Ordinatio

I ask whether there is only one God. Argument that there is not: I Corinthians 8.5: “As there be gods many and lords many.”

Again thus: God is; therefore Gods are. The proof of the consequence is that singular and plural indicate the same thing although they differ in mode of signification; therefore they include the same predicate taken proportionally. Therefore as the singular includes the singular predicate so the plural includes the plural.¹ Proof in a second way is that just as God is that than which a greater cannot be thought [n.11], so Gods are that than which greaters cannot be thought; but things than which greaters cannot be thought exist in fact, as it seems, because if they did not exist in fact greaters than them could be thought; therefore etc.

In addition, every real being by participation is reduced to something such by essence; created individuals in any species are real by participation, otherwise they would not be many; therefore they are reduced to something such by essence; therefore there is some man, some ox by essence, etc. But whatever is by essence and not by participation is God; therefore etc.

Again, more goods are better than fewer; but whatever is better should be posited in the universe; therefore etc.

Again, anything that, if it is, is a necessary being is simply a necessary being; but another God, if he is, is a necessary being; therefore etc. Proof of the major: grant the opposite of the predicate, ‘he is not a necessary being simply’, and the opposite of the subject follows, namely that, if he is, he is a possible being and a non-necessary being. Response: the opposite of the subject should be inferred in this way, ‘he is not a necessary being if he exists’, where let the relation between antecedent and consequent be denied.

To the contrary: Deuteronomy 6.4: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God;” and Isaiah 45.5: “Beside me there is no God.”²

[The opinion of others] – In¹ this question the conclusion is certain. But some say that this conclusion is not demonstrable but only accepted on faith; and for this there follows the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides], Guide of the Perplexed I ch.75: “the unity of God is received from the Law.”

This is also argued by reason, because if it could be known by natural reason that God is one, then it could be known that God is a singular naturally; therefore the singularity of God and his essence as singular could be known, which is false, and the contrary was said before in the question about the subject of theology [Prol. nn.167-168].

[Scotus’ own opinion] – However it seems that the unity could be shown by natural reason, and this by taking up the way, first, from infinite intellect, second from infinite will, third from infinite goodness, fourth from the idea of infinite power, fifth from the idea of the infinite absolutely, sixth from the idea of necessary being, seventh from the idea of omnipotence.

[First way, from infinite intellect] – On the part of infinite intellect the argument is first as follows: an infinite intellect knows most perfectly any intelligible whatever insofar as it is intelligible in itself;² therefore, if there are Gods – let them be a and b – a knows b most perfectly, namely insofar as b is knowable. But this is impossible. The proof is that either it knows b through the essence of b or it does not. If it does not and b is knowable through its essence, then a does not know b most perfectly and insofar, that is, as it is knowable. For nothing knowable through its essence is most perfectly known unless it is known through its essence, or through something more perfect that includes its own essence which it is in itself; but the essence of b is included in nothing more perfectly than in b, because then b would not be God. But if a knows b through the essence of b itself, then the act of a itself is naturally posterior to the essence of b itself, and so a will not be God. Now the proof that the act of a itself is posterior to b itself is because every act of knowing which is not the same as the object is posterior to the object; for an act is neither prior to nor simultaneous in nature with anything other than the act, because then the act might be understood without the object, just as conversely.

If it be said that a understands b by the essence of a itself, which is most similar to b itself, namely in this way, that a understands b in the idea of a species common to a itself and to b itself, on the contrary: neither response saves the fact that a understand b most perfectly, and consequently a is not God, because the knowledge of something in a likeness only and universally is not a knowledge most perfect and intuitive of that thing, and so a would not know b intuitively nor most perfectly, which is the conclusion intended.

The argument second on the part of the intellect is as follows: the same act cannot have two adequate objects; a is the adequate object of its own intellection, and b would be the adequate object of the same intellection if a could understand b; therefore it is impossible that a understand in a single intellection perfectly all at once both a and b. If a have intellections that are really distinct, then it is not God.³ The major is plain, because otherwise the act would be adequated to an object which, when removed, the act would no less be at rest and adequate, and so such an object would be in vain.

