Ordinatio

Now a certain doctor¹ argues otherwise in this way: the first person is constituted by relation to the second, and only by relation of origin; therefore one should posit in divine reality diverse supposits of which one is from another, etc. Proof of the first proposition: for the first person is relative to the second; and if he were not constituted by that relation then that relation would either be accidental to him or would be adventitious to the person² constituted, which is unacceptable.

Secondly he argues thus: a virtue supremely active diffuses itself supremely; but it would not diffuse itself supremely if it did not produce something supreme,³ or unless it communicated a supreme nature to something; therefore etc.

Others⁴ argue through the idea of good, because the good is of itself communicative; therefore the supremely good is supremely communicative; only internally, because nothing ‘other’ can be supreme.

There is a similar argument about the idea of the perfect, because the perfect is what can produce something like itself, from Metaphysics 1.1.981b7 and Meteorology 4.3.380a12-15; therefore the first agent, which is most perfect, can produce something like itself. But more perfect is what can produce something like itself univocally than equivocally, because equivocal production is imperfect; therefore etc.

These reasons do not make the intended proposition [n.220] clear through what is more manifest, either to the faithful or to the infidel. The first [n.248], when it accepts that the first person is constituted by relation, if it intends to persuade the infidel, is accepting something less known than the principal proposition; for it is less known to such a one that a per se subsistent thing is constituted by relation than that there is production in divine reality.⁵ If too the reason intends to persuade the faithful it still proceeds from that is less known, because that there is production in divine reality is an evident article of faith; but it is not in this way first evident that this is an article of faith, that the first person is constituted by relation.⁶

And when it is argued further that the distinction there is only by relations of origin [n.248], this not immediately manifest from faith as is the conclusion which it is intending to show.^{7 8}

When he proves it, because otherwise the relation would be adventitious to the constituted person and so would be an accident [n.248], this proof does not seem to be valid, because it could be argued in a similar way about active inspiriting, about which all hold that it does not constitute a person, nor yet is it an accident, because what the essence is in a person is perfectly the same as the foundation.

And when it is argued secondly that something supremely active is supremely diffusive of itself, the response would be that it is true to the extent that it is possible for something to be diffused, but it would be necessary to prove that it would be possible for something to be diffused or communicated in unity of nature.

Through the same point to the third argument about the idea of good [n.250], because it would be necessary to prove that communication of the same thing or nature would be possible, because to an impossible that includes contradiction there is no power or communication of goodness.⁹

Likewise to the fourth ‘the perfect is of a nature to produce a supreme like itself’ [n.251], it is true as to a supreme as like to it as can be produced;¹⁰ therefore one ought to prove that a like supreme univocally would be producible.¹¹