Ordinatio

Because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.3.995a13-14: “it is absurd to look for knowledge and the way of knowing at the same time,” I reply first to the second question, which inquires about the way of knowing this proposition ‘God exists’. And, as to its solution, I first set down the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, and I state as follows: When a proposition is said to be self-evidently known, by the phrase ‘self-evidently’ is not excluded every cause whatever, because the terms of the proposition are not excluded; for no proposition is known when the knowledge of the terms is excluded. Therefore a self-evidently known proposition does not exclude knowledge of the terms, because we know the first principles to the extent we know the terms; but what is excluded is every cause and idea that is outside the concept of the terms of a self-evidently known proposition. A self-evidently known proposition, then, is said to be one that gets its evident truth from nothing outside the proper terms, which are part of it.¹

Further, what are those proper terms from which it must be evident? – I say that, in this regard, one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms are taken for the words that signify or for the concepts signified.²

I prove this from the Posterior Analytics 1.6.75a25-27, because the ‘what it is’ or the definition of one of the extremes is the middle term in demonstration; therefore one of the premises does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition, and yet the premise is a self-evidently known principle; the conclusion, however, is not self-evidently known but is demonstrated. Therefore as to the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, the concept of the definition is different from the thing defined, because if the concept of the definition and of the thing defined were the same, there would, in the most potent demonstration, be a begging of the question; again, there would then only there be two terms, which is false.

This is proved, second, as follows, through Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a26-b3, that names bear to the definition what the whole does to the parts, that is, that a confused name is known prior to the definition; and a name introduces confusedly what a definition introduces distinctly, because a definition divides a thing into its elements; therefore the concept of a quiddity, as it is introduced by the name confusedly, is naturally known before the concept of it as introduced distinctly by the definition is known, and so it is another concept and another extreme term.³ – From this further: since a proposition is self-evidently known that gets evident truth from its own terms, and other terms are concepts of the quiddity distinctly (as imported by the definition) and concepts of the quiddity confusedly (as imported by the name), it follows that a proposition will not be self-evidently known of a quiddity confusedly taken, a quiddity which is only known if the same be conceived distinctly through a definition.

There is also proof of this conclusion because otherwise any other proposition, which is necessary and per se in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37] (as this proposition: ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is a body’, up to ‘[man is a] substance’), would be self-evidently known; for if the idea of each extreme is assigned by the ideas of the distinctly conceived extremes, it appears manifestly that one extreme includes the other. Similarly, otherwise any proposition would be self-evidently known in the special sciences that the metaphysician could possess as self-evidently known from the definitions of the extremes, which is not true, because the geometer does not use any principles as self-evidently known save those that have evident truth from terms confusedly conceived, to wit by conceiving line confusedly; but it is evident that a line is length without breadth when not yet distinctly conceiving, in the way considered by the metaphysician, what genus line pertains to. But the other propositions that the metaphysician could conceive, to wit that line is a quantity and one of this sort -- such propositions are not possessed by the geometer as self-evidently known.

This is clear, third, because the demonstration of some predicate about a defined thing stands well with the predicate being self-evidently known of the definition.⁴

Therefore all and only those propositions are self-evidently known that, from terms conceived as they are the terms of the proposition, have or are of a nature to have the evident truth of the combined proposition.⁵

From this is plain that one is to distinguish between a self-evidently known and a self-evidently knowable proposition, because they are the same; for a proposition is not called self-evidently known because it is self-evidently known by some intellect (for then, if no intellect actually knew it, no proposition would be self-evidently known), but a proposition is said to be self-evidently known because, as far as concerns the nature of the terms, it is of a nature to have the evident truth contained in the terms also in any intellect that conceives the terms. But if some intellect not conceive the terms, and so not conceive the proposition, the proposition is, as far as concerns itself, no less self-evidently known; and it is in this ways that we speak of things self-evidently known.

From this is also plain that there is no distinction between the self-evidently known in itself and to nature and to us, because whatever is in itself self-evidently known, though not actually known, is yet as far as concerns the terms evidently true and known to any intellect, provided the terms are known.^{6 7}

Nor is the distinction valid that some propositions are self-evidently known in the first order and some in the second, because any propositions self-evidently known, when the proper terms are conceived in the way they are the terms, possess evident truth in their own order.

From these points I say to the question that that proposition is self-evidently known which conjoins these extremes: existence and the divine essence as it is this, or God and his proper existence, in which way God sees that essence and existence under the most proper idea by which it is in God, in which way neither existence nor essence are understood by us now but by God himself and by the blessed; because the proposition has from its terms evident truth for the intellect, for the proposition is not per se in the second mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a37-b5], as if the predicate be outside the idea of the subject, but is per se in the first mode [n.19] and is immediately evident from the terms, for it is the most immediate proposition, to which are resolved all assertions of anything about God however he is conceived. Therefore this proposition ‘God exists’ or ‘this essence exists’ is self-evidently known, because the extremes are of a nature to make this proposition evident to anyone who perfectly apprehends the extremes of this proposition, because existence belongs to nothing more perfectly than to this essence. By thus understanding, therefore, by the name of ‘God’ something that we do not perfectly know nor conceive as this divine essence, is ‘God exists’ thus self-evidently known.

