Ordinatio

Now to make this in some way clear one must note that, just as repugnant things are repugnant of their own proper ideas, so non-repugnant things, or compossibility, are so by the proper ideas of compossible things.

But to see this compossibility one must look at the idea of the extremes, namely of nature and supposit. Here one should note that nature is not related to supposit as universal to singular, because in accidents too singularity without the idea of supposit is found, and an individual nature was assumed in our substance by the Word, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith III ch.3, but not a supposit of our nature. Nor is nature related to supposit as ‘in what’ to ‘what’, for to each ‘in what’ there corresponds a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’, and so, as nature is the ‘in what’, so it has a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’ which it does not contract to the supposit; and as the supposit is the ‘what’ or the ‘who’, so it has a proper ‘in what’ in which it subsists, and yet the supposit concomitantly is by necessity a singular, – and also, it cannot be an ‘in what’ with respect to something else, because it is subsistent, incapable of being the act of some subsistent thing; these two state a twofold incommunicability.¹

Here one needs to know that something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that what it is communicated to is ‘it’, or by informing, such that what it is communicated to is ‘by it’, not ‘it’.

In the first way a universal is communicated to a singular, and in the second way a form to matter.² Any nature at all, therefore, insofar as concerns itself and the idea of nature, is communicable in both ways, namely to several supposits, each of which is ‘it’, – and also as ‘in which’, as form, in which the singular or the supposit is a quidditative being, or is in possession of a nature; but the supposit is incommunicable by an opposed double incommunicability.

On this basis the intended proposition is made clear. And first in this way: any nature is communicable to several things through identity, therefore the divine nature too is communicable (for this is plain from the question set down before [nn.353-370]); but it is not divisible, from the question about the unity of God [nn.157-190]; therefore it is communicable without division.

Again I argue thus: ‘perfection simply’ as far as concerns itself, whatever be incompossible with it, is better than any supposit absolutely taken according to idea of supposit; the divine nature is not thus better, ex hypothesi; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: divine nature determines for itself a unique subsistence, therefore it is of itself incompossible with any other subsistence also precisely taken as it is another subsistence, namely without considering that it may be in another nature; and so, further, it is of itself not better than any other thing as it is another subsistence.

The proof of the first consequence is because, just as something of itself determines for itself a unique [supposit], so anything else incompossible with that is repugnant to it; ex hypothesi divine nature of itself determines for itself not only a subsistence which is in one nature (a trinity would stand along with this), but a unique subsistence – this subsistence and as this – in idea of subsistence, not considering it only because it is in this nature.

The proof of the second consequence is because, just as it is incompossible with this, so it is not better than this than is anything else incompossible with it.³

There is a clarification from the infinity which is a condition of nature, and this as follows: form, which is in some way unlimited in perfecting matter, can, without distinction of itself, perfect several parts of matter.

An example. The intellective soul, which is not limited to perfecting this part of an organic body, can, without any kind of distinction or extension of itself, whether per se or per accidens, perfect another part of organic body. But this property, namely that the form is not distinguished and yet it perfects several parts of body or matter, does not belong to the soul by reason of imperfection, because the soul is posited as the most perfect form among all natural forms, and all other more imperfect forms lack this grade in perfecting; for all are limited to perfecting one thing, nor do they perfect several parts of matter without extension per accidens.

From this I argue as follows: if such a oneness may stand with plurality, and not from the imperfection of that which is ‘one’, then, when everything of imperfection is removed from each part, perfect oneness can stand with plurality. But the fact that the soul perfects matter, this belongs to imperfection in it; the fact too that the several perfected things are parts of the same whole, this belongs to imperfection. If, therefore, is taken from the soul this which is ‘to perfect matter’, and from the many distinct things this which is ‘to be parts of one whole’, there will remain a form that has perfect unity, but does not inform matter, but does give total being, and this to several distinct things, which distinct things will not be parts of one whole but per se subsistent; and then there will be one nature giving total being to several distinct supposits. Therefore the divine essence, which is wholly unlimited, from which everything of imperfection is taken away, can give total being to several distinct supposits.

But there still remains a further difficulty. For it does not seem intelligible that the essence not be multiplied and that the supposits be several unless some distinction be posited between the idea of essence and the idea of supposit. And therefore, to preserve this aforesaid compossibility [nn.376-387], one must see about this distinction.

And I say, without assertion and without prejudice of a better opinion, that the idea by which the supposit is formally incommunicable (let it be a) and the idea of essence as essence (let it be b) have some distinction that precedes every act of created and uncreated intellect.

