Therefore a necessary being must be admitted, from which all the rest have being.
The fourth argument. — There is given some being supremely perfect, supremely noble, being in the highest degree, which is the cause of every perfection in other things. But that is God. Therefore God is given. — The minor is clear from what has been said. — The major is proved. We see among beings that some are more or less beings, more or less perfect. But more and less are predicated of diverse things according as they approach more or less to something which is more such, and participate in it in diverse ways: just as that is hotter which approaches more to what is maximally hot and participates more in it. Therefore there is given in the nature of things some being supremely perfect, supremely noble, being in the highest degree, and indeed one which is the cause of other perfect things, whether efficient, or at least exemplary, inasmuch as from approach to or withdrawal from it, from greater or lesser participation, imitation, or falling away, the perfection of other things descends or is measured. For, according to the common axiom, the first in each genus is the cause of the rest which are of that genus, namely either an efficient or an exemplary cause.
Fifth argument. — There is given a highest provider and governor. But God is such. Therefore God is given. — The minor is evident, because by God we understand nothing other than the supreme divinity ruling and governing all things. — The major is proved. We see that some things which lack cognition operate not at random and by chance, but for an end; which is apparent from this, that they always or for the most part operate in the same way. The heavens, for example, are always moved in the same way; heavy things are borne always downward, light things always upward, etc. But things which do not have cognition do not tend toward an end unless directed by something cognizant and intelligent; just as an arrow would not reach the target unless it were directed by the archer. Therefore there is given a most wise governor and a certain supreme intelligence directing all things to their ends, which is God.
There is added a sixth argument akin to the preceding one, from the contemplation of this world, which is briefly set forth thus. — All the wondrous things that shine forth in this world, whether in heaven, or on earth, or in the sea, or in man himself alone, according to their structure, order, position, motion, disposition, beauty, variety, harmony in relation to their ends, cannot without madness be referred back to the chance concurrence of atoms, but must necessarily be ascribed to some supreme intelligence, the artificer and directress of all these things. But this is God, since by God all understand the supreme founder and ruler of the world. Therefore God is given. — The antecedent is proved. A work elaborated with exquisite skill, for example, a royal house, a clock, an elegant statue or painting, could not without madness be ascribed to chance or fortune, and not to a most skillful artificer. Therefore, a fortiori, the ordered and wondrous disposition of the whole world, indeed even of the human body alone, in which far more of art and industry shines forth than in the most exquisite works made by human art, cannot without madness be ascribed to the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, and not to a supreme intelligence. And indeed, if this world, wondrous with so great a variety of parts and with so fitting a disposition of all things to their ends, has been made by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, I should like them to say why by this same fortuitous concurrence of atoms there has not at some time likewise been produced a clock or a royal palace, a statue or a painting, and other things which we see to be made by human art; or, as Tully says 6, why the poems of Homer are not made similarly from the fortuitous concurrence of letters, or a royal house from a fortuitous heap of timbers and stones, or painted panels from the fortuitous falling of colors upon them. — You will see this argument more fully expounded in the authors.
Articulus III: De Atheismo
Atheus, ἀ θεός in Greek, in Latin signifies the same as not God, or without God: whence atheism is ignorance or negation of divinity. — Hence there is a twofold species of atheism, namely negative atheism, which is nescience of God, or the lack of a notion of the existence of God, and positive atheism, which is the positive negation of the existence of God: the former arises from ignorance, the latter from error.
A twofold cognition of God can be had: one explicit and formal, by which God is cognized under the concept of Divinity, namely, as He is the supreme cause of all things, necessary being, and other things of this sort; the other implicit and virtual, which is not terminated precisely at God as He is God, or under the concept of Divinity, but at the morally good, or at another object in whose cognition God, the cause of that good or object, is necessarily involved, and consequently is implicitly cognized. — Explicit and formal cognition is again divided into distinct and confused, namely, according as His nature or quiddity, that is, the constitutive factor of the divine being, is clearly conceived; or according as it is indeed cognized that God is the supreme and universal cause, but by a generic notion which does not disclose what God is in Himself, or that from which the divine essence is constituted.
There is likewise a twofold ignorance concerning the existence of God, from which negative atheism is constituted: one vincible, which depends on the will, insofar as through either negligence or malice a man does nothing to acquire knowledge; the other invincible, which, if perhaps it exists, does not depend on the will, and cannot be avoided through means placed within man's power.
