Ordinatio

About the second distinction I inquire first about what pertains to the unity of God, and first¹ whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite.² That there is not is argued as follows: If one contrary were actually infinite, there would be nothing in nature contrary to it; therefore if there were some good actually infinite, there would be nothing of evil in the universe.

The response is made that the major is true of contraries formally; but nothing evil is formally contrary to God.

On the contrary: whether it is formally or virtually contrary, if it is infinite, it suffers nothing contrary to its effect, because it will, on account of its infinite virtue, destroy everything incompossible with its effect. The major is true, then, of a contrary virtually as of one formally. An example: if the sun were infinitely hot virtually, it would leave nothing cold in the universe, just as if it were infinitely hot formally.

Again, an infinite body allows of no other body along with it, therefore neither does an infinite being allow of any other being along with it. Proof of the consequence, first because, just as dimension opposes dimension, so actuality seems to oppose actuality; second because, just as a body different from the infinite would produce along with it something greater than the infinite, so a being other than the infinite seems to produce something greater than the infinite.

Further, what is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere is finite with respect to ‘where’, and what is now in such a way that it is not at another time, is finite with respect to ‘when’, and thus with each category. What does this thing in such a way that it does not do another is finite as to action, therefore what is a this something in such a way that it is not something else is finite in entity; God is supremely a this, because he is of himself singularity; therefore he is not infinite.

Again, from Physics 8.10.266a24-b6, if there were an infinite virtue, it would move in non-time; no virtue can move in non-time, because if it did motion would exist in an instant; therefore no virtue is infinite.

On the contrary: In the same place of the Physics [266a10-24, b6-20, 7b17-26] the Philosopher proves that the first mover is of infinite power because it moves with an infinite motion. But this conclusion cannot be understood only of infinity of duration, because he proves, on account of its infinity of power, that it cannot exist in magnitude; but it is not repugnant to magnitude, in his view, that there is a power in it infinite in duration, the way he would posit about the heaven.

Again Psalm 47.2: “Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised.”

Again Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9: “He is a sea, etc.”