Ordinatio

Lastly in regard to this first distinction I ask about the enjoyer, namely to whom as subject enjoyment belongs, and first whether enjoying belong to God. It seems not: Because enjoyment is with respect to the end; but God does not have an end; therefore enjoying does not belong to God.

On the contrary: God loves himself; and he does not love himself because of something else, because then he would be using himself; therefore he enjoys himself. The consequence is plain, because if he loves himself, either by using or enjoying.

Second I ask whether the wayfarer enjoys. It seems that he does not: Because the wayfarer has only an act of desire in respect of the absent good; but an act of desire is not an act of enjoyment. The proof of this is because desire is an act of concupiscence, but enjoyment is an act of friendship; therefore etc.

On the contrary: “To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake,” as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [Lombard Sentences 1 d.1 ch.2, from Augustines’s On Christian Doctrine 1 ch.4 n.4]; but the wayfarer thus inheres to God; therefore he can enjoy God.

Third the question is asked whether the sinner enjoys. And it seems he does not: Because what does not rely on something immovable does not enjoy nor rest; but the sinner does not rely on any immovable good; the proof, because he relies on a creature, which is movable, for “every creature is subject to vanity” [Romans 8.20, Ecclesiastes 3.19]; therefore he does not rest nor enjoy.

Again, he who wants another for use of his own act does not enjoy him; but the sinner wants God for use of his own act; therefore he does not enjoy him. The major is shown because he who wants another for use of his own act does not value him as the supreme good; therefore he does not enjoy him. The minor is clear because the sinner wants his own act to be; therefore he wants it to be from God, since nothing could exist except from God; therefore he wants God to use him, because God uses everything that is from him.

On the contrary: Augustine 83 Diverse Questions q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used” [n.70]; therefore it is possible for the sinner to enjoy things he should use.

Fourth the question is asked whether the brutes enjoy. And it seems that they do, from Augustine, where as before, 83 Diverse Questions q.30, he says that: “to enjoy any corporal pleasure the beasts too are not absurdly judged to do.”

On the contrary: “To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake” [nn.70, 162]; but the brutes do not have love, because neither do they have will nor do they adhere to anything for its own sake but for their own good; therefore they do not enjoy.

Fifth the question is asked whether all things enjoy. It seems that they do: Because all things desire the good with natural love, Ethics 1.1.1094a2-3; and they desire some good not for the sake of something else [Ethics 1.4.1096b13-14]; therefore they enjoy.

On the contrary: “We enjoy things known” [n72; Augustine On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13]; but not all things have cognition; therefore etc.

To solve these questions I put first a certain example, namely how bodies rest in diverse ways [cf. Prol. nn.170-178]. For the ultimate term of rest for heavy bodies is the center. But to this center, as to the ultimate term, a heavy body adheres per se and first, to wit earth which does not adhere by the nature of another body from which it participates heaviness and the adhering in question.

Now a body adheres to the center immovably and per se, but not first, because it adheres by the heaviness and the adhering participated from the earth. However it does adhere per se, because it adheres by an intrinsic form and firmly or immovably, because it is as it were intrinsic to the earth, which does rest first, as stones and metals in the bosom of the earth; and such things, although they do not rest first, do yet rest perfectly, because they are perfectly conjoined to the center through the medium of what first rests, to which they are, as it were, perfectly united.

In a third way, a body adheres to the center through the medium of the earth to which it is united, but movably and not firmly, as a heavy object existing on the surface of the earth; and such a thing, although it truly rest for a time, is yet not as determined to rest as a body resting in the second way.

In a fourth way, a body can adhere uniformly to a body next to it and rest with respect to it, and not rest with respect to the universe if the body next to it to which it adheres is not uniformly adhering to the center, for example in the case of a man lying in a ship; although it would be in the power of the body to rest itself, that heavy body, which would finally rest in some such movable thing but not in the center, whether mediately or immediately, would be disorderedly at rest, because although, as far as depends on itself, it would be at rest because of its firm adhesion to such a movable body, yet it does not adhere to that to which it should, according to its own nature, adhere in order to be at rest.

Applying the example to the matter at hand, the will corresponds in spiritual things to the weight of a body, because “as the body by weight, so the spirit by love is borne wherever it is borne,” according to Augustine On the City of God 11 ch.28. The center which of its own nature gives ultimate rest is the ultimate end; hence the wise man says that “God is the intellectual sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere” [Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus Book of 24 Philosophers prop.2] – according to truth. To this center the divine will first and per se, because not by participation in anything other than itself, immovably and necessarily adheres,¹ for this will, not by habit nor by a different act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves the supreme good.

