Ordinatio

In the first principal article I will principally show three things. First then I will show that there is something in effect among beings which is simply first¹ in efficient causality, and that there is something which is simply first in idea of end, and something which is simply first in eminence; second I show that that which is first in one idea of primacy is first also in the other primacies; and third I show that that triple primacy belongs to one nature alone such that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity. And so in the first principal article there will be three partial articles.

[First partial article] – The first article among them includes three principal conclusions, through a triple primacy; and each of the three conclusions has three conclusions on which it depends: the first is that something is first, the second is that that thing cannot be caused, the third is that that thing actually exists among beings. And so in the first article there are nine conclusions, but three principal ones.

Now the first conclusion of these nine is this, that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor does it by virtue of something other than itself cause an effect. The proof is because some being can be an effect. An effect of itself, then, or of nothing, or of something else. Not of nothing, because that which is nothing is cause of nothing; nor of itself, because there is nothing that makes or generates itself, Augustine On the Trinity 1 ch.1 n.1; therefore of something else. Let that something else be a. If a is first in the way expounded [n.43 init.], I have what was proposed; if it is not first, then it is effective secondarily, because it can be the effect of another or cause an effect by virtue of another, for if a negation is denied the affirmation is asserted.² Let that other be granted and let it be b, about which one argues as was argued about a, and thus either one proceeds ad infinitum, where each thing will be second in respect of a prior, or one stops at something that has no prior; but an infinity is impossible in ascending causes, therefore primacy is necessary, because what does not have a prior is posterior to nothing posterior to itself, for a circle in causes is unacceptable.³

Against this reasoning there is a double instance: first,⁴ that according to philosophizers an infinity in ascending causes is possible, as in the example they posit about infinite generations,⁵ where none is first but each is second, and yet they posited this without circularity.

Second, it seems that the argument proceeds from contingents and so is not a demonstration. The proof of the antecedent is that the premises assume the existence of something that is caused; everything such exists contingently.⁶

To exclude the first instance [n.44] I say that the philosophers did not posit that an infinity was possible in essentially ordered causes but only in accidentally ordered ones, as is clear from Avicenna in Metaphysics 6 ch.5 94rb-va, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.

And, in order to show the proposed point better, one must know that there are causes essentially ordered and accidentally ordered. Here one must note that it is one thing to speak of causes per se and per accidens, and another to speak of causes per se or essentially and accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only comparison of one thing with one thing, namely of the cause with the thing caused; and a cause per se is one that causes according to its proper nature and not according to something accidental to it,⁷ and a cause per accidens the converse;⁸ in the second case the comparison is of two causes with each other, insofar as something is caused by them.

And causes that are per se or essentially ordered differ from causes that are per accidens or accidentally ordered in three ways.

The first difference is that in per se ordered causes the second, to the extent it causes, depends on the first, but not in a per accidens ordered cause, though it may depend in being or in something else.⁹

The second difference is that in per se ordered causes there is a causality of another idea and another order, because the superior is more perfect, but not in accidentally ordered causes; and this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends in its causing on a cause of the same idea, because in the causing of something one thing of one idea is enough.

The third difference is that all causes ordered essentially and per se are necessarily required together for the causing, otherwise some essential and per se causality would be lacking to the effect; but it is not so in accidentally ordered causes, because the simultaneity of them in causing is not required.¹⁰

From these points the proposed conclusion is shown, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. Likewise second, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes; therefore in every way an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible. Even if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible; therefore in every way there is some first thing that is necessarily and simply efficient cause. – Of these three assumed propositions let the first for brevity’s sake be called a, the second b, and the third c.

