Ordinatio

[Article 1] – About these four articles [n.82] it is said first, as to the first, that the will of necessity enjoys the ultimate end thus apprehended obscurely and in general. There is a triple proof: First by the remark at Physics 2.9.200a15-16: “As the principle is in speculative things, so the end is in doable things;” but the intellect of necessity assents to the first speculative principles; therefore the will of necessity assents to the ultimate end in things doable.

There is a second proof for the same thing, because the will necessarily wills that by participation in which it wills whatever it wills; but by participation in the ultimate end does it will whatever it wills; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is because it wills nothing else except insofar as it is a certain good; but every other good seems to be a certain participation in the ultimate end, which is the supreme good, as seems to be proved by Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.3 n.4: “Take away this good and that good,” etc., “and see the good itself if you can, the good of every good.”

Third, the same thing is proved in this way: the will cannot not will something unless in it there is some defect of good or some idea of evil; in the ultimate end apprehended in general there is not any defect of good or any idea of evil; therefore etc.¹

[Article 2] – As to the second article [n.82] it is said that, when the end is thus obscurely apprehended in particular, the will is able not to enjoy it; which can be proved because it can enjoy something which it knows to be incompossible with such end, as is clear of someone sinning mortally.

[Article 3] – As to the third article [n.82] it is said that the will necessarily enjoys the end thus seen because of the third reason to the first article [n.85], since no idea of evil is found in it, no defect too of good discovered in it, – and this if it see the end with practical vision, whatever may be true of speculative vision; and added here is that the connection, or the necessity of the connection, is so great that God by his absolute power cannot separate practical vision of him from enjoyment.

[Article 4] – As to the fourth article [n.82] it is said that it is impossible for a will not elevated by charity to enjoy the end even when seen, because acting presupposes being; therefore supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being; but a will of this sort does not have supernatural being, therefore it cannot have a supernatural act.

Again, it would then be possible for such a will to be blessed. The consequent is false, because then charity would not be necessary for beatitude of the will. The consequence is proved as follows, because to enjoy the end when seen in particular seems to be beatitude, or to include beatitude formally.

An argument is also given in another way thus: when vision is posited, enjoyment is necessarily posited, when it is not posited, enjoyment is taken away; therefore vision is the total cause of enjoyment; therefore it is simply nobler. Proof of the first consequence: otherwise is taken away all knowledge what the cause is whose ‘through’, the sine qua non, anything at all will act on itself. Proof of the second consequence, because a total equivocal cause is more perfect.