Ordinatio

[The opinion of others] – In¹ this question the conclusion is certain. But some say that this conclusion is not demonstrable but only accepted on faith; and for this there follows the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides], Guide of the Perplexed I ch.75: “the unity of God is received from the Law.”

This is also argued by reason, because if it could be known by natural reason that God is one, then it could be known that God is a singular naturally; therefore the singularity of God and his essence as singular could be known, which is false, and the contrary was said before in the question about the subject of theology [Prol. nn.167-168].

[Scotus’ own opinion] – However it seems that the unity could be shown by natural reason, and this by taking up the way, first, from infinite intellect, second from infinite will, third from infinite goodness, fourth from the idea of infinite power, fifth from the idea of the infinite absolutely, sixth from the idea of necessary being, seventh from the idea of omnipotence.

[First way, from infinite intellect] – On the part of infinite intellect the argument is first as follows: an infinite intellect knows most perfectly any intelligible whatever insofar as it is intelligible in itself;² therefore, if there are Gods – let them be a and b – a knows b most perfectly, namely insofar as b is knowable. But this is impossible. The proof is that either it knows b through the essence of b or it does not. If it does not and b is knowable through its essence, then a does not know b most perfectly and insofar, that is, as it is knowable. For nothing knowable through its essence is most perfectly known unless it is known through its essence, or through something more perfect that includes its own essence which it is in itself; but the essence of b is included in nothing more perfectly than in b, because then b would not be God. But if a knows b through the essence of b itself, then the act of a itself is naturally posterior to the essence of b itself, and so a will not be God. Now the proof that the act of a itself is posterior to b itself is because every act of knowing which is not the same as the object is posterior to the object; for an act is neither prior to nor simultaneous in nature with anything other than the act, because then the act might be understood without the object, just as conversely.

If it be said that a understands b by the essence of a itself, which is most similar to b itself, namely in this way, that a understands b in the idea of a species common to a itself and to b itself, on the contrary: neither response saves the fact that a understand b most perfectly, and consequently a is not God, because the knowledge of something in a likeness only and universally is not a knowledge most perfect and intuitive of that thing, and so a would not know b intuitively nor most perfectly, which is the conclusion intended.

The argument second on the part of the intellect is as follows: the same act cannot have two adequate objects; a is the adequate object of its own intellection, and b would be the adequate object of the same intellection if a could understand b; therefore it is impossible that a understand in a single intellection perfectly all at once both a and b. If a have intellections that are really distinct, then it is not God.³ The major is plain, because otherwise the act would be adequated to an object which, when removed, the act would no less be at rest and adequate, and so such an object would be in vain.

[The second way, from infinite will] – As to the second way the argument is as follows: an infinite will is a right will, therefore it loves whatever is lovable insofar as it is lovable; if b is another God it is to be loved infinitely (since⁴ it is an infinite good) and to be loved infinitely by a will that is able thus to love it; therefore the will a loves b infinitely. But this is impossible because a naturally loves itself more than b. Proof: for anything whatever naturally loves its own being more than the being of something else of which it is not a part or an effect; but a is nothing of b whether as a part or as an effect; therefore a naturally loves itself more than it loves b. But a free will, when it is right, is in conformity with natural will, otherwise natural will would not always be right; therefore if a has this right will it loves itself with an elicited act more than it loves b; therefore it does not love b infinitely.

A second argument about will is as follows: a either enjoys b or uses it; if it uses it then a has a disordered will; if it enjoys b and enjoys a then a is blessed in two objects neither of which depends on the other, because just as a is blessed in itself, so also in b. But the consequent is impossible, because nothing can be actually blessed in two total beatifying objects; the proof is because, when either is destroyed, it would nevertheless be blessed; therefore it is blessed in neither.⁵

[Third way, from infinite goodness] – About the third way, namely about the idea of infinite good, the argument is as follows: the will can in an ordered way desire a greater good and love more a greater good; but several infinite goods, if they were possible, include more goodness than one infinite good; therefore the will could in an ordered way love several infinites more than one infinite, and consequently it would not rest in any single infinite good. But this is contrary to the idea of good – that it be infinite and not give rest to any will whatever.

[The fourth way, from infinite power] – As to the fourth way, about infinite power, I argue thus: there cannot be two total causes of the same effect in the same order of cause [n.73]; but infinite power is the total cause, in idea of first cause, with respect to any effect, so there can be no other power in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, and so no other cause infinite in power.