Proof of the them. First a, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. The proof is first because¹¹ a totality of essentially ordered causes is from some cause that is not any part of the totality, because then it would be cause of itself. For the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on any part of the totality.¹² Second because an infinite number of causes, namely of essentially ordered causes, would actually exist at once, from the third difference above [n.51],¹³ which no philosopher has posited. – Next, third, because the prior is what is nearer to the beginning, Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9-11; therefore where there is no beginning, nothing is essentially prior. – Next, fourth, because the superior cause is more perfect in causing, from the second difference [n.50]; therefore what is infinitely superior is infinitely more perfect, and so possessed of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently it does not cause in virtue of another, because anything such causes imperfectly, because dependent in causing on another cause. – Next, fifth, because an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection.¹⁴ But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection. Therefore independent effective causality can exist in some nature, and that nature is simply first; therefore effective causality simply first is possible. This is enough, because from this the conclusion is later [n.58] drawn that such a first effective cause, if it is possible, exists in reality. And thus by five reasons is a made plain.

Proof of b [n.52], namely that an infinity in accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes, because an accidental infinity, if posited, is not simultaneous, clearly, but only successive, as one after another, such that the second in a way flows from the prior. Yet it does not depend on it in causing; for it can cause when it does not exist just as when it does exist, as a son generates when his father is dead as when he is alive. Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend. For no deformity is perpetuated save in virtue of some permanent thing that is no part of the succession, because all the successive members of the succession are of the same idea;¹⁵ but something is essentially prior, because any part of the succession depends on it, and that in another order than on the proximate cause which is some part of the succession.¹⁶ So b is plain.

There is proof too of c [n.52], namely that if an essential order be denied, an infinity is still impossible. The proof is because, since from the first reason here adduced, namely that nothing can be from nothing [n.43], it follows that some nature is effective, if an essential order of active causes is denied then that nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be in some individual posited as caused yet in another it is not caused, which is the proposed conclusion about the nature; or, if it be in anything posited as caused, at once a contradiction is implied by denying the essential order, because no nature can be in anything posited as caused such that there be an accidental order under it without an essential order to another nature.

To the second instance posited above, which says that the reasoning proceeds of contingents and so is not a demonstration [n.43],¹⁷ I respond that one could argue thus: some nature is effected because some subject is changed, and so the term of the change begins to be in the subject, and so that term or composite is produced or effected; therefore there is some efficient thing, by the nature of correlatives, and then the first reason [n.43] can in truth be contingent, but manifest. – However, one can argue thus, by proving the first conclusion [n.43] in this way: this is true, ‘some nature is effectible, therefore some nature is effective’. The proof of the antecedent is because some subject is changeable, because some being is possible, by distinguishing the possible from the necessary [Prior Analytics 1.13.32a18-20: ‘the contingent is that which, whether it exists or not, nothing impossible follows’], and by proceeding in this way from things necessary. And then the proof of the first conclusion is about quidditative being or about possible being, but not about actual existence. But of that of which possibility is being proved now, actual existence will be proved further in the third conclusion [n.58].

The second conclusion about the first effective thing is this, that the simply first effective thing cannot be caused [n.42]. The proof is because it is a non-effectible independent effective thing. This is clear first [n.43] because, if it is causative by virtue of another or is effectible by another, then either there is a process to infinity, or a circle, or a stand at some non-effectible independent effective thing; that thing I say is first, and something else is plainly not first, from the things you have granted. Therefore there is also this further conclusion: if that first thing is non-effectible then it is un-causable, because it cannot have final, or material, or formal cause. The proof of the first consequence, namely that if it is non-effectible then it cannot have final cause, is that a final cause only causes because the cause moves metaphorically the efficient cause to causing its effect, for the entity of an end-ed thing does not in another way depend on itself as on something prior; but nothing is a cause per se save as the caused thing essentially depends on it as on something prior. – Now the two other consequences, namely that if it is non-effectible then it does not have material or formal cause, are proved together, because what does not have an extrinsic cause does not have an intrinsic cause either, because the causality of an extrinsic cause states perfection without imperfection, but the causality of an intrinsic cause necessarily states an imperfection annexed to it, because an intrinsic cause is part of the caused thing; therefore the idea of an extrinsic cause is naturally prior to the idea of an intrinsic cause. Therefore when the prior is denied so is the posterior. – The same consequences are also proved because intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic ones, either in their existence, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways, because intrinsic causes do not cause the composite by themselves without an agent. – From these statements the second conclusion is plain.

