Ordinatio

Name: Ordinatio
Author: John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

About the second part of this distinction a question is raised first whether, along with the unity of the divine essence, there can be a plurality of persons. That there cannot be: Because all things that simply with one and the same thing are simply the same are altogether the same among themselves. And ‘simply’ is added because if they are the same as the same not simply but in a certain respect, or if they are simply the same as the same only in a certain respect, they need not be simply the same among themselves. But the divine persons are simply and altogether the same as the divine essence, which in itself is altogether and simply the same; therefore etc. The major is plain because every syllogistic form holds on the basis of it, and this of the perfect syllogism [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.4.25b32-35]; it is evident of itself, because in the premises the extreme terms are known to be conjoined in the middle term, and from this only is concluded the identity of the extremes with each other in the conclusion; also because the opposite of the predicate destroys the subject, because if they are not the same as each other, they are not simply the same in a third. The minor too is plain, that the essence itself is simply the same, for it is whatever it has because of its supreme simplicity, according to the Master of the Sentences I d.8 ch.8, and Augustine City of God XI ch.10 n.1.
Again, essential and accidental divide the whole of being. So whatever is in something is the same as it either essentially or accidentally. But what distinguishes the persons is not an accident of the essence (because nothing is an accident of itself), therefore it is essential; therefore it is the same as it essentially. But when what is essentially the same as the essence is multiplied the essence is multiplied; therefore if there are several persons there are several essences.
Again, nothing is to be posited in beings – and especially not in the highest good – such that when it is not posited nothing of perfection is lacking to the universe; but if some divine person does not exist in the divine essence, nothing of perfection is lacking to the universe; therefore a plurality of such things is not to be posited in God. Proof of the minor: if the second person did not exist, whatever perfection is posited in it would exist in the first person; also, no perfection would be lacking to the universe if the second person did not exist, because whatever of perfection exists simply in one person exists also in another. Therefore when one person is removed and another remains, nothing of perfection is taken from the universe.
You say it is not the case under every mode that ‘whatever of perfection is in one is also in another’. On the contrary, that mode of having or of being is either a perfection or not a perfection. If it is it will exist in God, and consequently the first person, which will not have that mode, will not be simply perfect. If it is not then the argument stands that, when the second person does not exist, the whole of his perfection remains in the first; therefore nothing of perfection will perish from the universe with the second person removed.
Again, that there be several necessary beings includes a contradiction, because if there are several necessary beings I ask by what are they formally distinguished? Let these be a and b. Either then these ideas by which they are distinguished are necessary beings and necessities of being, and then there will be two necessary beings; also they agree in necessary being and consequently they are not distinguished by necessary being. Or if those ideas are possible, then the things distinguished by them are not necessary beings [n.177].
To the opposite: That is possible which does not include a contradiction. But there is no contradiction included in there being one essence in three persons, because contradiction is according to the same respect. But here there is no contradiction according to the same respect, because here there is unity of essence and plurality of relative supposits, therefore etc.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy