Ordinatio

To solve these questions I put first a certain example, namely how bodies rest in diverse ways [cf. Prol. nn.170-178]. For the ultimate term of rest for heavy bodies is the center. But to this center, as to the ultimate term, a heavy body adheres per se and first, to wit earth which does not adhere by the nature of another body from which it participates heaviness and the adhering in question.

Now a body adheres to the center immovably and per se, but not first, because it adheres by the heaviness and the adhering participated from the earth. However it does adhere per se, because it adheres by an intrinsic form and firmly or immovably, because it is as it were intrinsic to the earth, which does rest first, as stones and metals in the bosom of the earth; and such things, although they do not rest first, do yet rest perfectly, because they are perfectly conjoined to the center through the medium of what first rests, to which they are, as it were, perfectly united.

In a third way, a body adheres to the center through the medium of the earth to which it is united, but movably and not firmly, as a heavy object existing on the surface of the earth; and such a thing, although it truly rest for a time, is yet not as determined to rest as a body resting in the second way.

In a fourth way, a body can adhere uniformly to a body next to it and rest with respect to it, and not rest with respect to the universe if the body next to it to which it adheres is not uniformly adhering to the center, for example in the case of a man lying in a ship; although it would be in the power of the body to rest itself, that heavy body, which would finally rest in some such movable thing but not in the center, whether mediately or immediately, would be disorderedly at rest, because although, as far as depends on itself, it would be at rest because of its firm adhesion to such a movable body, yet it does not adhere to that to which it should, according to its own nature, adhere in order to be at rest.

Applying the example to the matter at hand, the will corresponds in spiritual things to the weight of a body, because “as the body by weight, so the spirit by love is borne wherever it is borne,” according to Augustine On the City of God 11 ch.28. The center which of its own nature gives ultimate rest is the ultimate end; hence the wise man says that “God is the intellectual sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere” [Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus Book of 24 Philosophers prop.2] – according to truth. To this center the divine will first and per se, because not by participation in anything other than itself, immovably and necessarily adheres,¹ for this will, not by habit nor by a different act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves the supreme good.

In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating in God, yet per se, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and this because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it always abides in that will’s good pleasure.

In third rank is the will of a just wayfarer, who although he relies on the divine will and, by its mediation, on the supreme good, in which the will itself rests, yet it does not firmly and immovably adhere to the good pleasure of the will; hence now it adheres to the good and now it turns away from the good. – But here there is a certain unlikeness to the third member in the case of bodies [n.172]; because there while the form remains by which the body rests the body is able itself not to be at rest, but here the form, by which it rests, is posited to be destroyed at the same time with aversion of the will from the center.

In the fourth rank is the mortal sinner, who although, as far as depends on the act of the will that is resting itself, he adhere vehemently to something other than God, so that neither by its mediation nor immediately is he adhering to God, yet on the part of the object he cannot be simply at rest; nay rather, just as someone at rest with respect to a ship, and not with respect to the center [of the earth], is not simply at rest, because not with respect to what in the universe ultimately brings rest, so the will, which is resting itself, as far as it can, in some object other than God, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes the will ultimately and most perfectly to rest. The fact is also plain, because the will is there never satisfied, however firmly it immerses itself in it by loving it for its own sake.

On the basis of these points I say to the questions posed that to enjoy either means delight or it means the act of adhering to the object for its own sake, to which act the resting of delight is concomitant, or which act is itself the delight or the resting, that is, the act that ultimately terminates the power to the extent that a power terminates itself in its act; so that about the idea of enjoyment, if it means the act, it does not seem to be that it itself makes the power to rest as far as depends on the part of the object, but as far as depends on the part of the power adhering to some object for its own sake: so that the divine will enjoys simply and necessarily and per se and first; but the blessed created will enjoys simply and perpetually and per se but not first; the just will of the wayfarer enjoys simply and per se but not immovably nor first. The will of the mortal sinner enjoys simply because, as far as depends on the part of the will, it would make itself to rest, and does rest, in the object which it loves for its own sake; but it does not simply rest as far as depends on the part of the object, nor does that object require enjoyment, but because the object does not cause rest as a power by its act makes itself rest in it, therefore is the enjoyment disordered.

But in that case there is a doubt as to what object the mortal sinner enjoys, namely whether his act or the object of his act. I reply: I say that in general he enjoys himself, because he loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence. Because all love of concupiscence is preceded by love of friendship, and consequently he loves something else with the love of friendship, and that something else is himself, for whom as loved with love of friendship he has concupiscence of that object. He does not then enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently the act itself, on which there is no need for there to be a reflecting back first. This is the opinion of Augustine On the City of God 14 ch.28: “Two loves have made two cities: the love of oneself to contempt of God has made the city of the devil, the love of God to contempt of oneself the city of God,” and Literal Commentary on Genesis 11 ch.15 n.20. Therefore the first root there is this, that the sinner enjoys himself.

To the penultimate question [n.166] it can be said that although the sensitive appetite in some way adheres to something for its own sake, that is, not because of another negatively, because it does not have the feature of referring to another, nor yet contrarily, because the object is not valued as non-referable to another; therefore it is said in an abusive sense to enjoy, because of non-relation, but not properly, because it does not adhere in a non-referring way. Likewise neither does it adhere with love, because loving does not properly belong to it. Likewise neither does it properly adhere, because it does not apply itself to the object but is as it were fixed by the force of the object, because it does not lead but is led, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 2 ch.22. And by following the said simile about the resting of bodies [n.173], it could be said that the sensitive appetite is likened to iron that is as it were fixed by the adamantine force of the adamant attracting it, and thus neither mediately nor immediately at rest in the center, nor in anything else, by the force that would give it rest in the center, or by any intrinsic force making it rest in something as if in the center, but only by the force of something extrinsic giving it rest. So here, the force of the object gives it rest, but not the intrinsic force of giving rest in the center or as if in the center, which force is as if freedom alone, which does not belong to the sensitive appetite.

To the final question [n.168] the answer is clear from the above. Because, if enjoying proper be denied of sensitive appetite, which however more agrees with the will of which there is enjoyment than natural appetite does, because the act of the sensitive appetite follows an act of knowing, just as the act of will – not so, however, the act of natural appetite, if there is any act of it – it follows that enjoyment proper does not belong to what has only natural appetite, indeed not even as abusively as it agrees with sense appetite.