The third conclusion about the first effective thing is this: the first effective thing is actually existing and is a nature truly actually existent in the way it is effective [n.42]. The proof of this: if that to whose idea it is repugnant to be from another can exist, it can exist from itself; but it is repugnant to the idea of the simply first effective thing to be from another, as is plain from the second conclusion [n.57]; likewise too it can exist, as is plain from the first conclusion where the fifth proof for a was set down [n.53], which proof seems less to conclude and yet it concludes this. But the other proofs for the a [n.53] can be brought to bear on the existence which this third conclusion proposes, and they are about contingents, though manifest ones; or let them be taken of the nature and quiddity and possibility of a, and they proceed from necessities. Therefore a simply first effective thing can be of itself. But what is not by itself cannot be by itself, because then a non-being would bring something into being, which is impossible, and further it would then cause itself and so would not be altogether un-causable. – This last point, namely about the existence of the first effective, is made clear in another way, because for the universe to lack a possible supreme grade in its being is unacceptable.

Next to the three conclusions made clear about the first effective thing, note a certain corollary which contains as it were the three proved conclusions, namely that the first effective thing is not only prior to other things but, because a contradiction is involved in something else’s being prior, so to the extent it is first, it exists. The proof is as before [n.58]; for being uncausable is most of all included in the idea of such a first, as is proved from the second [n.57]; for if it can be (because this does not contradict its being, as proved from the first [nn.53, 56]), it follows that it can be of itself, and so it is of itself.

Next to the first three conclusions about the efficient cause I propose three similar conclusions about the final cause. Some final cause is simply first, that is, it is neither orderable to another nor is it naturally end of other things in virtue of something else. And it is proved by five reasons similar to those set down for the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.53].

The second conclusion is that the first final cause is un-causable. The proof, because it cannot have an end, otherwise it would not be first; and, further, therefore it is in-effectible. The proof of this consequence is because every per se agent acts for an end, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22, where the Philosopher intends this to hold also of nature, about which it is less evident than about an agent that acts from deliberate choice. But that of which there is no per se efficient cause is not effectible, because in no genus can the per accidens be first, as is plain in the proposed case, especially about causes acting per accidens, which are chance and fortune, which according to Aristotle, Physics 2.6.196a5-13, are necessarily reduced to causes acting per se as to things prior, namely to nature and intellect or deliberate choice. Of that therefore of which there is not any per se agent there will be no agent; but of that of which there is not an end there is not any per se agent; therefore it will be in-effectible, for what can have an end is excelled by the end in goodness and consequently in perfection, – and so on, as was proved of the first effective cause [n.57].

The third conclusion is that the first final cause is actually existent and that to some actually existing nature that primacy belongs. The proof is from the first way about efficient causality [n.58].

A corollary: it follows that the first is so first that it is impossible for there to be a prior, and this is proved like the corollary in the prior way [n.59].

To the three conclusions already posited about both orders of extrinsic causality, I propose three similar conclusions about the order of eminence. Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection. This is plain because among essences there is an essential order, for according to Aristotle forms are related like numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33; in this order there is a stand, which is proved by the five ways that are above about a stand in effective causes [n.53].

The second conclusion is that the supreme nature is uncausable. The proof is that it is unendable, from the preceding [nn.57, 62]; therefore it is uneffectible and, further, therefore uncausable. These two consequences were proved in the second conclusion about effective causes [n.57]. Again, that the supreme nature is uneffectible is proved because everything effectible has some essentially ordered cause, as is plain from the proof of b itself in the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.54]; now an essentially ordered cause excels its effect.