Here it is asked whether negative atheists can be given, who are ignorant of the existence of God.
This question is posed either in the order of right, namely, whether they can be given, or in the order of fact, that is, whether they are in fact found. — In the order of fact, negative atheists do not exist, for man everywhere necessarily lives in society, and there is no people among whom the idea of God, however much obscured and disfigured, is not admitted.
But can there, in the order of right, exist a negative atheist, who so invincibly is ignorant of God that he does not know Him even confusedly as the supreme and universal cause?
Three principles borrowed from the Angelic Doctor are opportunely prefigured for the response:
First: “There is present in man a natural desire of knowing the cause, when he beholds the effect... If, therefore, the intellect of the rational creature cannot attain to the first cause of things, the desire of nature will remain vain1.” — This principle is apparent even in children, in whom there is a natural curiosity.
But that desire manifests openly that, in the apprehension of the effect, the existence of the cause is apprehended at the same time, at least confusedly, which cause is evidently correlative to the effect; otherwise that desire would not exist, if the notion of the cause were lacking, which is the terminus of that very desire.
3rd, “That which is naturally desired by man is naturally known by the same man2,” or at least can be known. For, as Cajetan most rightly notes on this passage of St. Thomas, “nature does not bestow an inclination to something to which the whole power of nature is unable to lead;” otherwise man would naturally seek something from the knowing of which he would also naturally be held back; which implies a contradiction.
These points having been set down, the question is solved.
Articulus IV: Utrum possit dari ignorantia invincibilis de existentia Dei?
I say: Invincible ignorance concerning the existence of God as natural author cannot be given.
It is proved first from the Scriptures. Those who have been ignorant of God are called indiscriminately inexcusable, Rom. I, 20. Therefore they were ignorant vincibly and culpably. Moreover it is said, Ps. LXXVIII, 6: Pour out thy wrath upon the nations that have not known thee, and upon the kingdoms that have not invoked thy name. But the Prophet, inspired by God, would not say this unless their ignorance were vincible and culpable. Therefore.
It is proved secondly from the Fathers. Augustine says, In Ps. LXXIV: “God everywhere hidden, everywhere manifest, whom it is permitted to none to know as He is, and whom no one is permitted to be ignorant of.” Chrysostom, on these words: The heavens declare the glory of God, says, Hom. IX ad pop. Antioch.: “The Scythian, and the barbarian, and the Jew, and the Egyptian, and every man walking upon the earth, hears this voice... Upon this book alike both the unlettered and the wise will be able to look.” Gregory the Great, book XXVII of the Moral., c. 9: “Every man, by the very fact that he has been made rational, ought from reason to gather that He who made him is God.”
It is proved by the third argument, by which also sufficient satisfaction is made to the foundation of the contrary opinion:
[Our first conclusion is evidently inferred from the principles set forth above. For, on the one hand, creatures, both as regards their motion and disposition, and as regards their subordination in causality, and as regards their contingency, and finally as regards their diverse grades of perfection, are daily set before the eyes of man; and, insofar as they are effects dependent on a cause, they are of themselves suited to lead to the cognition of the existence of a first unmoved mover, of a first efficient cause, of a supreme intelligence ordering all things to an end, of a necessary and most perfect being: to all which is added consciousness of our temporary existence and of the imperfect nature of our intelligence. — On the other hand, there is the natural desire of knowing the cause which is apprehended confusedly by our mind as soon as in the cognition of an effect; and for the fulfilling of this desire, reason, by the natural power of reasoning in which it rejoices, is naturally fitted, as was said in the third principle set forth above. Therefore, if man, using reason, does not know the creator from creatures, it must deservedly be affirmed that he does not do what is in him, and that by a base and culpable sloth he certainly neglects to apply natural reason to the inquiry into the primary truth from which the rest flow, and which, if cut off, no other can stand. Invincible ignorance, therefore, is excluded by that very fact from him, according to the definition given. Elsewhere]
Secondly. Although the existence of God is not per se known with respect to us, as we said above, but is demonstrable from creatures, nevertheless this demonstration is so easy, so obvious, that there is no one of sound mind, however rustic or barbarous, who is not capable of it, or at least to whom, from the inspection of the world or of himself, some suspicion or conjectural opinion of some supreme numen or ruler does not occur, as is clear from the Scriptures and Fathers cited; once this has been set before him, he is bound to inquire who He is; and if he neglects this, he is ignorant in a vincible way. Therefore.