[The second way, from infinite will] – As to the second way the argument is as follows: an infinite will is a right will, therefore it loves whatever is lovable insofar as it is lovable; if b is another God it is to be loved infinitely (since⁴ it is an infinite good) and to be loved infinitely by a will that is able thus to love it; therefore the will a loves b infinitely. But this is impossible because a naturally loves itself more than b. Proof: for anything whatever naturally loves its own being more than the being of something else of which it is not a part or an effect; but a is nothing of b whether as a part or as an effect; therefore a naturally loves itself more than it loves b. But a free will, when it is right, is in conformity with natural will, otherwise natural will would not always be right; therefore if a has this right will it loves itself with an elicited act more than it loves b; therefore it does not love b infinitely.

A second argument about will is as follows: a either enjoys b or uses it; if it uses it then a has a disordered will; if it enjoys b and enjoys a then a is blessed in two objects neither of which depends on the other, because just as a is blessed in itself, so also in b. But the consequent is impossible, because nothing can be actually blessed in two total beatifying objects; the proof is because, when either is destroyed, it would nevertheless be blessed; therefore it is blessed in neither.⁵

[Third way, from infinite goodness] – About the third way, namely about the idea of infinite good, the argument is as follows: the will can in an ordered way desire a greater good and love more a greater good; but several infinite goods, if they were possible, include more goodness than one infinite good; therefore the will could in an ordered way love several infinites more than one infinite, and consequently it would not rest in any single infinite good. But this is contrary to the idea of good – that it be infinite and not give rest to any will whatever.

[The fourth way, from infinite power] – As to the fourth way, about infinite power, I argue thus: there cannot be two total causes of the same effect in the same order of cause [n.73]; but infinite power is the total cause, in idea of first cause, with respect to any effect, so there can be no other power in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, and so no other cause infinite in power.

The proof of the first proposition is because then it would be possible for something to be the cause of something on which [the latter] would not depend. Proof: on no thing does something essentially depend that, when the thing does not exist, would no less exist; but if c has two total causes, a and b, and in the same order, then, when one of two does not exist, c would no less exist on the other, because when a does not exist c no less exists on b, and when b does not exist c exists no less on a.

Next to this is an argument about the unity of any first thing in any of the aforesaid primacies [n.41]; for nothing is exceeded by two first exceeding things, or no finite thing is essentially ordered to two first ends; for there would be something in relation to an end such that, when the end did not exist, it would no less have an end, as was argued before [nn.173, 73], and it would be essentially exceeded by something such that, when that thing did not exist, it would no less have an essential exceeder by which it would be essentially measured, and from which it would essentially receive its perfection, which is impossible; therefore it is impossible for there to be two first ends of any two finite things, or two first eminents of two exceeded things.

[The fifth way, from the infinite absolutely] – About the fifth way I say that an infinite cannot be exceeded, and I argue as follows: whatever perfection can be enumerated in diverse things has more perfection in several of them than in one, as is said in On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2; therefore the infinite cannot at all be enumerated in many things.

[The sixth way, from necessary being] – About the sixth way I argue first thus: a species that can be multiplied, namely in individuals, is not of itself determined to a definite number of individuals but, as far as concerns itself, it allows of an infinity of individuals, as is plain in all corruptible species; therefore if the idea of ‘necessary being’ is multipliable in individuals, it does not determine itself to a definite number, but, as far as concerns itself, allows of an infinity. But if there could be infinite necessary beings, there are infinite necessary beings; therefore etc. The consequent is false, therefore so too is the antecedent from which it follows.⁶

Secondly I argue thus, and according to this way: if there be several necessary beings they are distinguished by some real perfections [n.71]; let those perfections be a and b. Then as follows: either the two things distinct by a and b are formally necessary beings by a and b or they are not. If they are not then a is not the formal idea of necessarily existing, and consequently not b either; therefore also what includes them is not necessary first, because it includes some entity which is not formally the necessity of existing nor is necessary of itself. But if the two things are formally necessary beings by a and b, and if in addition to this each of them is a necessary being by that in which one of them agrees with the other, then each of them has in itself two ideas each of which is formally necessary being, but this is impossible, because neither of them includes the other; therefore each of them, when removed, would be this sort of necessary being by the other, and so something would be formally a necessary being by an idea such that, when the idea was removed, it would nevertheless be a necessary being, which is impossible [n.71].