The proof of the first proposition is because then it would be possible for something to be the cause of something on which [the latter] would not depend. Proof: on no thing does something essentially depend that, when the thing does not exist, would no less exist; but if c has two total causes, a and b, and in the same order, then, when one of two does not exist, c would no less exist on the other, because when a does not exist c no less exists on b, and when b does not exist c exists no less on a.

Next to this is an argument about the unity of any first thing in any of the aforesaid primacies [n.41]; for nothing is exceeded by two first exceeding things, or no finite thing is essentially ordered to two first ends; for there would be something in relation to an end such that, when the end did not exist, it would no less have an end, as was argued before [nn.173, 73], and it would be essentially exceeded by something such that, when that thing did not exist, it would no less have an essential exceeder by which it would be essentially measured, and from which it would essentially receive its perfection, which is impossible; therefore it is impossible for there to be two first ends of any two finite things, or two first eminents of two exceeded things.

[The fifth way, from the infinite absolutely] – About the fifth way I say that an infinite cannot be exceeded, and I argue as follows: whatever perfection can be enumerated in diverse things has more perfection in several of them than in one, as is said in On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2; therefore the infinite cannot at all be enumerated in many things.

[The sixth way, from necessary being] – About the sixth way I argue first thus: a species that can be multiplied, namely in individuals, is not of itself determined to a definite number of individuals but, as far as concerns itself, it allows of an infinity of individuals, as is plain in all corruptible species; therefore if the idea of ‘necessary being’ is multipliable in individuals, it does not determine itself to a definite number, but, as far as concerns itself, allows of an infinity. But if there could be infinite necessary beings, there are infinite necessary beings; therefore etc. The consequent is false, therefore so too is the antecedent from which it follows.⁶

Secondly I argue thus, and according to this way: if there be several necessary beings they are distinguished by some real perfections [n.71]; let those perfections be a and b. Then as follows: either the two things distinct by a and b are formally necessary beings by a and b or they are not. If they are not then a is not the formal idea of necessarily existing, and consequently not b either; therefore also what includes them is not necessary first, because it includes some entity which is not formally the necessity of existing nor is necessary of itself. But if the two things are formally necessary beings by a and b, and if in addition to this each of them is a necessary being by that in which one of them agrees with the other, then each of them has in itself two ideas each of which is formally necessary being, but this is impossible, because neither of them includes the other; therefore each of them, when removed, would be this sort of necessary being by the other, and so something would be formally a necessary being by an idea such that, when the idea was removed, it would nevertheless be a necessary being, which is impossible [n.71].

[The seventh way, from omnipotence] – About the seventh way, namely omnipotence, it seems that it is not demonstrable by natural reason, because omnipotence – as will be plain elsewhere [n.119] – cannot be proved by natural reason in the way Catholics understand omnipotence, nor can it be proved by reason of infinite power.

Yet from omnipotence believed the intended proposition may be argued for in this way: if a is omnipotent then it can cause the being and not being in the case of anything else, and so it could destroy b, and so might make b capable of nothing, and so it follows that b is not God.

This reasoning is not valid as some reply to it, because b is not an object of omnipotence since omnipotence has regard to the possible for its object; but b was posited as necessary [n.177] just like a. Therefore one argues in another way by thus declaring the reasoning of Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity I ch.25:⁷ just as the omnipotent by its willing can produce whatever is possible, so by its non-willing it can impede or destroy anything possible; but if a is omnipotent it can will everything other than itself to exist, and so by its willing them to bring them into existence. But it is not necessary that b will all the things that a wills, because the will of b is contingently related to them, just as the will of a is to the things that b wills, if it is God [n.156]. But if b does not will them to be, then none of them is. Therefore if there are two omnipotents, each of them would make the other impotent, not by destroying it, but by preventing by its non-willing the being of the things willed by the other.

But if you say, by playing the sophist as it were, that they may agree in their will, although there is no necessity [n.180], but they would as it were make a pact, still I argue that neither of them will be omnipotent; for if a is omnipotent it can produce by its willing any producible willed thing other than itself; from this it follows that b will be able to produce nothing by its own willing, and so is not omnipotent. Now that this follows is plain from the fourth way [n.172], because it is impossible for there to be two total causes of one effect, because from the fact that it is totally caused by one, it is impossible that it be caused by the other.⁸