Add that, if a man could be invincibly ignorant of God, however wicked he might be, he would commit no mortal sin. For mortal sin is an offense against God; but one who is invincibly not known cannot be offended.
[Here the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII must be noted: « Philosophical or moral sin is a human act at variance with rational nature and right reason; theological and mortal sin, however, is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave it may be, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment. » — This proposition, which Arnaldus had fabricated and, as was his custom, attributed to his adversaries, was noted as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous.]
Articulus V: An existant athei theoretici?
Negative atheism having been excluded, another question is raised, namely, whether positive atheists can be found, who by erroneous reasons persuade themselves that God does not exist.
Here again a distinction must be made. For positive atheists are commonly divided into practical and theoretical. — Practical atheists, while perceiving by reason that God exists, nevertheless so order their moral life as if God did not exist. Concerning such persons the question here is not raised; for sad experience, especially in these troubled and most wretched times, more than sufficiently demonstrates not only that atheists of this sort can be supposed, but that they are in fact found. — Theoretical atheists, however, if perhaps there are any, are those who assert that they hold in their mind that in truth God does not exist.
I say: first, it is more probable that theoretical atheists do not in fact exist as persons truly persuaded.
We say, first, more probably, because since the discourse concerns individuals, the question cannot be determined demonstratively. We say, second, atheists truly persuaded, because there is no question here of doubters, who are outside the case; for it seems that it cannot be denied that some doubt may arise and be able for a short time to occupy the mind.
Probatur the proposition thus explained. — Those who display the species of unbelief with respect to the existence of God are men who from infancy were imbued with the notion of divinity and grew up in it, nor are they ignorant of the demonstrations by which the existence of God is most fully proved. Can it therefore come to pass that a man so put off nature and reason as to hold with firm subjective persuasion that which so openly conflicts with nature and reason? This indeed seems altogether incredible. Hence Seneca says: « They lie who say that they do not perceive that God exists; for although they may assure you of it by day, yet by night and when alone they doubt.1 » And Bayle himself, certainly a man in this matter by no means suspect, and who knew by friendship or experience the chief atheists of his age, has these words in his Historical-Critical Dictionary: « It is highly probable that those who in gatherings of men are eager to attack the more commonly received truths of religion say more than they really think. Vanity has more place than conscience in their disputations.»2 And in fact many who were celebrated as leaders of atheism, when near death, with mind clear considering the falsity of the glory which they had wished to procure for themselves by their denials, and seriously revolving the ineluctable question concerning the origin and end of man, were compelled to acknowledge and confess God, imploring him either as merciful or blaspheming him as an implacable judge. It is certain therefore that, although perhaps they had previously tried to persuade themselves that God does not exist, especially in order to indulge their desires more freely, they were not truly persuaded that he is not.
I say: 2º It is also probable that theoretical atheists truly and firmly persuaded cannot be given.
For whatever they may boast that they believe, those who call themselves atheists, it seems altogether impossible that a man possessed of reason should not be moved by the spectacle of the Universe, and should not in some way detect in the Universe traces of some supreme Mind. To be sure, darkness can be cast over so resplendent a truth, especially through the depravity of the passions; yet not in such a way that reason does not struggle against those darknesses and prevent a man from resting peacefully in the error of the non-existence of God. This at least must be believed by one to whom the honor of human nature is dear. And hence it is that those who profess atheism either display scepticism, by proclaiming universal doubt, or teach pantheism, by perverting the genuine notion of divinity, which they are unable to deny.
Dissertatio II: De natura seu quidditate Dei et Ejus attributis in communi
Articulus I: Quodnam sit constitutivum divinae naturae?
The question is not about the physical constitution of the divine nature according as it is really in itself; for thus it is certain that all perfections, whether absolute or relative, really constitute God, since all are identified in the very nature of God, which in itself is most simple.
Nor again is the question about the divine nature taken broadly and in a certain ample signification for uncreated being, whereby it is distinguished from creatures, and which stands after the manner of a transcendens, and is found in all the attributes, in that proportional way in which the ratio of created being is imbibed in all the differences and modes of creatures.