In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating in God, yet per se, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and this because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it always abides in that will’s good pleasure.

In third rank is the will of a just wayfarer, who although he relies on the divine will and, by its mediation, on the supreme good, in which the will itself rests, yet it does not firmly and immovably adhere to the good pleasure of the will; hence now it adheres to the good and now it turns away from the good. – But here there is a certain unlikeness to the third member in the case of bodies [n.172]; because there while the form remains by which the body rests the body is able itself not to be at rest, but here the form, by which it rests, is posited to be destroyed at the same time with aversion of the will from the center.

In the fourth rank is the mortal sinner, who although, as far as depends on the act of the will that is resting itself, he adhere vehemently to something other than God, so that neither by its mediation nor immediately is he adhering to God, yet on the part of the object he cannot be simply at rest; nay rather, just as someone at rest with respect to a ship, and not with respect to the center [of the earth], is not simply at rest, because not with respect to what in the universe ultimately brings rest, so the will, which is resting itself, as far as it can, in some object other than God, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes the will ultimately and most perfectly to rest. The fact is also plain, because the will is there never satisfied, however firmly it immerses itself in it by loving it for its own sake.

On the basis of these points I say to the questions posed that to enjoy either means delight or it means the act of adhering to the object for its own sake, to which act the resting of delight is concomitant, or which act is itself the delight or the resting, that is, the act that ultimately terminates the power to the extent that a power terminates itself in its act; so that about the idea of enjoyment, if it means the act, it does not seem to be that it itself makes the power to rest as far as depends on the part of the object, but as far as depends on the part of the power adhering to some object for its own sake: so that the divine will enjoys simply and necessarily and per se and first; but the blessed created will enjoys simply and perpetually and per se but not first; the just will of the wayfarer enjoys simply and per se but not immovably nor first. The will of the mortal sinner enjoys simply because, as far as depends on the part of the will, it would make itself to rest, and does rest, in the object which it loves for its own sake; but it does not simply rest as far as depends on the part of the object, nor does that object require enjoyment, but because the object does not cause rest as a power by its act makes itself rest in it, therefore is the enjoyment disordered.

But in that case there is a doubt as to what object the mortal sinner enjoys, namely whether his act or the object of his act. I reply: I say that in general he enjoys himself, because he loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence. Because all love of concupiscence is preceded by love of friendship, and consequently he loves something else with the love of friendship, and that something else is himself, for whom as loved with love of friendship he has concupiscence of that object. He does not then enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently the act itself, on which there is no need for there to be a reflecting back first. This is the opinion of Augustine On the City of God 14 ch.28: “Two loves have made two cities: the love of oneself to contempt of God has made the city of the devil, the love of God to contempt of oneself the city of God,” and Literal Commentary on Genesis 11 ch.15 n.20. Therefore the first root there is this, that the sinner enjoys himself.

To the penultimate question [n.166] it can be said that although the sensitive appetite in some way adheres to something for its own sake, that is, not because of another negatively, because it does not have the feature of referring to another, nor yet contrarily, because the object is not valued as non-referable to another; therefore it is said in an abusive sense to enjoy, because of non-relation, but not properly, because it does not adhere in a non-referring way. Likewise neither does it adhere with love, because loving does not properly belong to it. Likewise neither does it properly adhere, because it does not apply itself to the object but is as it were fixed by the force of the object, because it does not lead but is led, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 2 ch.22. And by following the said simile about the resting of bodies [n.173], it could be said that the sensitive appetite is likened to iron that is as it were fixed by the adamantine force of the adamant attracting it, and thus neither mediately nor immediately at rest in the center, nor in anything else, by the force that would give it rest in the center, or by any intrinsic force making it rest in something as if in the center, but only by the force of something extrinsic giving it rest. So here, the force of the object gives it rest, but not the intrinsic force of giving rest in the center or as if in the center, which force is as if freedom alone, which does not belong to the sensitive appetite.

To the final question [n.168] the answer is clear from the above. Because, if enjoying proper be denied of sensitive appetite, which however more agrees with the will of which there is enjoyment than natural appetite does, because the act of the sensitive appetite follows an act of knowing, just as the act of will – not so, however, the act of natural appetite, if there is any act of it – it follows that enjoyment proper does not belong to what has only natural appetite, indeed not even as abusively as it agrees with sense appetite.

