Ordinatio

[Against article 1] – Against the first article I argue. First as follows: Augustine in Retractions 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4 says that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act.

From this, two conclusions: first, therefore the act of the will is more in the power of the will than any other act; second, therefore that act is in the power of the will not only mediately but immediately. From the first conclusion further as follows: the act of the intellect about the end is in the power of the will; therefore the act of the will is too. From the second conclusion there comes further as follows: therefore if an act of the will is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of some other power, much more is it immediately in the power of the will; but to will or not to will the end by the mediation of an act of the intellect is in the power of the will; therefore this is immediately in the power of the will. The minor is plain, because it is in the power of the will to turn the intellect away from consideration of the end, which when done, the will will not will the end, because it cannot have an act about something unknown. Response: it is supremely in its power because it is immediately in its freedom; everything else is in its power by the mediation of some volition, even what is not free but is not in possibility of contradiction.

There is a confirmation of this reason, namely the first against the opinion [nn.91-92], and it can be the second reason, because what, when not impeded, is compelled to act, of necessity removes, if it can, what prohibits its action; therefore if the will when not impeded is necessitated of its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes, if it can do so, everything prohibiting the volition; but what prohibits this volition is non-consideration of the end, and this the will can remove by making the intellect stand in consideration of the end; therefore the will of necessity will make the intellect stand in consideration of the end. – The major of this argument is plain, because that which of itself is necessitated to act will never be prohibited except by something repugnant to it that overcomes its active virtue, as is apparent about a heavy object; for a heavy object is prevented from falling because of something repugnant to it that overcomes its [downward] inclination, and, by parity of reasoning, the heavy object removes, if it can, what is prohibiting it, and once that thing is removed it descends unimpeded, because the heavy object removes what is repugnant to its effect as necessarily as it brings about the effect which that thing is repugnant to.¹

If objection be made to this reason [n.93] by saying that the will does not simply necessarily enjoy the end but with a conditioned necessity, namely that the end be shown to it, and if the major be said to be true of something acting simply necessarily, I reply: this is not a solution, because things that can be impeded do not act simply necessarily but only with conditioned necessity, namely if they not be impeded, and in these cases the major is true; therefore what is taken in the major is not ‘whatever necessarily acts necessarily removes, if it can, what prevents it’ but: ‘whatever is not impeded necessarily acts’, etc. [n.93], where a specification is made in the major about conditioned necessity.

If it be objected in another way that the major [n.93] is true of those things that have a like necessity with respect to what is principally intended and with respect to things that are necessary for that of which there are agents merely natural, which agents throughout the whole process up to the ultimate thing intended act merely of natural necessity – but the will in another way regards the end in which all goodness exists, and for that reason necessarily, and regards otherwise any other being in which there is a defect of good, and therefore regards anything else contingently – on the contrary: it is impossible for an extreme to regard another extreme with any necessity and not to regard with as much necessity any middle necessarily required between those extremes, otherwise a necessary thing would depend necessarily on a non-necessary thing; therefore the will tends to the end with the necessity with which it necessarily tends to the showing of the end, without which it is impossible for it to tend to the end.²

If, thirdly, an objection be made to the minor [n.93], that non-consideration does not properly prohibit the will from enjoying, it can be argued otherwise as follows: whatever necessarily rests in something present to itself, necessarily holds it present to itself if it has it and can; the will for you necessarily rests in the end presented; therefore it necessarily holds it once presented so that it might always be present to itself. – The major is proved by induction: if a heavy object necessarily rests at the center, it necessarily makes itself present to the center if it can, and the center present to it, and necessarily holds onto that presence as much as it can. The thing is apparent in sensitive appetite: if it necessarily rests in a present delightful thing, it necessarily as much as it can keeps the sense in that sensible object so that the object might be present to it to delight it. – The major is also proved by reason because³ the fact that something necessarily rests in something present is on account of the perfect agreement of the latter to the former; on account of the same agreement it seems equally necessarily to desire it to be conjoined to itself as much as possible; but this conjunction takes place in the presence of the latter to the former.⁴