[The seventh way, from omnipotence] – About the seventh way, namely omnipotence, it seems that it is not demonstrable by natural reason, because omnipotence – as will be plain elsewhere [n.119] – cannot be proved by natural reason in the way Catholics understand omnipotence, nor can it be proved by reason of infinite power.

Yet from omnipotence believed the intended proposition may be argued for in this way: if a is omnipotent then it can cause the being and not being in the case of anything else, and so it could destroy b, and so might make b capable of nothing, and so it follows that b is not God.

This reasoning is not valid as some reply to it, because b is not an object of omnipotence since omnipotence has regard to the possible for its object; but b was posited as necessary [n.177] just like a. Therefore one argues in another way by thus declaring the reasoning of Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity I ch.25:⁷ just as the omnipotent by its willing can produce whatever is possible, so by its non-willing it can impede or destroy anything possible; but if a is omnipotent it can will everything other than itself to exist, and so by its willing them to bring them into existence. But it is not necessary that b will all the things that a wills, because the will of b is contingently related to them, just as the will of a is to the things that b wills, if it is God [n.156]. But if b does not will them to be, then none of them is. Therefore if there are two omnipotents, each of them would make the other impotent, not by destroying it, but by preventing by its non-willing the being of the things willed by the other.

But if you say, by playing the sophist as it were, that they may agree in their will, although there is no necessity [n.180], but they would as it were make a pact, still I argue that neither of them will be omnipotent; for if a is omnipotent it can produce by its willing any producible willed thing other than itself; from this it follows that b will be able to produce nothing by its own willing, and so is not omnipotent. Now that this follows is plain from the fourth way [n.172], because it is impossible for there to be two total causes of one effect, because from the fact that it is totally caused by one, it is impossible that it be caused by the other.⁸

To the arguments [nn.163-164, 157-160] – For first to those that are for the other opinion. I reply to the authority of Rabbi Moses [n.163] and I say that God’s being one is handed down in the Law; for because the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry, therefore they needed to be instructed by the Law about the unity of God, although it could by natural reason be demonstrated. For it is also thus received from the Law that God exists (Exodus 3.14: “I am who am”, and the Apostle says in Hebrews 11.6: that “he who comes to God must believe that he is”), and yet it is not denied that God is demonstrable; therefore by parity of reasoning it should not be denied either that it could be demonstrated by reason that God is one, although it be ‘received’ from the Law. Also, it is useful for things which can be demonstrated to be handed down to the community also by way of authority – both because of the negligence of the community in inquiring into truth, and also because of the impotence of intellect and the errors of those who make inquiry by demonstration, because they mix many false things in with their truths, as Augustine says in The City of God XVIII ch.41 n.2. And therefore, because the simple who follow such demonstrators could be in doubt as to what to assent to, so an authority is a safe and stable and common way about the things it can neither deceive nor be deceived about.

To the second reason about the singular [n.164] I say that it is one thing for singularity to be conceived either as an object or as part of an object, and another thing for singularity to be precisely the mode of conceiving or that under which the object is conceived. An example: when I say ‘universal’, the object conceived is a plurality, but the mode of conceiving, that is, the mode under which it is conceived, is singularity; thus in the case of logical intentions, when I say ‘singular’, what is conceived is singularity, but the mode under which it is conceived is universality, because what is conceived, as it is conceived, is indifferent to many things. Thus I say in the proposed case that the divine essence can be conceived as singular such that singularity is conceived either as the object or part of the object; yet it does not follow that the essence can be known as it is singular, such that singularity be the mode of the concept; for thus to know something as singular is to know it as this, as a white thing is seen as this, and in this way it was said before [n.164] that the divine essence is not known under the idea of singularity; and therefore there is in the argument a fallacy of figure of speech [Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1.4.166b10-14], by changing thing to mode.

To the principal reasons [nn.157-160]. – I say that the Apostle [n.157] is speaking of idols, and so of ‘gods’ in name only; and he adds there: “but for us there is one God,” because “all the gods of the Gentiles are demons.”

