Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology
Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response
Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question
Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science
Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate
Articulus I: I. To the First Question
Articulus II: II. To the Second Question
Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end
Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is
Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action
Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action
Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question
Articulus V: V. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.
Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Book 1
Distinctio I: First Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility
Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God
Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature
Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact
Articulus II: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments
Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite
Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others
Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion
Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: On the Enjoyer
Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God
Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys
Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys
Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy
Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy
Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Distinctio II: Second Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently
Articulus I: I. To the Second Question
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus III: III. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear
Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear
Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated
Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly
Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion
Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence
Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence
Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions
Articulus I: I. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs
Section II: B. Proofs of Others
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question
Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded
Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected
Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion
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I say then to the question that there are only two productions distinct according to formal ideas of productions, and this because there are only two productive principles that have distinct formal ideas of production.
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Of this causal statement I prove the antecedent and the consequence. The antecedent I prove as follows: every plurality is reduced to as much unity, or as much fewness, as it can be reduced to; therefore the plurality of active principles will be reduced to as much unity, or as much fewness, as it can be reduced to. But it cannot be reduced to some single productive principle. The proof is because1 the principle would determinately have one mode of being principle, or the mode of being principle of one of them: for either it would be of itself determinately productive by way of nature, or not determinately of itself but freely productive, and so by way of will; therefore these cannot be reduced to some principle as it were third from these that would, namely in producing, have the idea of neither of them. Nor is one reduced to the other because then one would in its whole genus be imperfect, which is false, because since it belongs to both from the same perfection to be an operative and productive principle (which was proved in the preceding solution, in the proof of the minor of the first syllogism there given [nn.224, 226]), and since neither is in itself imperfect insofar as it is operative, for then it would not exist formally in God, therefore also is neither imperfect insofar as it is productive.
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The productive principles, therefore, cannot be reduced to a lesser fewness than to duality of principle, namely a principle productive by way of nature and a principle productive by way of will. Now these two principles, according to their ideas of being principle, should be placed in the first being, because in it there is every idea of principle that is not reduced to another prior principle. Therefore there are only two productive principles of different idea in the first productive thing, namely one productive by way of nature and one productive freely. Now these are inward productive principles are, because any productive principle which is not reduced to another prior principle is of a nature to have a production and a product adequate to itself; therefore the productive principle which is will is of a nature to have a product adequate to it, and the productive principle which is nature is of a nature to have a product adequate to it. These productive principles are infinite, therefore the products adequate to them can only be infinite. Also omnipotence in the first thing cannot have a possible infinite object, because then the creature could be infinite;2 but nothing is formally infinite except God, from the question ‘Whether there is a God’ [nn.39, 74-147]. Therefore these principles are productive of some things in the divine nature.
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Further it follows: if there are only two productive principles of different idea, then there are only two productions numerically. The proof is that each productive principle has a production adequate to itself and co-eternal; therefore while that production stands it cannot have another.3