But the question is about the nature or essence, strictly taken for that which is first conceived in God, as the font and origin of the other properties, from which it is therefore virtually distinguished, and in which, under this formal aspect, it is not conceived as transcendentally included; that is, about the metaphysical constitutive, or the essential difference of the divine nature, insofar as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state, as its essential difference and the origin of the other perfections, as rationality in man.
I say first: The nature or essence of God is not constituted metaphysically by aseity.
It is proved first by a fundamental argument. That is the formal constitutive of the divine nature which distinguishes it, not only from creatures, but also from the attributes, the persons, and the other divine formalities. But the ratio of ens a se does not provide this. Therefore, etc. — The major is evident; because here, as has been said, the question is not about the divine nature taken broadly for uncreated entity, under which ratio it is distinguished from created things, but about it taken strictly insofar as it is the root of the divine attributes, and thus virtually distinct from them. — The minor is proved. The ratio of ens a se, from its formal ratio, is a transcendent predicate of all the divine formalities or perfections, and is formally imbibed in them. But such a predicate does not distinguish the nature from the attributes. Therefore. — The major is evident; for everything that is in God is ens a se. — The minor is also evident, because nature and property are not distinguished by that through which they agree, and which is found formally in them all. This argument also militates against the opinion of Scotus, because infinity, in which he places the divine essence, is also a transcendent predicate.
To this fundamental argument the adversaries reply, first and commonly, that to be from oneself can be taken in a threefold way: first, for the negation of being from another as from a real cause with dependence; and thus, they say, whatever is in God is a being from itself. Second, for the negation of being from another as from a formal principle without dependence, and thus the eternal Father is a being from himself, but not the Son and the Holy Spirit. Third, for the negation of being from another as from a virtual cause, or root, and this belongs to the divine essence alone. They therefore admit that aseity in the first way does not constitute the divine nature, because thus it transcends all the attributes; nor even when taken in the second way, because otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit, as such, would not have the divine nature, since they have being from the Father as from a principle. Therefore aseity taken only in the third way is the constitutive of the divine nature, since it as such is not transcendent to the attributes, but their root.
On the contrary. This response manifestly begs the principle, and supposes or does not attain that which is at issue. Therefore it is of no force. — The antecedent is proved. Aseity taken in the third way, that is, not to be from another as from a root, but rather to be the root of others, constitutes the divine nature, they say. But this is not what is asked, for all admit that; rather, it is asked to which formality or ratio in God this belongs, namely, that it is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest: which this response of the adversaries in no way proves or shows, since they admit that it is not aseity in the first or second way. Therefore.
This argument is confirmed and more fully explained. To say that not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, constitutes nature, and conversely that to be from another as from a root constitutes properties, is to prove what nature is and what properties are in general, but not what they are in this particular matter, namely in God, or to which of His formalities they belong; and yet this is what is asked here. Therefore, the same as before. — The major is proved. Not to be from another as from a root, but to be the root of the rest, likewise to be from another as from a root, are definitions of nature and of properties in general, which belong no more to God than to man or to other creatures. For in like manner I say of the nature of man that it is that which is not from another as from a root, but rather is the root of the rest, and of his property that it is from another as from a root; but if it be asked what it is in man that is not from another as from a root, but is the root of the others, I shall answer that it is rationality. And this is what is now asked in God and what the adversaries ought to assign in Him. It is not, as we have already said and as they admit, aseity in the first and second mode, nor, as is clear, aseity in the third mode. Therefore it is none of the things assigned by the adversaries; and this argument, of which I have not yet heard or seen a solution, has turned me, while wavering, to this opinion.
It is proved secondly. God ought to be constituted through the grade of understanding. Therefore not through the grade of being, or of being from Himself. — The antecedent is proved. First, since God is the most perfect being, He ought to be constituted through the most perfect grade. But among the four grades constituting nature, namely, of being, of living, of sensing, and of understanding, the grade of understanding is the most perfect. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved secondly from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, question 93, article 3. Among creatures, only angels and men were made to the image of God, that is, they participate in and imitate something of the nature of God, because they are intellectual. Therefore the nature of God is constituted through the grade of understanding, and not through the grade of being, otherwise all creatures would have been made to the image of God.