A response is made in another way to the major of the first reason [n.93], that it is true of what is said properly to be impeded, namely that it is prohibited from acting because of something else that overcomes its active virtue; it is not so here, but there is something else acting whose action is previous to the action of the will, and therefore the cessation of this something else is by extension said to prevent the will from willing, and about such the major is false. For although an agent that presupposes to its own action the action of another could move that other to act and, with that other acting first, would itself necessarily act by conditioned or concomitant necessity, yet it does not necessarily move that other to act first, because it does not simply necessarily act, just as that which is said properly to be impeded would simply necessarily act as much as depends on itself, but it only acts with conditioned necessity, namely once the previous action is in place; an example is about a power acting contingently, and yet once the act that generates the habit is in place, it acts with the necessity of concomitance.⁵

On the contrary: the necessity of acting only comes through something intrinsic to the active principle; the previous action is not something intrinsic to the active principle; therefore, with that circumscribed, there is a necessity of acting, and so absolute necessity. – And then as before: if there is a simple necessity for acting, then there is for doing that without which it cannot act, provided however this is in its power; but here it is; therefore etc. Confirmation: here the necessity is not of action to action, because one action is not the active idea with respect to another; therefore the necessity is on account of the inclination of the power to the action; therefore the power is also necessarily inclined to the required intermediates, because there is no necessary connection between the extremes unless there is also a necessary connection of all the intermediates required for the connection of the extremes.

Response to these and to the principal argument [n.93]: here the necessity is conditioned, namely on the presupposition of something else; and I concede that the necessity is through what is intrinsic to the principal agent and that it is for the intermediates as of extremes among themselves, but the whole is conditioned, namely with the showing of the object presupposed. On the contrary: an agent that can be impeded does not act simply necessarily but conditionally, ‘if it is not impeded’ [n.94], but yet it necessarily removes the impediment if it can; therefore so here. Nor is the first response valid about what is properly impeded, ‘the will is not properly impeded by non-understanding’ [n.97].⁶

[Again, propositions against article 1] g.⁷ Whatever⁸ power operates necessarily about the most perfect object, and not about something else, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.133].

n. Whatever power necessarily rests-operates about an object present to it, necessarily moves toward it when absent as much as it can; agreement is the common cause [n.96].

t. If a power principally necessarily acts-operates about an object present to it, in that power is the idea, as much as depends on itself, of always necessarily about it, either whenever it can or if it can [n.96].

m. If there is a necessity simply, or as much as depends on itself, of extreme to extreme, there will be a similar necessity of it to any simply necessary intermediate between them [n.95].

a. Whatever when not impeded necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can [n.93].

b. Whatever necessarily acts when a preceding action is in place, necessarily makes determination for that preceding action if it can [nn.97, 98].

c. A principal agent that necessarily acts whatever is placed in a secondary agent, is necessitated by an active principal principle [n.98].

d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object present to it, necessarily determines that it be present if it can [n.96].

e. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to knowledge of it if it can [n.96].

f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to the sole supremely most perfect object when apprehended, necessarily determines itself to apprehension of the object if it can [n.96].

g. Whatever power necessarily operates about the sole most perfect object, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.100].

Note,a g [nn.100, 110] appears to be truer among these: first because there seems generally to be the same reason for necessarily acting or operating as for necessarily continuing – if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can; next because of t above [n.102]; next because we see this by sense and understanding in sensitive appetite; next it seems most true in the will, because the will does not cease of itself to act about any object except by turning itself to some other object, either one more perfect or more agreeable, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which object prevents it operating about this [other] object at the same time; but the end is the most perfect, most agreeable object: to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined and in it does it most delight; the volition of it stands with the volition of anything else.⁹

From the proof of g. there follows f. [n.109], at any rate if one understands in the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ that being already posited it needs to be continued. If it be taken that ‘to apprehension of it’ must be posited if it has not been posited, in this way it does not follow from g. but is proved by the reason given above a a, “on the contrary: it is impossible for an extreme to regard…” [n.95]; but there is a necessity that the appetite tend to the object when it can, because it cannot save in the present; therefore in this way there is a necessity with respect to any intermediate when the proximate power is able. – Not so now e. [n.108]; it is more universal, because it does not specify the object as ‘most perfect’ nor as ‘only’ [n.109]; it is proved however as f. is, but above here, e—e. [n.96], it is not proved first except about a posited apprehension. To be set down are k. [n.96] and q. [footnote to n.96]; they are as it were a single proof. – d. [n.107] and b. [n.105] are very universal, hence let them be proved: a. [n.104] is sufficiently dealt with [nn.93-95, 97-99], and is improper; what is proper returns in b.; but b. and d. are proved from c. [n.106], along with the major ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme…’ [n.95]; the deduction is made here under ‘Confirmation for the reason…’ [footnote to n.93]. – Therefore g. stands; c. is disputed; k. and q. are probable.