But if it be inquired whether existence is present in any concept which we conceive of God, so that the sort of proposition in which existence is asserted of such a concept is self-evidently known, for example as about a proposition whose extreme terms can be conceived by us, that is, can in our intellect be a concept said of God, but not one common to him and creatures, namely necessary existence or infinite being or supreme good, and of such a concept we can predicate existence in the way it is conceived by us, – I say that no such proposition is self-evidently known, for three reasons:

First, because any such proposition is a demonstrable conclusion, and a ‘conclusion-why’. Proof: whatever first and immediately belongs to something can be demonstrated of whatever is in it⁸ by a ‘demonstration-why’ through what it first belongs to as through a middle term.⁹ An example: if the triangle first have three angles equal to two right angles, it can be demonstrated of whatever is contained in triangle that it has three angles etc. by a ‘demonstration-why’ through the middle term which is ‘triangle’, to wit that some figure would have three [angles equal to…] etc., also about any kind of triangle that it has three angles etc., although not first. But existence belongs first to this essence as this in the way the divine essence is seen by the blessed; therefore of anything in this essence that can be conceived by us, whether it be as something superior or as a property, existence can be demonstrated through this essence, as through a middle term by a ‘demonstration-why’, just as by this proposition ‘a triangle has three etc.’ there is a demonstration that some figure has three etc.; and consequently it is not self-evidently known from the terms, because then there would be no ‘demonstration-why’.¹⁰

Second in this way: a self-evidently known proposition is self-evidently known to any intellect from known terms. But this proposition ‘there is an infinite being’ is not evident to our intellect from the terms; proof: for we do not conceive the terms before we believe the proposition or know it by demonstration, and in that prior stage it is not evident to us; for we hold it from the terms with certitude only by faith or demonstration.

Third, because nothing about a concept that is not simply simple is self-evidently known unless it be self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but no concept that we have of God which is proper to him and does not belong to creatures is simply simple, or at any rate no concept that we distinctly conceive to be proper to God is simply simple;¹¹ therefore nothing is self-evidently known about such a concept unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but this is not self-evidently known, because the union of these parts is something demonstrated, by the two [earlier] reasons [nn.27-28].

The major is manifest from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.29.1024b31-32, because an account in itself false is false about everything; therefore no account is true of anything unless it is in itself true. Therefore in order for it to be known that something is true of some account, or for the account to be true about something, one must know that it is in itself true; but no account is in itself true unless the parts of the account are united. And just as one must know as regard quidditative predications that the parts of the account can be united quidditatively, to wit that one formally contain the other, so one must know as regard the truth of a proposition asserting existence that the parts of the account of the subject or of the predicate are actually united. An example: just as the proposition ‘irrational man is an animal’ is not self-evidently known when speaking of quidditative predication, because the subject includes something in itself false, for it includes a proposition that includes contradictories in itself, so this proposition ‘man is white’ is not self-evidently known if it not be self-evidently known that man and white are actually per se conjoined; because if they not be conjoined in actual existence, this proposition is true ‘nothing is a white man’, and consequently its converse will be true ‘no white man is’; therefore its contradictory is false ‘a white man is’.

Proof of the minor: whatever concept we conceive, whether of good or of true, if it is not contracted by something so that it is not a concept simply simple, is not a concept proper to God. Now I call a concept simply simple which is not resolvable into other simple concepts any one of which might in a simple act be distinctly conceived.

From this last reason [sc. the third, nn.29-31] a response to the [following] instances is clear, when the argument is made ‘this is self-evidently known, necessary existence exists’ (proof, because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if it does not exist, it is not ‘necessary existence’), ‘this too is self-evidently known, God exists’, because, according to every exposition posited by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9, ‘God’ is named from actual operation, that is, from warming or burning or seeing,¹² therefore, according to every acceptation [of the term], ‘God exists’ is the same as ‘what is actually operating exists’, which seems self-evidently known, because, as before, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.¹³

For this reason I reply to these points [n.32] in another way, that none of these propositions, ‘necessary existence exists’ or ‘what is actually operating exists’, is self-evidently known, because it is not self-evidently known that the parts that are in the subject are actually united. When it is said that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’ [n.32], I say that it does not follow from this that the proposition is self-evidently known unless the repugnance is evident, and unless it is evident also along with this that each extreme has a simply simple concept or that the concepts of the parts are simply united.¹⁴