I say secondly: Divine understanding, not radical but actual, under the formal aspect of ultimate actuality per se subsisting, metaphysically constitutes the divine nature. Hence the description of God will be this: A being understanding most supremely and most actually.
It is proved 1°. According to what we have just said in the second proof of the preceding conclusion, the divine nature is metaphysically constituted through the intellective grade; and since it is the purest act, devoid of all potentiality, it ought to be constituted through that which in that grade is most actual and has no shadow of potentiality. But such is actual understanding, and not radical understanding. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Either the discourse is about remote radical understanding, which is the immaterial substance itself, or about proximate radical understanding, which is the intellective power. But each of the two, in our manner of conceiving, is related to actual understanding in the mode of potency to act, or of first act to second. Therefore.
The 2nd conclusion is proved. That is constitutive of the nature of any thing, not what is first conceived in it in whatever way, otherwise the ratio of substance in man would be constitutive of human nature; but what is first conceived in it as something more actual and more perfect, whence it comes about that it is the root and origin of the other perfections. But among all the perfections of God, the first that is conceived as more actual and more perfect is not radical understanding or the potency of understanding, but understanding itself, most actual and most perfect. Therefore.
An objection is raised against the second conclusion: actual understanding is essentially an operation. But operation does not constitute the operating nature; rather, it presupposes it as constituted. Therefore.
*I respond. *I distinguish the minor. A finite operation which is an accident does not constitute the operating nature, but presupposes it as constituted: I concede the minor. An infinite operation subsisting through itself: I deny the minor. The disparity is that it belongs to the notion of an operation which is finite and an accident superadded to the operator, that it proceed from the operator itself, and therefore presuppose it as constituted. But indeed it does not belong to the notion of an infinite operation and one subsisting through itself that it proceed from the operator, but only that it be its ultimate act, identified with it without a virtual distinction. Because in an infinite being nothing can be conceived unless pure act remain in our concept; but the operating nature would not remain pure act, if it were conceived as distinct from its ultimate act proceeding from it and under the ratio of first act with respect to that act. Therefore operation as emanating from a principle and under the concept ab is not formally in God, which note well, but only eminently and virtually, insofar as the same entity in God eminently does the whole of what in created things an operation proceeding forth and the principle from which it proceeds do. And therefore it must be said that the divine nature is constituted by intellection, not under the ratio of operation as emanating, or under the concept ab, but under the ratio of ultimate actuality subsisting through itself.
It must be admitted that the opinion which holds that the divine essence is constituted by aseity is the more common. Although, however, at first sight it seems to be opposed to the opinion which our author defends, they can somehow be reconciled with one another. For a twofold way is open for knowing God: one a posteriori, by which we arrive at Being from itself, pre-containing all the perfections that are in creatures, and in a more eminent mode than they are in them; the other a priori, by which, by investigating the divine attributes and comparing them with one another, we acquire a more perfect knowledge of the divine essence, by determining among those same attributes that one which, in relation to us, has the character, as it were, of a specific difference, exhibiting more actually and more perfectly the divine nature itself, and from which consequently all the others are understood to flow forth.
These things having been posited, it seems possible to say that, if the matter concerns the metaphysical constitutive of God insofar as it is conceived and inferred of God in the first place a posteriori, according to the principle of causality, aseitas ought to be held as such a constitutive, as the arguments of those who stand for aseitas prove. But if the discussion is about the more actual and more determinate metaphysical constitutive according as it is discovered from demonstrations a priori, the supreme grade of understanding can be called the metaphysical constitutive of the divine essence, and in this sense Billuart, and others with him, argue correctly. But because those things which are arguments a priori disclose and declare the essence of a thing more, this latter explanation seems clearer, and therefore to be preferred.]
Articulus II: De attributis divinis in communi
Whether and in what way they are distinguished from one another and from the essence?
An attributum, properly taken, is commonly defined as a perfection simply simple1, existing in God necessarily and formally, and consequent, according to our mode of conceiving, upon the essence as constituted.
The attributes are distinguished into absolute and relative. Those are called absolute which pertain to the divine being, as simplicity, immensity, etc. Relative, those which pertain to operations, as knowledge, providence, omnipotence, etc. Likewise, some are negative, which remove imperfections from God, as to be infinite, immense, immutable, etc., by which way God is better and more easily known; for it is easier to say what God is not than what He is. Some are affirmative, which are predicated of God affirmatively, as goodness, justice, etc.
