Ordinatio

To the arguments of this question. To the first [n.1] I say that an infinite cause, active by necessity of nature, does not suffer anything contrary to it, whether something be contrary to it formally, that is, according as something agrees with it essentially, or virtually, that is, according to the idea of its effect which it virtually includes. For in each way it would impede whatever was incompossible with its effect, as was argued before [n.3].¹

On the contrary: is it really the case that the philosophers, when positing that God acts from necessity of nature, did not posit that there was anything bad in the universe? I reply: as was made evident in the proof that God is an agent through knowledge [n.86], the philosophers could not save the idea that something evil can happen contingently in the universe, but only that one order of courses would produce something that was receptive of a perfection, while another order would of necessity produce the opposite of that perfection; such that this perfection could not then be induced when all the causes come together, although absolutely a thing produced by some of the causes, when considered according to the idea of its species, would be receptive of the perfection whose opposite necessarily comes about.² But what the philosophers can say about our free choice and about badness of morals must be discussed elsewhere.

To the second [n.4] I say that the consequence is not valid. For proof of the consequence I say that there is not a like incompossibility of dimensions in filling up a place and of essences in existing simultaneously. For a single entity does not so fill up the whole nature of being that no other entity can stand along with it (but this must not be understood of spatial filling up but of, as it were, essential commensuration), but one dimension fills up the same place according to the utmost of its capacity. Therefore one entity can exist at the same time along with another, just as, in respect of place, there could exist along with a body filling the place another body not filling the place. Likewise the other consequence [n.4] is not valid, because an infinite body, if it existed along with another body, would become a greater whole than either by reason of dimensions, because the dimensions of the second body would be different from the dimensions of the infinite body, and of the same nature as them; and therefore the whole would be greater because of the diversity of dimensions, and the whole would not be greater because an infinite dimension cannot be exceeded. Here, however, the whole quantity of infinite perfection receives, in the idea of such quantity, no addition from the coexistence of another thing finite in such quantity.

To the third [n.5] I say that the consequence is not valid unless that which is pointed to in the antecedent, from which other things are separate, is finite. An example: if there were, per impossibile, some infinite ‘where’, and an infinite body were to fill up that ‘where’, it would not follow that ‘this body is here such that it is not elsewhere, therefore it is finite according to where’, because the ‘here’ points only to something infinite; so, according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time were infinite, it does not follow that ‘this motion is in this time and not in another time, therefore it is finite according to time’. So, as to the intended proposition, it would be necessary to prove that what is pointed to by the ‘here’ is finite; but if it is assumed, the conclusion is being begged in the premises.

To the final one [n.6] I say that the Philosopher infers that ‘it is moved in non-time’ from this antecedent, that ‘infinite power exists in a magnitude’, and he understands ‘it is moved’ properly in the consequent, in the way motion is distinguished from mutation; and in this way the consequent involves a contradiction, and the antecedent too, according to him.³ But how the consequence hold I make clear in this way: if a power is infinite and acts from necessity of nature, therefore it acts in non-time. For, if it acts in time, let it be a. And let some other virtue be taken, a finite one, which acts in a finite time; let it be b. And let the finite virtue which is b be increased according to the proportion which b has to a, to wit, if b is a hundred or a thousand times a, let a hundred or a thousand times virtue be taken for that given finite virtue. Therefore the virtue so increased will move in the time a, and so that virtue and the infinite one will move in an equal time, which is impossible if an infinite virtue moves according to the utmost of its power and necessarily.

From this, then, that the virtue is infinite it follows that, if it act of necessity, it does not act in time; but from this, that in the antecedent is posited what exists in a magnitude [n.152], it follows that, if it act on a body, it properly moves that body, which speaks of virtue extensive⁴ per accidens. But such virtue, if it were to act about a body, would have the parts of such a body at different distances with respect to it, to wit, one part of the body closer and another part further away; it also has some resistance in the body on which it acts; which two causes, namely resistance and the diverse approximation of the parts of the moveable thing to the mover, make there to be succession in the motion and make the body to be properly moved. Therefore from the fact that in the antecedent the virtue is placed in a magnitude, it follows that it will properly move. And so by joining the two things together, namely that it is infinite and that it is in a magnitude, it follows that it will move properly in non-time, which is a contradiction.

But that does not follow of an infinite virtue which is not in a magnitude; for although it act in a non-time if it acts necessarily, because this is consequent to infinity, yet it will not properly move, because it will not have in the thing it acts on those two ideas of succession [n.153]. The Philosopher, therefore, does not intend that an infinite power properly move in non-time, in the way the argument proceeds [n.6], but that an infinite power in a magnitude properly move and in non-time [n.152], which are contradictories; and from this it follows that such an antecedent involves contradictories, namely that an infinite virtue exist in a magnitude.

But in that case there is a doubt. Since he posits a motive power that is infinite and naturally acting, it seems to follow that it would necessarily act in non-time although it would not move in non-time, rather then will nothing move another thing, properly speaking; and that this follows is plain, because the thing was proved before through the idea of an infinite power acting necessarily [nn.152-153].

Averroes replies, Metaphysics 12 com.41, that in addition to the first mover which is of infinite power there is required a conjoint mover of finite power, such that from the first mover there is infinite motion and from the second there is succession, because there could not otherwise be succession unless the finite thing acted along with it, because if the infinite thing alone acted it would act in non-time. This is refuted later in I d.8 [p.2 q. un nn.3, 8-20], where argument on this point is made against the philosophers, who posit that the first thing does of necessity whatever it does immediately. But the argument is not difficult for Christians, who say that God acts contingently; for they can easily reply that, although an infinite power acting necessarily do according to the utmost of itself, and so in non-time, whatever it immediately does, yet not an infinite virtue acting contingently and freely; for just as it is in its power to act or not to act, so it is in its power to act in time or to act in non-time; and so it is easy to save the fact that the first thing moves a body in time although it be of infinite power, because it does not act necessarily, nor according to the utmost of its power, namely as much as it could act, nor in as brief a time as it could act.