To the arguments. To the argument of the first question [n.159] I say just as was said in the first question of this distinction in the fourth article [n.17], that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable, but the idea of the absolute good is to which the idea of end belongs. Although, therefore, God is not the end of himself, yet with respect to his will he is that absolute object to which naturally belongs the idea of end, because he is the supreme good; but the idea of end cannot belong to him with respect to himself (just as neither is he the end with respect to himself) but with respect to all enjoyable things, of which sort are all the goods that can be ordered to another. If the objection be raised how God then is said to act for an end, and also that a superior agent has a superior end, I reply: with respect to nothing is there any final cause unless with respect to it there is an efficient cause, because the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act; God then, not being something that can be effected, has no final cause. But that first common saying [God acts for an end] must be understood to mean that he acts for the end of the effect; but not for the end of himself, because he is not an agent of himself. Likewise the second common saying [a superior agent has a superior end] must be understood of the end of the effect, because a superior agent orders, not himself, but his effect to a more universal end; and so the superior end is the agent’s, not as his end, but as that to which he orders what he does.

To the argument of the second question [n.161] I say that, besides the act of desire which is with respect to something not possessed, by which the just wayfarer desires God for himself with an act of concupiscence, the just wayfarer has another act of friendship, by wanting well being for God in himself, and this act of friendship is enjoyment, but not the act which is of desire; and this second act is properly the act of charity, but not the first, which is the act of desiring, as will be said in 3 Suppl. d.26 q. un n.17. The major then is false.

To the first argument of the third question [n.163] an exposition of the minor can be given, because what adheres to a movable thing does not rest simply, although as far as depends on its own part it makes itself rest in it, and so the conclusion is to be conceded, because the mortal sinner does not simply rest, although as far as depends on his own part, by his own act of ultimate rest, he rests himself in a movable thing. If it be added that nothing enjoys a thing unless it rest simply in that thing, this must be denied, but one must add: ‘unless it be at rest as far as depends on the part of the act itself,’ namely the act by which he adheres to the object; and also: ‘as far as depends on the part of the object’, in ordered enjoyment. Nor ought supreme rest to be understood here, because to all rest on the way there follows the greater rest of the fatherland, but because of an act accepting the object not referable to another.

As to the second [n.164], the major can be denied, because although by ordered love no one enjoys anything save what he does not wish anyone to use but to enjoy, yet with disordered love someone can well enjoy what he does not wish another to enjoy but only to use, or to love it in no way, as is evident about inordinate jealousy. – To the proof of the major one can say that although the enjoyer values the enjoyable as the supreme good, yet he does not wish it to be thus valued by everyone when he is enjoying it inordinately; therefore the conclusion does not follow: ‘he wishes it to be the supreme good or he loves it as the supreme good, therefore he wishes others thus to love it’. One can reply in another way by denying the minor. – To the proof, when it is said ‘he wishes the enjoyable to be, therefore he wishes it to be from God’, the conclusion does not follow. Nor does this follow either: ‘he wishes it to be from God, therefore he wishes God to use the act’. And the cause of the defect of each consequence is because he who wills the antecedent need not will the consequent when the consequent is not per se included in the antecedent but only follows through an extrinsic topic. So it is in the proposed case.

As to the authority of Augustine for the fourth question [n.166], it is clear that his authority is to be expounded of abusive enjoyment, or by extending the term enjoyment, because the sensitive appetite does not refer by understanding negatively, nor by contrariety, because it does not inhere in the object as something that cannot be referred, because, although the thing cannot be referred by it, this belongs to its natural impotency, not the goodness objectively or in the acceptation of the power. About the difference between these, namely not being referred negatively, by contrariety, and by privation, there will be discussion at 2 d.41 q. un n.3.

As to the argument of the final question [n.168], it is plain that although natural appetite inhere to something for its own sake negatively, not however by contrariety for the most part, and if sometimes by contrariety, yet it does not inhere by love; nor does it properly inhere either, but by itself giving the nature it is fixed as it were in the object itself, not indeed by an elicited act other than nature, as is the case with even the sensitive appetite, but by habitual inclination of nature. Hence as was said [n.181], enjoyment belongs less to it than to the sensitive appetite which by an elicited act inheres as to an object now known, though not freely; but natural appetite is perpetually inclined without any cognition. From what has been said about enjoying, and especially in the third question of this distinction (namely ‘whether enjoying be an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight’ [nn.62-76]), use can be made plain, which is a more imperfect act of the will ordered to enjoying as to a more perfect act of the same power.