But, although we speak of several attributes, it must be observed that they are not several really, on account of the supreme simplicity and unity of God, but are several only virtually, insofar as the most simple entity of God is equivalent to several created perfections really distinct.
Distinction is the lack of identity; for those things are said to be distinguished which are not the same. It is divided into a real distinction and a distinction of reason.
A real distinction is the absence of identity which is given on the part of the thing, independently of the intellect. It is twofold: one is real simply, which is called the major; the other is real modal, which is called the minor. The major real distinction is between complete entities which are separated from one another or can be separated, as between Peter and Paul, between body and soul. The minor real distinction is between a thing and its mode, as between Peter and his sitting, or between two modes, as between sitting and standing. They are called modes because they are minute entities which, although they cannot exist without a subject, nevertheless the subject can exist without them; hence they are said to be distinguished from it modally. But that such entities are given is established by sense itself and is proved in the Metaphysics.
A distinction of reason is the absence of identity under a concept alone between things which on the part of the thing are not distinct, but are one and the same. It is also twofold: one, of the reasoning reason, the other, of the reason reasoned. The first is that which is made without a foundation in the thing, as if you distinguish between Tully and Cicero, or if you conceive the same thing to be predicated of itself, saying, for example, Cicero is Cicero; for then I conceive the same suppositum, enunciated under the mode of subject and predicate, as if duplicated, whence there results in the mind a certain distinction. The second is that which is made with a foundation in the thing, as if you distinguish, for example, between justice and mercy in God; for although justice and mercy are really identified in the same divine essence and are one and the same in reality with it, yet because this simple essence is equivalent to justice and mercy really distinct in creatures, and thus is virtually manifold, it provides our intellect with a foundation for distinguishing them in God. Therefore, a twofold foundation can be assigned for this distinction. The first is the aforesaid eminence of the thing identifying to itself several perfections really distinct in lower things. The second is the imperfection of our intellect, which, since it cannot attain all these perfections at once, conceives them by distinct acts, as if they were distinct; whence there results a distinction in the intellect. This distinction, which, when it is considered in the intellect, is called a distinction of reason reasoned with a foundation in the thing, when it is considered in the thing, is called virtual; because it provides what a real distinction would provide, and is equivalent to it for the verification of contradictories concerning the same thing.
Scotus with his followers rejects this distinction of reasoned reason, or virtual distinction, and establishes another, which he calls actual, formal, from the nature of the thing: actual, because it is on the part of the thing before every concept of the mind; formal, because it is not between things that enjoy their own existence, but between formalities or modes of the same thing; from the nature of the thing, because it results from this, that the one is not of the formal concept of the other. He says that this distinction is not real, because it is not between things, although he admits that in this sense it is real, that it is on the part of the thing independently of the intellect; nor is it of reason, because, as has been said, it precedes every act of the intellect: whence, according to him, it is intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason.
The question, therefore, is by what distinction the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence. The same difficulty exists concerning the divine relations with respect to the essence, which, although it pertains to the treatise on the Trinity, will likewise be resolved here.
I suppose, first, against Gualterus, Abbot Joachim, the Palamites, and Gilbert, that neither the attributes are really entitatively distinguished from one another and from the essence, nor the relations from the essence in God; because the opposite opinion has been defined in the Lateran and Reims Councils, and this will be clear from the refutation of the Scotistic distinction. For if these are not distinguished actually formally, a fortiori they are not distinguished actually really.
I suppose, secondly, against the Aetians and the Nominalists, that these aforesaid things are distinguished by more than a distinction of reason reasoning: this will be evident from the assertion of the virtual distinction. Therefore
I say first: the divine attributes are not distinguished from one another and from the essence, nor the relations from the essence, by an actual formal distinction, commonly called Scotistic.
It is proved by the first argument drawn from the Scriptures. Those things which are actually and formally distinguished in reality from someone cannot be predicated of him in the abstract, but rather denied; because, since the abstract includes of itself nothing other than what it explicates, if it were predicated of that from which it is formally and actually distinguished in reality, there would not be an identity of predicate and subject, as is clear in these predications: “Peter is humanity, is justice, is goodness.” But, according to the Scriptures, the attributes are predicated of God in the abstract; thus John, xiv, 6: Christ said of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life. Hence St. Bernard, when at the Council of Reims he was asked to set forth in writing what he thought against Gilbert, said, “let it be written with an iron stylus, with an adamantine point, and carved in flint, that the divine essence, form, nature, deity, goodness, wisdom, virtue, power, greatness, truly is God.” Therefore.