I prove this as follows: the first supposit formally or really has a communicable entity, otherwise it could not communicate it; also it really has an incommunicable entity, otherwise it could not be positively a supposit in real entity. And I understand ‘really’ thus, what in no way by an act of an intellect considering it, nay what would be such an entity there if no intellect were considering it; and to be in this way there if no intellect were considering it I call ‘to be before every act of intellect’. – But there is not any entity before every act of intellect, such that it is not communicable by an act of intellect and another entity is of itself incommunicable such, namely, that to be communicated contradicts it, unless there is before every act of intellect, that is, not precisely through an act of understanding, some distinction between this entity and that; therefore etc.

If you say that before every act of intellect of the Father there is not there any distinction but an entity altogether of one idea,¹ and thus the Father has no positive entity in himself which he does not communicate to the Son; therefore he communicates to him paternity just as he does essence!

There is an argument, second, as follows: one distinction in the intellect is in the presence of a diverse mode of taking the same formal object, and this either by conceiving it grammatically, as ‘man’, ‘of man’, or logically, as ‘man’ and ‘this man’; another distinction, a greater one, is in the intellect by conceiving two formal objects for two acts, and this whether diverse things correspond to them, as when understanding man and ass, or whether one thing outside does, as when understanding color and what diffuses [sc. sight].

From this I argue: the Father, when understanding himself in the first moment of origin, either understands the essence and property a [n.389] as diverse formal objects, or precisely as the same object under different modes of conceiving. But not in the second way, because then there would be no greater difference than when conceiving God and deity, and so one would not conceive the property a as more incommunicable than incommunicable deity, for man is not incommunicable if humanity is communicable, nor conversely; so it is in the matter at hand. And then too the intellect of the Father would not be more blessed in the divine essence than in a, which is said to be a property of the Father, nor more in a than in a property of the Son, and thus in two objects, as in the property of the Father and of the Son, he would first be blessed.

And if the first mode be given, that the paternal intellect has the essence and a as two formal objects [n.393], then I argue: that intellect understands nothing save intuitively, because – as will be plain from I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24, 28 [above n.139] – every abstractive and non-intuitive understanding is in some way imperfect. But intuitive knowledge is of an object as the object is present in actual existence, and this in itself or in another containing eminently its whole entity; therefore, as to things that are known intuitively as formal distinct objects, either one is contained eminently in another, or each according to its own existence terminates the act as the act is of it. But nothing intrinsic to a divine person is properly contained in something eminently, because then it would not be a being save by participation in the thing containing it; therefore all intrinsic things that are diverse intuitive formal objects, according to their proper actual existence, terminate intuition as objects, and so they have some distinction before the act of understanding.

If you say that the essence makes of itself one concept in the intellect of the Father but the paternal intellect can make diverse ideas about it and precisely in the second mode are essence and a in the paternal intellect distinguished but not in the first mode [n.393], – on the contrary: whatever the intellect, without the action of the object, causes about the object precisely by the proper virtue of the intellect (and this when speaking of the object as it has known being in the intellect precisely and of the intellect as considering it), that thing is precisely a relation of reason. But now the idea which the essence makes of itself is plainly absolute, otherwise it would not beatify the intellect of the Father; besides this absolute idea there is no other in reality before the act of the intellect, or the intended proposition is attained [n.389]; also there is for you no other idea in the intellect of the Father save through an act of intellect busy about it and not through an impression made by the object, which, for you, only imprints one concept; therefore any idea at all other than the absolute idea of the essence would be precisely a relation of reason, and thus the property of the Father by which he is incommunicable will be a relation of reason, which seems unacceptable.

Second, it is necessary to see [n.388] of what sort the difference is that is posited to precede every act of intellect. I say that both in things and in the intellect a major difference is manifest, and that from it a minor difference is frequently inferred that is not manifest, just as from the difference of creatures a difference of ideas is inferred in the divine intellect, as is plain from Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.46 n.2. In reality, however, a distinction of things is manifest, and this a twofold one, namely of supposits and of natures; in the intellect there is manifest a twofold difference, namely of modes of conceiving and of formal objects [n.392].

From what has been said is inferred the difference here intended, which is not manifest, namely because it is least in its order, that is, among all those that precede intellection.

Now the inference is made from real difference in this way: the distinction of divine supposits is real; therefore since it cannot be that the same formally agree in reality with the same (which is something of itself) to such an extent that it not be distinguished from it, and differ from it in reality to such an extent that it not agree with it (because if it is altogether the same in reality, why is this so great a principle of identity and non-distinction and the same so great a principle of distinction and non-identity?), there is inferred some difference or distinction of the essence in which the supposits agree from the ideas by which the supposits are distinguished.

Likewise in the second way [n.396]: from the difference of formal objects, neither of which is contained eminently in something (and this in an intellect considering intuitively), there is inferred some difference, prior to an act of intellect, in the things that are known intuitively [n.394].

But will this distinction then be called real? I reply: it is not an actual real, understanding (as is commonly said) ‘actual real difference’ to be that which is a difference of things and a difference in act, because in one person there is not any difference of things, on account of the divine simplicity; and just as the difference is not a real actual so it is not a real potential, because nothing is in potency there that is not actual.