Note the following four points as a gloss on the many things posited above [nn.94-112]: g. is well proved [n.111], and is a more evident way to a negative conclusion in the first article of the question [n.82]; g. can also be proved from c. here [n.106], and c is proved hereunder, namely on the appended sheet [n.98, first paragraph], at c c [nn.98-99]. – From m. here [n.103], major, and from c. here [n.106], made major [n.98, first clause], a. follows, b. follows, d. and e. and f. follow, each of which can serve as major for a negative conclusion of the first article. – From n. here [n.101] follows e., which is a more particular major than a. or b. or d. – g. entails that a willing and an understanding already posited are necessarily continued, two other reasons (the first from m. and c., the second from n. [n.112]) entail that what is not posited must necessarily be posited; the second entailment is more unacceptable but it less manifestly follows, the first contrariwise.

To the first way g. [nn.100, 110, 111], for the negative conclusion to the first article [n.82], which is about necessarily continuing the willing as much as the will can: Let the conclusion be conceded, nor does the will ever stop unless the intellect first at least in nature stop considering the end, etc.

And if it be argued that the will necessarily will continue that understanding as much as it can, by commanding it [n.93], – response: it does not follow, because the will does not necessarily will the understanding as it does will the end [n.95].

It is argued in another way: at least the will would never turn away from this understanding, because the will, when necessarily continuing dependently, does not by commanding destroy that on which it depends. Response: while the consideration of the end stands, and as a result the willing of it, something else is offered confusedly, the consideration of which is commanded by the will, and thus indirectly the will turns the intellect from consideration of the end; and for the ‘now’ for which it is averted the consideration first in nature ceases and next in nature the volition itself.

Against the first response [n.115]: the necessity that is of extreme to extreme is the same as to any necessary intermediate [n.103]. But here there is the reply on the preceding page above [n.95] that there is not the like relationship to any intermediate as there is to the end, and then it might be conceded that I can will this and not will that without which I cannot will this [n.95].

Against the other response [n.116]: the fourth proof of g. [n.111], because no other object is more perfect nor to which it is equally, or more necessarily, inclined as it is to this; a more perfect and necessary volition of what is both more perfect and more agreeable more impedes a volition when less such than conversely.

Again, a superior power inclines an inferior in a concordant way; therefore where it is more superior it more inclines.

Again, if an object is necessarily willed, then the willing of it is more determinately to be willed than any other willing; so also the understanding of it more than any other understanding. The proof of both consequences is because the will wills to will on acount of the object, and to understand on account of the willing.

Again, we experience that the will impels us to the understanding of the object to which the will is more prone.

Therefore it is conceded that it never turns [us] away from it [n.116] but only an occurrent phantasm does, which is not in the power of the will, Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3 ch.25 n.74. Here against the second response [n.116], also against the first [n.115]; it always continues as much as it can, but it cannot continue when another phantasm occurs whose movement is not subject to it. Confirmation: the separated intellect will always persist in consideration of the ultimate end and in the volition of it, although sometimes of something else; they do indeed stand well together [n.111].

On the contrary: we experience that the will as freely turns the understanding from consideration of the end to a different object as it does in the case of other objects.

Again, the intellect would, as much as depends on itself, always persist in consideration of the end, because the end is the maximally moving object; therefore if it sometimes cease, this will be by command of the will.

Response: if the end were the object that moves in itself or even in its proper species, it is true that it would maximally move. But now, according to some, it moves only in something else that is more of a nature to move toward itself in itself than to that. Or, for you, many phantasms together move it to the concept of a description of it as taken from common notions; therefore less than to other objects, for two reasons: first, because it is difficult to persist in consideration of a transcendent universal [Ord. 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 n.26], for a phantasm moves rather to the most specific species [Ord. 1 d.3 p.3 q.1 n.9], Augustine On the Trinity 8 ch.2 n.3: “When you begin to think what truth is, at once phantasms will present themselves to you;” second, because it is more difficult to use the many common notions at the same time for a description than to use individual ones separately.

Against this response: at any rate the separated intellect always considers these common notions at the same time; likewise, according to Henry [of Ghent] it has a proper concept of God.

Again, to the principal, for a negative conclusion of the first article [n.82]: The damned apprehend the ultimate end. If they necessarily will it, then they do so by the love or willing of friendship or of concupiscence. Not in the first way, for that enjoyment is supremely right; nor in the second way, because they apprehend it as impossible for them.

Again, if loving the end is necessarily elicited once practical understanding is in place, and yet there is there the supreme idea of right and merit by congruity: because every other act of the will is acceptable and laudable only by virtue of it, then there would stand with any merit whatever the fact that the will would necessarily follow practical understanding, – against Anselm On the Virginal Conception ch.4.

Again, in something necessitated to acting of itself or whenever it can act [n.102], there cannot be a habit; for thus there could be a habit in a stone, which is not simply necessitated to fall but as much as depends on itself [nn.93, and footnote]. Therefore in the will with respect to the end there can be no habit. There is a confirmation about acquired habit: because it is only generated by act, but then when the will acts it has a necessity to act in sensu diviso. The conclusion is conceded about acquired habit. – But this agrees with the Philosopher, that wisdom is the supreme habit [Ethics 6.7.1141a16-20, Metaphysics 1.2.983a6-7]. A proof that neither can there be a supernatural habit with respect to it, because it is not capable of another habit with respect to an act to which it is necessitated. Response: it is not necessitated to love now of the end in particular, nor of it when seen in the fatherland unless it be elevated. – The first is rejected as below against the second article [nn.134-135], the second as below against the third article [nn.136-140].

Against the reason [n.129] there is an objection, because it rejects a habit in the intellect. – It is conceded that the intellect as inclining has no habit but not the intellect as displaying.¹⁰

Again, a priori, every single power, as it has one first object, so also one mode with respect to the first object; therefore it has the same mode with respect to anything whatever in which its first object is per se included. Response: it has some one mode which is per se, but the ensuing modes can vary, which modes belong to the power in its acting from the idea of special objects; of this sort are ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’. – But the per se mode is ‘freely’ as this is contradistinguished from ‘naturally’; ‘freely’ however does not entail ‘contingently’.¹¹

Again, a priori, whatever any will wills necessarily if shown to it, this it simply necessarily wills; the thing is clear about the will of God, where infinity is as simply the idea of necessity as if the object be shown.

Again,¹² a power free by participation does not tend more to a perfect object than to any object; therefore neither a power free by essence; but there is no difference between the end that is willed and other things that are willed except on the part of the perfection of the object. The antecedent is plain, because sight, which is a free power by participation, namely insofar as its act is subject to the command of the will, does not more necessarily see a very beautiful thing than a less beautiful thing; therefore it is turned away from each equally and each it sees equally contingently. The response is that the major is true of the cognitive power but is not true of the appetitive power tending to the object apprehended by its cognitive power; for more necessarily does a very beautiful thing seen delight the seeing appetite than a less beautiful one does, and if the appetite could carry itself to that seen thing by an elicited act, it would more necessarily carry itself or be carried to a more beautiful thing seen than to a less beautiful one.

[Against article 2] – Against the second article [n.86].¹³ It seems that the reasons of the first article destroy the second article, because the reasoning that in the ultimate end there is not any defect of good nor any malice [n.85], seems to be conclusive with equal efficacy about the ultimate end apprehended in particular, or with more efficacy, because in the ultimate end in particular there is apprehended the whole idea of the end in general, nay it is also shown that in it alone can the perfection of the end in general exist, and thus no defect of good nor any malice either.