The third conclusion is that the supreme nature is something actually existing, and it is proved from the preceding [nn.58, 62].

Corollary: that there is some nature more eminent or superior to it involves a contradiction; it is proved as is the corollary about the efficient cause and the end [nn.59, 63].

[Second partial article] – As to the second article [n.41] I say that the first efficient cause is the ultimate end.¹⁸ The proof is because every efficient cause per se acts for an end, and a prior efficient cause for a prior end; therefore the first efficient cause for the ultimate end. But it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; therefore it acts for itself as for an end. Therefore the first efficient cause is the first end.¹⁹

Likewise, the first efficient cause is the first eminent cause. The proof is because the first efficient cause is not univocal with other effective natures, but equivocal; therefore it is more eminent and more noble than they. Therefore the first efficient cause is the most eminent.

[Third partial article] – As to the third article [n.41] I say that since that in which there is the triple primacy is the same thing, for that in which one primacy is the others are in too, there is also in it a triple identity such that the first efficient cause is only one in quiddity and in nature. To show this I show first a certain preliminary conclusion, and second the principal conclusion. Now a preliminary conclusion is that the efficient cause that is first by this triple primacy is necessarily existent of itself. The proof is because it is through and through uncausable, for there is a contradiction involved in something’s being prior to it in the genus of efficient or final cause and consequently in the genus of any cause at all; therefore it is altogether uncausable. From this I argue: nothing is able not to be unless something positively or privatively incompossible with it can be; but for that which is from itself and is through and through uncausable, there cannot be anything which is positively or privatively incompossible with it; therefore etc. The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save by what is positively or privatively incompossible with it. The proof of the minor is that that incompossible thing can either be from itself or from another; if from itself and it is from itself, then two incompossible things will be at the same time, or neither of is, because each destroys the being of the other; if from another, then to the contrary: no cause can destroy some being on account of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it give to its effect a more perfect and intense being than is the being of the other destructible thing; of no being from another is its being from its cause nobler than is the being of something necessary of itself, because every caused thing has dependent being, but what is from itself has independent being.

Further to the intended proposition, from this is proved the unity of the first nature, which is the thing principally intended in this third article. This is shown by three reasons. First in this way, because if two natures are necessarily existent they are distinguished by some real proper reasons, and let them be called a and b. The reasons are either formally necessary or not. If they are,²⁰ then each nature will be necessarily existent by two formal reasons, which is impossible, because since neither of the reasons per se includes the other, each of the natures, taken separately, would be necessarily existent.²¹ But if by the reasons by which they are distinguished neither is formally necessarily existent, then the reasons are not reasons for necessarily existing, and so neither is included in necessary existence, because whatever entity is not necessarily existent is of itself possible, but nothing possible is included in necessary existence.²²

The second proof is because there cannot be two most eminent natures in the universe; so not two first effective things either. The proof of the antecedent is because species are related as numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33, and consequently there cannot be two in the same order; therefore much less can there be two first or two most eminent natures.

This is also plain, third, by reasoning about the idea of end, because two ultimate ends, if they existed, would have two coordinate orders of beings related to them such that these beings would have no order to those, because not to their end either, for things that are ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another, because there being two total and perfect causes in the same order of the same caused thing is impossible; for then something would be in some order a per se cause that, when not posited, the caused thing would nevertheless be. Therefore things ordered to one end are in no way ordered to another end, nor consequently ordered to things that are ordered to the other end, and so from them no universe would come to be. – There is also a general confirmation of this, because there cannot be two things that are the total term of the dependence of some same thing, because then that thing would be the term of a dependence that, when it was removed, the dependence would no less have a term, and so it would not be a dependence on that thing. But other things are essentially dependent on the efficient and eminent and final cause. Therefore no two natures can be first the terms of other beings according to that triple dependence. There is therefore precisely some one nature which is the term of beings in accord with that triple dependence, and so which has this triple primacy.