It is proved secondly. The Council of Reims against Gilbert of Poitiers, and the Lateran Council2, under Innocent III, condemned and rejected the truly and properly real distinction in divine things: this the Scotists admit. But the actual formal distinction before every concept of the mind is truly and properly real. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Whatever it may be, whether substance, or mode, or identity, or distinction, or accident, or action, is truly and properly real, if it is or can be on the side of the thing independently of the intellect; for this is the definition of a truly and properly real being. But Scotus’s actual formal distinction is on the side of the thing independently of the intellect. Therefore.
It is proved thirdly by a twofold argument. The first is set forth thus. God is supremely simple. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with a formal real distinction. Therefore. — The major is certain by faith. — The minor is proved. A formal real distinction in God imports a formal real composition in God, namely in the manner in which there is distinction. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with a formal real composition. Therefore. — The minor is evident and admitted. — The major is proved: first, composition is the union of things distinct. But things formally and really distinct in God, if there are any, are united to the divinity and to one another. Therefore a formal real distinction in God imports a real composition in God. The same major is proved secondly. From a real entitative distinction in God, if it were granted, the Fathers inferred, and used to infer against Walter and Gilbert, a real entitative composition in God. Therefore from a formal real distinction in God, a formal real composition in God is legitimately inferred.
The second argument is sought from the supreme unity of God, and is thus formed. « Just as God is most simple, so He is most one, indeed most one of all, if that could be said, » says Saint Bernard. But a real formal distinction is opposed to this supreme unity: both because, as Father Henno himself admits, it imports a real formal plurality, whereas plurality is diametrically opposed to unity; and because distinction stands to unity as composition to simplicity. But real formal composition overthrows supreme simplicity, as the opponents admit. Therefore a real formal distinction destroys supreme unity.
I say secondly: the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence, and likewise the relations from the essence, by a virtual distinction, or a distinction of reasoned reason, not indeed the greater one, which is by way of excluder and excluded, but the lesser, which is by way of implicit and explicit.
The first part is proved. Those things are said to be distinguished virtually which, although in themselves they are a most simple thing, nevertheless are equivalent to several really distinct things and produce diverse effects; hence they provide our intellect with a foundation for forming distinct inadequate concepts as though of things really distinct; from this there results in the mind a certain distinction, which is called a distinction of reason reasoned-out, or with a foundation in the thing. But in God the attributes, relations, and essence are one most simple thing, as is clear from what has been said, yet equivalent to several really distinct things in creatures, producing diverse effects, and thence providing our intellect with a foundation for forming diverse inadequate concepts of it; from this there results in the intellect a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing. Therefore.
*The second part is proved. *A greater distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, or one which stands after the manner of the excluding and the excluded, is that by which one thing, with a foundation in the thing, is so prescinded from another that it in no way, even implicitly, includes that other in its concept, but remains in potency to it as something contractible and perfectible by it as by something extraneous. But such a distinction cannot be conceived in God. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Whatever is divine, or whatever is conceived in God, ought to be conceived as most pure act and as a being infinite in the genus of being. But it is repugnant to conceive, with a foundation in the thing, most pure act and infinite being as in potency, contractible and perfectible by another as by something extraneous; for this would be to destroy the concept of most pure act, to whose ratio it belongs to exclude all potentiality and imperfection, and the concept of infinite being, to whose ratio it belongs to include at least implicitly every ratio of being. Therefore.
An objection is raised against the first conclusion. Such as the distinction is, such is the contradiction. But before every operation of the mind concerning the divine essence, attributes, and relations, a certain contradiction is affirmed, or rather contradictories are verified. Therefore. — The major is certain. — The minor is proved. Thus, before every operation of the mind, it is truly said: “God is formally God by deity, not by justice. The intellect generates, the will does not generate. The essence is communicated to the Son, paternity is not communicated.” Therefore. Thus says Franciscus Henno.