Likewise the second reason for the first member about participation [n.83] concludes more about the end apprehended in particular, for created goods, if they be good by participation, are more truly goods by participation in the ultimate end in particular than by participation in it in general; for they do not participate in it in general save because they participate in it in particular, since the participator has the participated for the cause or measure on which it essentially depends, and the dependence of a real being is only on a real being, and so on some singular.

[Against article 3] – Against the third article [n.87]. When an elicitive principle does not elicit necessarily, what has that principle does not necessarily act; nor does an elicitive principle, while being disposed in the same way, elicit necessarily now what before it was eliciting contingently, therefore neither will what has that principle necessarily act. But a will having the same charity that it has now was before eliciting contingently the act of enjoying, therefore it does not now necessarily elicit that act, since no change has been made on its part. This is plain in the rapture of Paul. If before he had a charity equal with that which he had during the rapture, there was no change on the part of his will nor on the part of the elicitive principle; therefore there was no necessity then for eliciting it more than before.¹⁴ At any rate there could have been an equal charity during the rapture and prior to it.

Or let the reason be formed in this way: the necessity of acting can only be through something intrinsic to the active principle; but, by the fact that the intellect now sees the object, there is nothing new intrinsic to the active principle in enjoyment; therefore not a new necessity of acting either. – Proof of the major: otherwise the necessity of acting would not be through the idea of the active principle, and so it would be by nothing or by something extrinsic; and if by something extrinsic, the acting would be through that, because the acting is through that through which is the necessity of acting. – The minor is plain: if vision in accord with this does not have the idea of active principle with respect to enjoyment, neither does the intellect nor anything in the intellect; also if vision in some other way has some idea of active principle, though not of the principal one but of the secondary one, then let the major be taken determined thus: ‘the necessity of acting is only through something intrinsic to the principal active principle’; for a secondary principle does not give necessity to a principal one, just as neither does it determine it to acting, but conversely the principal agent of itself uses the secondary one in its own way, so that if nothing in the principal one exclude contingency, the whole action will be contingent. The minor is thus plain, because through enjoyment nothing is intrinsic to the principal active principle; therefore etc.

Again, either the end moves to this act or the power does. If the end, it is plain there is no necessity, because the end moves necessarily to no created act. If the will moves,¹⁵ then I argue: the diverse proximity of the passive thing to the agent does not cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain of the hot with respect to heatable things that are more and less proximate; but the diverse presence of a known object, to wit seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the will of what the act of will should be about; therefore this does not diversify necessity and non-necessity, but only makes the act more or less intense.¹⁶

Again, what it says in this article, that it is altogether impossible for an act of vision to be without enjoyment [n.87], does not seem true, because any absolute distinct natures at all are so disposed that a prior nature can essentially exist without a later without contradiction; those acts ‘vision’ and ‘enjoyment’ are two absolute natures; therefore without contradiction can vision, which is naturally prior, exist without the later, namely enjoyment.

A response is that the major is true of those absolutes neither of which depends on the other nor both on a third; but in the proposed case both depend on a third, as on the causing and moving object. On the contrary: if they do not depend on a third necessarily causing both, nor necessarily causing one though it cause the other, the major will still be true, because the prior will without contradiction be able to exist without the later.¹⁷ But they do not depend on a third necessarily causing them both simply, it is clear, nor necessarily causing the later if it cause the prior, because any absolute thing¹⁸ that is able non-necessarily to cause immediately is able non-necessarily to cause through an intermediate cause that is also caused, because that intermediate caused cause does not necessitate it to causing the absolute effect of the intermediate cause; therefore if it not necessarily cause a later absolute, it does not necessarily cause it even when the prior cause is in place, if in any respect it be cause.

[Against article 4] – Against the fourth article [n.88] the argument goes: that by which someone can simply act is the power; therefore if the will is not able from its natural properties to have an act about a seen end but it can when it has charity, charity is either simply a power of volition about that object or a part of the power of volition, each of which is false.

Again, if a willable object less sufficiently proximate or made present to the will can sufficiently terminate an act of will, much more so if the same object is more perfectly proximate or made present to the will; therefore if some good obscurely apprehended can be willed by a will not elevated by a supernatural habit, much more so can the same object clearly seen be willed in some act by such a will. I therefore concede the conclusions of these reasons [nn.141-142].