Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology
Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response
Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question
Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science
Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate
Articulus I: I. To the First Question
Articulus II: II. To the Second Question
Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end
Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is
Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action
Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action
Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question
Articulus V: V. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.
Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Book 1
Distinctio I: First Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility
Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God
Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature
Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact
Articulus II: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments
Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite
Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others
Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion
Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: On the Enjoyer
Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God
Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys
Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys
Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy
Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy
Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Distinctio II: Second Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently
Articulus I: I. To the Second Question
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus III: III. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear
Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear
Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated
Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly
Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion
Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence
Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence
Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions
Articulus I: I. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs
Section II: B. Proofs of Others
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question
Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded
Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected
Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion
Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution
Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question
Articulus V: V. To the Second Question
Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality
Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
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To the arguments. – When it is argued ‘they are equally noble, therefore they are so many [n.197]’, there is figure of speech, by change of ‘what’ or ‘what sort’ to ‘how many’. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is: for it is not because of the nobility or ignobility of the relation of principle or principled that it is multiplied or not multiplied, but unity is of the idea of principle, although in principled things there can be plurality, because there is always reduction of plurality to unity. And so, with equal nobility standing, there can be multiplication in the relations of the produced though not in the relations of the producers.
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Another response is that there any relation of one idea is of itself a this, yet from the several relations of the producers there can perhaps be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘productive’, and so from the several relations of the produced there can be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘produced’. Although therefore there is one relation in common – if there is a common abstractable – which is called in common ‘relation of producer’, yet there are two relations of the producer, in this way and in that, just as there are two relations corresponding to them.
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To the second reason [n.198] I concede that to relations on the part of the produced there correspond relations on the part of the productive, and as many relations, but it does not follow ‘if the relations of the produced are distinguished personally, therefore so are the relations of the producer’; the reason assigned for which is because on the part of the producer another idea of producing is sufficient,1 just as artificial and natural production are thus distinguished through productive principles, namely art and nature, although they come together in the same supposit. But the relations of the produced cannot so come together in the same supposit and in one person, but they are personally distinct, because the produced is per se subsistent and a supposit.
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Another response is plain from the solution of the question [nn.357, 172-173], because the same thing cannot be produced by two total productions, although the same thing can produce by two total productions; and therefore the relations of the produced are not multiplied in the same thing, although the relations of the producer can be multiplied.
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To the third [n.199]: a finite power cannot have at the same time two adequate terms in the being produced, although it can have one in the being produced and another in the having been produced; but an infinite power has its term within always in the being produced, and this term is adequate, and therefore it cannot have several terms.