I say to the second [n.158] that the consequence is not valid, because number is not the sort of grammatical mode of signifying as are other grammatical modes that state precisely a mode of conceiving a thing without any reality corresponding to that sort of mode of conceiving; hence they state precisely some aspect in a thing by which the intellect can be moved to conceive such a thing.¹ But number truly includes the thing subtracted; hence the inference follows ‘men are running, therefore several men are running’. But it is not so in the case of the other co-signified things of a noun or a verb, because this inference does not follow ‘God exists, therefore God is masculine’² [in Latin the word for ‘God’ is a masculine noun], because it suffices for the masculine that there is something in the thing from which this mode of conceiving could be taken, to wit activity. I say therefore that only ‘Gods’ conceived in the plural mode includes a contradiction, because the mode of conceiving is repugnant to that which is conceived under the mode. – When therefore the consequence is proved because the same thing includes the singular and plural [n.158], I say that the singular includes it under a mode of conceiving fitting the concept but the plural includes it under a mode impossible to that concept; and therefore the singular, insofar as it includes the concept and the mode of conceiving, includes an idea that is as it were in itself true, but the plural, insofar as it includes these two things, includes an idea that is as it were in itself false. And so it does not follow that the plural is true of a plural as the singular is of a singular, because about that whose idea is in itself false nothing is true [n.30].

Through this is plain the response to the other proof ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [n.158] because Gods are not thinkable without contradiction, because the mode is repugnant to the thing conceived; and therefore the major is to be glossed as was said before in the preceding question [n.137]. Now for sense and truth it is required that the idea of the subject does not include a contradiction, as was said in the second question of this distinction [n.30].

To the third [n.159] I say that the major proposition is not the first but is reduced to this ‘everything imperfect is reduced to the perfect’; and because every being by participation is imperfect, and only that being is perfect which is a being by essence, therefore does that proposition follow.³ But this major about ‘the imperfect’ has to be distinguished in this way: something is imperfect according to a perfection simply that does not necessarily have an accompanying imperfection, because it does not include in itself a limitation, as ‘this good’, ‘this true’, ‘this being’; and an imperfect of this sort is reduced to a perfect of the same nature, namely ‘good’, ‘being’, and ‘true’, which import perfections simply. But something is imperfect according to a perfection non-simply that of its idea includes a limitation, and so it necessarily has an annexed imperfection, as ‘this man’, ‘this ass’; and imperfects of this sort are not reduced to a perfect by essence absolutely of the same idea as to specific idea, because it still includes imperfection because it includes limitation, but they are reduced to a first perfect that contains them super-eminently and equivocally. What is imperfect then in the first way is reduced to a perfect simply according to a perfection of the same nature, because something can according to that nature be simply perfect. But what is imperfect in the second way is not reduced to something perfect according to a perfection of the same idea; for because that idea includes imperfection, therefore it cannot be a perfect thing simply, because of the limitation, but it is reduced to something simply equivocal perfect, eminently including that perfection. And for this reason an imperfect good is reduced to a perfect good, but a stone, which is imperfect, is not reduced to a simply perfect stone, but to supreme being and to supreme good, which include that perfection virtually [n.69].

To the final one [160] the response is that many finite goods are better than fewer finite goods, but many infinite goods are not.

But this does not seem to respond to the argument, because all things that would be better if they existed should be posited in beings, and most of all in the supreme being, which is a ‘necessary being’, because there whatever could exist is good and must necessarily be there; but many infinite goods, if they existed, would be better; therefore it seems that many infinite goods should be posited in the nature of the supreme good.

To this I reply that when it is said in the major ‘things which would be better if they existed should be posited there’, I say that by the ‘if’ either a possible positing is implied or a positing of incompossibles is. If in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false, because the implication in the minor is not possible but is of incompossibles. But if the ‘if’ implies a positing of incompossibles then the minor is true and the major false; for things that would only be better from a positing of incompossibles would not be better, nor are they even good, just as that which only exists from the positing of incompossibles altogether does not exist, just as neither does the posited thing on which it depends.