Ordinatio

[To the first] – To the first principal argument [n.191] I say that the major is to be understood in this way: ‘all things that are by some identity the same as another are by such identity the same thus among themselves’, because an identity of extremes with each other cannot be concluded unless they are according to that identity the same as the middle and the middle is in itself in this way the same; and by this proposition so understood ‘every syllogistic form holds’. For when one or other condition is omitted, whether of the unity of the middle in itself or of the extremes to the middle, there is no syllogism, but a paralogism of the accident.

Another response, where the unity of the middle is unlimited with respect to the unity of the extremes. An example of limited where-ness and limited when-ness: things that are together according to ‘where’ or ‘when’ without limitation, in this way or that, are nevertheless not thus the same among themselves. Another example, more familiar, about the intellective soul and about this and that part of flesh [nn.386-387]. – This response succeeds when the same unlimited thing is ‘with which’ or ‘in which’, not when it is ‘this’, unless the requisite unity is lacking to the middle in itself, as the logical response contained here just above has it.

When is taken in the minor that ‘whatever is in the divine essence is the same as it’ [n.191], it is not true of formal identity, and therefore formal identity of the extremes among themselves cannot be inferred; but as long as the formal distinction of the relations of the supposit stands, the distinction of the supposits stands.

And if you say that at least from the real identity of them with the essence the identity of them among themselves is inferred, I say that the essence does not have such unique identity of subsistence to the extent the persons or the personal features as extremes are united in the essence, and therefore one cannot infer identity of subsistences or of subsistence through the idea of their identity in the essence as in a middle term.

From this the response is plain to such sophisms as ‘this God is the Father, the Son is this God, therefore the Son is the Father’, which has a confirmation because when ‘this something’ exists as middle term, the extremes are necessarily conjoined. My reply. Just as in creatures what is common is disposed as ‘some sort of what’, the singular as ‘this something’, so here the essence common to the persons has the idea of ‘some sort of what’, and the person has the idea of ‘this something’. The middle term here, then, is ‘some sort of what’ and not ‘this someone’. But the identity of the extremes in the conclusion is inferred as if the middle term were ‘this something’; likewise there [in the above sophism] it seems there is a fallacy of the accident and of the consequent, because ‘this God’ is taken in the premises for different supposits, and likewise a fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘some sort of what’ to ‘this something’.

But if you argue ‘the deity is the Father, the Son is deity, therefore etc.’, although deity does not supposit for any supposit in the major and minor, yet there is [fallacy of] figure of speech there, by change of ‘some sort of what’ to ‘this someone’. For to make a change like this is nothing other than from the force of the inference to interpret that that has the idea of ‘this someone’ which has the idea of ‘some sort of what’; so thus to infer supposit of supposit is to interpret the middle to be the same according to idea of existence or of subsistence, which is false.

But if you at least argue that ‘the extremes are really the same among themselves because the same also in the middle’, I concede that essential identity can be inferred, not formal identity or identity of supposit. And therefore it should not be inferred ‘the Son is the Father’, because there by the force of the words formal or hypostatic identity is denoted, but it should be inferred in this way ‘the Son is the same with that which the Father is’ or ‘the Son is that which the Father is’.

But if there be still a confirmation of the major of the principal argument [n.191] through the fact that, by denying it, one seems to destroy a first principle, namely by positing affirmation and negation to be true of the same thing, I reply: about something that has true identity, but not only unique, formal identity, the same thing by reason of one ‘reality’ must be formally predicated of it, and of the other ‘reality formally’ not be predicated formally. Just as whiteness by reason of some reality which it has in itself agrees with blackness, and by reason of another reality does not really agree with it but differs, nor are affirmation and negation said of the same thing by reason of the same thing – namely ‘of reality formally’ –; so here, the Father by reason of essence is the same quidditatively, and by reason of property is not the same formally or hypostatically, nor is the affirmation and negation of the same identity about the same thing nor by reason of the same thing; and although affirmation and negation be said of the same identity about the same thing, not however by reason of the same thing, namely if it were said that by reason of paternity the Father is not the same quidditatively with the Son but by reason of essence.

If on the contrary you argue that affirmation differs from affirmation where the negation of one is said about the other or stands with the other, because neither is true of the affirmation contradicting the negation, therefore if deity stands with non-paternity (to wit in some other person), deity itself would differ from paternity, which never stands along with non-paternity in the same thing, I reply: the major could be conceded of formal, or not adequate, non-identity, because one of them is not determined to the other, wherefore it stands with the opposite of it, – or in other words it could be conceded of convertible and precise non-identity. But if the major take real distinction simply, it is to be denied; the thing is plain in whiteness: by taking the proper reality from which the genus is taken, to that is the opposite of the difference of blackness not of itself repugnant; yet to the reality from which is taken the specific difference of whiteness is the difference of blackness repugnant.

And this response should be understood as to the second part of the major, which says that one or other of the affirmations ‘stands’ with the negation. But the first part of the major, which takes the negation ‘to be said’ of the affirmation – the major could, as to that part, be conceded if ‘to be said’ is understood ‘necessarily and universally and through the proper idea of that of which it is said’, and this when the contradiction which the words concern is real or is of thing to non-thing, but not of reason to non-reason, for then there only follows a distinction of reason of affirmation from affirmation.

By applying the first part of the major – in the way it is true – to the matter at hand, it follows that the Son is really distinguished from the Father, but not that God or deity is, because not-Father is not said of God necessarily and universally, nor by reason of the subject, although according to some [Henry of Ghent] it be said particularly by reason of the supposit of the subject.

But if you argue, let that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son be a, then a, insofar as it is a, is either the same as the essence or different – if it is different, this is unacceptable; if insofar as a is the same, then insofar as it distinguishes it is the same, and consequently the essence distinguishes – I reply: I say that it is neither true that a insofar as it is a is the same as the essence nor that a insofar as it is a is different from the essence, and this by understanding that which follows the reduplication to be taken according to its formal idea, and it has along with this to be the formal idea for the inherence of the predicate, as I distinguished above in the case of unity of enjoyable object in response to the third argument [I d.1 n.58]. There is an example for this: for man and non-man are immediate opposites, and yet neither is said formally about anything along with reduplication; as a white thing is not man insofar as it is white nor is it non-man insofar as it is white.

And if you say ‘the same’ and ‘other’ are immediate opposites in the case of being, I say that it does not follow “they are immediate opposites, therefore one or other is said of anything along with ‘insofar as’” such that the idea of the subject is the formal reason for the inherence of the other contradictory, but it suffices that one or other of the contradictories truly exist in any subject, although not per se by reason of the subject. But if the ‘insofar as’ is taken in the first way, so that it only indicates that the a is taken according to its formal idea [n.422], I say that a, whatever way it is formally taken, is the same as the essence, although it is not formally the same as the essence; but in that case this inference does not follow “‘a formally’ is the same as the essence, ‘a formally’ distinguishes, therefore the essence distinguishes,” but there is [fallacy of] figure of speech, by change of ‘this someone’ to ‘what sort of what’.

If still you insist that a insofar as it is a is a being or a thing, so which thing or which being? – if the essence then the proposition [n.191] is obtained, if a thing and not the essence, then it is another thing – I reply: I concede that it is a being and a thing, and this by taking ‘insofar as’ in both ways, because if some predicate per se in the first mode is present in something, then it will be present in the same mode per se whether the subject is a thing distinct from whatever is outside the idea of it or is contained by identity in something which is outside the idea of it; for such containing does not take away the formal idea nor what is present per se in the first mode.

But when you ask, what being [n.424], – I say the being which is a; just as if a substance is a per se being, which being, by descending under being, is per se substance, and not something else. If you ask further whether it is per se essence, it has been said [n.423] that it is not. If you infer ‘therefore it is another per se thing’, there is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘it is not per se this thing, and it is a thing, therefore it is another thing’ [n.424], because in the antecedent ‘per se identity’ is denied, in the consequent ‘identity’, and so the antecedent is destroyed.¹

Suppose you object: ‘it is per se a thing, and it is not per se essence’, ‘therefore it is per se another thing’, and further, ‘therefore it is another thing’.

The proof of the first consequence, for ‘the same’ and ‘different’ about a being are immediate opposites; therefore if it is per se a thing, it is per se the same thing as the essence (and so it is per se essence), or it is per se some other thing. The proof of the second consequence is because ‘per se’ is not a distracting determination, it is plain.

Further, the first consequence is proved, and it is to the principal point: if it is per se a thing, it is either a thing which is essence or a thing which is not essence. If it is per se a thing which is essence, therefore it is per se essence; if it is per se a thing which is not essence, then it is a thing other than essence.

Further, third: essence is per se a thing, and a property is per se a thing, and they are not per se the same thing; therefore they are per se two things, and so each is per se a thing different from the other.

To the first [n.426]. Although the conclusion of the first argument could be distinguished, that there would be there an otherness of per se-ity or a per se-ity of otherness, and in the first way the ‘per se’ would be denied by the negation included in otherness, in the second way it would be affirmed, because it would precede the force of the negation, and consequently in the first way the consequent of the first consequence [‘it is per se a thing and not per se essence, therefore per se another thing’, n.426] would be conceded – but then the second consequence [‘it is per se a thing, and not per se essence, therefore it is another thing’ n.426] would be a fallacy according to the consequent by destruction of the antecedent [n.425], in the second way the first consequence would be a fallacy according to the consequent – however, because it does not seem logically well said that negation, if it is in any way included in otherness, could attain anything besides a term of respect and a form in which, or according to which, otherness is noted to exist, nor does it seem logically well said that the ‘per se’, which states the mode of inherence and consequently determines the composition, could be denied by any denial in the predicate, therefore one should say in another way that, in the consequent of the first consequence, there can be obtained, by force of the words, only one sense, namely that this predicate, to be a thing other than the essence, is ‘per se’ present in the property; and this sense is false, because thus the false thing that is inferred in the second consequence very well follows. Therefore I simply deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent [‘it is per se a thing, and not per se essence’] are true and the consequent [‘therefore per se another thing’] false.

To the proof of the consequence [n.427] I say that ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are not immediate about any predicate as per se said of a subject, rather neither are contradictories thus immediate: for man is not per se white nor per se not-white. Yet between contradictories absolutely taken or absolutely said of anything, there is no middle; so if a property is a thing, it is true it is the ‘same’ or ‘other’, but with a ‘per se’ it is not valid that it be ‘per se the same’ or ‘per se other’.

To the second [n.428]. The antecedent [‘if it is per se a thing, either a thing which is essence, or a thing which is not essence’] can be distinguished according to composition and division. In sense of composition neither [part of the antecedent] is to be granted; for just as one must not grant that it is per se essence or per se non-essence [n.431], so neither must one grant the other member of the disjunctive, with ‘which is’, in sense of composition. Nor are by this both contradictories denied, because if you are speaking of the terms, it is got that neither of them is said per se of the subject; this I concede. If you wish to get contradictory propositions, I say that they will be these: ‘either the property is per se a thing which is essence, or it is not per se a thing which is essence’; and the negative here is true, but it does not entail ‘therefore it is per se a thing which is not essence’, just as it does not follow ‘man is not per se white’, ‘therefore he is per se non-white’. – In sense of division the affirmative part of the disjunctive must be granted; but it does not further follow ‘therefore it is per se essence’, because formal identity is being inferred from real identity, for the antecedent in sense of division only indicates real identity by the ‘which is’.

In another way could the aforesaid antecedent [n.432] be distinguished, so that by the implication ‘which is’ be understood formal inherence or only identical inherence. In the first way neither part is to be granted, because neither of the opposites is per se in the thing which is said per se of the property. In the second way the affirmative part is to be granted, but the further proposition [n.191] does not follow, because of assertion of the consequent [n.428].

This second distinction [n.433] does not hold by force of the words, because the implied composition [‘which is’] is not determined by something which indicates that it [‘which is’] states formal inherence, but only identical inherence; the first distinction [n.432] is got by force of the words, and although ‘which is’ there does not indicate formal inherence in sense of composition, yet from the unity of the extreme, as it is a quasi specific or determinative construction, the essence has to be denominated ‘per se present in’ the subject.^Interpolation, giving a response to the third objection, n.429] The answer to the third is plain. It is said that neither are they per se the same things nor are they per se two things; but it is well said that when the syncategorematic term is removed, namely the ‘per se’, the affirmative is true, namely ‘they are the same thing’.

[To the second] – To the second [n.192] I say that accidental is either taken for something extraneous or is taken properly for that which as it were perfects something accidentally which pre-exists perfect in itself. If in the second way, I say that not every being is essential or accidental to every being that it is in; for there is a middle between accidental and essential, as what contracts, as difference contracts a genus, because such a thing is not substantial nor accidental, taking it in this way. And thus in divine reality nothing is accidental, but there is beside the essence something non-essential. – But if accidental be taken in the first way, whatever is not of the formal idea of it but extraneous, although it not properly be thus called accidental, would thus be an accidental difference with respect to the genus; and in this way the Philosopher takes the accidental for the extraneous in the fallacy of the accident [Sophistical Refutations 1.5.166b28-30]. Thus can be called accidental to something whatever is extraneous to it as that is compared to some third predicate.

[To the third] – To the third [n.193] I say that if in the major by the ‘if’ be understood a possible condition, the major is true and the minor false; for by no possible position when posited can the second person in divine reality be lacking without supreme good and supreme perfection being lacking. And if you prove that, if the second person were lacking, supreme perfection would exist in the Father, I say that if that person were lacking, supreme perfection would be lacking; and if the second person were lacking and the Father were not lacking, supreme perfection would be present; and so for supreme perfection to be lacking and for the Father to be present includes a contradiction. – But if in the major by the ‘if’ be posited an incompossible position, I say that the major is false; for that must be posited in the supreme good which cannot be posited not to be without the positing of incompossibles.

[To the fourth] – To the final one [n.195] I say that the reason about ‘necessary being’ must be thus understood: whatever is of itself a necessary being has of itself the most actual existence, such that it does not expect through anything – in any way other than itself – any actuality of existing. And therefore it is of itself indivisible, because if it could be divided, then from the things by which it would be divided it would expect some actuality of existing that it would have in the divided parts; and it would then be necessary that the things distinguishing those necessary beings would be formally necessities of existing; because they would be ultimate actualities of necessity in those diverse necessary beings, without which they would not have the most actual entity; because the divisible does not have the most actual entity or the most actual existence. On this basis, then, holds the reason posited above [n.177] in the question about the unity of God, from the idea ‘necessary being’, which was also touched on in the first question of the second distinction [n.71], that necessary being is not divided among several things. Because if a and b were not formally necessities of existing, before even they were understood in any of the things among which necessary being is divided, then, since they are ultimate actualities without which that common actuality would not exist, that common actuality would not be necessary being, because it would in some way require something other than itself by which it would be. But this conclusion does not hold of diverse persons in the same necessary entity; for that entity, of itself necessary, does not expect any actuality from the things that distinguish the persons, because it is not divided by the things that distinguish the persons, and the things that distinguish the persons are not as it were ultimate actualities by which such beings exist.

When therefore it is argued ‘a and b (understanding by these here two personal properties) are either formally necessities of existing or they are not’ [n.195], one can concede that they are not formally necessities of existing; nor does it follow ‘therefore they are possibilities’, because they are by identity that one necessity of existence. But if a and b were in diverse things, one would have to say that they were formally necessities or possible entities, because they could not be the same as some entity that was of itself necessary; for that common entity, with which they would be the same, would be as it were a potential for existing as it is pre-understood before the idea that contracts or divides it.

Against this [nn.438, 437]: being able to fail is either repugnant to a, insofar as it is a, or is not repugnant. If it is, a insofar as it is a is necessary, and so it is the reason for necessarily existing for that for which it is the form. If not, therefore through nothing else can it be repugnant to a precisely insofar as it is a, therefore by nothing is it taken away without ‘failing to be’ being compossible to a precisely insofar as it is a; therefore always, as precisely taken, it is ‘able to fail’; therefore, it is repugnant to ‘necessarily of itself’. – To this…²