But it can be called ‘a difference of reason’, as a certain doctor said [Bonaventure]; – not that ‘reason’ be taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but as ‘reason’ is taken for the quiddity of a thing according as quiddity is an object of the intellect.

Or, in another way, it can be called ‘virtual difference’, because what has such a distinction in itself does not have thing and thing, but it is one thing, having virtually and pre-eminently two realities as it were, because to each reality, as it is in that one thing, there belongs, as if it were a distinct thing, that which is a proper principle for such reality; for in this way does this reality distinguish and that one not distinguish, as if the former were one thing and the latter another.

Or, as most properly, let it be said: just as we can find in unity many grades – first, there is the least unity of aggregation; in the second grade there is unity of order, which adds something above aggregation; in the third there is unity per accidens, where beyond order there is an informing, although accidental, of one by another of those things that are in this way one; in the fourth there is a per se unity of a thing composed of essential principles per se in act and per se in potency; in the fifth there is unity of simplicity, which is truly identity (for whatever is there is really the same as any at all, and is not just one with the unity of union, as in other modes) – so, still further, not every identity is formal. But I call identity formal where that which is called thus the same includes that with which it is thus the same in its own formal quidditative idea and per se in the first mode. Now in the matter at hand essence does not include in its formal quidditative idea the property of a supposit, nor conversely. And therefore it can be conceded that, before every act of intellect, there is a reality of essence by which essence is communicable, and a reality of supposit by which supposit is incommunicable; and before an act of intellect this reality is formally not that one, or it is not formally the same as that one, in the way that what ‘formally’ is was expounded before [n.390].

But should not, then, some ‘distinction’ be conceded? It is better to use this negative ‘this is not formally the same’ than ‘this is distinct thus and so’.

But surely this follows, a and b [n.389] are not the same formally, therefore they are formally distinct? I reply that it need not follow, because formality is denied in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent.

Briefly then I say² that there is in the divine essence before an act of intellect entity a and entity b, and this one is not formally that one, such that the paternal intellect when considering a and considering b has, from the nature of the thing, that which makes this composite true ‘a is not formally b’, but not precisely from any act of intellect about a and b [n.389].

This difference is made clear by an example:³ if whiteness be set down as a simple species not having in itself two natures, yet there is in whiteness something really whereby it has the idea of color, and something whereby it has the idea of difference; and this reality is not formally that reality, nor formally the reverse, nay one is outside the reality of the other – speaking formally – just as if they were two things, although now by identity those two realities are one thing.

But this example, although it is in a way similar to the matter at hand (namely as to the fact that real identity does not necessarily entail the formal identity of anything that is in something thus the same with anything that is in it), is yet not altogether alike, because there is some composition in whiteness, although not of thing and thing, yet of a sort that would not be conceded in God, because of formal non-identity. But where formal non-identity of some things in the same thing requires some composition, and where it does not, will be stated in distinction 8 in the question about attributes and in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ [I d.8 p.1 q.4.3].⁴

This formal distinction or non-identity, which was proved before by two or three reasons [nn.390, 394, 398], can also be proved by two or three authorities of Augustine: On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2 ‘about big things’ or ‘about little things’: “Every essence which is said relatively is something other when the relative is excepted;” and: “If the Father is not something to himself he is altogether not one who may be said relatively.” In reality therefore he is essence to himself and not to another, and in reality the Father, insofar as he is Father, is said relatively, or he is in relation to something or someone other; but he is not formally the same entity to himself and not to himself; therefore etc.

Again in the same place ch.2 n.3: “He is not Word by that by which he is wisdom, because the Word is not said to himself but only relatively to him of whom he is the Word, as Son to Father; but he is wisdom by that by which he is essence.”⁵ And from this he concludes: “Wherefore not because the Father is not the Son…is there for that reason not one essence, because by these names of theirs relatives are indicated; but both are together one wisdom, one essence.” There is, therefore, according to him such a non-identity of relation with absolute in divine reality that if one is the ‘by which’ with respect to another, the other will not be the ‘by which’ with respect to the same; but to be the ‘by which’ belongs to someone according to his formal idea; therefore one of them is not of the formal idea of the other but is outside it, and consequently he is not formally the same as the other, just as the idea of that which is ‘not to be the same’ was expounded above [n.403].⁶ And yet from this does not simply follow a real diversity or non-identity of substance and relation. For that by which the Father is Father is not other than the essence but the same, according to Augustine himself⁷ City of God XI ch.10 n.1: “God is called simple because he is what he has, except that each person is said relatively to another;” nor is essence “as the Father has a Son but is not the Son,” but “whatever the Father has in himself, to which he is” as a consequence “not said relatively, that he himself is” by true identity, although not by formal identity.