I respond. First, I retort the argument. The distinction is such as the contradiction is. But between the divine essence and the relations there is not only a formal contradiction, that is, as regards the formalities, but a real entitative contradiction, that is, as regards the entities; for truly the essence is communicated to the Son not only formally but really and entitatively, whereas paternity is not; otherwise the Father would be distinguished from the Son only formally and not really entitatively, which cannot be admitted. Therefore.
Response. 2nd, directly to the argument, which totters on every side, and 1st, the major can be denied, although Father Henno calls it certain. For of a thing simply and formally one, but virtually distinct and multiple, the same can be affirmed and denied, and thus statements that seem contradictory can be verified, because those things are not truly and properly contradictory except which are affirmed and denied of the same thing under the same ratio; but where the thing is virtually distinct and multiple, those things which seem contradictory are not enunciated of the same thing under the same ratio, but under a different one. Thus the divine essence, insofar as it is equivalent to the created intellect, generates; insofar as it is equivalent to the will, it does not generate. The divine essence, insofar as it is absolute, is communicated; insofar as it is equivalent to the relative, it is not communicated. For note well that the things which in creatures are really distinguished are identified in God, their natures being preserved. — Consequently, following upon these points, the minor too must be denied, namely that properly so called contradictories are verified of the divine essence, attributes, and relations.
But for the sake of greater clarity, I distinguish the major. Such a distinction is formally or virtually such as a contradiction is, I concede the major. Such a distinction is always formally such as a contradiction is, I deny the major. For it suffices, as has been said, that there be a virtual distinction which is equivalent to an actual real distinction, such as the eminence or virtual multiplicity of the divine entity. For by that title it is called a virtual distinction, because by reason of the infinite entity it furnishes eminently what a real distinction would furnish formally. Hence you will infer that the formal distinction itself, which the Scotists so greatly vaunt, does not suffice to verify a strictly real contradiction in divine things. For since for this there is required a distinction strictly real, or equivalent to what is strictly real—for, they say, the distinction ought to be such as the contradiction is—and since their formal distinction is neither strictly real nor equivalent to it, it follows that it is not sufficient for this effect, unlike our virtual distinction, which is equivalent to what is strictly real.
[With the distinction having been established that can be admitted among the attributes of God when compared to one another and when referred to the divine essence, it must be inquired whether they differ among themselves by a certain pre-eminence.
You ask therefore, first, whether all the attributes in God are equal.
I respond. First, if the discourse is about the attributes insofar as they are on the part of the thing, they are equal, not by a positive equality which would require a real distinction, but by a negative equality, which consists in the negation of excess; for in reality they are one and the same.
I respond. Secondly, if the discourse is about those things as they are conceived by us, the matter is under a distinction. Either they are considered under the ratio of uncreated and infinite being, which they include transcendentally, and thus they are equal; because this ratio, as being indivisible and unique, is imbibed equally by all. Or they are considered under an explicit ratio and by analogy to similar perfections in creatures, and thus they are unequal secundum quid; because intellect, for example, explicates greater perfections than will, and so of the rest.
You ask secondly whether God and the blessed also make a distinction of reason between the essence and the attributes.
Resp. more probably in the negative, because the foundations of the distinctio ratiocinata are, partly the eminence of the thing, partly the imperfection of the intellect attaining the thing by diverse inadequate concepts. But God attains His most eminent essence by a single intuition; likewise the blessed also, at least by the beatific vision, because they know God by a single and most simple species, namely the divine essence performing the office both of the impressed species and of the expressed species.
I said, at least by the beatific vision; because it does not seem repugnant that the blessed, through another cognition than that which they have outside the Word, may be able to form diverse concepts of the essence of God, and thus form a distinction of reason.]
Dissertatio III: De attributis in particulari quae pertinent ad divinum esse
Among the attributes which we conceive in God, some regard His being or substance, some His operation. Since being is prior to operating, we first treat of those things which regard the divine being, then of those things which regard His operation, as concerning knowledge, providence, etc. But since, as St. Thomas teaches in Contra gentes I, ch. 14, «for the knowledge of God one must use the way of removal,» or of negation, namely by removing from Him the imperfections of creatures, rather than the way of affirmation, by attributing to Him divine perfections which we are not able sufficiently to grasp, therefore with the Holy Doctor we begin from the negatives, and first treat of the simplicity of God, or the non-composition of the divine being. Whence there is: