Ordinatio

Now to make this in some way clear one must note that, just as repugnant things are repugnant of their own proper ideas, so non-repugnant things, or compossibility, are so by the proper ideas of compossible things.

But to see this compossibility one must look at the idea of the extremes, namely of nature and supposit. Here one should note that nature is not related to supposit as universal to singular, because in accidents too singularity without the idea of supposit is found, and an individual nature was assumed in our substance by the Word, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith III ch.3, but not a supposit of our nature. Nor is nature related to supposit as ‘in what’ to ‘what’, for to each ‘in what’ there corresponds a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’, and so, as nature is the ‘in what’, so it has a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’ which it does not contract to the supposit; and as the supposit is the ‘what’ or the ‘who’, so it has a proper ‘in what’ in which it subsists, and yet the supposit concomitantly is by necessity a singular, – and also, it cannot be an ‘in what’ with respect to something else, because it is subsistent, incapable of being the act of some subsistent thing; these two state a twofold incommunicability.¹

Here one needs to know that something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that what it is communicated to is ‘it’, or by informing, such that what it is communicated to is ‘by it’, not ‘it’.

In the first way a universal is communicated to a singular, and in the second way a form to matter.² Any nature at all, therefore, insofar as concerns itself and the idea of nature, is communicable in both ways, namely to several supposits, each of which is ‘it’, – and also as ‘in which’, as form, in which the singular or the supposit is a quidditative being, or is in possession of a nature; but the supposit is incommunicable by an opposed double incommunicability.

On this basis the intended proposition is made clear. And first in this way: any nature is communicable to several things through identity, therefore the divine nature too is communicable (for this is plain from the question set down before [nn.353-370]); but it is not divisible, from the question about the unity of God [nn.157-190]; therefore it is communicable without division.

Again I argue thus: ‘perfection simply’ as far as concerns itself, whatever be incompossible with it, is better than any supposit absolutely taken according to idea of supposit; the divine nature is not thus better, ex hypothesi; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: divine nature determines for itself a unique subsistence, therefore it is of itself incompossible with any other subsistence also precisely taken as it is another subsistence, namely without considering that it may be in another nature; and so, further, it is of itself not better than any other thing as it is another subsistence.

The proof of the first consequence is because, just as something of itself determines for itself a unique [supposit], so anything else incompossible with that is repugnant to it; ex hypothesi divine nature of itself determines for itself not only a subsistence which is in one nature (a trinity would stand along with this), but a unique subsistence – this subsistence and as this – in idea of subsistence, not considering it only because it is in this nature.

The proof of the second consequence is because, just as it is incompossible with this, so it is not better than this than is anything else incompossible with it.³

There is a clarification from the infinity which is a condition of nature, and this as follows: form, which is in some way unlimited in perfecting matter, can, without distinction of itself, perfect several parts of matter.

An example. The intellective soul, which is not limited to perfecting this part of an organic body, can, without any kind of distinction or extension of itself, whether per se or per accidens, perfect another part of organic body. But this property, namely that the form is not distinguished and yet it perfects several parts of body or matter, does not belong to the soul by reason of imperfection, because the soul is posited as the most perfect form among all natural forms, and all other more imperfect forms lack this grade in perfecting; for all are limited to perfecting one thing, nor do they perfect several parts of matter without extension per accidens.

From this I argue as follows: if such a oneness may stand with plurality, and not from the imperfection of that which is ‘one’, then, when everything of imperfection is removed from each part, perfect oneness can stand with plurality. But the fact that the soul perfects matter, this belongs to imperfection in it; the fact too that the several perfected things are parts of the same whole, this belongs to imperfection. If, therefore, is taken from the soul this which is ‘to perfect matter’, and from the many distinct things this which is ‘to be parts of one whole’, there will remain a form that has perfect unity, but does not inform matter, but does give total being, and this to several distinct things, which distinct things will not be parts of one whole but per se subsistent; and then there will be one nature giving total being to several distinct supposits. Therefore the divine essence, which is wholly unlimited, from which everything of imperfection is taken away, can give total being to several distinct supposits.